Iraq's Real Problem
The Institutional Capability Gap between Resources and Outcomes
1. Executive Summary
Iraq entered 2024 with a substantial resource base: 46,118,793 people, nominal GDP of IQD 359.1 trillion, foreign reserves of approximately IQD 145.3 trillion, and a current account surplus of US$8.37 billion, while crude oil represented 95.2% of merchandise exports. Yet poverty remained at 17.5%, illiteracy at 15.71%, and female economic activity at just 13.1%, while only 14.93% of rural households were connected to the public sewerage network.1234
This comparison shows that the problem is not a “lack of money,” but how money is collected, allocated, spent and monitored. Salaries and pensions absorbed approximately IQD 90 trillion of the roughly IQD 211 trillion 2024 budget—around 42.7%. Meanwhile, direct credit to the private sector did not exceed IQD 43.94 trillion, or approximately 12.2% of nominal GDP. Public administration is digitally fragmented: Iraq scored 21 out of 100 on the 2022 Government Electronic and Mobile Services Maturity Index, with a zero score for interoperability across channels.567
Diagnostic Findings
• Oil rents finance short-term stability but weaken incentives to build a tax base, productive capacity and accountable institutions.
• High current expenditure constrains the budget and makes investment and administrative reform the first casualties of fiscal shocks.
• Fragmented powers, data and procedures turn the state into institutional islands: the transaction continues, but the outcome is not assured.
• Plans exist, but the connection between the plan, budget, project and outcome remains weak and intermittent.
• Corruption, quota-based allocation and informal relationships are not separate phenomena; they exploit numerous decision points, weak traceability and dispersed responsibility.
The Chapter's Proposed Outcome
The chapter proposes a transition by 2045 from a state that manages crises to one that manages development, through eight interconnected programmes: a national delivery centre; linking plans to budgets; civil service and procedural reform; digital infrastructure and interoperability; a fiscal rule for resource rents; integrity and open procurement; productive financing for the private sector; and spatial equity contracts. Interim targets are policy commitments, not automatic forecasts.
Method and Intellectual Honesty
2. Scope, Source Map and Data Decisions
The chapter covers the state structures that convert resources into outcomes: public finance, administration, planning, data, institutions, integrity, coordination and implementation capability. It does not replace subsequent sectoral chapters on oil, education or services. Instead, it identifies the shared bottleneck that explains their weak outcomes. The year 2024 is used as the baseline because it brings together the comprehensive census, national accounts, and annual monetary and external-sector reports in a relatively complete single year.
| Source | Use in the Chapter |
|---|---|
| Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority | 2024 census, poverty, illiteracy, economic activity, services and GDP. |
| Central Bank of Iraq | Reserves, balance of payments, money supply, inflation and private credit. |
| Ministry of Planning | National plans, Vision 2030, diagnosis of weaknesses in annual planning, and the GEMS index. |
| Ministry of Finance | Budget law and fiscal archives; a gap remained in extractable detailed execution tables. |
| Commission of Integrity and Federal Board of Supreme Audit | Oversight and legal framework; detailed annual data were not incorporated quantitatively because direct access was incomplete. |
| Official / credible international sources | Comparative verification: Oman, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and extractive industries transparency. |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
Decisions on Conflicting Sources
| Subject | Conflict | Working Decision |
|---|---|---|
| Population | Preliminary result of 45.4 million versus final result of 46,118,793 | Use the Authority's final figure; mention the preliminary figure only to document the revision.89 |
| Reserves | Conflict between OCR text and the summary table | Use IQD 145.3 trillion from the structured table in the monetary policy report.10 |
| Poverty | Older values from earlier surveys | Use 17.5% for 2024 as the latest published working figure, requesting detailed tables at the review.11 |
| Budget | Complete detailed execution data could not be extracted from the archive | Temporarily use IQD 211 trillion and IQD 90 trillion from an official statement reported by Reuters, labelled as working figures rather than audited execution data.1213 |
| 2025 GDP | Preliminary estimate of IQD 330.7 trillion | Use only as a directional update, not as a replacement for the 2024 baseline.14 |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
2024 Baseline
3. Iraq's Reality Dashboard
| Indicator | Value | Year | Definition / Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Population | 46.118 million | 2024 | Final census |
| Nominal GDP | IQD 359.1 trillion | 2024 | Current basic prices |
| Foreign reserves | IQD 145.3 trillion | 2024 | Value in the summary table |
| Current account surplus | US$8.37 billion | 2024 | With a trade surplus of US$26.69 billion |
| Oil share of merchandise exports | 95.2% | 2024 | Indicator of external rent dependence |
| Overall poverty | 17.5% | 2024 | Poverty gap of 3.9% |
| Illiteracy | 15.71% | 2024 | 23.04% in rural areas |
| Female economic activity | 13.1% | 2024 | 8% in rural areas |
| Rural connection to the sewerage network | 14.93% | 2024 | 61.78% in urban areas |
| Private-sector credit / GDP | 12.2% | 2024 | IQD 43.94 trillion |
| GEMS | 21/100 | 2022 | 30 services, 13 institutions, zero interoperability |
Source: Statistics Authority, Central Bank, Ministry of Planning and the sources identified in the footnotes.1516171819
Figure (1): Nominal GDP, 2022–2025
Source: Statistics Authority; GDP reports for 2023, 2024 and preliminary 2025.2021
Fact: Nominal GDP reached IQD 416.7 trillion in 2022, then IQD 348.3 trillion in 2023 and IQD 359.1 trillion in 2024, before a preliminary estimate of IQD 330.7 trillion for 2025. This series alone does not establish a real recession: it is expressed in current prices and is affected by oil. It does, however, reveal pronounced sensitivity to rent cycles.2223
The Central Argument
4. The Crisis Is Not a Shortage of Resources
Figure (2): A Brief Comparison of Resources and Outcomes
Source: Statistics Authority and Central Bank of Iraq, 2024.242526
Where Is Resource Value Lost?
