Implementation Stages

Chapter profile

Table (1): Chapter profile and remit boundaries.

Door Ten follows the doors establishing the citizen, the state, security, the economy, human development, technology, infrastructure, justice and Iraq’s place in the world. This chapter does not repeat the case for every sectoral reform. It addresses the dilemma that can defeat all reforms, however well conceived: how should dependencies be organised between decisions that take days, reforms that take years and capabilities that take a generation? How can they be prevented from stopping whenever the government changes, oil prices fluctuate, drought occurs or a security threat emerges?

A “phase” is therefore not defined here by its number of years alone. It is a package of mandatory capabilities and intermediate outcomes, recognised when documented transition conditions have been met. Education, industry and governance programmes may overlap across phases, but a political or media announcement of a new phase cannot replace a readiness test. This discipline prevents the timetable from becoming an unconditional promise of growth or delivery for which neither financing nor institutions have been established.

Governing principle: the correct sequence is not a rigid, linear “state first, economy second”. It is to build a minimum institutional, financial and service foundation that enables production to begin early, while deepening institutions and productivity through overlapping, measured cycles.

1. Executive summary

Iraq Vision 2045 faces a familiar planning paradox: the state can produce a substantial, technically sound document, but that does not ensure its conversion into services, production or stability. Iraq already has a National Development Plan for 2024–2028, planning, budgeting and oversight institutions, and systems for monitoring investment and projects. The starting point is therefore neither to abolish existing arrangements nor to create a “vision authority” above them. It is to make each existing instrument perform a defined function within one implementation system that sets priorities and links them to funding, accountable officials, data and correction.¹

The current situation reveals three decisive quantitative and institutional signals. In 2024, the Ministry of Planning announced 2,612 stalled projects: 1,321 at ministry level and 1,291 at governorate level. It reported addressing or reactivating 997 of them, but addressing a project’s problems must not be counted as full completion. Iraq’s final 2024 census recorded a population of 46,118,793, a scale at which the costs of delayed services, skills and jobs accumulate rapidly. In the International Monetary Fund’s estimates for 2024, wages and pensions accounted for 22% of GDP, while government revenue remained heavily linked to oil, narrowing fiscal flexibility in the face of shocks.²

The monitoring architecture has, meanwhile, improved. In 2025, the Ministry of Planning established working levels for monitoring the development plan, covering political and technical levels and a committee for liaison, reporting and impact measurement. In September 2026, it presented developments to the IDMS system for finding projects, updating their records and preparing reports. In August 2026, the Ministry of Finance announced continued preparation for programme and performance budgeting, linking allocations to programmes, objectives and results. These mechanisms are an asset to build on, but their existence does not yet establish that all projects are managed from request to operation with verified results and auditable data.³

The vision divides implementation into four integrated phases: 2027–2030 to restore the foundations; 2031–2035 to build reliable institutions capable of reproducing results; 2036–2040 to expand production and diversification once conditions have matured; and 2041–2045 to consolidate capabilities for expansion, renewal and competition. The process begins in the first 100 days by identifying priorities and establishing each outcome owner, baseline, risks and financing, rather than by announcing dozens of new projects.

The document sets out nine shared programmes and acceptance gates for each major project or reform: a legal basis, a baseline, feasibility and options, life-cycle costs and a financing source, procurement readiness, independent monitoring, operational handover and then impact measurement. Across ministries and governorates, delivery is measured not by expenditure alone, but by the asset’s or service’s ability to operate, its equitable distribution and its continuity after a shock. The operational targets presented here are proposed policy commitments requiring baseline verification in 2027, not national figures already achieved.

The five strongest launch decisions are: adopting a limited national portfolio of priorities with measurable outcomes; building a unified register of projects and dependencies using IDMS; gradually linking budget allocations to delivery and operating costs; resolving the stock of stalled projects through reasoned decisions to complete, redesign or terminate them; and establishing a quarterly monitoring and correction cycle that publishes aggregate results while preserving the constitutional independence of oversight bodies, the judiciary and the central bank.

Governing principle: if the first phase does not establish a mechanism for managing continuity, shocks, data and public money, the objectives of later phases will be projections without a driving mechanism. If the first phase remains an administrative repair exercise without tangible production and opportunities, it will not earn the trust and political capacity needed to complete the transformation.

2. The central question and the scope of a phase

The question is not what the government could do during 2027–2045: the list of possible activities is virtually open-ended. A more disciplined question is which legal, financial, institutional and skills arrangements would make a limited set of national outcomes implementable, then scalable, then reproducible under successive governments. This chapter tests three things in every choice: implementation precedence; the state’s current capacity to carry it; and how the state and society will know that the choice resolved the problem rather than transferring it to another budget line or institution.

