Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Accession and National Implementation Package · State, Constitution, Justice, Rights and Governance

Accession to OPCAT and Establishment of the National Preventive Mechanism Bill

Preventive legislation linking Iraq's accession to OPCAT with an independent national system of unannounced visits to all places of deprivation of liberty, full access to persons and records, confidential interviews, prohibition of reprisals and mandatory dialogue on recommendations.

Prepared by: Ali Zuweid

Document number: POL-20
Version: 1.0
Publication / last updated: 6 October 2026
Scope: Republic of Iraq

Executive Summary

Iraq has been a party to the United Nations Convention against Torture since 7 July 2011, but as of 6 October 2026 is not a party to its Optional Protocol, OPCAT. The Protocol differs from complaint systems and investigation after violations occur: regular, independent and unannounced visits to all places where persons are deprived of liberty, conducted by the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and a permanent national mechanism, identify and correct risk factors before torture or ill-treatment occurs.

The document recommends accession without the postponement declaration under Article 24. To avoid accession before readiness, deposit of the instrument is conditional on an operational mechanism, an independent budget and legal coverage of all places of deprivation of liberty, including those under Kurdistan Region authorities.

Rather than creating a parallel body, the package designates the High Commission for Human Rights as the federal component's institutional basis, drawing on its constitutional independence and existing right to visit detention facilities without prior permission. Within it, a preventive directorate shall have functional and financial independence from complaints and investigation units. A corresponding Kurdistan Region component shall operate within the Region's Independent Commission for Human Rights under regional legislation ensuring the same OPCAT powers.

The package addresses the practical conflict recorded by the Committee against Torture in 2022 between the Commission's unannounced-visit right and an Inmates and Detainees Rehabilitation Law provision making certain oversight visits dependent on an agreed appointment. It expressly provides that mechanism and Commission visits within their mandates require no prior approval or agreement, and detainee interviews shall be confidential without detaining officials present.

Iraq's Legal Status and OPCAT

Iraq acceded to the Convention against Torture on 7 July 2011. It does not appear among parties or signatories to the Optional Protocol, adopted on 18 December 2002 and internationally effective since 22 June 2006, as of this document's preparation. The United Nations treaty register, updated in October 2026, listed 96 states parties.

The Protocol enters into force for an acceding state thirty days after deposit. It prohibits reservations but allows, upon ratification or accession, a declaration postponing Part Three or Four obligations for up to three years under its conditions. This document does not recommend postponement: it establishes the national mechanism through the same legislation and delays international deposit until basic readiness is complete.

In its 2022 concluding observations, the Committee against Torture asked Iraq to ensure unannounced High Commission for Human Rights visits, noted conflict between prior-agreement requirements for certain detention visits and the Commission's mandate, and recommended considering OPCAT ratification. In 2026, the Council of Representatives was still completing formation of a new board of commissioners, a matter to resolve as part of pre-deposit readiness.

The Problem Accession Addresses

Iraq already has prison and detention visitors: the High Commission for Human Rights, Public Prosecution, oversight and administrative bodies, and international organizations within their mandates. These visits do not automatically constitute an OPCAT mechanism. The crucial difference is a stable legal system guaranteeing independence of programme, budget and staff; access to all official and unofficial places of deprivation of liberty; full information access; choice of interviewees; private interviews; and sustained dialogue with authorities on recommendations.

Prevention does not await a complaint. A facility may lack written complaints because people are isolated, afraid or unaware how to complain. The mechanism therefore examines the detention system itself: registration, detention, isolation, questioning, force, health care, deaths, physical environment, legal safeguards, institutional culture and vulnerable groups' exposure to risk.

Institutional Choice for the National Mechanism

Option	Assessment	Legislative Choice
Create an entirely new independent body	Offers clear formal independence but duplicates institutions, offices and resources and overlaps with the human rights commission.	Not preferred.
Treat the entire Commission as the preventive mechanism without special regulation	Economical, but insufficient to ensure independence of preventive work, information confidentiality, budget and specialized methodology.	Insufficient.
A specialized, functionally independent mechanism within the Commission	Uses existing constitutional independence, infrastructure and expertise while separating preventive budget, programme, data and leadership.	Adopted option.
One federal component for all Iraqi institutions without a regional arrangement	Creates practical and constitutional problems in facilities under regional authorities.	Replaced by a multi-component system.

This choice is consistent with OPCAT, which leaves states free to choose the mechanism's form, provided effective independence, resources, multidisciplinary expertise and full access are secured. It also draws on the High Commission for Human Rights' independent national status and existing detention-visit mandate, and the Kurdistan Region's Independent Commission for Human Rights established by Regional Law No. 4 of 2010.

Federal and Regional Design

Iraq's Protocol obligations cover all places under its jurisdiction and control. No geographic area or security institution may be excluded because of internal allocation of powers. Federal arrangements and Kurdistan Region powers must also be respected. The package therefore adopts a “multi-component mechanism”: a federal component within the High Commission for Human Rights and a regional component within the Region's Independent Commission, with methodological coordination and national reports but no central chief controlling the regional component.

Federal facilities within the Region remain within the federal component's remit; regional facilities fall to the regional component. Mixed or disputed sites must not become oversight gaps: the Law permits an immediate joint visit, with institutional jurisdiction resolved later.

Optional Protocol Accession Bill

In the name of the people

Pursuant to the Constitution and Treaty-Making Law No. (35) of 2015, and to strengthen prevention of torture and ill-treatment in all places of deprivation of liberty, the following Law is enacted:

Article (1) — Accession

The Republic of Iraq shall accede to the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted in New York on 18 December 2002 and deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General, according to the official text annexed to this Law.

Article (2) — No Reservations

Accession shall be without reservations, as required by the Protocol. Iraq shall not deposit a declaration postponing obligations concerning the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture or national preventive mechanism, provided this Law's readiness requirements are completed before deposit.

Article (3) — National Mechanism

The national system established under Part Two of this Law is the national preventive mechanism for Protocol purposes. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall notify the United Nations Secretary-General and Subcommittee of its particulars, composition and contact points through prescribed international procedures.