• Allocation: When current commitments take precedence over investment, maintenance and reform.
• Design: When a project starts without a feasibility assessment or a clear definition of its output and outcome.
• Procedure: When approvals, committees and veto points multiply without a binding service deadline.
• Implementation: When the funder, implementer, beneficiary and overseer are disconnected, and nobody owns the complete outcome.
• Measurement: When money spent or activities completed are measured instead of the service delivered and its impact on citizens.
Recommendation: The standard of state success must shift from “the size of the allocation” to “the value of the outcome per dinar.” This requires programme-based budget classification, feasibility gates for projects, performance contracts and published data connecting inputs to outputs and outcomes.
The Economy and Public Finance
5. The Rentier Economy and Wasted Wealth
Figure (3): The Rentier Cycle That Reproduces Crisis Management
Source: Iraq Vision 2045 team analysis based on the structure of exports, the budget and credit.272829
Rent dependence appears at three levels. Externally, crude oil represented 95.2% of merchandise exports in 2024. In production, mining and quarrying value added totalled IQD 149.85 trillion in 2023, approximately 43% of nominal GDP. Fiscally, salaries and pensions absorbed approximately IQD 90 trillion of the 2024 budget—around 42.7% of the total according to the available working figure.303132
“Wasted wealth” is not limited to theft or financial violations. Structural waste also involves using rents to protect short-term arrangements at the expense of capital accumulation, productivity, maintenance and capable institutions. Its effect is visible in weak private credit: just IQD 43.94 trillion in 2024, or approximately 12.2% of GDP.33
The Proposed Rule
• Decouple fiscal stability from the oil price through a conservative reference price and a stabilization fund with clear rules.
• Set a medium-term ceiling on growth in current expenditure, protecting acquired rights and reforming gradually through natural retirement and workforce redeployment.
• Protect productive investment and maintenance from indiscriminate cuts when oil prices fall.
• Link any expansion in recruitment or subsidies to a permanent funding source and impact measurement, not temporary oil revenue.
• Allocate an increasing share of surpluses to relieving bottlenecks that raise private-sector productivity.
Public Administration
6. Inert Administration and a Disabled State
Figure (4): Digital Government Services Maturity—Iraq and Oman
Source: Ministry of Planning, GEMS Index 2022.34
Iraq scored 21 out of 100 on GEMS in 2022, compared with 64 for Oman, with only 30 services and 13 institutions assessed and a zero score for interoperability across channels. These figures describe administrative fragmentation: platforms that do not communicate, requests for citizens to supply data already held by the government, and transactions that start electronically but revert to paper and in-person attendance.35
Indicators of Active Administration
| Indicator | Definition |
|---|---|
| Cycle time | Time from application to completed service, measured by the median and 90th percentile. |
| First-time completion | Proportion of transactions completed without rework or requests for duplicate documents. |
| Integrated digital service | Proportion of services completed end to end without paper or in-person attendance. |
| Interoperability | Proportion of services that automatically retrieve verified government data. |
| Backlog | Number of transactions exceeding the time standard. |
| User satisfaction | Regular published measurement, disaggregated by governorate and group. |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
Institutions and Integrity
7. Weak Institutions, Corruption and Conflicting Powers
An effective institution consists of rules, responsibilities, data and organizational memory that survive changes in personnel. In Iraq, indirect evidence reveals weaknesses in these attributes: the first comprehensive census after 37 years; net errors and omissions of negative US$8.02 billion in the 2024 balance of payments; and the same report's recommendation for continuing reviews to improve the accuracy of import data.3637
Corruption should not be reduced to individual cases. Its risk grows when broad discretion combines with lengthy transaction procedures, disconnected data, responsibility divided among several bodies, and procurement that does not disclose the complete contract cycle. In this environment, quota-based allocation and informal influence networks become practical substitutes for rules: selecting people, accelerating or obstructing decisions, protecting interests and weakening civil service impartiality.
