Confronting Despair, Emigration and Withdrawal

1. Executive Summary

This chapter treats “despair” as a social and institutional phenomenon: diminished expectations that the future will improve and declining belief that individual or collective action can change outcomes. It does not use the term as a psychological diagnosis of society. It also distinguishes migration intentions from actual migration from the outset: the finding that 35% of Iraqi adults in 2021–2022 said they had considered emigrating does not mean 35% will leave. Intentions signal assessments of the future, while actual behaviour is shaped by resources, networks, constraints and opportunities.¹

The strongest baseline shows a young Iraqi population under considerable pressure in the transition from education to employment. The 2021 Labour Force Survey recorded unemployment of 16.5%, youth unemployment among those aged 15–24 of 35.8%, and a NEET rate of 36.7%, with a severe gap affecting young women. Opinion data nevertheless do not depict “universal despair”: in 2024, trust in government stood at 34%, in the legal/judicial system at 42%, and in police at 71%, while 38% reported optimism about the economy's future. The diagnosis is therefore a gap between aspiration and a feasible pathway, not a cultural judgment about Iraqis.²

For individuals, emigration may be a rational and legitimate decision: higher pay, better education or research, safety, a career path or a future for the family. It becomes a strategic problem when movement is large, sustained and concentrated among young and skilled people, without being balanced by return, knowledge transfer or investment. The state then loses not only people but human, institutional, entrepreneurial and social capital, weakening its ability to train the next generation and carry out transformation.

The chapter defines “practical hope” as a desirable future, a realistic pathway, a tangible ability to act and visible evidence that institutions respond. Building hope is therefore not a media campaign: it is fair recruitment, a completed project, a complaint that produces a response, a known career path and a reliable legal rule. Visible early results become evidence of reform's credibility rather than a means of marketing it.

The Vision does not seek “zero migration”. It seeks to reduce emigration driven by blocked opportunities and injustice, make staying more attractive, and transform relations with Iraqis abroad from an unclear numerical issue into networks of knowledge, investment and contribution. The distinction between brain drain, brain gain and brain circulation is that between one-way movement depleting the available stock, movement producing skills and relationships, and an ongoing cycle enabling contribution and temporary or permanent return.³

Part One concludes with the model of the “capable citizen”: someone who belongs to the shared state, has rights and duties, respects fair rules and possesses initiative, skills and agency, enabling them to build inside or outside Iraq without severing ties with it. The question then moves to Part Two: what form of state, sovereignty and governance can translate this citizen into national capacity?

2. From a Rule-Governed State to a State of Possible Futures

The third chapter established that fair, clear and predictable rules reduce dependence on favouritism and personal relationships and increase trust. Predictability alone, however, is insufficient. Citizens may know the rules yet remain convinced that their professional, academic or family lives cannot advance within the country. This chapter therefore adds a new question: do citizens see a future worth investing years of their lives in?⁴

Figure 1: Part One's progression from belonging to capability | Prepared by the Iraq Vision 2045 team based on chapters V1-D01-C01–C04, 2026.

Patriotism gives belonging meaning; citizenship provides rights, duties and participation tools; law provides general rules that reduce uncertainty; and this chapter adds pathways and agency. Part One's structure thus progresses from “What do we feel?”, “What are our rights and duties?” and “How do rules work?” to “Can we build?”

3. The Chapter's Defining Concepts

Table 1: Conceptual glossary | Source: detailed research report V1-D01-C04 and migration and agency literature | Data year: 2026 | Unit: operational definition.

4. The Iraqi Baseline: What Do We Actually Know?

The fundamental measurement rule is not to combine stocks, flows, intentions, asylum, irregular migration and brain drain into one figure. Stock describes people living abroad at a particular moment; flow describes movement over a period; intention is an attitude; an asylum application is a legal procedure; and irregular migration is a different movement category. Failing to distinguish them produces a politically attractive number that is unusable for public policy.

