Standards for Voting, Confidence, Appointments and Constitutional Decisions

1. Purpose of this document: a decision rule before the names are known

Major constitutional decisions differ from votes on ordinary provisions or day-to-day political positions. Some establish an entire executive authority; others give an individual sovereign powers, impose an international obligation on the state, permit exceptional powers in an emergency, or change the rules of the constitutional order itself. Personal impressions or political agreement alone are therefore insufficient.

I undertake to treat these decisions as decisions involving a constitutional trust: the Council of Representatives grants confidence, legitimacy, authorization or consent with effects extending beyond a short political cycle. Accordingly, the standard required must rise as a decision's impact increases, its effects last longer and reversing it becomes harder.

2. The constitutional limits of an MP's role

The Council of Representatives exercises powers established by the Constitution and laws in force, and an individual MP participates in exercising them under the Council's rules. A single MP cannot elect the President of the Republic, grant confidence to a government, appoint an ambassador, declare an emergency or approve a constitutional amendment. An MP has a vote; the right to research, request information available under the law and participate in debate; the use of legally authorized parliamentary instruments; the ability to build support within the Council; and a public commitment to explain their position.

3. Principles governing voting

4. General decision test — Decision Test

Before any major constitutional or sovereignty-related vote, I will subject the decision to the following tests. Passing one test does not make a decision adequate: some are disqualifying conditions, while others are criteria to be weighed.

5. Electing the President of the Republic

The Council of Representatives elects the President of the Republic under Article (70) of the Constitution and the applicable procedures and conditions. Given the sovereign character of the office and its role in the orderly functioning of the state and the process of designating the Prime Minister, I will not treat the vote as a symbolic distribution of offices.

Voting policy: If no candidate meets the minimum tests of integrity, legality and independence, I will not regard time pressure as sufficient reason to grant my vote. Where more than one candidate is constitutionally acceptable, preference will rest on institutional suitability, track record and the ability to protect the state's orderly functioning, rather than personal closeness or a parallel deal.

6. Forming the government and granting confidence

Article (76) of the Constitution governs designation and the formation of the Council of Ministers. In its binding decisions, the Federal Supreme Court has affirmed the interpretation of the concept of the 'largest parliamentary bloc'. When the cabinet and its programme reach the Council of Representatives, I will treat granting confidence as a foundational decision followed by continuous oversight and accountability, rather than an open-ended mandate.

6.1 Testing the Prime Minister and the ministerial programme

6.2 Voting on ministers individually

I will assess each minister as a candidate for a specific responsibility, rather than merely part of an overall deal. The review will cover suitable qualifications, leadership experience, administrative record, integrity, conflicts of interest, understanding of the ministry's sector, ability to manage public money and willingness to submit to parliamentary oversight.

7. Assessing ministers, interpellation and withdrawal of confidence

Withdrawal of confidence is neither an instrument of partisan punishment nor the automatic consequence of any political disagreement. It is a constitutional procedure with a direct effect on executive stability and must rest on a serious evidentiary record and proper procedures. Equally, considerations of stability must not become immunity from accountability where serious failure, a breach of integrity, misleading the Council or repeated inability to perform the role has been established.

I am inclined to oppose withdrawal of confidence where the case rests on political antagonism alone, incomplete evidence, matters outside the official's remit or limited shortcomings that a lesser measure can correct.

I am inclined to support it where serious facts are established, such as a clear breach of integrity, misleading the Council of Representatives on a material issue, an ongoing constitutional or legal violation, serious and repeated administrative failure without a corrective plan, or abuse of power warranting termination of political responsibility. The decision remains subject to the procedures, deadlines and majority prescribed by the Constitution and law.

8. Senior appointments and nominations within the Council of Representatives' remit

The Council of Representatives does not have the right to approve every senior state office. I will therefore deal only with offices for which the Constitution or applicable law gives the Council a role in approval or decision-making. Constitutional examples include approving the Supreme Judicial Council's nominations for the President and members of the Federal Court of Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Head of the Judicial Oversight Commission; and approving the Council of Ministers' nominations of ambassadors and special-grade officials, as well as the Army Chief of Staff and deputies, officers at division commander rank and above, and the head of the intelligence service.

8.1 Minimum candidate file before voting

Policy on voting for lists: If a group of names is presented as a single package without information enabling each candidate to be assessed, I will request separate assessment or completion of the file where procedurally possible. Passing a suitable candidate is no justification for passing an unqualified one in the same package.

9. International treaties and agreements

The Constitution provides that ratification of international treaties and agreements is to be regulated by law; the Treaty Conclusion Law No. (35) of 2015 was enacted. For me, ratification is not a formality: it is the point at which executive negotiations become a state obligation within the constitutional and legal framework.

Where an agreement has major financial, security or sovereignty implications, I will press for a hearing or specialist report before the vote, rather than reducing consideration to the agreement's title and the government's memorandum.

10. Emergencies, war and peace

The Constitution establishes special procedures for declaring war and a state of emergency, including a special majority and a joint request from the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, with a defined duration for the emergency and oversight of exceptional powers. These are among the most consequential forms of authorization because they permit extraordinary measures in extraordinary circumstances.