The Institutional Failure Chain
| Bottleneck | Implementation Effect |
|---|---|
| Conflicting powers | A single decision passes through multiple bodies without a time-bound resolution protocol. |
| Dispersed responsibility | Each body performs one part, but none owns the final outcome. |
| Informal relationships | Intermediation solves complexity for the individual but reproduces it for the system. |
| Ex-post oversight only | Detects violations after spending rather than preventing them through system design. |
| Weak institutional memory | Priorities, teams and data change with the administration. |
| Lack of contract transparency | Citizens cannot see the project's progression from award to completion and settlement. |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
Policy decision: Move from fighting corruption through isolated case files to “integrity by design”: reduce discretion, create digital audit trails, disclose contracts, separate critical powers, apply risk-based auditing and publish rates of closure of audit findings.
Planning and Continuity
8. The Absence of Long-Term Planning
The Ministry of Planning itself diagnosed the problem of the annual approach when preparing the National Development Plan 2018–2022, noting the difficulty of developing medium- and long-term visions, prioritizing and integrating annual investment programmes. Iraq's Sustainable Development Vision 2030 also called for connecting the efforts of ministries and governorates and delivering priorities institutionally and quantitatively.3940
Four Points of Disconnection
| Link | Typical Failure | Required Reform |
|---|---|---|
| Plan ↔ Budget | The strategic objective does not always carry a budget code and a multi-year programme. | Programme and performance budgeting and a medium-term expenditure framework. |
| Budget ↔ Project | An allocation does not guarantee readiness of design, land, contracting or subsequent operation. | A feasibility and readiness gate before inclusion. |
| Project ↔ Service | Completion of the physical asset does not mean it is operating or has staff and maintenance. | An operation, maintenance and staffing plan before handover. |
| Service ↔ Outcome | Buildings and equipment are measured instead of learning, health, time or productivity. | Outcome indicators, performance contracts and regular publication. |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
The New Rule
• No new federal project without a link to a national objective, programme code, outcome indicator and accountable owner.
• No investment listing before a minimum level of technical, legal and financial readiness is complete.
• No final acceptance without an operation and maintenance plan and performance data for the first two years.
• National programmes continue across governments unless cancelled through a reasoned decision and published assessment, not an unannounced political change.
9. Where the State Is Weaker across Places and Groups
Figure (5): Poverty in Selected Governorates, 2024
Source: Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority.41
Poverty reached 43.6% in Al-Muthanna, 34.4% in Babylon and 28.9% in Al-Qadisiyah, compared with 5.9% in Erbil, 7.9% in Sulaymaniyah, 9.5% in Kirkuk and 13.5% in Baghdad. The highest governorate rate is approximately 7.4 times the lowest. Rural illiteracy rises to 23.04%, compared with 12.69% in urban areas, while female economic activity falls to 8% in rural areas.42
In services, piped water inside the home reaches 66.7% in urban areas and 54.7% in rural areas, but the sharper gap is in sewerage: 61.78% urban versus 14.93% rural. Some 42.41% of rural households dispose of waste by burning it. These are not simply social differences; they measure the state's actual presence outside urban centres.43
Targeting Principles
• A national service minimum below which no governorate may remain after a specified date.
• Additional financing for areas with larger gaps, conditional on ready projects and operational indicators.
• Disaggregate indicators by sex, rural / urban location and age group instead of hiding them within national averages.
• Assess the effect of allocations on poverty, jobs and services, not expenditure alone.
The Integrated Diagnosis
10. The Causal Map of the Real Problem
Figure (6): The Cycle That Reproduces Iraq's Crisis
Source: Iraq Vision 2045 team analysis based on the assembled national evidence.
The cycle begins with readily available, concentrated oil revenue that does not require a broad tax base. This revenue allows salaries and transfers to expand and crises to be addressed through spending, reducing political pressure to build agile administration, an information base and accountability for outcomes. Institutions fragment, investment and productive financing weaken, and the private economy fails to create enough jobs. Social demand for public appointments, intermediation and support then rises, returning the state to greater distribution of rents.
