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POL-01

This is a proposal for discussion, not an enacted law.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Proposed legislation · State, Constitution, Justice, Rights and Governance

Federation Council and Bicameral Federal Legislature Bill

A legislative framework to complete the constitutional structure of the federal legislature, represent regions and governorates not incorporated into a region, and regulate legislative review and mediation between the Council of Representatives and the Federation Council, without diminishing the powers expressly assigned by the Constitution to the Council of Representatives.

Document number
POL-01
Version
1.0
Publication / last updated
5 October 2026
Jurisdiction
Republic of Iraq
Document type
Proposed legislation
Principal constitutional basis
Articles 48, 65 and 137 of the Constitution

Executive Summary

This bill completes the second chamber of the federal legislature, which the Constitution provides for but which has yet to become operational as an institution. Its design rests on two inseparable principles: the Federation Council must be a genuine institution of federal representation, rather than a symbolic advisory body; and the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution on the Council of Representatives—particularly the enactment of federal laws, approval of the budget and political oversight of the government—must remain within their constitutional boundaries.

The bill proposes stable representation of regions and governorates through direct elections: three members for each governorate not incorporated into a region, and representation for each region equal to three times the number of its constituent governorates. Under this formula, a governorate's transition from the status of a “governorate not incorporated into a region” to membership of a new region changes the form of its delegation, rather than its original numerical weight, thus neither rewarding nor penalising the choice to form regions.

In the legislative process, the Federation Council reviews every federal law after its adoption by the Council of Representatives and before its transmission to the President of the Republic. It may approve the law, propose amendments or lodge a reasoned objection within specified short periods. Its objection to general legislation remains suspensive and may be overridden by the Council of Representatives, while federal-balance legislation is subject to mandatory joint mediation where an objection meets the enhanced threshold. As for the budget, treaty ratification, war, states of emergency and oversight leading to withdrawal of confidence, the final constitutional powers remain where the Constitution places them, with the Federation Council receiving an informational and advisory role relating to the interests of regions and governorates.

The bill also provides guarantees of openness and recorded voting, limits on financial benefits, a conflict-of-interest code, public participation, a professional secretariat and shared use of resources during the establishment phase. It further sets out transitional provisions to ensure that establishing the Council neither interrupts the work of the Council of Representatives nor automatically reopens laws already in force.

II — Proposed Legislative Policy

The institutional choices governing the bill
IssueChosen optionRationale
Nature of representationRepresentation of federal units through direct electionGives the Council independent democratic legitimacy and prevents membership from becoming an automatic extension of local executive authorities.
Numerical weight3 for each governorate not incorporated into a region; 3 × the number of constituent governorates for each regionMaintains a fixed regional/governorate weight when regions are formed and avoids turning the Council into a population-based replica of the Council of Representatives.
Ex officio membershipNo ex officio membership for Presidents of the Republic, heads of government, heads of the judiciary or former officeholdersThe Council represents federal units; it is not a personal council of elders. Ex officio membership weakens the link to regional representation.
General legislationMandatory review and an overridable suspensive objectionGives the Council a substantive function without usurping the express constitutional power of the Council of Representatives to enact federal laws.
Federal-balance legislationEnhanced review and joint mediation before an overrideThese laws affect the core reason for establishing the Federation Council and therefore warrant a stronger procedural safeguard than general legislation.
BudgetA reasoned, non-blocking federal opinionArticle (62) places the budget process in the Council of Representatives. The voice of federal units is added without obstructing the constitutional power.
Political oversightHearings, information and reports; no withdrawal of confidenceProtects the Council's federal function without duplicating the system of political accountability entrusted by the Constitution to the Council of Representatives.
Administration and costFunctional independence, with shared services and resources during establishmentBalances the Council's independence against the risk of an oversized new bureaucracy.

The essence of the bill is “asymmetric bicameralism”: the two Councils participate in lawmaking but do not have identical functions. The Council of Representatives represents the Iraqi people as a whole and retains its express constitutional powers. The Federation Council represents the regional and governorate dimension, adding an institutional federal review of every law, with stronger tools when a bill affects the balance of powers and resources between levels of government.

IV — Statement of Reasons

This Law is enacted to implement Articles (48) and (65) of the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq; complete the bicameral composition of the federal legislature; ensure the representation of regions and governorates not incorporated into a region in the federal legislative process; achieve a practical balance between the unity of the federal state and the rights of its constitutional units; regulate legislative review, mediation between the two Councils and oversight of the effects of federal legislation on levels of government; and preserve the powers expressly assigned by the Constitution to the Council of Representatives and other authorities.

V — Explanatory Memorandum

1. Why a substantive Federation Council rather than an advisory body?

The Constitution describes the Federation Council as a “legislative council” and establishes a federal legislature comprising two chambers. It is therefore insufficient for its function to consist of general recommendations detached from the legislative process. At the same time, a law may not rewrite the Constitution or remove powers expressly granted to the Council of Representatives. The proposed approach is to involve the Federation Council in every legislative process after the Council of Representatives' vote and before promulgation, with a suspensive objection for general legislation and a stronger mediation pathway for legislation affecting the substance of federalism.