Article (4) — National Readiness Condition

The accession instrument shall not be deposited until essential implementing instructions, an independent financial allocation, professional federal-component leadership and an effective legal arrangement giving the same core powers over detention facilities under Kurdistan Region authorities are verified.

Article (5) — Deposit and International Entry into Force

After constitutional and statutory procedures are completed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall deposit the instrument with the United Nations Secretary-General. Under the Protocol, it enters into force for Iraq on the thirtieth day after deposit.

Article (6) — International Cooperation

All public authorities and bodies shall facilitate the Subcommittee's work and Protocol powers, including access to places of deprivation of liberty, information and private interviews. Reprisals for contact with it are prohibited.

Article (7) — Publication

This Law and the Protocol's official text shall be published in the Official Gazette under the Treaty-Making Law. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall announce its international entry-into-force date for Iraq.

Statement of reasons: To complement Iraq's Convention against Torture obligations; establish regular national and international independent preventive visits to places of deprivation of liberty; and provide a sustainable mechanism for early risk detection and prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, this Law is enacted.

National Mechanism for Prevention of Torture and Ill-Treatment Bill

In the name of the people

Pursuant to the Constitution, implementing the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, and ensuring independent, permanent preventive oversight of all places of deprivation of liberty, the following Law is enacted:

Chapter One — General Provisions and Preventive Principles

Article (1) — Title

This Part shall be called the “National Mechanism for Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Law”.

Article (2) — Objective

This Law establishes a permanent national system of independent preventive visits to all places where persons are or may be deprived of liberty, identifying risk factors before they become torture or ill-treatment and strengthening legal, physical and institutional safeguards for human dignity.

Article (3) — Nature of the Mandate

The mechanism is preventive, not a criminal or disciplinary investigator, court or judgment-review body. It need not await a complaint or alleged violation, and does not prevent other judicial or oversight authorities from exercising their powers.

Article (4) — Prohibition of Torture

Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are absolutely prohibited. War, terrorism, emergency, superior orders, investigative or security needs or any exceptional circumstance cannot justify them.

Article (5) — Comprehensive Prevention

Prevention covers laws, procedures, practices, detention conditions, training, registers, health care, outside contact, complaint investigation, institutional culture and every factor increasing or reducing torture or ill-treatment risks.

Article (6) — Cooperation Principle

The mechanism shall work independently through preventive dialogue. Cooperation does not limit unannounced visits, publication, referral, criticism or requests for urgent action.

Article (7) — Non-Discrimination

The mechanism shall act without discrimination based on sex, gender, origin, ethnicity, religion, sect, language, disability, age, legal status, opinion, affiliation, nationality or any other status.

Article (8) — Best Interests of Groups Most at Risk

Particular attention shall be given to children, women, persons with disabilities or mental disorders, older persons, foreign nationals, stateless persons, asylum seekers, trafficking victims, minorities and those facing isolation or reprisals.

Article (9) — Definitions

“Mechanism” means this Law's national preventive system; “federal component”, the independent prevention directorate within the High Commission for Human Rights; “regional component”, the corresponding Kurdistan Region body; and “deprivation of liberty”, any situation where a person cannot freely leave a place because of an order, measure or practice by a public authority or at its instigation, with its consent or acquiescence.

Article (10) — Reference Standards

The mechanism shall be guided by the Constitution, Iraqi laws in force, the Convention against Torture, OPCAT and relevant international standards. No international standard may be interpreted to reduce constitutional or national-law protection.

Chapter Two — National Mechanism Composition and Federal and Regional Coverage

Article (11) — Multi-Component System

The national preventive mechanism comprises federal and Kurdistan Region components, together constituting one national system for Protocol purposes. Each retains operational independence over facilities under its respective level of government.

Article (12) — Federal Component

The High Commission for Human Rights is designated the federal component's host institution. A “National Preventive Mechanism Directorate” shall be established within it, functionally and financially independent of other complaint, monitoring and investigation departments.

Article (13) — No Parallel Body

This Law creates no new independent constitutional body. Existing Commission administration shall be used only insofar as it preserves functional independence, information confidentiality and freedom of visit programming.

Article (14) — Regional Component

A preventive component shall be established or reorganized within the Kurdistan Region's Independent Commission for Human Rights under regional law, with at least the powers, independence, resources and anti-reprisal protection prescribed by this Law and the Protocol.

Article (15) — Federal Facilities in the Region

The federal component covers facilities under federal authority even within the Kurdistan Region. Joint visits may occur where actual authority overlaps or is disputed.

Article (16) — Regional Facilities

The regional component covers facilities under Kurdistan Region authorities. The federal component may join visits at its request, under a joint national plan, or where necessary for an international obligation and coordinated according to law.

Article (17) — Preventive Coordination Council

A national preventive coordination council shall comprise both component heads and their professional representatives. Its remit is limited to methodology, national data, training, Subcommittee cooperation and the annual national report. It may not cancel visits, alter findings or direct members of another component.

Article (18) — Unified National Report

An annual national report shall compile federal and regional findings, trends and recommendations, identifying each finding's source. Each component may simultaneously publish independent reports.

Article (19) — Entire Territory Coverage

Every person deprived of liberty anywhere in Iraq shall fall within an independent preventive body's Protocol powers. Jurisdictional disputes or facility affiliation may not create oversight gaps.

Article (20) — Resolving Disputes

Operational disagreements shall be resolved through direct coordination within forty-eight hours. If unresolved and ill-treatment risk is serious, an immediate joint visit shall proceed, leaving institutional jurisdiction to subsequent constitutional and legal resolution.

Chapter Three — Independence, Governance and Leadership

Article (21) — Functional Independence

The mechanism shall determine its programme, visits, interviews, reports, recommendations and international contacts without orders or approval from government, Parliament, the host Commission or any body managing a place of deprivation of liberty.