Table 2: Baseline for migration and withdrawal in Iraq | Sources: UN DESA, Arab Barometer, ILO/CSO/KRSO, EUAA and World Bank.

Table 3: Stock / flow / intention / asylum / brain drain | Note: they must not be combined into one figure.

5. Why Do Iraqis Consider Leaving?

Available data cannot assign a “national causal weight” to each factor. The chapter therefore treats causes at two levels: documented Iraqi pressures and plausible mechanisms to be tested in the 2027 survey. In 2024, 45% described unemployment as the most pressing economic problem, and 76% considered housing a major or moderate problem. Satisfaction with electricity, education, healthcare, streets and waste collection also remained limited. These describe the decision-making environment; they do not independently prove that everyone considering migration does so for the same reason.

Table 4: Push and pull factors and what the Iraqi state can change | Source: detailed research report and Arab Barometer/LFS | Implication: policy targets the viability of staying, not preventing movement.

6. Migration Intentions: A Warning Indicator, Not a Migrant Count

Migration intentions provide an early signal because they ask citizens before desire becomes costly movement. In 2021–2022, young people aged 18–29 were approximately seven percentage points more likely than older adults to consider emigrating, while those with university education or above were approximately eight points more likely than less-educated people. These differences do not establish causation by education or youth; they may also reflect greater mobility, professional aspirations and different networks.

Table 5: Migration intentions by group | Source: Arab Barometer Migration Report | Data decision: rebuild the baseline through the 2027 national survey.

7. Withdrawal Begins Before Crossing Borders

National losses can occur within the country's borders. Citizens who doubt institutions' usefulness may participate less, use intermediaries instead of rules, postpone investing in skills, avoid starting businesses or treat Iraq as a temporary stop. No single behaviour establishes “withdrawal”: informality, for example, may reflect regulatory constraints rather than a psychological attitude. A composite measure is needed in 2027 connecting participation, personal investment, agency and expectations of the future.

Figure 3: The positive cycle of trust and opportunity | Iraq Vision 2045 theory of change | Implication: trust informs decisions to invest in local life; it is not merely a moral value.

8. Emigration as an Individual Solution and a National Problem

Table 6: Individual decisions versus national effects | Source: Iraq Vision 2045 analysis and migration and development literature.

9. Why Does a Country Weaken When Its Capable People Leave?

“Capable people” are not only degree holders. The term includes doctors, engineers, researchers, nurses, professors, technicians, skilled workers, entrepreneurs, managers, craftspeople, artists, athletes, enterprising young people and those with institutional expertise. What matters is how difficult the skill is to replace and its connection to production, services, leadership or accumulated knowledge.

Table 7: Channels of human-capital loss | Note: Iraq has no unified aggregate brain-drain figure; sectoral estimation is deferred to Part Five.

10. Young People: An Opportunity That Can Become a Drain

The 2024 census recorded a population of 46.119 million, with 35.9% under 15 and 60.4% aged 15–64. This structure gives Iraq an important demographic window, but it does not automatically become a source of strength. The 2021 survey showed youth unemployment of 35.8% and a NEET rate of 36.7%, rising to 52.3% among young women compared with 22.1% among young men, alongside female labour-force participation of 10.6%.⁵⁶

This chapter does not treat unemployment as the sole explanation or provide a complete labour-market policy; those tasks belong to the economic and human-resources parts. Its role here is to establish that the decision to stay is shaped by the transition from education to independence: a first job, promotion prospects, housing, the ability to start a business and institutions that reward effort.

11. Trust in the Future, Not Only in Government

Trust in the current government is a fluctuating political and institutional variable. Confidence in the possibility of building a life in Iraq is broader. Citizens can criticise a government or parliament while believing the state can be reformed and coming years may offer a path forward. The reverse is also true: they may be satisfied with a particular service while seeing no long-term professional or family pathway.