This chapter concerns the design of timing and dependencies, management of the national portfolio and transitions between phases. It does not set final poverty, growth, energy or export rates, or sectoral outcomes for 2045. These belong to the relevant chapters, Appendix One and C02; missing baseline values are recorded as gaps rather than replaced with a false aggregate figure. Nor does the chapter replace ministry or governorate plans, or select a particular commercial project or partner. It builds a general test that permits comparison and reprioritisation.

3. Implementation terminology and rules of evidence

Table (2): The chapter’s operational definitions.

The chapter distinguishes four types of statement: a “documented fact” with a source and date; an “analytical inference” that follows the evidence without exceeding it; a “planning assumption” used to test a scenario rather than treated as fact; and a “proposed policy decision” requiring authorisation, financing and review. All proposed future coverage percentages in this chapter belong to the fourth category, with some conditional on the results of a 2027 survey.

4. Iraq’s 2024–2026 baseline

Iraq’s situation is neither a blank slate nor a fully interconnected system. The 2024–2028 development plan, its five programmes and the monitoring matrices under development show that planning tools are available and defined in principle. Yet their coexistence with a large number of distressed projects and multiple approval gates reveals a gap between “having a procedure” and “delivering an outcome”. A layered baseline is therefore used, without mixing population, public finance and project data or claiming that one year covers everything.⁴

Table (3): A multi-year baseline dashboard; each value must be read within the limits of its source.⁵

The spatial dimension is especially important. In governorate workshops in late 2025, the Ministry of Planning documented weaknesses in data, coordination and analysis, and the need to strengthen local project preparation. A national plan will therefore be unimplementable if it relies only on nationwide averages or treats every governorate as a miniature capital. A unified template is needed to measure urban and rural services, population shares, deprivation and institutional readiness, with differences in coverage disclosed whenever data for the Region or a particular governorate are absent.⁶

Governing principle: Data Decision V4-D10-C01/01: this chapter does not assign a “national implementation rate for Vision 2045”, a “national financing cost” or a “share of completed projects in Iraq”, because their definitions and denominators are unavailable in a consistent series. They are to be established and reviewed in 2027.

5. Where does the implementation chain break?

Figure (2): The chain from public policy to public benefit; any break creates activity without impact.

Implementation failures recur at seven links. The priority list may expand until real prioritisation disappears; targets may be set before the starting point is verified; a project may enter the budget without land, design, feasibility or operating costs; responsibility may be fragmented among a ministry, governorate and facility; a contract may be executed without a mechanism to measure quality and acceptance; financing may stop in a weak oil-revenue year; or a project record may be closed upon construction completion without measuring the service after opening.

These failures intensify when institutional incentives reward announcing allocations, higher spending rates or more listed projects rather than closing a verified service gap. Improving “performance monitoring” on top of the old incentive structure is therefore insufficient. The decision model must change: no entry to the priority portfolio before definition and feasibility testing; no full funding before implementation conditions are met; and no declaration of closure before operation and benefit are verified. Managers must not be professionally penalised for exposing delays early. Penalties should address concealment or proven misconduct, while early correction should be encouraged.

This principle draws on centre-of-government literature showing that a small “delivery unit” can help resolve dependencies and bottlenecks, but must not become a parallel ministry and cannot compensate for ministries’ resources or oversight bodies’ institutional independence. The challenge is not to build a colourful platform; it is to create a regular decision cycle with accountable officials and the authority to modify or stop unviable activities.⁷

6. Constitutional legitimacy and existing institutions

Article 78 of the Constitution identifies the Prime Minister as the direct executive authority responsible for the state’s general policy. Article 80 empowers the Council of Ministers to plan and implement general policies and plans, supervise ministries, and prepare the draft general budget, final accounts and development plans. Article 114 provides for shared federal and regional authority over development and general planning policies, alongside electricity, water, health and education policies as specified in its text, subject to the other constitutional rules on competence. This framework prevents “central implementation” from being interpreted as an automatic takeover of governorate and regional powers.⁸

Appropriations, oversight and legislation remain within the Council of Representatives’ powers, while the government implements within approved budgets and laws. Federal Financial Management Law No. 6 of 2019, as amended, establishes the legal framework for budgeting and financial and accounting management. A vision document alone therefore cannot create an off-budget financial commitment, exempt a contract from lawful competition or bind a future government to a partisan programme. It can, however, establish a public national framework capable of adoption, updating and legislation through proper procedures.⁹