2. Representation: why this numerical formula?

The Council of Representatives represents the population on a national basis, so the Federation Council should not repeat the same population-based logic. The chosen formula gives each governorate not incorporated into a region a fixed weight, while treating a region as a constitutional unit represented by a single delegation whose size equals the original weight of its constituent governorates. If a new region is formed from two governorates, six seats move from two governorate delegations to one regional delegation of six members, without creating a numerical reward or penalty for choosing to form a region.

This design differs from a model that gives equal numbers to each region and each governorate, since equating a multi-governorate region with a single governorate may produce a severe imbalance. It also differs from population-based allocation, which would make the second chamber a smaller copy of the first.

3. Direct election and independent legitimacy

Direct election was chosen so that a Federation Council member would not become a delegate removable by a regional government or governorate council, and so that political accountability would remain to the voters of the represented unit. This is coupled with a clear prohibition on combining membership with executive, judicial or security offices, together with conflict-of-interest rules, transparency and recorded voting.

4. Limits on the power of objection

Article (61/First) assigns enactment of federal laws to the Council of Representatives, while Article (65) empowers the Federation Council law to regulate the latter's powers. To reconcile the two provisions, the bill does not give the Federation Council a final veto over general legislation. It may temporarily halt the process and require the Council of Representatives to reconsider, but a final decision remains possible for the Council of Representatives by a specified majority of its entire membership. For federal-balance legislation, a joint mediation committee must meet before an override. This adds a strong procedural safeguard without transferring final legislative authority outside the constitutional framework.

5. Protecting the budget from obstruction

The budget is the area most closely connected to the distribution of resources between the centre and federal units, but it is also directly governed by Article (62) and linked to the continuity of the state. The bill therefore gives the Council the right to receive data early and issue a public opinion on the fairness of transfers and unfunded obligations. It nevertheless sets a short time limit and expressly states that the opinion shall not delay budget approval once that period has expired.

6. Federal oversight rather than duplicated government oversight

Giving the Federation Council powers of questioning and withdrawal of confidence would create a second centre of political accountability for the government that could conflict with the constitutional structure. The bill therefore focuses on specialised oversight: the effects of federal laws, financial transfers, unfunded obligations, coordination between levels of government, recurring disputes and implementation of decentralisation. The Council may request information, hold hearings and publish reports, but it cannot remove a minister or government.

7. Legislative initiatives

The Constitution specifies the bodies entitled to introduce draft laws and legislative proposals. The bill therefore does not create a parallel route for the Federation Council that could conflict with Article (60). Instead, it permits the Council to adopt a “federal legislative initiative” and refer it to the Council of Representatives as a text and memorandum. It then passes through the competent constitutional body within the Council of Representatives or the government. This gives the Council a genuine capacity to generate legislative ideas without claiming a power not expressly granted by the Constitution.

8. Preventing the Council from becoming an oversized administrative apparatus

Independence does not mean duplicating every department of the Council of Representatives. The bill therefore requires shared services in the early years, prohibits permanent buildings or large staffing establishments before needs are assessed, and subjects expenditure to the Board of Supreme Audit's oversight. This matters because the actual cost depends on staff numbers, the electoral system, premises, the level of digitalisation and the scale of committees. These variables do not permit a responsible financial figure before an official estimate is prepared.

9. The Council's relationship with the Federal Supreme Court

The Council is neither a constitutional court nor a dispute adjudication body. The mediation it facilitates between levels of government is non-binding and does not prevent judicial recourse. If a disagreement concerns the constitutionality of a law or interpretation of a provision, determination remains with the competent constitutional judicial authority. This separation is necessary to avoid politicising the judiciary or turning the Federation Council into a supraconstitutional arbitration body.

VI — Alignment with Existing Legislation

Amendments required when the Federation Council begins work
Legislation / instrumentRequired alignmentPriority
Council of Representatives and its Formations Law No. 13 of 2018Coordinate the transmission of laws, joint offices and document exchange, and avoid institutional descriptions that effectively assume a unicameral legislature.High
Council of Representatives Rules of Procedure No. 1 of 2022, as amendedAdd chapters on referral to the Federation Council, reconsideration following an objection, formation of the mediation committee and calculation of time limits.High
Independent High Electoral Commission Law No. 31 of 2019, as amendedAdd the administration of Federation Council elections to the express procedural powers where necessary.High
Election Law No. 12 of 2018, as amendedAlign voter registration, appeals, campaigning, finance and electoral offences with Council elections insofar as they are not directly regulated by this Law.High
Rules for preparing government billsAdd a “federal impact statement” for bills affecting the powers or finances of federal units.Medium
Legislative publication and archiving systemsShow the referral date, the Federation Council's position and the mediation report in the published legislative record.Medium

Establishing the Council should not be used to abolish existing structures that are compatible with it. The purpose is to amend only the procedural interfaces, while retaining expertise and shared services wherever they are more efficient.