The Vision therefore proposes measuring five things separately: trust in institutions; expectations of improvement over the next five years; perceived capacity for professional advancement; individual and collective agency; and migration intentions. According to the research report, optimism about the economy's future rose to 38% in 2024 from 29% in 2022, demonstrating that expectations can shift. It does not establish that overall trust is now high or that migration's causes have disappeared.

12. Practical Hope, Not Illusion

Hope here is a policy variable, not a personal-development programme. The state cannot order citizens to be optimistic, but it can reduce the distance between effort and outcome. A fair competition, a procedure with a published deadline, a completed project, a loan awarded by clear criteria, a university research pathway, a start-up growing without extortion or a complaint producing a correction are modest pieces of evidence. Their accumulation changes citizens' expectations about whether action is worthwhile.

Figure 4/illustrative table: The practical hope model | Source: detailed research report and agency/future-expectations literature; not a clinical psychological measure.

“Early visible wins” enter here as a test of credibility. They should not be showcase projects detached from priorities, but relatively small reforms whose results citizens can verify and that establish a realistic belief in the feasibility of the wider course of reform.

13. From “Nothing Changes” to “I Can Make a Difference”

Individual agency is citizens' sense that their choices and decisions change their path. Collective agency is the belief that organised action with others can produce public impact. This differs from the intensity of political activity. Citizens can exercise agency through businesses, professional associations, neighbourhood councils, innovation, complaints or local initiatives.

The instruments that build agency are not “calls to participate”, but institutional designs that give participation consequences: published project indicators, local budgets open to discussion, youth councils with agendas and official responses, proposal platforms with response deadlines, innovation competitions tied to implementation and competitive recruitment with auditable results. Token participation asks for young people's presence or opinions without authority or follow-up. Meaningful participation makes clear who listens, what they decide and what changed.

14. Migration Is Not Always a Net Loss

Migrants may send remittances, open markets, transfer technology, train teams, establish businesses between countries, connect Iraqi universities to research networks or return with expertise. The chapter therefore uses neither remittances to justify skills depletion nor skills depletion to deny migration's benefits. The question is net national capacity and whether channels for contribution, return and circulation function.

Figure 5: Brain drain / brain gain / brain circulation | Source: OECD and World Bank work on migration, development and diaspora networks.

The chapter's principle: Iraq does not need to bring back every Iraqi abroad. It needs the ability to benefit from its human capital wherever it is, while making return, work and investment within Iraq increasingly attractive choices.

15. The Iraqi Diaspora: From an Unknown Number to a National Network

UN DESA estimates the migrant stock originating from Iraq at 2,313,028 in 2024. This is a “statistical core”, not a diaspora census: it is not necessarily equivalent to Iraqi citizens abroad, dual nationals or subsequent generations connected to Iraq. The launch of the National Migration Plan in 2025 also used an approximate figure of “around two million Iraqis”. This reflects different definitions and policy communication, not a reason to merge the two figures.⁷⁸

The question therefore shifts from “How many Iraqis are abroad?” to “What skills, networks, investments and capabilities exist, and what institutional channel can turn them into contributions?” Iraq's statistical initiative collecting information from Iraqis abroad is useful for mapping skills, but it is voluntary and cannot alone estimate the diaspora's size or nationally representative shares of reasons for emigration.⁹

Table 8: Degrees of diaspora engagement | Success criterion: the contribution of Iraqi human capital, not only the number of returnees.

16. A Diaspora Engagement Policy

The national policy needed begins by serving the relationship rather than demanding return. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs leads external networks and relations; the Ministry of Planning leads measurement and data; the Ministry of Migration and Displacement leads its migration and return mandates; and professional-sector ministries lead sector-specific retention. A parallel body is unnecessary if existing institutions can be connected through a data protocol and clear responsibilities.

The initial package includes a voluntary skills register, a global Iraqi professional network, short fellowships, research contributions and remote training, mentorship, university partnerships, temporary expert contracts, investment windows, easier recognition of qualifications and digital consular services. The network's value is measured through projects and outputs, not the number of registered names.