Root Problems in Order
| Rank | Root Problem | Why Is It Fundamental? |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | The distributive rentier state | Determines the logic of revenue, expenditure and incentives. |
| 2 | Weak implementation capability | Prevents plans and money from becoming services and outcomes. |
| 3 | Weak linkage between plans and budgets | Makes strategy a document rather than an operating system. |
| 4 | Fragmented data and responsibility | Weakens the state's view of itself and accountability. |
| 5 | Constraints on private financing and production | Keep jobs and growth captive to the state and oil. |
| 6 | Spatial and group disparities | Deepen vulnerability and loss of trust. |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
Comparative Learning
11. International Experiences and Transferable Lessons
| Case | Reason for Selection | Transferable Lesson | Limits to Transfer |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oman | An Arab rentier state; GEMS=64 versus Iraq's 21 in 2022.44 | An integrated service system, interoperability, user-centred design and channel standards. | Its smaller institutional scale and demographic context cannot be transferred literally. |
| Saudi Arabia | Non-oil GDP growth of 4.3% in 2024 versus overall growth of 1.3%.45 | A delivery centre, programme portfolio, continuity in the diversification objective and regular measurement. | Do not replicate projects or spending levels without Iraqi feasibility assessments. |
| Indonesia | A legal rule capping the deficit at 3% of GDP.46 | A binding fiscal rule that protects sustainability and limits current expenditure growth in years of abundance. | Iraq must adapt the rule to oil volatility and federalism. |
| Extractive industries transparency | Completion of EITI validation with corrective actions still outstanding.47 | Reform advances when the gap, owner, deadline and disclosure are specified. | Procedural compliance is insufficient unless linked to the budget, contracts and outcomes. |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
Comparative Conclusion
There is no ready-made “state formula” for Iraq. The common lesson is that resources and a vision do not work without four structures: a disciplined fiscal rule; a delivery centre with information and the ability to resolve conflicts; interconnected public services and data; and a continuous link between plans, financing and outcomes. These mechanisms can be transferred; the form of the system or the scale of spending cannot simply be copied.
The Final Explanation
12. Why Does the Current State Fail to Deliver Genuine Renewal?
Reference Scenario to 2045 without Transformation
The chapter does not offer an artificial numerical forecast. Continuing the current structure, however, is likely to mean a budget more resistant to reform and more sensitive to oil; a public apparatus larger than its management capacity; a private sector with limited financing; persistent spatial disparities; and repeated waves of emergency spending during each crisis. Individual services or projects may improve, but the system will not generate cumulative national renewal because the link connecting resources to outcomes remains broken.
The Transformation Vision
13. The State Iraq Needs in 2045
Figure (7): The Chapter's Theory of Change
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team.
Transformation Phases
| Phase | Institutional Focus |
|---|---|
| 2027–2030: Restoring Capability | Establish the delivery centre, unify data, select 100 priority services and 20 priority programmes, and link them to the budget. |
| 2031–2035: Institutional Consolidation | Programme budgeting, a merit-based civil service, digital procurement, fiscal rules and governorate outcome contracts. |
| 2036–2040: Broadening Productivity | Expand private credit and investment, fully digitalize services, and convert savings into productive infrastructure. |
| 2041–2045: The State of Outcomes | Sustain rules across governments, reduce oil dependence, and achieve stable service and accountability standards. |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
Target Ladder
14. Quantitative Targets for 2030–2045
The following targets are policy commitments, not automatic forecasts. They are based on the baseline, gaps relative to comparable experiences, the time needed to build institutions and the need for consistency with the first chapter's objectives. They are reviewed every five years in light of data and fiscal capacity.
| Indicator | Baseline | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2045 | Measurement Body |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crude oil share of merchandise exports | 95.2% (2024) | 85% | 78% | 70% | 60% | Central Bank / Customs |
| Salaries and pensions as a share of the budget | 42.7%, working figure (2024) | ≤40% | ≤37% | ≤34% | ≤30% | Ministry of Finance |
| Private-sector credit / GDP | 12.2% (2024) | 18% | 25% | 32% | 40% | Central Bank / Statistics Authority |
| GEMS or its national replacement | 21/100 (2022) | 45 | 60 | 75 | 85 | Ministry of Planning / Digital Transformation Centre |
| Services with full interoperability | Baseline to be established in 2027 | 40% | 65% | 85% | 100% | Government Data Centre |
| Overall poverty | 17.5% (2024) | 12% | 9% | 7% | 5% | Statistics Authority |
| Female economic activity | 13.1% (2024) | 18% | 24% | 30% | 36% | Labour Force Survey / census |
| Rural connection to the sewerage network | 14.93% (2024) | 25% | 40% | 60% | 75% | Statistics Authority / municipalities |
| Rural illiteracy | 23.04% (2024) | 17% | 12% | 8% | 5% | Statistics Authority / Education |
| Programme expenditure linked to the plan | Baseline to be established in 2027 | 60% | 80% | 90% | 100% | Planning and Finance |
| Projects with regular time and cost reporting | Baseline to be established in 2027 | 70% | 90% | 100% | 100% | National Projects Platform |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
15. National Policies and Programmes
| Code | Programme | Implementation Content |
|---|---|---|
| P1 | National Delivery and Performance Centre | Government priority portfolio, resolution of conflicting powers, performance contracts, and monthly and quarterly reviews. |
| P2 | Linking Plans, Budgets and Implementation | Programme budgeting, a medium-term expenditure framework, and a project feasibility and readiness gate. |
| P3 | Civil Service and Procedural Reform | Job classification, competencies, mobility and redeployment, and simplification of 100 high-friction services. |
| P4 | A State of Data and Interoperability | Unified identifiers, data exchange, core registers, data protection and end-to-end digital services. |
| P5 | A Fiscal Rule for Transforming Resource Rents | Reference oil price, stabilization fund, ceiling on current expenditure growth, and protection of investment and maintenance. |
| P6 | Integrity by Design and Open Procurement | Electronic purchasing, beneficial ownership, publication of contracts and amendments, and risk-based auditing. |
| P7 | Productive Financing and the Private Sector | Credit guarantees, banking reform, and financing for value chains and small and medium-sized enterprises. |
| P8 | Spatial Equity Contracts | Transfer formula, national service minimums, federal–local outcome contracts and governorate dashboards. |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
Actions in the First 24 Months
• Adopt 20 priority national programmes, each with an accountable owner, outcome indicator and multi-year financing.
