Why Is Technology Part of Sovereignty?

Chapter Overview

1. Executive Summary

Part Six begins with a reality different from that of traditional infrastructure: technology is no longer merely another sector of the economy. It is an operating layer running through the state, military, banks, hospitals, universities, factories, water, energy, transport and media. As these functions become more digital, elements of public capability move from buildings, employees and machines into software, data, networks, cloud services, computing and algorithms. The sovereign questions therefore become: who understands this layer, and who can operate it if the supplier changes, service is interrupted, or a political, commercial or security restriction arises? ⁸

Iraq has a broad base of technology use, but that is not equivalent to full technological capability. World Bank data show that around 81% of the population used the internet in 2024. Iraq scored 73.9 out of 100 in the International Telecommunication Union’s 2024 ICT Development Index. Yet a World Bank field survey conducted in federal Iraq in 2023 found that only 25% of respondents reported adequate computer skills, and only 5% reported adequate programming skills. Use is therefore far more widespread than the ability to produce, modify and develop technology. ^{1 2 3}

The digital state displays a similar gap. The United Nations E-Government Survey 2024 placed Iraq in the middle development group, with an EGDI score of 0.4572 and a global ranking of 148. Meanwhile, the National Centre for Digital Transformation was established under the 2025 instructions governing the formations of the Prime Minister’s Office. It now presents a national cloud, a secure government network connecting more than 500 entities, and a data management and exchange platform. These are important signs of institution building, but they do not yet establish that the state’s critical technological dependencies are known, measured and replaceable. ^{4 5}

In artificial intelligence, the state has also moved from scattered use towards a national framework. The National Centre for Artificial Intelligence presents a preliminary strategy running from 2026 to 2050 and puts its completion at 40% in 2026. In April 2026, the Ministry of Planning discussed a national Iraqi language model project (Iraq LLM) and infrastructure combining local servers with cloud services. This does not mean Iraq must build a global foundation model or chip factories from scratch. It means that the state has begun asking questions about ownership, data, computing and adaptation, rather than simply buying applications. ^{6 7}

The Vision proposes a selective definition of technological sovereignty: Iraq’s ability to identify the technologies critical to its national functions, understand their dependencies, and own or secure sufficient skills, data, computing, contractual rights, open standards and alternatives to retain freedom of decision, continuity and development. Non-critical technologies can be purchased from the market at the best cost. Technologies that are critical but replaceable require diversification and portability. Those that are critical and not replaceable require deeper national capability or a partnership that guarantees knowledge and operational control.

By 2045, the result should not be measured by the number of applications, data centres or slogans about “national technology”. It should be measured by the state’s ability to operate critical functions during a shock, change suppliers without collapse, audit algorithms, data and contracts, adapt technology to Arabic and to Iraq, produce an increasing share of value and knowledge locally, and participate in standards and partnerships from a position with alternatives rather than one of dependence.

2. From Human Capital to Technological Capability

Part Five ended with people who are educated, trained, healthy and able to work, and with a network of Iraqi expertise at home and abroad. But human capital does not automatically become national capability. Iraq’s best programmers may work on foreign platforms; its best universities may use tools their laboratories have no right to modify; and a ministry may depend on a system its staff cannot recover or migrate when the supplier’s contract ends. This is where Part Six begins: human capability is a prerequisite, but it needs institutions, assets, standards, funding and contracts that turn individual knowledge into reproducible capability.

The transition from people to technology is not a move from the “social” to the “technical”. It is a move from developing the individual to developing the system that multiplies that individual’s impact. A programmer working within open infrastructure, with reliable data, suitable computing resources and interoperable standards, produces greater capability than one working in closed silos. The question therefore becomes: what infrastructure enables Iraqi skills to work for Iraq even as companies, products and technological generations change?

3. The Central Question and the Chapter’s Scope

The central question is: what minimum knowledge, data, computing, software, standards, industrial capability and contractual capability must Iraq possess or secure so that digitalising the state and economy does not create strategic dependence beyond its control?

