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POL-48

This is a proposal for discussion, not an enacted law.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Ratification bill · Economy, Finance, Investment and Employment

Bill for Iraq's Ratification of the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation

The Singapore Convention on Mediation — completing Iraqi ratification and linking international entry into force to clear domestic rules for enforcing and invoking international commercial settlements.

Code
POL-48
Version
1.0
Last updated
7 October 2026
Jurisdiction
Republic of Iraq

Executive Summary

This file does not start from the premise that Iraq must make an initial decision on the Singapore Convention on Mediation. Iraq already signed the Convention on 17 April 2024. The Council of Representatives completed the first reading of the ratification bill on 24 August 2026, then concluded the second reading and discussion on 24 September 2026. As of this document's update date, the United Nations register shows no deposited Iraqi instrument of ratification. The legislative task is therefore to complete voting, ratification and deposit while closing the domestic procedural gap needed for the Convention to operate in practice when it enters into force for Iraq.

This programme proposes ratification without either optional reservation under Article (8) of the Convention. A settlement agreement would not be excluded merely because a public body is a party, nor would parties be required to add a special clause expressly applying the Convention. Conversely, a public body's authority to settle, limits on dealing with public funds, rules on competence, budgeting and oversight, and immunities established by law remain governed by Iraqi law. The Convention itself creates no new authority to waive claims or compromise.

The bill below creates a domestic procedural bridge: clear judicial jurisdiction over applications to enforce or invoke settlements, prohibition of reconsidering the merits, refusal limited to Convention grounds, and a duty on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to complete deposit and identify the entry-into-force date. It creates no new authority, fund or administrative apparatus and imposes no separate capital establishment expenditure on the budget.

I — Current Legal and Parliamentary Position

20 December 2018Adoption of the Convention by the United Nations General Assembly.
12 September 2020International entry into force following fulfilment of the deposit requirement.
17 April 2024Signature by the Republic of Iraq, as recorded by UNCITRAL and the United Nations Treaty Collection.
24 August 2026First reading of the ratification bill in the Council of Representatives.
24 September 2026Completion of the second reading, report and discussion, with the Foreign Relations Committee instructed to incorporate comments before voting.
7 October 2026No Iraqi instrument of ratification is yet shown as deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General as depositary.

Since Iraq signed the Convention during the period open for signature, the correct legal description of the next step is ratification , rather than accession. Accordingly, the appropriate parliamentary measure is a law ratifying the Convention on behalf of the Republic of Iraq, followed by ratification by the President of the Republic and deposit of the ratification instrument through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Treaty-Making Law No. (35) of 2015.

This is therefore not a theoretical proposal remote from the legislative process. It is a specific legislative position on a bill already at the pre-vote stage. The priority is to avoid leaving signature without domestic and international effect, and to prevent ratification from taking practical effect without a clear judicial pathway for enforcing settlements.

II — Why Must Iraq Complete Ratification?

Commercial mediation differs from arbitration. An arbitrator issues a binding decision following adversarial proceedings, while a mediator imposes no solution: the parties themselves create the settlement. The practical difficulty arises when a settlement is international and one party breaches it. The other party may need to bring a new contractual claim to establish the agreement and obtain a judgment, or attempt to turn the settlement into a judgment or arbitral award if the legal system allows. This loses a substantial part of mediation's advantage: reaching an enforceable solution quickly.

The Singapore Convention addresses precisely this missing link. It does not regulate every detail of mediation, establish an international court or replace Iraqi courts. Its core function is to require States Parties to provide a means of invoking an international settlement agreement resulting from mediation and seeking its enforcement, subject to specified conditions, evidence requirements and grounds for refusal.