Article (22) — Financial Independence

The federal component shall receive a distinct, independent allocation within the Commission's budget, which it may administer lawfully. Funding may not be reduced or withheld to influence a visit, report or recommendation.

Article (23) — Federal Component Head

A special-grade executive director titled “Head of the Federal Preventive Mechanism” shall lead the component, selected through public competition based on experience in human rights, justice, medicine, forensic medicine, detention management or relevant preventive fields.

Article (24) — Selection Committee

An independent seven-member committee shall comprise a retired judge of recognized integrity, a Bar Association representative, a forensic doctor, a human rights academic, a Medical Association representative, a disability expert and a civil society representative experienced in detention facilities. None may currently work for a security or correctional body.

Article (25) — Head's Term

The federal head serves five years, renewable only once. Early removal requires permanent incapacity or serious misconduct established through fair procedure and a reasoned, judicially appealable decision.

Article (26) — Independence Requirements

No person who held political, security or intelligence leadership or directly managed a prison, detention centre or closed institution during the previous three years may be appointed until that period has elapsed and conflicts are eliminated under a published assessment.

Article (27) — Professional Advisory Council

A professional advisory council shall include law, medicine, psychiatry, forensic medicine, nursing, social work, psychology, disability, children, gender, prison management and security expertise. It provides technical advice without power over visit programming.

Article (28) — Diversity and Balance

Recruitment and selection shall consider gender balance, ethnic, religious, linguistic and geographic diversity, and disability representation so visiting teams can communicate with and understand different groups.

Article (29) — Prohibition of External Instructions

Instructions, directions or correspondence intended to prevent visits, interviews or publication or alter findings are void. The mechanism head shall record interference attempts in a special register and may publish serious instances.

Article (30) — Disclosure of Interests

The mechanism's head, members and experts shall disclose interests and relationships affecting impartiality and refrain from visits or assessments involving actual or apparent conflicts.

Chapter Four — Personnel, Expertise and Professional Immunities

Article (31) — Multidisciplinary Teams

Visiting teams shall combine legal professionals, doctors, mental-health and forensic experts, social workers, child and disability specialists and others appropriate to facility type and risks.

Article (32) — Engagement of Experts

The mechanism may engage independent national or international experts temporarily, subject to confidentiality and conflicts rules and protected during assignments.

Article (33) — Medical Expertise

Permanent staff shall include sufficient doctors and health professionals. Visits examining care, torture effects, isolation, physical restraint or mental health shall include a doctor or health specialist.

Article (34) — Interpretation and Accessibility

The mechanism shall provide language and sign-language interpreters and accessible alternative communication. Detaining officials shall not interpret private interviews except in an emergency with the person's consent.

Article (35) — Staff Functional Independence

Staff may not be transferred, downgraded, dismissed or disciplined because of professional findings, good-faith reports or refusal of instructions impairing visit independence.

Article (36) — Professional Immunity

Mechanism members incur no civil or disciplinary liability for good-faith opinions, recommendations or reports issued in their duties. Immunity does not cover corruption, forgery, intentional confidentiality breaches or abuse of power.

Article (37) — Protection of Working Materials

During lawful visits, members' bags and devices may not be searched, notes seized or data copied except by judicial order concerning an offence independent of their mandate and without exposing protected confidential information.

Article (38) — Training

Staff shall receive initial and continuing training in torture prevention, safe interviewing, forensic medicine, the Istanbul Protocol, mental health, children, disability, sexual violence, risk management and data protection.

Article (39) — Occupational Safety

The mechanism shall protect teams against health and security risks and psychological stress. Safety requirements may not be used to deny access to any part of a place of deprivation of liberty.

Chapter Five — Places of Deprivation of Liberty and Visit Scope

Article (40) — Broad Definition of Place

A place of deprivation of liberty includes any public or private location where a person is or may be unable to leave freely because of public authority, its orders, instigation, consent or acquiescence, whether officially acknowledged or not.

Article (41) — Prisons and Detention

The mandate covers correctional prisons, detention and investigation centres, police stations, court holding cells, crime, narcotics and counter-terrorism centres, and all pretrial or post-trial detention facilities.

Article (42) — Security and Military Bodies

The mandate covers detention, holding and questioning facilities of the Ministries of Interior and Defence, Iraqi National Intelligence Service, National Security Service, Counter-Terrorism Service, Popular Mobilization Authority and any security, military or other formation legally empowered to deprive liberty.

Article (43) — Juveniles

The mandate covers observation homes, correctional schools, juvenile police centres and any institution holding a child by judicial or administrative order or under circumstances preventing departure.

Article (44) — Migration, Asylum and Borders

The mandate covers detention of foreign nationals, asylum seekers and persons facing removal; borders, airports, entry points, holding and deportation areas; and any place of detention for entry, residence or removal reasons.

Article (45) — Health and Care

The mandate covers mental-health, addiction-treatment and social-care hospitals and institutions, shelters and other facilities where persons are not practically free to leave, are involuntarily placed or held by authority's order.

Article (46) — Transport and Guarding

The mandate covers vehicles, aircraft, vessels, waiting rooms and temporary points used to transport or guard persons deprived of liberty.

Article (47) — Unofficial Facilities

On reliable information that people may be held at an unregistered or legally undesignated location, the mechanism may enter immediately to verify. The controlling body's denial that it is a detention site does not justify refusal.

Article (48) — Private Facilities

The mandate covers facilities managed by private companies, organizations or contractors where deprivation of liberty rests on public authority's decision, delegation, consent or acquiescence.

Article (49) — Effective Control

Actual control or ability to prevent departure determines jurisdiction. Formal arrangements or transfer of management may not remove a facility from oversight.

Chapter Six — Access and Information-Gathering Powers

Article (50) — Right of Entry

The mechanism may enter any facility within its remit at any suitable day or night time, announced or unannounced, without prior permission, judicial warrant or agreed appointment.

Article (51) — Unannounced Visits

Advance notice is not required. Limited safety or logistical coordination is permitted only where it does not compromise surprise or enable concealment of persons or evidence.