This chapter sets out the general doctrine without detailing the instruments of every technology. It leaves research and university funding to V3-D06-C02, the innovation and start-up ecosystem to C03, detailed discussion of artificial intelligence and computing to C04, public digital infrastructure to C05, data sovereignty and cybersecurity to C06, and advanced industry, robotics and semiconductors to C07. Its role is to establish when technology becomes an issue of sovereignty and what degree of capability is required.

• “Sovereign” must not be used to justify government monopoly or more expensive purchasing without a return.

• Hosting within Iraq alone is not assumed to deliver sovereignty; a locally hosted system may still be closed, unmaintainable or impossible to replace.

• Open source is not assumed to be automatically free or secure; it requires operational, maintenance and governance capability.

• External dependence is not assumed to mean subordination; it becomes dangerous when it is critical, concentrated and short of alternatives, and the state lacks the right to exit or continue operating.

4. Definitions and Measurement Rules

5. The Iraqi Baseline: Widespread Use, Incomplete Capability

Table 1: Concise technological baseline. Sources ¹–⁷.

This baseline rules out two opposing narratives. The first is that Iraq is “entirely technologically backward”; this is untrue, because connectivity is widespread and new government institutions, platforms and capabilities exist. The second is that widespread internet access means entry into the knowledge economy; this too is untrue, because computer and programming skills, government service maturity, knowledge of dependencies, and the ability to adapt and produce technology are not at the same level.

Geographical and population-group disparities require better measurement. The survey providing detailed digital skills data covers federal Iraq and cannot by itself establish a comprehensive national baseline for the governorates and the Kurdistan Region. National connectivity indicators also conceal differences in speed, cost, devices and the ability to use technology productively. The Vision therefore begins in 2027 and 2028 with a national survey of skills and dependencies, rather than inventing unpublished local percentages.

6. Why Is Technology Part of Sovereignty?

Traditional sovereignty addresses territory, decision-making, force, borders and resources. The digital state adds operational questions: can the central bank execute payments if a technology provider changes? Can a ministry access its data if a platform stops? Can an electricity network or hospital be updated if the supplier withholds updates or digital spare parts? Can the state audit an algorithm used in a high-impact decision? These are not merely “information technology” questions; they concern the continuity of public decision-making.

Technology affects sovereignty in three ways. First, it multiplies capability: good data, computing and software enable a small institution to accomplish what once required a huge apparatus. Second, it relocates failure points: a function that depended on a building and an employee may now depend on an encryption key, API, cloud account or software update. Third, it changes the balance of power: those who own knowledge, standards and platforms can set terms for markets, speed, cost and access. It is therefore not enough to “use the latest technology”; we must know how to retain freedom of decision while using it.

7. Knowledge and Computing, Not Resources Alone, Drive the World Ahead

The World Bank’s 2025 report on AI foundations identifies four foundations: connectivity, compute, context/data, and competency/skills. It notes that innovation, computing and start-up financing are highly concentrated in high-income economies. In mid-2025, high-income economies also held 77% of global colocation data-centre capacity, compared with 18% in upper-middle-income economies and only 5% in lower-middle-income economies. This structure means that access to computing has itself become an element of power and negotiation. ^{8 9}

The Vision does not conclude, however, that Iraq should replicate the largest data centres or build expensive frontier models merely for symbolism. The World Development Report 2026 warns that control of advanced models, chips and data centres by a limited number of companies creates dependency risks. But it also warns that pursuing complete “AI sovereignty” may be costly, with uncertain returns. Rational decisions are therefore selective: own what directly affects national functions and sovereignty, and secure diversified access to what can be bought globally. ¹⁰

8. From Normal Imports to Critical Dependence

Every modern economy imports technology to some extent. The problem begins when four characteristics coincide: the function is critical; the supplier or technology is concentrated; migration to an alternative requires unavailable time, data or knowledge; and the contract or architecture gives the user no practical right to exit. The risk then exceeds a simple price increase or delivery delay.