• Launch a public dashboard covering the budget, projects, contracts, time, cost and completion rates.
• Re-engineer 25 services in the first year and a further 75 in the second.
• Unify the dictionary for fiscal, population and service data, and codes for bodies and projects.
• Stop listing any new project that does not pass the readiness gate, while addressing the stock of stalled projects.
• Adopt a public-employment transition plan based on natural retirement, redeployment and training, rather than social shock.
Institutional Implementation
16. Implementation Matrix—Governance and Legislation
| Code | Action | Lead | Partners | Legislation | Period | Cost | Financing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D00-A01 | Establish the National Delivery and Performance Centre | Prime Minister's Office | General Secretariat, Planning, Finance, governorates | Regulation / law on the delivery unit and performance contracts | 2027; permanent | Low | Budget + technical assistance |
| D00-A02 | Adopt programme budgeting and the expenditure framework | Finance and Planning | Council of Ministers, Council of Representatives, Board of Supreme Audit | Amend / implement the Financial Management Law and unified instructions | 2027–2030 | Low–medium | Budget + international institutions |
| D00-A03 | National project feasibility and readiness gateway | Ministry of Planning | Finance, ministries, governorates, Board of Supreme Audit | Unified investment and project-listing instructions | 2027–2029 | Medium | Budget + assessment fees |
| D00-A04 | Civil service and job reform | Federal Public Service Council | Finance, Planning, ministries, governorates | Update service, staffing and disciplinary laws | 2027–2035 | Medium | Budget + restructuring savings |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
Governance Principles
• The implementation owner is a named individual, not a “committee” with unclear accountability, supported by a deputy, alternate and decision log.
• Review delivery monthly, outcomes quarterly, and targets and financing annually.
• Escalate delays through a time-bound resolution path: body → minister → delivery centre → Council of Ministers.
• Multi-year programmes do not stop when a minister changes, except through a reasoned decision and an assessment of withdrawal costs.
• Publish exceptions and changes in cost and duration; do not treat them as administrative secrets.
Implementation and Financing
17. Implementation Matrix—Digitalization, Integrity, Economy and Place
| Code | Action | Lead | Partners | Legislation | Period | Cost | Financing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D00-A05 | Interoperability infrastructure and digital services | General Secretariat / National Data Centre | Communications, Planning, Interior, ministries | Data protection law, identity and data exchange, service standards | 2027–2035 | High | Budget + development loans |
| D00-A06 | Open procurement and contract tracking | Planning and Finance | Commission of Integrity, Board of Supreme Audit, contracting bodies | Update contract instructions and require disclosure and beneficial ownership information | 2027–2030 | Medium | Budget + procurement savings |
| D00-A07 | Fiscal rule and stabilization fund | Ministry of Finance | Central Bank, Planning, Council of Representatives | Fiscal rule and stabilization fund law | 2028–2032 | Low institutional cost | Oil surplus under the rule |
| D00-A08 | Programme to deepen productive credit | Central Bank | Banks, development fund, guarantee bodies, private sector | Credit guarantee regulation and banking reform | 2027–2040 | High | Domestic capital + development financing |
| D00-A09 | Spatial equity contracts | Ministry of Planning | Finance, governorates, Statistics Authority | Transfer formula and outcome contract instructions | 2028–2035 | Transformational at sector level | Budget + development funds + partnerships |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
Financing Architecture
| Source | Rule for Use |
|---|---|
| Reallocation and savings | Eliminate duplication, digitalize transactions, consolidate government procurement, and reduce the cost of delays and unready projects. |
| Oil rule | Deposit part of the revenue above the reference price in a stabilization and transformation financing fund. |
| Development financing | Concessional loans and technical grants for data, digitalization and fiscal and administrative reform. |
| Private financing | Bank capital, guarantees and credit for productive projects, not financing for the state's current expenditure. |
| Asset recovery and fines | Direct these legally to prevention, audit and digitalization systems, not one-off expenditure without impact. |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
Risks and Monitoring
18. Risks, Mitigation Mechanisms and Monitoring Dashboard
| Risk | Impact | Mitigation | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|
| Political and administrative resistance | Obstructing laws or stripping them of substance | Public contracts, a reform coalition, gradual sequencing, publication of obstruction costs | Delay exceeding two quarters |
| Oil-price shock | Investment cuts and postponed reform | Stabilization fund, reference price, protection of investment and maintenance | Revenue falling below the trajectory |
| Disruptive salary reform | Protests and loss of public support | Natural retirement, protection of rights, redeployment and training | Increasing complaints / attrition |