10.1 Necessity test

1. Is there a real and specific threat that ordinary legal instruments cannot address effectively?
2. Is the proposed situation's geographic, temporal and substantive scope limited to what is necessary?
3. Precisely which powers are requested, who will exercise them, and what limits apply?
4. What is the impact on rights and freedoms, citizens' movement, the media and the economy?
5. What mechanisms provide parliamentary and judicial oversight and periodic reporting?
6. Is there a clear exit plan ending exceptional measures as soon as they are no longer necessary?

10.2 Decisions concerning war

For any war-related decision constitutionally within the Council of Representatives' remit, I will request an assessment of legal and security necessity, specific objectives, the chain of command, resources, realistic human and financial costs, diplomatic alternatives, rules for protecting civilians and criteria for ending the mission. 'Showing resolve' cannot replace a defined objective that the state can achieve and measure.

11. Constitutional amendments

Amending the Constitution is not ordinary legislation. The Constitution establishes special routes and conditions for amendment, and the Federal Supreme Court has addressed the relationship between Articles (126) and (142). The first test of an amendment initiative is therefore not only its political substance, but also the correct constitutional route available when it is introduced.

My position in principle: I do not support amending the Constitution to resolve a temporary political crisis that legislation or proper application of an existing provision can address. Amendment is justified where the problem is structural and after studying its impact on the constitutional order as a whole.

12. Laws concerning sovereignty and independent institutions

Some legislation is not formally labelled a 'sovereign law' but concerns the core of the state: regulation of the armed forces, security and intelligence; judicial independence; elections; oversight institutions; nationality; sovereign resources; borders; strategic data; or the balance of powers. I will apply a higher standard of scrutiny to these laws commensurate with their impact.

12.1 Institutional independence

Where a decision concerns an independent body or an oversight, electoral or judicial institution, I will look for three risks: political domination, conflicts of interest and weakening of oversight instruments. Institutional independence does not mean absence of accountability; it means accountability under the law and by the competent authority, without turning supervision into day-to-day management or party control.

12.2 Dismissal and accountability

Where the Constitution or law grants the Council of Representatives a power concerning the accountability or dismissal of an official in an independent institution, I will examine that institution's governing provision, the procedure preceding the decision, the official's right to respond, the established facts and the required majority. I will not apply one rule indiscriminately to all bodies, because the source of the power may differ between institutions.

13. General amnesty when proposed in legislation

A general amnesty is a legislative decision with a direct impact on justice, victims, prisons and society. I do not approach it as a slogan of 'tolerance' or 'toughness', but as a question of balancing the correction of injustice or the handling of exceptional circumstances against protecting rights and preventing impunity for crimes that call for stronger safeguards.

14. Matters requiring a special majority

A special majority is not a procedural detail; it is a constitutional safeguard because certain decisions require a broader consensus than the ordinary majority. I will treat the required quorum and majority as part of the decision's legitimacy itself.

15. Policy on abstention, conflicts of interest and insufficient information

15.1 Abstention is not permanent neutrality

I will use abstention in limited, justified circumstances, rather than as a means of avoiding responsibility. On issues requiring a clear choice where I can form a responsible judgment, I will vote for or against and explain why.

15.2 When might I abstain?

• A material personal conflict of interest that calls my participation into question, with disclosure and compliance with the applicable rules.
• Essential information remains unavailable despite requests, where the rules permit abstention and postponement is unavailable or not preferable.
• A specific procedural situation in which voting for or against would imply a substantive position, while the actual objection concerns the validity of the procedure, with this explained publicly.

15.3 When will I not use insufficient information as an excuse?

Where documents were available and I failed to read them or prepare. An MP's responsibility is to acquire a reasonable level of knowledge before the sitting, rather than discovering the file when voting begins.

15.4 Conflicts of interest

If I, my family, a business partner or an entity with which I am affiliated have a direct and particular interest in a decision, I will disclose the conflict to the extent required and permitted by law and follow the applicable rules on recusal or abstention. I will not use information acquired in my parliamentary capacity for private benefit.

16. Explaining votes and publication

On major decisions, it is not enough for the record merely to show that an MP voted 'yes' or 'no'. I will therefore connect the voting record to a concise explanation grounded in the standards above.

I will publish the explanation in a public register maintained by my parliamentary office, linking it to the voting record whenever official data are available. If full publication is impossible for legal or security reasons, I will explain why details cannot be disclosed, rather than invoking confidentiality as a general, unverifiable formula.

17. Ali Zuweid's accountable commitments

18. Monitoring indicators

These indicators do not mechanically measure the 'quality of political opinion', but reveal the extent of compliance with the transparency and discipline declared in this document.

19. Relationship to the legislative package and Iraq Vision 2045

This document does not rewrite the proposals in the legislative package and political programme, nor does it provide a government implementation plan. Its function is to establish how I will decide and vote when major constitutional and sovereignty-related decisions are put before the Council of Representatives.

As for Iraq Vision 2045, it is a long-term strategic implementation framework for the state. Its objectives can inform assessment of whether a government programme or sovereign decision aligns with the long-term national interest. As an MP, however, I distinguish voting and oversight from managing ministries and implementing projects.