Table 2: Sovereign decision matrix. The concept of open strategic autonomy ¹¹.

This matrix prevents two mistakes: turning every technology purchase into an expensive localisation project, and leaving critical technologies to the logic that “the market will find an alternative” until a crisis arrives. Sovereignty begins with classifying dependence, not with slogans.

9. The Technological Capability Ladder: From User to Capability Owner

Not every ministry should aim for the fifth level. The optimal choice is the minimum level that protects the function and provides appropriate flexibility. A general email platform may require only portability; a national identity platform needs deeper operational, audit and development capabilities; and a very expensive advanced technology may be managed through a multi-source partnership rather than a fully local project.

10. Data and National Context: The Material That Cannot Be Imported in Full

A server or licence can be purchased, but the history of state transactions, records of roads, water, health and land, Iraqi Arabic, and the legal and administrative context that makes a digital model work correctly cannot. Data therefore become a national asset, not in the sense of closing them off, but in the sense of knowing their owner, quality, permitted uses, who accesses them, how they move, and what must remain recoverable and auditable.

The sovereign value of data emerges when the state can use the same asset for multiple functions without creating new silos, when data can move between suppliers, and when a proprietary storage format does not become a barrier to competition. Details of data protection, storage and security remain for V3-D06-C06. Here, the Vision establishes the principle: there is no technological sovereignty without legal and operational control over the data on which a function depends.

11. Computing and Cloud: Control over Decisions, Not Ownership of Every Server

In the age of artificial intelligence, computing is a productive resource. The World Bank describes it as a decisive layer in the ability to use AI and sets out a choice for governments between building local capacity and accessing international cloud services. The Vision rejects a single answer for every workload. Some public services can operate efficiently on a commercial cloud, while critical data or functions require stronger controls, national hosting or an independent recovery copy. ⁸

The National Centre for Digital Transformation announces that it operates the “national cloud” to host government systems and data with high availability and data remaining within the country. This is a useful foundation, but insufficient by itself: workload portability, recovery tests, growth capacity, energy, connectivity, skills and lifecycle costs must all be measured. National hosting without a team capable of operation, or without migration interfaces and standards, may create domestic dependence rather than remove dependence. ⁵

12. Artificial Intelligence as a Force Multiplier: Owning Context and Governance before Owning the Model

Artificial intelligence amplifies what already exists: an organised institution with good data may improve productivity; one with poor data may accelerate error. AI sovereignty therefore begins not with “Who owns the largest model?” but with four questions: do we have suitable data and context? Do we have sufficient computing for the use case? Does an Iraqi team understand and test the model? And do legal responsibility and the ability to make changes remain within the institution?

The Ministry of Planning’s 2026 discussion of Iraq LLM and local and cloud servers is an important example because it shifts the question from buying a foreign service to building Iraqi contextual capability. But this chapter does not decide that a large sovereign model is the best option before testing costs and alternatives. Open or smaller models adapted to Iraq’s language and context may be more viable for some uses. The economic and technical detail belongs in V3-D06-C04. ^{7 10}

13. Software, Standards and Openness: Freedom to Migrate Is Part of Strength

Technology suppliers create dependence not only through intellectual property, but also through data formats, closed interfaces and licences that make migration costly or impossible. Vision 2045 therefore makes interoperability and portability default requirements for new government systems, particularly those sharing data or building a long-lived national service.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s experience with “digital public goods” highlights that open software and standards can reduce vendor lock-in by allowing the state to adopt, modify and scale while retaining greater flexibility. The European Union’s Data Act experience makes easier switching between cloud providers and interoperability explicit regulatory objectives. The lesson for Iraq is not to impose open source on every project, but to require exit capability, standards and interfaces wherever the sovereign cost of lock-in is high. ^{12 13}

14. Components and Supply Chains: Sovereignty Does Not Equal a Chip Factory

Chips, network equipment, storage systems, sensors, robots, satellites, batteries and control components all serve civilian and military functions. Building an entire supply chain within Iraq, however, is neither realistic nor necessary in the near term. What is needed is to identify critical components, diversify suppliers, set safety stocks where risk justifies them, possess inspection, maintenance and repair capabilities, and select a few fields in which Iraq can produce local or regional value.