17. Staying Must Be a Competitive Choice

Retention policy needs merit-based jobs and career paths, research environments and equipment, legal security, housing, transport, schools and services, enterprise finance, advancement opportunities and connections to the global economy. Some instruments have medium costs and can begin early. Others have “high, transformational” costs because they require reform of the economy, cities, education and research; responsibility therefore extends across the Vision's other parts.

18. Circular Migration and Flexible Return

Return is not a binary event: “returned/did not return”. Researchers may contribute from abroad, doctors may return for three months, entrepreneurs may work between countries, and others may settle permanently. Policy is therefore measured through knowledge, investment, research, training and post-return retention outcomes, not merely the number of “returnee” records. This perspective also prevents unjustified discrimination between returnees and those who remained in Iraq.

19. International Experience: Transfer the Mechanism, Not the Society

Table 9: Focused international comparison | Sources: official Irish policies, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, World Bank/OECD.

20. The Citizen We Need in Iraq in 2045

This section constructs neither an “ideal citizen” nor an obedient one. It brings together the four chapters in a single operational definition: the capable citizen is an equal member of the shared state who knows their rights and responsibilities, respects fair rules and demands that the state respect them, and possesses skills, agency and initiative to build a path and participate in public life without dependence on political rents or personal connections.

Figure 6/table: The capable citizen in Iraq in 2045 | Source: synthesis of V1-D01-C01–C04; not an ideological template or a condition for rights.

21. Iraq Vision 2045: From a State That Drives Young People Away to One That Competes for Talent

22. Transition Stages, 2027–2045

Table 10: Transition stages, 2027–2045 | Targets are policy commitments, not automatic forecasts.

23. Indicator and Target Dashboard

“Migrant numbers” are not the ultimate KPI. They may fall because travel has become harder or rise because citizens are wealthier and better able to study and work globally. The dashboard therefore measures causes, behaviour and skills circulation. B denotes the national baseline to be established in the 2027 survey; targets will be recalibrated after the first wave.

Table 11: Indicator and target dashboard | B = 2027 baseline; relative values are strategic proposals to be recalibrated after the survey.

24. Future Confidence and Attractiveness of Staying Index

An initial composite index can be developed, but must not receive a current score before a foundational survey. Proposed components are employment opportunity, income sufficient for independent living, merit, housing, services, security and law, quality of education/training, career pathways, civic agency and expectations of improved life within five years.

Several questions per dimension are converted to a 0–100 scale. The pilot begins with equal weights, then tests factor structure, internal consistency and measurement invariance across sex, age, governorate and education. “Do you want to migrate?” is excluded from the index itself; migration intention remains a separate outcome variable to avoid circular inference. Approval requires at least two pilot waves and explanatory power for independent outcomes such as investment in skills, business formation and intentions.¹⁰

25. The Highest-Impact Implementation Programmes

Table 12: Implementation programme package | Source: detailed research report; begin with nine interconnected programmes, not twenty separate initiatives.

26. Implementation Matrix

Table 13: Unified implementation matrix | Note: any linkage of movement data must be statistical, anonymised and purpose-limited, with the Ministry of Interior providing a supporting data role.

27. Institutions and Responsibilities

The Council of Ministers establishes the national framework, resolves overlapping mandates and prevents retention from becoming restrictions. The Ministry of Planning and Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority own measurement systems, baselines and the observatory. The Ministry of Migration and Displacement leads its migration and return policy mandates. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies and consulates lead state relations with networks abroad and digital services. The Ministry of Labour and Federal Public Service Council lead merit-based transitions and public employment, while the Ministry of Higher Education and universities lead recognition of experience and temporary academic return. The Ministry of Health leads health-skills programmes within its sectoral chapter.