| Expansion of the delivery centre | Centralization and bypassing ministries | Clear mandate, ministerial ownership, intervention only on priorities and obstacles | High number of exceptional decisions |
| Manipulation of indicators | Cosmetic improvements or concealed data | Independent audit, multiple sources, published indicator definitions and raw data | Unexplained gaps |
| Privacy and cyber risks | Data breaches and service disruption | Data protection law, security classification, testing, auditing and continuity | High-impact incidents |
| Unequal governorate capability | Unequal benefits | Technical assistance, outcome contracts and financing based on gaps and readiness | Diverging indicators |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
Core Monitoring Dashboard
| Dimension | Indicators | Frequency | Publisher |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resource rents and public finance | Oil share of exports; salaries and pensions share; stabilization fund balance | Annual / quarterly | Finance and Central Bank |
| Implementation capability | Programmes on track; projects within time and cost; obstacles resolved | Monthly / quarterly | Delivery Centre and Planning |
| Digital administration | Service time; complete digitalization; interoperability; user satisfaction | Monthly / quarterly | Data Centre and ministries |
| Integrity | Share of contracts published; competition; cost changes; closure of audit findings | Quarterly | Commission of Integrity and Board of Supreme Audit |
| Productive economy | Private credit / GDP; non-oil exports; formal private-sector jobs | Quarterly / annual | Central Bank and Statistics Authority |
| Spatial equity | Poverty, illiteracy, sewerage and women's activity by governorate / rural area | Annual | Statistics Authority and Planning |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
Methodological Closing
19. Data Gaps and References
Data Gaps Register
| Gap | Requirement | Owner | Closure Deadline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Budget execution, 2023–2025 | Unified tables of allocations / actual expenditure by economic, programme and spatial classification | Ministry of Finance | Before review 1.1 |
| Public projects | National database of time, cost, amendments, stoppages and operation | Planning / Board of Supreme Audit | 2027 |
| Corruption and oversight | Comparable annual series of referrals, recoveries and closure of audit findings | Commission of Integrity / Board of Supreme Audit | Next review |
| Civil service | Employee numbers, jobs, skills, vacancies, retirement and spatial distribution | Finance / Public Service Council | 2027–2028 |
| Government services | Transaction time, backlog, rework, satisfaction and complete digitalization | General Secretariat and ministries | 2027 baseline |
| Sub-governorate poverty and services | District and subdistrict tables linked to allocations and outcomes | Statistics Authority / Planning | When tables become available |
Source: Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on the sources identified in the footnotes.
Principal References
• Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, “The 2024 General Census and Household Surveys: An Integrated Digital Map to Close Iraq's Development Gaps,” 2024–2025.48
• Statistics Authority, reports on actual GDP for 2023 and preliminary estimates for 2024 and 2025.4950
• Central Bank of Iraq, Balance of Payments Report for 2024.51
• Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Monetary Policy Report 2024.52
• Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Economic Report / direct credit data 2024.53
• Ministry of Planning, Government Electronic and Mobile Services Maturity Index, GEMS-2022.54
• Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018–2022 and Iraq's Sustainable Development Vision 2030.5556
• Ministry of Finance, budget law and fiscal archives; Reuters, working figures for the structure of the 2024 budget.5758
• Reuters, Saudi Arabia's 2024 growth figures and Indonesia's deficit rule.5960
• Iraqi Constitution and the laws governing the Commission of Integrity, Board of Supreme Audit and Public Service Council.61
• World Bank, Iraq's Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative validation, 2025.62
Footnotes and Detailed References
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, “The 2024 General Census and Household Surveys: An Integrated Digital Map to Close Iraq's Development Gaps,” official material covering population, urbanization, poverty, illiteracy, economic activity, services and spatial disparities, 2024–2025.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, GDP reports: actual GDP for 2023 and preliminary estimates for 2024; includes the 2022–2024 series and mining and quarrying value added.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Balance of Payments Report for 2024: current account surplus of US$8.37 billion, trade surplus of US$26.69 billion, oil at 95.2% of merchandise exports, and net errors and omissions of negative US$8.02 billion.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Monetary Policy Report 2024; the summary table's foreign reserves figure of IQD 145.3 trillion is used, alongside headline inflation of 4.4% and broad money of IQD 174.0 trillion.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Economic Report / Statistics Portal 2024: direct bank credit to the private sector of IQD 43.94 trillion, approximately 12.2% of nominal GDP.↩︎