VII — Transitional Provisions and Financial and Implementation Implications

Transitional pathway

  1. The Council of Representatives issues the decision required by Article (137), by the constitutionally prescribed majority, before enacting the law, in accordance with the Federal Supreme Court's interpretation.
  2. The law itself is adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Council of Representatives.
  3. The Commission begins electoral preparations within 90 days, alongside completion of the temporary structure and shared services.
  4. The first elections are held no later than 270 days after entry into force.
  5. Bicameral review begins from the first sitting and applies to laws voted on by the Council of Representatives after that date.
  6. The Council of Representatives' rules and law, and the electoral rules, are aligned within 180 days of the first sitting.

Financial implications

The Council entails real expenditure: regular elections, members' remuneration, a legislative secretariat, digital systems, committees, security and premises. However, fixing a total figure at this stage would create false precision because the cost of premises, the proportion of infrastructure shared with the Council of Representatives and staffing levels have not yet been settled. The bill therefore adopts a binding costing method rather than an assumed figure.

The official estimate consists of: (a) the cost of the first and subsequent elections, calculated by the Commission; (b) one-off establishment costs, including equipment, digital systems and temporary premises; (c) annual operating costs, including members, staff, committees and services; (d) savings from resources shared with the Council of Representatives and federal bodies; and (e) the opportunity cost of any new building or additional staffing. The Board of Supreme Audit shall review the estimation method before capital expansions are approved.

Feasibility of implementation

The main implementation challenge is not creating a new chamber, but establishing a timetable protocol that prevents conflicting deadlines and legislative obstruction. The bill therefore requires electronic, time-stamped referral, sets short deadlines, treats expiry of the period for general legislation as consent to proceed, and limits mandatory mediation to legislation directly affecting the federal balance.

VIII — Relevant Comparative Legislation

The bill does not assume that a foreign model should be copied unchanged. Comparison is used here to identify institutional tools that can be adapted to the Iraqi constitutional text.

Selected lessons from federal models
ModelMechanismRelevance for IraqWhat was not adopted
Germany — BundesratState representation in legislation; referral of laws from the Bundestag to the Bundesrat; a mediation committee; an overridable objection for some laws and mandatory consent for categories affecting state interests.Mandatory review, mediation and varying the strength of the second chamber according to a law's impact on the constituent units.Membership drawn from state governments and a unified vote for each state. The Iraqi bill instead uses direct election and individual voting, with a geographical support test for certain decisions.
South Africa — National Council of ProvincesA delegation for each province, a special procedure for legislation affecting provinces, and a mediation committee in the event of disagreement.Classifying legislation by its provincial impact and linking the second chamber's procedural strength to the nature of the law.A system of delegation mandates and voting as a single unit; this does not suit the proposed Iraqi design of directly elected membership.
Iraq — ConstitutionA legislative council representing regions and governorates not incorporated into a region, with broad delegation to legislation to regulate its composition and powers.The possibility of designing asymmetric bicameralism that accommodates Iraq's circumstances while remaining within constitutional powers.An absolute veto or transfer of express powers from the Council of Representatives may not be imported without constitutional amendment.

IX — Sources and References

A. Iraqi Constitution, judiciary and legislation

  1. Iraqi Council of Representatives — Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, particularly Articles 47–65 and 137.
  2. Federal Supreme Court — Decision 72/Federal/2012 on the constitutional pathway preceding enactment of the Federation Council law.
  3. Ministry of Justice — Iraqi Gazette, issue 4499, containing the Council of Representatives and its Formations Law No. (13) of 2018.
  4. Iraqi Council of Representatives — Rules of Procedure, with due regard to Rules of Procedure No. (1) of 2022, as amended.
  5. Ministry of Justice — Iraqi Gazette, issue 4569, containing the Independent High Electoral Commission Law No. (31) of 2019.
  6. Ministry of Justice — Iraqi Gazette, issue 4752, containing the First Amendment to the Commission Law, No. (34) of 2023.
  7. Ministry of Justice — Iraqi Gazette, issue 4718, containing Law No. (4) of 2023, the Third Amendment to Election Law No. (12) of 2018.

B. Recent parliamentary developments

  1. Iraqi Council of Representatives, 21 August 2026 — Deputy Speaker's statement on the absence of the Federation Council and the gap in the legislative structure.
  2. National Iraqi News Agency, 7 September 2026 — Discussion of the Federation Council law among priority fundamental laws.
  3. Iraqi Council of Representatives — Research Department, catalogue entry “Observations on the Draft Federation Council Law”, 17 August 2025.

C. Official comparative legislation

  1. Federal Republic of Germany — Basic Law, Articles 50–53 and 77–78.
  2. German Bundesrat — official legislative procedure information.
  3. Republic of South Africa — Constitution, Chapter 4, sections 60–76.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · POL-01 · Version 1.0 · 5 October 2026

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