For Iraq, the step is additionally important for three reasons. First, Iraq has been a party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards since 2022, so completing the international dispute-resolution framework has value: arbitration should not be the sole route with cross-border enforcement. Second, investment, commercial, construction, energy, finance and supply contracts often involve multiple nationalities, and ending a dispute through an enforceable settlement reduces costs compared with turning every disagreement into full litigation or arbitration. Third, mediation can preserve commercial relationships in ways that judicial or arbitral decisions do not always permit.

What the Convention does not do

The Convention does not give an investor a right to require the state to settle, empower a mediator to issue a judgment, or make every domestic compromise internationally enforceable. It does not cover consumer, family, inheritance or employment settlements, or settlements that have become enforceable judgments or arbitral awards. Nor does it remove refusal grounds relating to public policy or the subject matter's inability to be settled.

III — Iraqi Constitutional and Legal Basis

1. The Constitution

Article (61/Fourth) of the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq places regulation of the ratification of international treaties and agreements within the powers of the Council of Representatives. The detailed framework was subsequently adopted in Treaty-Making Law No. (35) of 2015. The ratification law remains federal legislation: an international commitment in the name of the Republic of Iraq cannot arise from an administrative decision or unilateral executive signature alone.

2. Treaty-Making Law No. (35) of 2015

The Law distinguishes ratification of a treaty Iraq has signed from accession to one it did not sign within the prescribed period. It also regulates preparation of the ratification instrument, publication of the law and treaty, and deposit with the depositary, and assigns the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsibility for tracking the treaty's entry-into-force date and publishing it in the Iraqi Gazette.

Under Article (17), the general rule is approval of a treaty ratification law by an absolute majority of the total membership of the Council of Representatives. A two-thirds majority is required for specified categories, including border and peace treaties, political, security and military alliances, and establishment of or accession to regional organisations. The Singapore Convention is a multilateral commercial dispute-resolution convention, not one of those four categories, so the general rule in Article (17) applies.

3. Relationship with national mediation legislation

Ratifying the Convention does not replace modern domestic commercial mediation legislation. The Convention itself allows each state to determine procedural mechanisms for its competent authorities where these are not directly regulated. It must therefore operate alongside national rules identifying the competent court, application procedure, service, appeals, relationship with enforcement legislation and protection of confidentiality. Within the political programme, this relates to the Commercial Arbitration and Mediation and Investment Dispute Settlement Bill, which already establishes domestic rules for enforcing settlement agreements and treats the Singapore Convention's entry into force as complementary rather than substitutive.

IV — What Does the Singapore Convention Add?

The Convention's basic legal structure
SubjectPractical effect
ScopeAn international settlement agreement, in writing, resulting from mediation and concluded to resolve a commercial dispute.
ExclusionsConsumer, family, inheritance and employment matters, and settlements enforceable as judgments or arbitral awards.
Core obligationA State Party must make enforcement of a settlement agreement available and allow it to be invoked as evidence that a matter has been resolved.
EvidenceSubmit the signed settlement agreement and evidence that it resulted from mediation, with electronic forms accepted where the conditions are met.
Grounds for refusalA defined list concerning capacity, the agreement's validity, clarity and finality, material mediator conduct, public policy and whether the subject matter can be settled.
More favourable lawThe Convention does not prevent a party from benefiting from another law or treaty providing a more favourable route for invoking a settlement.
Temporal effectApplies to settlement agreements concluded after the Convention enters into force for the state concerned.

The important point is that the Convention makes a settlement neither a “foreign judgment” nor an “arbitral award”. It creates an independent route. This independence matters because forcing parties to convert every settlement into a judgment or consent award increases costs and can lead them to initiate artificial arbitration merely to obtain an enforcement instrument. The Convention allows the settlement itself, if its conditions are met, to be the subject of an enforcement application.

Conversely, the Convention does not permit a retrial of the underlying dispute. The court's role is to examine requirements and refusal grounds, not reconsider whether the parties' bargain was economically fair or whether either could have obtained a better outcome in court.