Article (52) — All Facilities

Access covers every building, wing, cell, questioning and isolation room, health-care area, kitchen, store, yard, visiting area, sanitary facility, relevant staff area and other part of the premises.

Article (53) — Detainee Lists

The mechanism may access total detainee numbers, names, locations, grounds, admission, transfer and release dates, and ordering authorities, respecting confidentiality.

Article (54) — Records and Documents

The mechanism may inspect arrest, detention, questioning, transfer, isolation, force, restraint, complaint, disciplinary sanction, death, injury, visit, communications, health-care and other records necessary for prevention.

Article (55) — Electronic Systems

Access includes databases, electronic systems and access and modification logs needed to verify detention times, movements and procedures. Verifiable copies may be requested.

Article (56) — Video Surveillance

The mechanism may inspect and obtain relevant surveillance footage where necessary to assess a risk or incident. Recordings may not be deleted after preservation is requested.

Article (57) — Copying and Documentation

The mechanism may copy documents, photograph, measure, draw plans and technically document conditions unless this reveals a non-consenting person's identity or information unrelated to the mandate.

Article (58) — Medical Access

Individual health files may be inspected as necessary with the person's consent. Anonymized or statistical health data may be examined without individual consent for system assessment.

Article (59) — Food, Water and Medicine

The mechanism may examine samples and records concerning food, water, medicine, hygiene, ventilation, lighting, temperature, space and care, using independent laboratories when needed.

Article (60) — Selecting Persons

The mechanism freely selects interviewees and files. Detaining authorities may not impose lists or bar interviews because of administrative status or security classification.

Article (61) — Immediate Access

Access shall begin upon presentation of identification or a general mission order. Waiting may last only for a specific immediate safety procedure; any delay and reason shall be documented.

Chapter Seven — Private Interviews and Preventive Examination

Article (62) — Confidential Interviews

The mechanism may interview privately and without witnesses any person deprived of liberty or anyone it considers able to provide relevant information.

Article (63) — Choice of Location

The mechanism shall choose a location preventing the detaining body from overhearing, observing or recording. A room with operating recording equipment requires express consent from the person and mechanism.

Article (64) — Consent

No one may be compelled to meet or answer the mechanism. Purpose, confidentiality and the right to end the interview at any time shall be explained.

Article (65) — Interpretation

Interpretation shall be independent and confidential. The interpreter's or specialist's gender shall be considered where sexual violence or cultural or personal considerations require.

Article (66) — Medical Examination

The mechanism's doctor may independently examine a consenting person in private, recording findings under medical and ethical standards and the Istanbul Protocol where torture or ill-treatment is suspected.

Article (67) — Children

Children shall be interviewed through age-appropriate methods respecting best interests and avoiding repeated harm. Institutional staff need not attend; an independent support person may participate if the child wishes and it is safe.

Article (68) — Persons with Disabilities

Reasonable accommodation and alternative communication shall be provided. A guardian or staff member is not required unless requested or genuinely necessary for protection unavailable through less restrictive means.

Article (69) — Women and Sexual Violence

Female teams shall be provided where needed. Sexual-violence disclosures shall be handled confidentially and sensitively to trauma. Identity may not be referred elsewhere without consent except under this Law's imminent-risk provisions.

Article (70) — Staff

The mechanism may privately interview personnel, guards, administrators, doctors and contractors. Punishment or adverse assessment merely for cooperation is prohibited.

Article (71) — Follow-Up after Interviews

The mechanism shall monitor interviewees' safety where reprisals are a risk, including follow-up visits, confidential contact or urgent protection requests.

Chapter Eight — Confidentiality and Data and Information Protection

Article (72) — Source Confidentiality

The mechanism shall not disclose a confidential informant's identity or identifying details without free and informed consent.

Article (73) — Preventive Information Privilege

Administrative or security bodies may not compel disclosure of private interview notes or sources. Judicial disclosure requires consent or the narrowest exception to avert imminent, grave danger to life after protective measures are taken.

Article (74) — Personal Information

Personal data shall not be published without express consent. Public reports shall use aggregate or anonymized data where identification is unnecessary.

Article (75) — Information Security

Files shall be held in an independent secure system with encryption, access controls, audit logs and backups. Confidential notes shall not be stored on systems managed by detaining bodies or executive government.

Article (76) — Retention Periods

The mechanism shall determine retention according to preventive necessity and reprisal risk. Unnecessary data shall be irrecoverably destroyed.

Article (77) — Images and Recordings

Images or recordings identifying persons deprived of liberty shall not be published without consent. They may be retained confidentially for preventive documentation or lawful referral.

Article (78) — Data Sharing

Data may be shared only as necessary for a lawful purpose with equivalent confidentiality safeguards. A central government database automatically receiving interview data is prohibited.

Article (79) — Institutional Transparency

Confidentiality does not cover methodology, budget, general plans, reports or recommendations unless publication creates a specific personal risk or reveals future unannounced-visit arrangements.

Chapter Nine — Visit Programme and Methodology

Article (80) — Visit Plan

The mechanism shall prepare an annual plan within a multi-year framework covering all facility types, using risk assessment considering numbers, complaints, isolation, secrecy, vulnerable groups, oversight gaps and controlling authority.

Article (81) — No Veto over the Plan

Lists of facilities and unannounced-visit dates shall not be submitted to any body for approval or prior coordination.

Article (82) — Visit Types

The mechanism shall conduct periodic, comprehensive, follow-up, thematic, urgent and unannounced visits. No type replaces regular repetition.

Article (83) — Visit Frequency

Frequency shall reflect risk, facility size, violation history and institutional changes. High-risk facilities may not remain unvisited for years.

Article (84) — Night Visits

Night visits are permitted where night conditions, shifts, transport, investigation or isolation bear on ill-treatment risk.

Article (85) — Sampling

The mechanism may professionally sample files, wings or persons, documenting its selection rationale without disclosing it where surprise would be compromised.