The Ministry of Planning should lead the integration of project, development and investment data, as it already does under the 2024–2028 plan. The Ministry of Finance should lead fiscal alignment, allocation, flows and commitments. The central bank must retain the independence of its monetary function, and the Federal Board of Supreme Audit and judicial bodies must retain their independent mandates. Governorates and service bodies implement in accordance with the law, while the centre of government helps remove bottlenecks rather than replacing specialists. Creating a large new body compounds the risks unless these relationships are settled first.¹⁰

7. The reference scenario if the present course continues

The reference scenario is not a spurious numerical forecast of GDP or poverty in 2045. It is a directional test: if volatile oil revenue continues to finance rigid commitments, allocations remain disconnected from readiness, and project data remain fragmented among multiple bodies, an accumulating pattern is likely to persist—new projects preceding closure of old ones, operating and maintenance expenditure considered only after assets are built, and services improving in some areas but not others. This rests on a diagnosis of public finance and the gap between announcement and delivery; it does not claim that continuation will produce a particular numerical outcome.¹¹

In the realistic reform scenario, the early years reduce the most costly implementation bottlenecks and establish baselines, oversight channels and managers’ skills, while allowing early results in services and the private sector. Capabilities then become repeatable at scale, followed by production chains and competitiveness whose survival does not depend on each wave of oil-funded spending. The accelerated scenario becomes a binding reference only if prerequisites are met: security and fiscal stability, stronger delivery capacity, reliable data, and suitable business readiness, skills, water and energy resources.

Table (4): Institutional scenarios; analytical descriptions, not quantitative forecasts.

8. The logic of the phases and transition conditions

The phases are not separate islands. Schools, water improvements, network maintenance and financing for eligible businesses must begin in the first phase; judicial, planning and expenditure reforms also continue through 2045. Yet each phase has a distinguishing central task. The first asks, “Do we understand, control and deliver the foundations?” The second asks, “Can institutions reproduce the outcome when managers change?” The third asks, “Does the economy produce and expand beyond the rent cycle?” The fourth asks, “Can the state retain its capabilities, exert influence and renew itself even under less favourable conditions?”

Figure (3): The logic of accumulating capabilities, rather than a calendar with four boxes.

Table (5): Phase gates; reaching the end of a year is insufficient to certify passage.

9. Phase One, 2027–2030: restoring the foundations

The first phase does not aim to “solve every Iraqi crisis in four years”. It aims to restore the state’s ability to see fundamental problems, identify who is responsible, finance a feasible remedy and measure the difference. Priority goes to rescuing services and public functions at risk of disruption, resolving bottlenecks affecting large numbers of people, and establishing rules that prevent repeated delays. Projects with completed studies and the greatest human and economic impact take precedence over large symbolic projects that are not ready.

9.1 Work in 2027: from a plan on the shelf to a deliverable list

Within its powers, the Council of Ministers issues a decision establishing an initial portfolio of no more than 12 cross-ministerial national priorities in the first cycle—not 12 construction projects. Each priority has one outcome owner, identified beneficiaries and a service or production gap, a baseline or a deadline for establishing it, quarterly milestones, a dependency map, a conditional initial financing ceiling and an early-warning indicator. The Council reviews the number annually. The proposed limit must not become legislation preventing ordinary sectoral priorities outside the portfolio; its purpose is to protect the political centre’s focus.

The National Development Plan for 2024–2028 is used as a connecting framework, not a competing plan. Projects are reviewed against its five programmes and the Ministry of Planning’s existing monitoring arrangements, and the 2027–2030 roadmap is then updated using risks and the register of ready projects. Implementation rates for the 2024–2028 plan must not be retrospectively recounted under “Vision 2045”. Denominators and versions are preserved, and what has been integrated, modified or excluded is disclosed.¹²

9.2 Recovering public capacity before multiplying construction

A portfolio for resolving stalled projects is opened under four categories: (a) a high-benefit project with defined obstacles, completed after the obstacle is removed; (b) a project requiring redesign and revised costing; (c) a project lacking economic viability or service value, which must be stopped or repurposed according to law; and (d) a project structurally complete but not handed over to genuine operation. Each category requires a decision published within disclosure limits, a lawful funding source, a responsible contracting official and a closure criterion extending beyond a certificate of percentage completion.