V — Reservations Policy: Ratification Without Article (8) Reservations

Article (8) permits only two reservations. The first allows a state to exclude settlement agreements to which it, its agencies or persons acting on their behalf are parties, to the extent specified. The second allows a state to make application of the Convention conditional on the settlement parties expressly agreeing to its application. No other reservations are permitted.

Assessment of reservation options
OptionEffectProposed position
Exclude government bodiesAlso deprives the state, its companies and its agencies of the enforcement route when the other commercial party breaches the settlement, and creates two different systems for commercial settlements.Not adopted. Public funds should be protected by controlling the authority to conclude a settlement, not by undermining its enforceability after it has been validly concluded.
Require party consent to application of the ConventionTurns the Convention into an opt-in system and creates another dispute over whether the settlement clause included the correct wording.Not adopted. The default should be that the Convention operates whenever its conditions are met, while parties retain freedom to design their settlement within the law.
Additional reservationsNot permitted by Article (8/2).Impermissible under the Convention.

Choosing not to enter reservations does not waive protection of the state. A public body cannot create powers for itself simply by entering mediation. A government settlement's validity remains dependent on lawful competence, approval by the authorised decision-maker, and compliance with mandatory rules, financial appropriations and public contracting requirements. Recognition and enforcement of a settlement likewise do not in themselves amount to a general waiver of legally established immunities against execution on particular assets.

VI — The Bill

VII — Statement of Reasons

This Law is enacted to complete the Republic of Iraq's integration into the modern international commercial dispute-resolution system; provide a direct, reliable route for invoking and enforcing international settlement agreements resulting from mediation; encourage commercial parties, investors and public bodies to resolve disputes amicably where more effective than litigation or arbitration; reduce the cost and duration of cross-border disputes; strengthen predictability in international transactions and investment; recognise that the Republic of Iraq signed the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation on 17 April 2024; and establish the domestic rules needed to implement it while protecting public policy, public funds and judicial jurisdiction.

VIII — Explanatory Memorandum

1. From signature to international commitment

Signature is important but does not make Iraq a full party to the Convention. The United Nations register clearly distinguishes signature from ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. For Iraq, the register records signature on 17 April 2024 without a date of deposit of a ratification instrument as of this document's update date. The principal international effect therefore remains pending until domestic procedures are completed and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deposits the instrument with the United Nations Secretary-General.

Application does not begin the day after deposit. Article (14/2) provides that, for a state ratifying after the Convention's international entry into force, it enters into force six months after deposit of the ratification instrument. This period is not a vacuum. It is a necessary window for preparing courts, application forms, service procedures, translation, training and professional guidance.

2. Why add implementation rules to a ratification law?

The Convention does not impose a single judicial model. It requires states to provide enforcement and invocation while leaving part of the procedural machinery to them. Without a designated court, an initial dispute may arise over whether an application belongs before a first-instance court, appellate court or enforcement body. Without a defined standard of review, enforcement proceedings may become a reconsideration of the merits. The bill avoids this by assigning original jurisdiction to the federal Court of Appeal, with cassation review, an approach consistent with concentrating expertise in specialised international disputes.

These rules do not prevent later integration into comprehensive arbitration and mediation legislation. Once such legislation is enacted, its more complete special provisions shall apply within their scope. The procedural bridge is intended to ensure that the treaty's operation does not depend on a second law whose enactment may be delayed.

3. A settlement's binding force is not absolute

A settlement agreement is not above the law. In specified circumstances, the Convention permits refusal where a party lacked capacity; the agreement is invalid, non-binding or not final; it has been modified or performed; obligations are unclear or incapable of performance; a serious mediator breach of standards directly affected a party's consent; or a material conflict of interest was not disclosed. The competent authority may also refuse on its own initiative where relief would contravene public policy or the dispute's subject matter cannot be settled by mediation.

These safeguards do not reopen the commercial dispute. A court may not substitute its judgment for the parties' assessment or ask after signature whether one party conceded too much or received less than expected. This distinguishes reviewing the instrument's validity from retrying the merits.