The Ministry of Education develops the early skills and expectations that precede migration decisions, and the Ministry of Youth and Sports participates in local agency channels. The Central Bank and Investment Commission measure and support financial and investment channels. Governorates are responsible for visible local results; professional associations define occupations and skills and participate in recognition; private businesses and incubators provide professional and entrepreneurial pathways; and civil society monitors participation and rights protection. The Ministry of Interior supports flow measurement through entry and exit data subject to privacy safeguards.

28. Funding and Costs

Cost framework: this chapter provides no aggregate financial figure before detailed design and feasibility studies.

A large fund or “diaspora bonds” are not currently recommended merely because a diaspora exists. Financial instruments require institutional trust, legislation, returns and risks that can be priced. They should not precede development of the platform, data and investment opportunities themselves.

29. 2045 Scenarios

Table 14: These scenarios do not forecast population figures; they clarify policy choices and risk pathways.

30. The Cost of Inaction

No database supports declaring that “brain drain costs X billion dollars”. The correct method is sectoral and auditable: education and training costs + service-gap costs + replacement costs + lost productivity/innovation + fiscal losses, minus measurable benefits from remittances, investment, knowledge transfer and return. Double counting must be avoided: lost income must not be counted again within lost services.¹¹

31. Rights Safeguards

Nor may the “capable citizen” become a political or ideological template. Citizens have the right to oppose, criticise and withdraw from political activities they do not wish to join. Agency does not mean imposing constant participation, but making channels accessible and effective for those who choose to use them.

32. Risk Matrix

Table 15: Risk matrix | Annual review alongside the indicator dashboard; the greatest risk is treating migration before addressing the factors driving people away.

33. Conclusion: Closing Part One

Part One completes the citizen-development sequence through four interconnected layers: belonging to a shared state; full membership with knowledge of rights and responsibilities; discipline within fair, predictable rules; and the capacity to initiate, learn, work, participate and build a future. The state needs a capable citizen, not an “obedient citizen”, and does not measure patriotism by residence or support for the government.

The chapter's central conclusion is that staying cannot be commanded and hope cannot be produced through rhetoric. A state seeking to retain its most capable citizens must compete for their futures. Migration remains a right and a normal form of movement in an open economy. What must change is a situation in which “leaving” is always the most rational choice because opportunity and justice are blocked.

Figure 7: The bridge from Part One to Part Two | Source: Iraq Vision 2045 structure; this chapter does not begin designing “The State First”, but passes the question to it.

Core References

1. Iraq Vision 2045: Operational Guide, official index and final chapters V1-D00-C01–C03 and V1-D01-C01–C03, versions 1.0, 2026.

2. UN DESA, International Migrant Stock 2024 by Origin, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.

3. Arab Barometer, Wave VII Migration Report (Iraq, 2021–2022), and Wave VIII Iraq Public Opinion Report/fieldwork 2024.

4. CSO/KRSO & ILO, Iraq Labour Force Survey 2021, national household survey, Iraq.

5. Ministry of Planning/Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, final results of the 2024 General Population and Housing Census.

6. EUAA, Iraq country guidance and EU+ asylum trends/recognition data, 2023–2024.

7. IOM, Iraq launches its first National Plan to Promote Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 2025; Migration Governance Indicators, Iraq Second Profile.

8. World Bank, Personal remittances received (% of GDP), Iraq 2024; Migration and Brain Drain; diaspora networks and migration-development literature.

9. OECD, Effects of Migration on Sending Countries; International Migration Outlook 2025; studies on skills and return.

10. Government of Ireland, Global Ireland / diaspora engagement progress materials; Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, diaspora engagement materials.

11. QuantMig, literature review on migration aspirations, intentions and realized migration behavior.

12. Detailed research report V1-D01-C04, “Confronting Despair, Emigration and Withdrawal”, data freeze 12 August 2026.

35. Data Gap Register

Data gap register: a gap is an outcome to remedy, not justification for a hypothetical figure.