International experiences of technological sovereignty do not rest on self-sufficiency. The OECD’s 2026 policy dashboard defines strategic autonomy as reducing critical foreign dependencies while preserving cooperation, markets and research networks. Comparative literature describes countries combining “protect, promote and project”: protect sensitive functions, promote domestic capabilities, and build external alliances, standards and partnerships. ¹¹

15. Public Procurement: The Largest Immediately Available Lever for Sovereignty

The state need not wait for a large technology industry to begin. Every software, cloud or control-system contract is an architectural decision for ten years or more. A contract that requires documentation, open interfaces, data rights, a migration plan, training, acceptance testing and continuity builds capability. One that purchases a closed product without these conditions may buy a function while simultaneously creating a point of dependence.

Table 3: Proposed minimum requirements for critical technology procurement.

16. International Partnerships and Capability Transfer: Beyond Replacing One Supplier with Another

Iraq will remain an importer and partner in technology, and this is no deficiency. Strength comes from how partnerships are structured: a single supplier over many years, without knowledge or alternatives, creates vulnerability; a diverse network of partners transferring knowledge, accepting interoperability and allowing the Iraqi institution to manage the asset increases autonomy. A partnership is therefore measured by what remains after the contract ends: staff, documentation, processes, data, rights, a laboratory, local suppliers or the ability to compete in the next procurement.

Technology partnerships also require geographical and functional diversification. The best computing partner may differ from the best partner for technical education or precision industries. Iraq should also use universities, scholarship programmes and the diaspora addressed in the preceding chapter as knowledge bridges, rather than confining technological relationships to government purchasing contracts.

17. The Doctrine of Selective Sovereignty: Own What Is Necessary and Secure What Can Be Bought

Full technological sovereignty in every field is uneconomic even for larger countries. The Vision therefore adopts “selective sovereignty”: a limited list of functions and technologies that justify deep national capability, and a wider list for which diversified access and portability suffice. Priority is determined not by a technology’s prominence but by the impact of its interruption on the state, economy and security, supplier concentration, replacement time and opportunities for local learning.

18. International Comparisons: Transfer the Mechanism, Not the Country

Europe offers the mechanism of “open strategic autonomy”: reducing critical dependence without closing the market, using protection, promotion and partnership instruments. European cloud regulation offers portability and interoperability to counter vendor lock-in. The digital public goods movement offers the idea that openness in code and standards can be an instrument of sovereignty where local operational and maintenance capability exists. The World Bank report offers the “four Cs”: connectivity, compute, context and competency. ^{8 11 12 13}

What should not be transferred is spending levels, institutional names or an attempt to imitate major semiconductor supply chains. Iraq needs a decision mechanism suited to its size, resources and needs: identify dependence, measure criticality, choose the depth of capability, purchase with exit provisions, build skills and review risk regularly.

19. Iraq’s Technological Position in 2045

In Iraq in 2045, a ministry’s first question will not be “Which software should we buy?” but “What is the function, what are its data and dependencies, and what level of sovereignty does it require?” Every critical system will be recorded in a national dependency register, with a technical owner, an outcome owner, a continuity plan and an exit test. National and multi-provider cloud infrastructure will reflect risk; government standards will make data and interfaces portable; and Iraqi skills will enable systems to be operated and modified, not merely used.

Artificial intelligence will become an instrument of the state and economy, not a procurement fashion: models selected by task, Iraqi data organised, computing available through a local and global mix, and high-impact decisions auditable. Universities and companies will help build some capabilities, while the state connects to global markets and alliances in science and standards without tying an entire national function to a key held by a single party.