4. Electronic form

The Convention accommodates modern commerce by recognising electronic writing, signatures and evidence where reliability and information-accessibility requirements are met. Iraqi courts should therefore treat digital settlements and mediation as a normal possibility, not an exception. Rules on evidentiary integrity, identity verification, technical integrity and data protection nevertheless remain applicable.

IX — Settlement Agreements Involving the State or a Public Body

The most sensitive ratification question is whether Iraq should use the reservation under Article (8/1/a) to exclude the state and government bodies. This programme does not recommend doing so. The real problem is not enforceability of a valid settlement, but ensuring beforehand that the signatory has authority and that the required financial and legal assessment has occurred.

If a public body concludes a valid commercial settlement after an international dispute, the state itself may need to enforce it against a foreign company or contractor. Excluding government bodies also deprives them of that tool. It may signal that settlement with the state is less secure than settlement between two private companies, an undesirable effect in long-term contracts.

The balanced solution separates three stages:

StageRequired rule
Decision to enter mediationA documented professional decision by the competent body, considering prospects of success, cost, time and project continuity.
Conclusion of the settlement agreementSignature by the authorised decision-maker, clear financial and non-financial obligations, and verification of necessary appropriations and legal restrictions.
EnforcementIf the settlement is valid, its substance is not reopened merely because a party is a public body; public policy, immunities and restrictions on state assets at execution remain applicable.

Recognition of a contractual obligation should also not be confused with execution against all state assets. An agreement may be binding while certain assets enjoy special protection against attachment under national law or immunity rules. The bill preserves this distinction and prevents ratification from being interpreted as a general waiver of immunity.

X — Proposed Judicial Enforcement Mechanism

Enforcement procedures should be concise and focused. The applicant submits the signed settlement and evidence that it resulted from mediation. Evidence may include the mediator's signature, a document from the administering institution, an appropriate statement, or other evidence accepted by the court under the Convention. Foreign-language documents should include the certified translation required by court rules.

After service, the other party may invoke the Convention's refusal grounds and provide supporting evidence. The hearing should not become substantive litigation over the original contract. Its purpose is not to re-establish the breach resolved by mediation, but to examine whether the settlement qualifies for enforcement.

The bill gives original jurisdiction to the territorially competent Court of Appeal for three reasons: concentration of expertise, fewer divergent interpretations, and consistency with the proposed structure of modern domestic arbitration and mediation legislation. Jurisdiction must respect the federal judiciary and the judiciary of the Kurdistan Region according to the place of execution, with cassation appeal before the higher judicial body competent under the law. The aim is a consistent Convention standard without creating a new court or bypassing the constitutional judicial structure.

An essential rule

A party should not have to bring a new original claim for the value of the settled dispute to obtain an enforceable instrument. If the Convention's conditions are met, the application should concern enforcement or invocation of the settlement itself.

XI — Entry into Force and Transition

1. After the vote: Complete promulgation of the ratification law and presidential ratification through the proper procedures.

2. After publication: The Ministry of Justice publishes the ratification law and official Convention text, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepares and deposits the ratification instrument with the United Nations Secretary-General.

3. From the deposit date: The six-month period before entry into force for Iraq begins.

4. During transition: The Supreme Judicial Council prepares procedural guidance, forms, training and assignment of judicial panels, without creating new courts if existing structures can accommodate the jurisdiction.

5. Upon entry into force: Courts begin accepting applications concerning settlement agreements within the Convention's temporal scope. It does not apply retroactively to settlements predating its entry into force for Iraq.

If comprehensive national mediation and arbitration legislation with a compatible enforcement mechanism is enacted beforehand, that mechanism becomes the detailed domestic framework. This Law's provisions should be read so as to prevent duplication and conflict.

XII — Financial and Administrative Implications

Establishment costs: Ratification requires no authority, fund, building or independent apparatus. Initial costs are principally judicial training, forms and guidance, preparation of electronic filing where available, translation, publication and professional awareness.