Reuters, “Iraq faces 2025 fiscal squeeze amid oil price decline, adviser to PM says,” 10 September 2024; quotes a government economic adviser on the approximately IQD 211 trillion 2024 budget, a deficit of IQD 64 trillion, and salaries and pensions of approximately IQD 90 trillion.↩︎
Iraqi Ministry of Planning, “Government Electronic and Mobile Services Maturity Index, GEMS-2022”: Iraq 21/100, Oman 64/100, 30 services and 13 institutions assessed in Iraq, and zero interoperability across channels.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, “The 2024 General Census and Household Surveys: An Integrated Digital Map to Close Iraq's Development Gaps,” official material covering population, urbanization, poverty, illiteracy, economic activity, services and spatial disparities, 2024–2025.↩︎
Associated Press, preliminary results of Iraq's census in November 2024 estimating the population at approximately 45.4 million; replaced in this chapter by the detailed final result of 46,118,793 subsequently issued by the Iraqi Authority.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Monetary Policy Report 2024.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, “The 2024 General Census and Household Surveys: An Integrated Digital Map to Close Iraq's Development Gaps,” official material covering population, urbanization, poverty, illiteracy, economic activity, services and spatial disparities, 2024–2025.↩︎
Reuters, “Iraq faces 2025 fiscal squeeze amid oil price decline, adviser to PM says,” 10 September 2024.↩︎
Iraqi Ministry of Finance, official website and archives of budget law, execution and debt. Not all detailed execution tables could be extracted in the working environment; aggregate figures reported by a government official were therefore labelled provisional working figures.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, preliminary quarterly / annual GDP estimates for 2025; IQD 330.7 trillion is a preliminary estimate, not an adopted baseline.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, “The 2024 General Census and Household Surveys: An Integrated Digital Map to Close Iraq's Development Gaps,” official material covering population, urbanization, poverty, illiteracy, economic activity, services and spatial disparities, 2024–2025.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Balance of Payments Report for 2024: current account surplus of US$8.37 billion, trade surplus of US$26.69 billion, oil at 95.2% of merchandise exports, and net errors and omissions of negative US$8.02 billion.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Monetary Policy Report 2024.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Economic Report / Statistics Portal 2024: direct bank credit to the private sector of IQD 43.94 trillion, approximately 12.2% of nominal GDP.↩︎
Iraqi Ministry of Planning, “Government Electronic and Mobile Services Maturity Index, GEMS-2022”: Iraq 21/100, Oman 64/100, 30 services and 13 institutions assessed in Iraq, and zero interoperability across channels.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, GDP reports: actual GDP for 2023 and preliminary estimates for 2024.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, preliminary quarterly / annual GDP estimates for 2025.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, GDP reports: actual GDP for 2023 and preliminary estimates for 2024.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, preliminary quarterly / annual GDP estimates for 2025.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, “The 2024 General Census and Household Surveys: An Integrated Digital Map to Close Iraq's Development Gaps,” official material covering population, urbanization, poverty, illiteracy, economic activity, services and spatial disparities, 2024–2025.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Balance of Payments Report for 2024: current account surplus of US$8.37 billion, trade surplus of US$26.69 billion, oil at 95.2% of merchandise exports, and net errors and omissions of negative US$8.02 billion.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Monetary Policy Report 2024.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Balance of Payments Report for 2024: current account surplus of US$8.37 billion, trade surplus of US$26.69 billion, oil at 95.2% of merchandise exports, and net errors and omissions of negative US$8.02 billion.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Economic Report / Statistics Portal 2024: direct bank credit to the private sector of IQD 43.94 trillion, approximately 12.2% of nominal GDP.↩︎
Reuters, “Iraq faces 2025 fiscal squeeze amid oil price decline, adviser to PM says,” 10 September 2024.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, GDP reports: actual GDP for 2023 and preliminary estimates for 2024.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Balance of Payments Report for 2024: current account surplus of US$8.37 billion, trade surplus of US$26.69 billion, oil at 95.2% of merchandise exports, and net errors and omissions of negative US$8.02 billion.↩︎
Reuters, “Iraq faces 2025 fiscal squeeze amid oil price decline, adviser to PM says,” 10 September 2024.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Economic Report / Statistics Portal 2024: direct bank credit to the private sector of IQD 43.94 trillion, approximately 12.2% of nominal GDP.↩︎
Iraqi Ministry of Planning, “Government Electronic and Mobile Services Maturity Index, GEMS-2022”: Iraq 21/100, Oman 64/100, 30 services and 13 institutions assessed in Iraq, and zero interoperability across channels.↩︎