Article (86) — Safeguards Assessment

Visits shall assess registration, rights notification, access to counsel, doctors and family, judicial appearance, detention duration, appeal, isolation, complaints and reprisal protection.

Article (87) — Conditions Assessment

Review shall cover space, ventilation, lighting, hygiene, water, food, health, sleep, activities, education, outside contact, privacy, separation of groups, force and restraints.

Article (88) — Medical Methodology

The mechanism shall review health-service independence, medical confidentiality, admission examinations, injury documentation, treatment referral and doctors' non-participation in punishment or questioning.

Article (89) — Closing the Visit

The team may hold a professional closing meeting with facility management on urgent risks and preliminary observations. This is neither a condition of publication nor a means of altering findings.

Chapter Ten — Reports, Recommendations and Preventive Dialogue

Article (90) — Visit Report

After each visit, the mechanism shall report methodology, findings, risks, positive practices, recommendations, priorities, implementing authorities and proposed timescales.

Article (91) — Fact Verification

Draft factual findings may be sent to the relevant body for up to fifteen working days to correct factual errors. That body may not alter assessments or delete recommendations.

Article (92) — Publication of Visit Reports

The mechanism may publish full reports or summaries when it considers appropriate, balancing effective dialogue, public interest, reprisal risk and personal confidentiality.

Article (93) — Urgent Recommendations

Where imminent danger to life or safety, serious risk of torture or disappearance, or unlawful detention exists, an urgent recommendation shall specify action and timing. The body must respond within seven days or immediately according to risk.

Article (94) — Response to Recommendations

Competent bodies shall examine recommendations, enter dialogue and provide written, reasoned responses within sixty days, stating completed and planned action and reasons for refusal.

Article (95) — Implementation Plan

The mechanism may agree implementation plans with deadlines and indicators without waiving publication or follow-up visits.

Article (96) — Following Recommendations

Visits, correspondence and data shall track recommendations, classified as implemented, partly implemented, in progress, unimplemented or superseded by changed circumstances.

Article (97) — Referral to Parliament

Failure to respond or persistent serious risks or legislative defects may prompt a special report to the Council of Representatives and competent regional legislature, without exposing confidential sources.

Article (98) — Annual Report

The mechanism shall publish an annual report submitted to the Council of Representatives, relevant authorities and the Subcommittee. The state shall publish and disseminate it under the Protocol.

Article (99) — Legislative Recommendations

The mechanism may comment and propose changes to legislation, bills, regulations and instructions affecting deprivation of liberty or torture and ill-treatment risks.

Chapter Eleven — Prevention of Reprisals and Protection of Cooperating Persons

Article (100) — Absolute Prohibition of Reprisals

No authority, official, employee or contractor may order, impose, permit or tolerate punishment, threats, harassment, transfer, isolation, deprivation or other harm against persons or organizations for contacting or providing information to the mechanism or Subcommittee, whether information is later substantiated or not, provided the contact was not a separate offence.

Article (101) — Presumption of Suspicion

Where an unusual adverse measure closely follows a private interview, the body shall demonstrate a lawful, independent basis. The mechanism may treat it as a risk pending verification.

Article (102) — Immediate Measures

The mechanism may request temporary suspension of transfer, isolation, discipline or direct contact with a specified official where serious reprisal risk exists. Measures affecting judicial powers shall be presented to the competent judge.

Article (103) — Reporting Reprisals

A continuing confidential channel shall receive post-visit reprisal reports, accessible to detainees without monitoring by the detaining body.

Article (104) — Staff Protection

Protection extends to staff, doctors, interpreters, guards, contractors, family members and anyone providing information or assistance in good faith.

Article (105) — No Punitive Use of Information

Statements to the mechanism may not ground disciplinary or administrative proceedings against their maker unless that person elects formal submission to a competent body after understanding consequences.

Article (106) — Confidential Reprisal Investigations

When suspected reprisals are referred for investigation, source identity shall be protected as far as possible, using alternative evidence before contemplating disclosure.

Article (107) — Post-Referral Follow-Up

The mechanism shall continue monitoring safety until risk ends. Referral to prosecutors or courts does not terminate preventive responsibility.

Chapter Twelve — Referrals, Serious Risks and Relationship with Investigations

Article (108) — Separation of Prevention and Investigation

The mechanism shall neither criminally investigate torture allegations nor gather evidence for conviction. These remain the investigating judge's, Public Prosecution's and investigative bodies' lawful functions.

Article (109) — Suspected Torture

On reasonable indicators of torture or serious ill-treatment during a visit, the mechanism shall explain referral, protection and medical-examination options and document risk preventively.

Article (110) — Consensual Referral

Victim-identifying information shall be referred to the competent judicial authority with free and informed consent and protection requests where needed.

Article (111) — Imminent Risk

Where non-referral creates a specific imminent threat to life or serious personal safety, the mechanism may take the least identity-revealing action necessary to avert it, documenting necessity.

Article (112) — Anonymized Information

Trends or anonymized information on recurring patterns or dangerous facilities may be referred without exposing sources. Competent authorities shall assess the need for independent investigation.

Article (113) — Evidence Preservation

The mechanism may request preservation of recordings, records, locations or physical traces pending judicial attendance. This does not authorize seizure or questioning of suspects.

Article (114) — Death in Custody

On learning of a suspicious custodial death, the mechanism may immediately visit, review safeguards and conditions, and request evidence preservation and independent forensic examination alongside judicial investigation.

Article (115) — Unregistered Detention

On finding someone deprived of liberty without a record or apparent lawful basis, the mechanism shall immediately notify prosecutors and the competent judge, requesting confirmation of location and identity, prevention of secret transfer and urgent lawful action.

Article (116) — No Obstruction of Investigation

The mechanism shall coordinate with courts to avoid compromising evidence or investigations. Conversely, investigative secrecy may not prevent verification of treatment or detention conditions.

Article (117) — Victim Support

The mechanism shall provide information on legal, medical and psychological aid and available complaints and compensation, without becoming the person's litigation representative.