Annual costs: Applications are handled within existing courts, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice and Supreme Judicial Council. No professionally sound basis exists for assuming a fixed annual amount before caseload is known. Needs should therefore fall within existing operating allocations or be estimated in the relevant bodies' budgets according to actual workload.

Potential effects on public expenditure: Undocumented numerical savings should not be claimed. The qualitative expectation is fewer protracted disputes if mediation becomes an enforceable option, but savings depend on parties' use of mediation and the types of cases resolved successfully.

Revenue: The Law proposes no exceptional fees. Any court fee must be proportionate and must not make the enforcement mechanism a financial obstacle.

XIII — Expected Economic and Legal Effects

AreaExpected effectSafeguard
Investment and tradeGreater predictability in settling cross-border commercial disputes.Defined enforcement rules and limited refusal grounds.
CourtsA shorter route instead of some repeated original claims.Concentrated jurisdiction, training and no reconsideration of the merits.
Public bodiesMediation available for commercial and investment contracts, while valid settlements remain enforceable.Legal authority, approvals, financial oversight and no presumed waiver of immunity.
Private sectorLower risk of non-performance after time and money have been spent on mediation.Clear evidence of settlement and mediation, and protection of public policy.
Reputation of the legal environmentCompletes the link between litigation, arbitration and mediation within the dispute-resolution system.Consistent judicial application and publication of principles after redacting confidential data.

Success is not measured solely by mediation numbers. More suitable monitoring indicators are: time to determine enforcement applications, refusal rates and grounds, decisions quashed on cassation for misapplication of the Convention, regular publication of judicial principles, and use of mediation in international contracts without increased procedural disputes over the competent court or form.

XIV — Position Within the International Dispute-Resolution System

Iraq acceded to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards on 11 November 2021, and it entered into force for Iraq on 9 February 2022. This provided an international framework for enforcing arbitral awards. The Singapore Convention does not duplicate that function: it addresses a different instrument, the mediated settlement agreement.

UNCITRAL also designed its 2018 Model Law on International Commercial Mediation to complement the Convention. The ideal Iraqi model therefore has two levels: an international commitment through the Singapore Convention and modern national legislation regulating mediation from beginning to end, including confidentiality, conflicts of interest, suspension of limitation periods, evidence, enforceability and court procedure.

Comparison with States Parties does not require copying any particular country's law. The Convention is uniform, but each state builds judicial procedures within its own structure. Iraq needs procedures consistent with its judiciary, civil procedure and enforcement laws, rather than imported foreign institutional labels.

XV — Official and Primary Sources

  1. Iraqi Council of Representatives — Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, particularly Article (61) on parliamentary powers and treaties. Accessed: 7 October 2026.
  2. Ministry of Justice — Treaty-Making Law No. (35) of 2015, Iraqi Gazette, issue 4383. Reference for ratification, deposit, publication and reservation procedures.
  3. Council of Representatives — Decisions and recommendations of the sitting of 24 August 2026, documenting the ratification bill's first reading.
  4. Council of Representatives — Decisions and recommendations of the sitting of 24 September 2026, documenting the second reading, report and discussion before voting.
  5. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law — United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, text, purpose and principal provisions.
  6. UNCITRAL — Status of the Singapore Convention on Mediation, including Iraq's signature date.
  7. United Nations Treaty Collection — Official Convention status held by the depositary, for verification of signature, ratification and entry into force.
  8. UNCITRAL — Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 2018, a complementary reference for national rules.
  9. United Nations Treaty Collection — Iraq's accession to the 1958 New York Convention, a reference for comparing enforcement of arbitral awards with enforcement of mediated settlements.

The Convention's status with the depositary should be rechecked when the law is scheduled for the final vote and when the ratification instrument is prepared, because signature, ratification and entry-into-force data may change.

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