Why is Iraq struck every time the American-Iranian conflict escalates?
When great powers quarrel, the smaller pays the price. But Iraq is not small by nature -- it was made to remain small.
The arena and its function
In international conflict theory, there is a subtle distinction between the states that are parties to a conflict and the arenas in which it is conducted. The United States and Iran have been competing for influence in the Middle East since 1979. But this conflict has rarely taken the form of direct confrontation; instead, it has found its way to Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. Iraq among these arenas is the most interesting because it is the country in which Iran holds direct influence, and in which America also maintains a military presence and bases, and it produces oil tied to the global interests of both.
When American-Iranian tensions escalate, both powers search for ways to deliver messages without costly direct escalation. Iraq provides an ideal arena for these messages: Iran can strike American bases in Iraq through its affiliated factions. America can assassinate Iranian leadership on Iraqi soil -- as happened with Qasem Soleimani. The result: Iraq absorbs both strikes.
Soleimani's assassination took place on Iraqi soil without Iraqi permission. The Iranian response came by striking Iraqi bases. In both cases, no one asked Iraq: Do you consent? Because everyone knows Iraq does not say no.
The targeting mechanism
How exactly is Iraq struck in every escalation? The mechanism operates at multiple levels. First: striking infrastructure by pressuring the Iraqi government through sanctions mechanisms and indirect economic threats, forcing Baghdad to choose between its relationship with Washington or continued trade with Tehran. Second: armed operations targeting American forces in Iraq by Iran-aligned factions put Iraq in an embarrassing position -- either it takes a stance against these factions and faces Iranian pressure, or it stays silent and faces American pressure. Third: the conflict inflames Iraqi internal divisions, as Iraqi political forces are mobilized to support one party and others to support the other, converting the external conflict into an internal proxy war.
Why does Iraq not stop playing this role?
The harder question is: why does Iraq accept being an arena for conflict rather than refusing this role? The answer is multifaceted. First, institutional weakness makes the Iraqi government incapable of imposing its sovereignty even if it wanted to -- the Iran-affiliated factions do not in practice answer to the central authority. Second, the absence of a defined national strategy deprives the government of the argument and legitimacy needed to say 'no' to parties more powerful than itself. Third, the deep economic dependency on Iran in energy and trade makes any attempt at independence costly in the short term.
Is there a way out?
Yes, but it requires unprecedented political will. Exiting the arena role demands an Iraq that possesses independence in the energy sector to reduce its dependence on Iran; a national security institution capable of controlling informal armed activity; and an independent foreign policy that explicitly declares that Iraqi territory will not be an arena for the conflicts of others. The difference between this and the current situation is the difference between a state with genuine sovereignty and a state with nominal sovereignty. Iraq is currently in the second category.
Analytical conclusion
Iraq is struck in every American-Iranian conflict because both sides know it can be struck without paying the full price. This reality will not change unless an Iraq is built that possesses the capacity for deterrence or carries a price for being targeted that changes the calculus. Building this Iraq is the hardest challenge in its contemporary history, but it is not impossible -- it simply has never been seriously tried.