Iraqi Ministry of Planning, “Government Electronic and Mobile Services Maturity Index, GEMS-2022”: Iraq 21/100, Oman 64/100, 30 services and 13 institutions assessed in Iraq, and zero interoperability across channels.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, “The 2024 General Census and Household Surveys: An Integrated Digital Map to Close Iraq's Development Gaps,” official material covering population, urbanization, poverty, illiteracy, economic activity, services and spatial disparities, 2024–2025.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Balance of Payments Report for 2024: current account surplus of US$8.37 billion, trade surplus of US$26.69 billion, oil at 95.2% of merchandise exports, and net errors and omissions of negative US$8.02 billion.↩︎
Republic of Iraq, Constitution of 2005 and the laws governing the Commission of Integrity and illicit enrichment, the Federal Board of Supreme Audit and the Federal Public Service Council; used here to establish the institutional and oversight framework, not to measure actual effectiveness.↩︎
Iraqi Ministry of Planning, introduction to the National Development Plan 2018–2022; an official diagnosis of the difficulty of developing medium- and long-term visions, prioritizing and integrating programmes within an annual approach.↩︎
Iraqi Ministry of Planning, “Iraq's Sustainable Development Vision 2030: The Future We Aspire To”; emphasizes institutional and quantitative links between ministry and governorate efforts and national priorities.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, “The 2024 General Census and Household Surveys: An Integrated Digital Map to Close Iraq's Development Gaps,” official material covering population, urbanization, poverty, illiteracy, economic activity, services and spatial disparities, 2024–2025.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, “The 2024 General Census and Household Surveys: An Integrated Digital Map to Close Iraq's Development Gaps,” official material covering population, urbanization, poverty, illiteracy, economic activity, services and spatial disparities, 2024–2025.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, “The 2024 General Census and Household Surveys: An Integrated Digital Map to Close Iraq's Development Gaps,” official material covering population, urbanization, poverty, illiteracy, economic activity, services and spatial disparities, 2024–2025.↩︎
Iraqi Ministry of Planning, “Government Electronic and Mobile Services Maturity Index, GEMS-2022”: Iraq 21/100, Oman 64/100, 30 services and 13 institutions assessed in Iraq, and zero interoperability across channels.↩︎
Reuters, “Saudi Arabia says GDP grew 1.3% in 2024, lifted by non oil sector,” 30 January 2025; non-oil growth of 4.3% and overall GDP growth of 1.3%.↩︎
Reuters, “Indonesia will keep budget deficit below 3% of GDP…,” 3 March 2026; the statutory 3% deficit ceiling is a reference point for Indonesian fiscal policy.↩︎
World Bank, “Iraq Makes Strides in Extractives Transparency with EITI Validation Milestone,” 14 May 2025; validation against the 2019 Standard completed with 27 corrective actions outstanding before the 2027 cycle.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, “The 2024 General Census and Household Surveys: An Integrated Digital Map to Close Iraq's Development Gaps,” official material covering population, urbanization, poverty, illiteracy, economic activity, services and spatial disparities, 2024–2025.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, GDP reports: actual GDP for 2023 and preliminary estimates for 2024.↩︎
Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, preliminary quarterly / annual GDP estimates for 2025.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Balance of Payments Report for 2024: current account surplus of US$8.37 billion, trade surplus of US$26.69 billion, oil at 95.2% of merchandise exports, and net errors and omissions of negative US$8.02 billion.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Monetary Policy Report 2024.↩︎
Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Economic Report / Statistics Portal 2024: direct bank credit to the private sector of IQD 43.94 trillion, approximately 12.2% of nominal GDP.↩︎
Iraqi Ministry of Planning, “Government Electronic and Mobile Services Maturity Index, GEMS-2022”: Iraq 21/100, Oman 64/100, 30 services and 13 institutions assessed in Iraq, and zero interoperability across channels.↩︎
Iraqi Ministry of Planning, introduction to the National Development Plan 2018–2022.↩︎
Iraqi Ministry of Planning, “Iraq's Sustainable Development Vision 2030: The Future We Aspire To.”↩︎
Reuters, “Iraq faces 2025 fiscal squeeze amid oil price decline, adviser to PM says,” 10 September 2024.↩︎
Iraqi Ministry of Finance, official website and archives of budget law, execution and debt. Not all detailed execution tables could be extracted in the working environment.↩︎
Reuters, “Saudi Arabia says GDP grew 1.3% in 2024, lifted by non oil sector,” 30 January 2025.↩︎
Reuters, “Indonesia will keep budget deficit below 3% of GDP…,” 3 March 2026.↩︎
Republic of Iraq, Constitution of 2005 and the laws governing the Commission of Integrity and illicit enrichment, the Federal Board of Supreme Audit and the Federal Public Service Council.↩︎
World Bank, “Iraq Makes Strides in Extractives Transparency with EITI Validation Milestone,” 14 May 2025.↩︎