Chapter Thirteen — Relationship with the Commission, Public Prosecution and Oversight Bodies

Article (118) — General Commission Functions

The High Commission retains statutory powers over complaints, monitoring, preliminary investigation, litigation and visits. These functions shall be organizationally separated from confidential preventive files.

Article (119) — No Automatic File Transfer

Confidential mechanism information shall not automatically pass to the Commission's complaints units. Source consent or imminent risk under this Law is required.

Article (120) — Public Prosecution

The Public Prosecution continues lawful visits and oversight of detention legality and enforcement. Independent prevention complements rather than replaces its role.

Article (121) — Judiciary

Visits do not affect judicial powers over arrest, detention and release orders. The mechanism may offer general systemic observations on detention patterns, delays and safeguards.

Article (122) — Ministry of Justice

The Ministry remains responsible for its correctional institutions and shall enable full access. Administrative responsibility confers no prior-approval power over visits.

Article (123) — Ministry of Interior and Security Bodies

The Ministry of Interior and all security, intelligence and military bodies shall appoint round-the-clock logistical contacts to facilitate immediate entry, without authority to withhold covered places, persons or information.

Article (124) — Parliamentary Oversight

Parliamentary committees may use reports and hold executive bodies accountable for implementation. They may not demand confidential sources or direct the visit programme.

Article (125) — Civil Society

The mechanism shall consult periodically with civil society, bar and medical associations, disability organizations, academia and detainees' families. It may not delegate legal responsibility to a body lacking independence.

Article (126) — International Committee and International Organizations

The mechanism does not affect visitation powers of the International Committee of the Red Cross, United Nations mission or internationally authorized bodies under laws or agreements. Sharing methods and non-confidential information to avoid duplication is encouraged.

Article (127) — Conflicting Rules

Where an administrative restriction or facility rule conflicts with entry, interview or information rights, this Law prevails as the later special provision on torture prevention.

Chapter Fourteen — Cooperation with the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture

Article (128) — Direct Contact

The mechanism may communicate directly and confidentially with the Subcommittee and provide information, reports and recommendations without government permission.

Article (129) — Subcommittee Visits

Authorities shall enable Protocol-covered visits, information and personal access and private interviews, without making them subject to detaining-body approval.

Article (130) — Diplomatic Contact Point

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall handle diplomatic and organizational UN communications on Subcommittee visits, without reviewing its chosen facilities or interviewees.

Article (131) — Logistical Support

Each relevant federal and regional body shall designate a contact to facilitate entry, transport and general permits, assisting rather than monitoring visits.

Article (132) — Protection of Cooperating Persons

This Law's anti-reprisal protection applies to everyone contacting or assisting the Subcommittee or providing information.

Article (133) — Confidential Recommendations

The state shall respect Subcommittee report confidentiality under the Protocol. Publication may occur at the state's request or under Protocol provisions, without preventing independent national assessments by the mechanism.

Article (134) — Technical Assistance

The mechanism may seek advice, technical assistance and training from the Subcommittee, the UN Special Fund under the Protocol and specialized international bodies, respecting transparency and independence.

Chapter Fifteen — Special Standards for High-Risk Groups and Situations

Article (135) — Solitary Confinement

The mechanism shall review isolation grounds, duration, medical and judicial review and effects, prioritizing prolonged or repeated isolation and isolation of children or persons with psychosocial disabilities.

Article (136) — Force and Restraints

The mechanism shall examine force, restraint and less-lethal-weapon records, necessity, proportionality, subsequent medical examination and injury investigations.

Article (137) — Questioning

It shall review questioning conditions, timing, duration, counsel, recording, rest, food, threats and pressure. It may attend ongoing questioning only where necessary for systemic assessment without impairing defence rights.

Article (138) — Women

The mechanism shall review women's health and reproductive needs, hygiene, privacy, pregnancy and maternal care, and prevention of degrading searches, violence and harassment, guided by the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders.

Article (139) — Children

Deprivation of a child's liberty shall be a last resort for the shortest appropriate period. Review shall cover separation from adults, education, family contact, legal aid and prevention of isolation and corporal punishment.

Article (140) — Disability and Mental Health

The mechanism shall monitor involuntary placement, restraints, isolation, non-consensual treatment, community alternatives and accommodation. Disability alone shall not justify confinement or restraint.

Article (141) — Foreign Nationals and Refugees

Review shall cover immigration detention's legality, duration and alternatives, legal aid, interpretation, consular or refugee-agency contact and risks of return to torture.

Article (142) — Sexual Violence

A specialized approach shall detect and prevent rape, harassment, abusive strip searches and exploitation, protecting confidentiality, medical and psychological care and access to justice.

Article (143) — Hunger Strikes

Review shall cover independent medical decisions, informed consent, avoidance of medically unethical force-feeding and risks of pressure or punishment for striking.

Article (144) — Death Penalty

The mechanism shall monitor death-row conditions, notification, execution, family contact, mental health and prevention of mock threats or treatment amounting to torture or ill-treatment, without deciding the judgment's lawfulness.

Chapter Sixteen — Legislation, Policies, Training and Preventive Research

Article (145) — Review of Bills

Bills and regulations materially affecting arrest, detention, prisons, migration, mental health, juveniles and security agencies shall reach the mechanism reasonably before approval for preventive comment.

Article (146) — Non-Binding Opinion

Opinions are advisory but shall be published. The competent legislature or executive shall explain its treatment of substantive recommendations when adopting the text.

Article (147) — Thematic Studies

The mechanism may conduct national studies on pretrial detention, isolation, custodial deaths, health care, women, children, disability, migration and other risk factors.

Article (148) — National Data

It shall seek standardized periodic data on populations, facilities, capacity, deaths, injuries, isolation, complaints and force, improving record quality rather than creating an unnecessary parallel personal database.

Article (149) — Preventive Training

The mechanism may contribute to prevention training for police, prisons, military, security, doctors, judges and prosecutors, preserving independence and avoiding certification of bodies it monitors.