20. Transformation Stages from 2027 to 2045

21. Indicator and Target Dashboard

Table 4: Targets are policy commitments, not forecasts. Values without a baseline begin with foundational measurement and are not filled with estimates.

The Vision does not use EGDI or IDI rankings as direct sovereignty targets. They are useful external indicators for verification, but do not measure vendor exit capability, depth of operational skills or concentration of dependence. The new national indicators complement rather than replace them.

22. The Implementation Programme Package

Programme 1 — National Review of Technological Dependencies: inventory critical systems, services, components, data and suppliers; classify criticality and replaceability; and update the register annually.

Programme 2 — “Sovereignty by Design” Procurement Standard: a mandatory template for critical contracts covering portability, standards, data rights, documentation, knowledge transfer, exit planning and continuity testing.

Programme 3 — Multilayer National Computing Architecture: classify workloads among the national cloud, commercial cloud, edge computing and backups according to risk and cost, rather than localisation slogans.

Programme 4 — Iraqi Context Assets: inventory the datasets, language resources, dictionaries, standards and maps needed by AI and services, with quality, access rights and documentation; governance details are in C06.

Programme 5 — Interoperability and Portability Laboratory: test APIs, data formats, workload migration, recovery and compatibility between suppliers, and certify test results before purchasing systems with wide-ranging effects.

Programme 6 — Technological Capability Transfer: link contracts and partnerships to testable learning outcomes: an Iraqi team able to operate, update, recover and undertake the next procurement.

Programme 7 — Technology and Strategic Dependence Observatory: monitor technologies, suppliers, standards, export restrictions and cost trends, and submit an annual report to the Council of Ministers on risks and opportunities.

Programme 8 — Open and Diversified Technology Partnerships: a portfolio of university, industrial and international partnerships preventing single-source dependence and connecting Iraq to research networks, standards and markets.

23. Implementation, Cost and Financing Matrix

Table 5: Cost is a relative classification. The chapter does not invent a national financial estimate before project design and lifecycle studies.

24. Risks and Safeguards

25. Governance, Data and Review

The Vision does not need a new “Ministry of Technology”. It needs a clear allocation of functions across existing institutions: the National Centre for Digital Transformation leads government architecture, interoperability and cloud services; the National Centre for Artificial Intelligence leads AI policy within its remit; the National Cybersecurity Centre leads security and resilience; the Ministry of Planning manages indicators and links to the development plan; the Ministry of Higher Education leads research and scientific capabilities; the Ministry of Communications leads infrastructure and the sector; and ministries owning public functions remain responsible for their technological outcomes rather than transferring responsibility to an IT department.

A technological sovereignty subcommittee should be established within an existing government structure, not as an independent executive body, to approve the classification of critical technologies, review the dependency register and decide major procurement exceptions. An annual non-confidential report should show the proportion of systems classified, recovery tests, progress on portability and the capability map, while details of vulnerabilities and sensitive components remain within protected channels.

The doctrine should be reviewed every five years because technology moves faster than legislative cycles. A technology critical in 2030 may become an easily replaceable commodity in 2035, or a new technology may turn a minor dependency today into a major failure point tomorrow. Success means keeping the system able to reclassify and change, rather than freezing a sacred list.

26. Conclusion and Bridge to Research and Development

Sovereignty in the twenty-first century is incomplete with borders, decisions and money if the tools implementing those decisions are not understood or cannot be sustained. Conversely, technological greatness does not mean that the state manufactures everything. A capable state knows what it must own, what it merely needs to manage, what it can buy, what it must diversify and what it can safely leave to the market.

The chapter’s contribution to this part is a doctrine of capability: using technology is not possessing it; hosting is not sovereignty; open source is not capability without skills; partnership is not subordination when decision-making and alternatives remain; and localisation is not success unless it produces knowledge, continuity and value. The question therefore moves to the next chapter: if knowledge is the foundation of technological capability, how should Iraq fund research and development and build universities and innovation centres that connect science to industry and the state?