Article (150) — Awareness

The mechanism shall distribute accessible, plain-language materials inside detention facilities on its role, contact methods and the prohibition of reprisals.

Article (151) — Self-Evaluation

The mechanism shall periodically review methodology, independence, coverage and resources using Subcommittee tools and professional standards, publishing findings summaries and improvement plans.

Article (152) — External Evaluation

Every five years, independent experts without interests in the mechanism or detaining bodies may evaluate effectiveness. The report and mechanism's response shall be published.

Chapter Seventeen — Violations and Sanctions

Article (153) — Obstructing Entry

An official who intentionally prevents access to a covered place or delays it to conceal a person, condition or evidence is punishable by detention not exceeding two years, without prejudice to a harsher penalty.

Article (154) — Concealing a Detainee

Where an official transfers or conceals a person or alters their record to avoid a mechanism or Subcommittee interview, the harsher statutory penalty applies. This Law does not preclude enforced disappearance, forgery or unlawful detention charges where their elements exist.

Article (155) — Destroying Records

Intentional destruction, falsification or withholding of a record, recording or file after a preservation or access request is punishable under applicable penal laws. Official status and deprivation-of-liberty circumstances are aggravating factors within legal limits.

Article (156) — Reprisals

Intentional reprisals causing serious harm because of contact with the mechanism or Subcommittee are punishable by detention of one to five years. A harsher penalty applies if the act constitutes another offence.

Article (157) — Disclosure

A mechanism member or employee intentionally disclosing a confidential source or protected personal data without lawful grounds is punishable proportionately to the harm, without prejudice to civil and disciplinary liability.

Article (158) — Disciplinary Responsibility

Criminal prosecution does not preclude discipline for obstruction, reprisals, refusal to cooperate or false data. Discipline does not substitute for criminal investigation where an offence is suspected.

Article (159) — Superior Responsibility

Administrative or security superiors are liable under general rules if they order obstruction or reprisals, or know of them and fail to take reasonable preventive action within their authority.

Article (160) — No Punishment for Cooperation

No liability arises merely for good-faith information to the mechanism or Subcommittee, even if later found inaccurate. This does not excuse separate offences such as fabricating physical evidence or threatening someone.

Chapter Eighteen — Budget, Administration and Continuity

Article (161) — Separate Allocation

Federal mechanism appropriations shall be clearly identified within the Commission's budget, covering salaries, travel, regional offices, medical expertise, interpretation, equipment, digital security and publication.

Article (162) — Needs Assessment

Budgeting shall reflect facility numbers and distribution, population, risk and required visit frequency, not complaints alone.

Article (163) — Audit

Expenditure is subject to public financial audit without access to source identities, unannounced-visit plans or confidential interview contents.

Article (164) — Contracting

The mechanism may directly contract experts, interpreters, laboratories and technical services under financial rules, with strict conflicts and information-protection safeguards.

Article (165) — Offices

Governorate offices or mobile teams may follow the national detention map. Permanent offices in every governorate are unnecessary where mobile teams are more efficient.

Article (166) — Digital Security

Separate digital infrastructure shall protect sensitive data, encryption keys, incident management and backups, subject to independent periodic penetration testing and audit.

Article (167) — Continuity

The mechanism shall plan continued visits and confidential contact during crises, emergencies, epidemics, disasters and communications outages. Comprehensive suspension shall be temporary and limited to actual physical danger.

Article (168) — International Financial Cooperation

Technical assistance or unconditional funding from specialized international funds or organizations may be accepted through transparent lawful channels. Donors may not receive authority over a location, finding or report.

Chapter Nineteen — Transitional Provisions and Legislative Harmonization

Article (169) — High Commission for Human Rights Law

This Law supplements High Commission for Human Rights Law No. (53) of 2008, as amended. Provisions on mechanism independence, confidential sources, visit programme and budget prevail in conflicts.

Article (170) — Commission Visits

Creation of the mechanism shall not reduce the Commission's statutory right to unannounced visits to prisons, detention centres and other facilities.

Article (171) — Inmates and Detainees Rehabilitation Law

No provision of Inmates and Detainees Rehabilitation Law No. (14) of 2018 or its instructions requiring agreed appointments or staff presence during confidential interviews applies to lawful mechanism or Commission visits.

Article (172) — Procedural Laws

This Law does not affect investigating judges', courts' or prosecutors' powers or detainee rights under the Criminal Procedure Code or special laws. The mechanism is an additional independent safeguard.

Article (173) — Security Laws

All security, military and intelligence bodies shall comply with these access rules regardless of secrecy classification or facility affiliation. Security classification may not place detention outside preventive oversight.

Article (174) — Implementing Regulations

Within ninety days, the mechanism shall issue internal rules and guidance on visits, confidentiality, data protection, conflicts and experts. Regulations may not restrict statutory powers.

Article (175) — Initial Resources

Sufficient posts and resources shall be transferred or allocated from the Commission to the federal component. Necessary posts may be created in the first post-entry-into-force budget based on workload analysis.

Article (176) — Selection of the Head

Selection shall begin within thirty days of publication and appointment be completed within one hundred and twenty days.

Article (177) — National Facility Survey

Within six months, the mechanism shall map official and potential unofficial facilities and controlling bodies, updating continuously and withholding details that risk security or individuals.

Article (178) — Regional Arrangement

Within six months, federal and Kurdistan Region authorities shall complete legal arrangements for the regional component under the Protocol, preserving the Region's human rights commission independence.

Article (179) — Pre-Deposit Readiness

The High Commission's head, regional component and Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall jointly report institutional readiness to the Council of Representatives before deposit, without subjecting the mechanism's programme to political approval.

Article (180) — Commencement of Visits

Federal preventive visits shall start once minimum operational capacity exists, without awaiting international entry into force. The pre-deposit period may test methods and remedy gaps.

Article (181) — Two-Year Review

Two years after international entry into force, the Council of Representatives shall hold a public institutional review using the mechanism's annual report and any Subcommittee assessment, without intervening in confidential individual cases.

Article (182) — Entry into Force

National mechanism-establishment provisions take effect upon Official Gazette publication. International obligations begin when the Protocol enters into force for Iraq.

Alignment with Existing Legislation

The package need not repeal the Commission Law, Inmates and Detainees Rehabilitation Law or prosecution powers. Their relationship needs adjustment. The Commission Law remains the constitutional and institutional basis; this Law adds an OPCAT function with stronger confidentiality, independence and budget safeguards. Correctional administration remains governed by the Rehabilitation Law, but advance visit-agreement requirements do not apply to the preventive mechanism or Commission's unannounced-visit right.

The Law also complements proposed Penal Code POL-14 on substantive criminalization of torture, proposed Criminal Procedure Code POL-15 on arrest, detention and investigation safeguards, and POL-17 on prosecutorial oversight of lawful detention. The mechanism replaces none of these functions; it independently tests whether safeguards work in practice.

Legislation/Institution	Relationship after POL-20
High Commission for Human Rights Law No. 53 of 2008, as amended	Remains effective, adding a specialized independent preventive function, protected budget and separate data within it.
Inmates and Detainees Rehabilitation Law No. 14 of 2018	Remains effective, but advance-agreement requirements do not apply to mechanism visits or confidential interviews.
Public Prosecution and Judiciary	Remain responsible for detention legality, investigation and prosecution; the mechanism is preventive, not accusatory.
Security, Military and Intelligence Bodies	All places of deprivation of liberty under their control are subject to preventive access without institutional exceptions.
Kurdistan Region	A corresponding regional component shall be created within the Independent Commission for Human Rights under regional law and participate in the national system.

Financial and Implementation Implications

Locating a specialist mechanism within the High Commission reduces the cost of a new constitutional body, buildings and parallel administration, but does not make implementation inexpensive. OPCAT requires genuine capacity for regular access across detention, care and closed institutions. The mechanism therefore needs legal, medical, psychological and social staff, mobile teams, interpretation, highly protected data systems, travel, examinations, independent expertise and resources for night and unannounced visits.

Public data on all places of deprivation of liberty across federal and regional ministries, agencies and authorities are insufficient for responsible costing. The Law instead adopts a calculation method: map facilities, classify risks, set minimum visit frequency, then calculate teams, workdays, expertise, mobile offices and equipment. A separate Commission budget line shall enable verification of adequacy and prevent funding pressure.

Implementation Path

Adopt the package. The Council of Representatives shall adopt accession and domestic mechanism-establishment provisions through an interconnected process.
Complete the Commission's board. Select a board capable of protecting institutional independence before international deposit.
Appoint professional leadership. Open competition for the federal head begins upon publication, with appointment completed within 120 days.
Allocate budget and staff. Provide a separate allocation and transfer or create necessary posts, separating preventive data from general complaints databases.
Adopt the regional arrangement. The Kurdistan Region shall enact the amendment or law needed for a regional component with equivalent powers.
National survey. Map all places of deprivation of liberty, including security, military, health, social-care, migration and potential unofficial locations.
Begin visits before deposit. Test methodology in practice and remedy gaps during readiness preparation.
Deposit the accession instrument. Once national coverage, independence and funding are verified, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall deposit with the United Nations Secretary-General.
International entry into force. OPCAT takes effect for Iraq thirty days after deposit, with continuing direct Subcommittee cooperation.
Annual report and review. Publish the first report after a full operational cycle and conduct parliamentary institutional review two years after international entry into force.

General Explanatory Memorandum

OPCAT addresses a gap the Penal Code alone cannot fill. Criminalizing torture is essential but principally acts after an incident or evidence emerges. Prevention examines enabling conditions: unregistered detention, prolonged isolation, absent counsel, dependent medical examinations, lack of confidential interviews, non-functioning cameras, alterable records or institutional acceptance of disproportionate force. Addressing these before harm is the Protocol's core.

Iraq has an institutional foundation. The High Commission is constitutionally independent and legally entitled to visit prisons, detention centres and other facilities without prior permission; official Iraqi information submitted to the UN states it obtained A-status accreditation. Yet in 2022 the Committee against Torture noted prior appointment requirements for certain correctional visits, conflicting with unannounced access. Merely naming the Commission as the national mechanism is insufficient; OPCAT functions require a defined statutory basis and clear priority in conflicts.

Hosting the mechanism within the Commission does not merge prevention with complaints. Preventive confidentiality is different: a person may disclose information knowing it will not automatically become investigative testimony. Fear of direct transmission to prison management or police defeats visits. The bill therefore separates mechanism databases from complaint units and bases identity-revealing referrals on consent, with a narrow exception for imminent, grave danger to life.

Nor does the Law replace prosecution. Prosecutors oversee detention legality and may take judicial action, investigate or appeal within their powers. The mechanism addresses systems and risks and may interview without a complaint or case. This deliberate plurality creates independent protective layers rather than duplicated functions.

Places of deprivation of liberty include institutions not called “prisons”. The Subcommittee's first general comment in 2024 confirms coverage wherever a person cannot actually leave because of public authority or its instigation, consent or acquiescence. The bill thus includes mental health, care, migration, transport, military and security sites and potential unofficial locations. Restricting visits to known prisons leaves the highest risks outside the system.

Finally, the document advises against the Article 24 postponement declaration. Legislating and operating the mechanism before deposit makes entry into force the result of genuine national readiness, rather than the starting point for finding an institution, budget and powers.

General Statement of Reasons

This legislative package is prepared to strengthen constitutional and legal prohibitions of torture and ill-treatment; complement Iraq's Convention obligations; establish independent regular and unannounced visits to all places of deprivation of liberty; enable multidisciplinary preventive access to persons and information, confidential interviews, recommendations and follow-up; protect against reprisals and cooperate with the United Nations Subcommittee; and use existing institutions without an unnecessary parallel body.

Sources and references

Ratification status, party numbers and observations on Iraq reflect official sources published by the preparation date. Institutional design, legal articles and transitional measures are legislative proposals within the political programme, not descriptions of a law in force.