Rapid service improvements must reflect local conditions. A water network, health centre or school is not selected merely because it provides an easy photograph, but because its failure is documented and can be remedied quickly, with operating finance, a maintenance system and a clear benefit indicator. Energy, water, roads, health and education work is managed as programmes with interdependent outputs. Starting one service must not be made dependent on completing a giant, multi-year national project where a safe interim solution is available.

9.3 The measure of success in the first phase

Success at the end of 2030 means that the state and citizens know where priority funding went, who implemented the work and what changed. Most of the priority portfolio should have become verified outcomes or corrective termination decisions, rather than continuing indefinitely. Budget preparation should also connect to a transitional programme and performance classification that preserves statutory accounts, while feasibility testing and life-cycle cost reviews are piloted in major projects before wider adoption. No arbitrary workforce reduction or immediate abolition of subsidies is imposed: reforms that destroy trust in the early years may obstruct what follows.¹³

10. Phase Two, 2031–2035: building institutions

The second phase begins when government units can publish standardised priority data and identify and explain delays professionally. Its task is to make outcomes a property of the institution rather than of a minister or exceptional team: licensing services, hospital operations and contract management must continue without administrative reconstruction after every change. This requires workforce planning and a skills-based civil service, multi-year budgets linked to the legal fiscal framework, public procurement based on competition and oversight, and interoperable digital archives.

10.1 Building an administration that delivers rather than expands

Each ministry and governorate identifies five to seven critical functions needed to carry the portfolio: project management, procurement, economic appraisal, data, finance, law and contracts, and operation and maintenance, according to the sector. Professional training pathways are tied to practical assessments and real projects, not attendance certificates. Professional appointment, assignment and promotion within each specialism should favour merit, experience and lawful performance under applicable civil-service provisions, rather than the number of committees formed.

This phase also builds an interoperability layer between Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance and sectoral records, respecting privacy rights and system security. Some digital assets may be new and others extensions of IDMS, but technical decisions follow testing of shared fields, project identity and alignment between the budget, contract and delivery, rather than purchasing a separate application for each ministry. Integration should allow the same record to generate reports on delays, financing, delivery and maintenance burdens, without employees having to copy data manually several times.

10.2 Consolidating accountable decentralisation

Planning in a federal state requires a division of functions, not automatic transfer of central models. The authorised body retains local executive decision-making within the law, with explicit identification of who finances, owns, operates and reviews the impact of each asset. Local outcome agreements must not diminish constitutional powers. If a governorate is delayed by an unpaid federal allocation, the shortfall must not be attributed to it alone; if the problem lies locally in tendering or supervision, it becomes visible and remediable. Clear deprivation measures, rather than population shares alone, guide prioritisation.

10.3 Testing readiness for transition

By the end of 2035, a repeatable chain should connect programme design to service delivery, supported by auditable project data and a record distinguishing what worked, what failed and why. The third implementation phase is not ruled out because “institutions are not yet perfect”. The requirement is a defined level of adequacy in the sectors and chains selected for expansion. Qualified value chains may launch before 2035, but support must not be extended indiscriminately to industries lacking measures of cost, demand, water, energy and exports.

11. Phase Three, 2036–2040: diversifying the economy

Diversification does not mean announcing the end of oil. It means gradually shifting the centre of effort from rehabilitating basic functions to expanding firms and production chains whose viability has been demonstrated. This chapter carries forward Door Four’s distinction that “non-oil” does not mean “independent of oil-funded expenditure”; investment must turn capital into operating assets, value added and formal jobs; and sound exports consist of repeated transactions in different markets, not a first shipment. Successful expansion is therefore tested against domestic and foreign demand, including when public spending falls.

Priority goes to selected chains that demonstrated realistic advantages during 2027–2035 in inputs, demand, logistics, energy, water, skills and standards, with annual reviews of environmental and fiscal sustainability. Policy begins with shared instruments: standards, testing and accreditation; supplier training; productive infrastructure; efficient finance; predictable customs and logistics services; and market-access agreements. It then uses limited transitional protection with an announced expiry where justified. Agricultural expansion must not rest on irrigated acreage alone, but on value and food produced per unit of water and resilience during drought.

Before this phase, the state should have acquired stronger capabilities to assess private-sector and partnership feasibility, regulate land allocation, measure incentive effects and monitor hidden risks in long-term contracts. No financing partnership may become a parallel budget or an open-ended government guarantee, nor may the slogan of “national industry” become an exemption from quality or competition. Government efficiency in this phase supports producers’ growth rather than substituting for them.

Governing principle: the diversification gate—expansion by a firm or sector merits encouragement when repeated production, local value, sales capacity and the necessary resources are demonstrated, not because the investment licence has a large stated value or the enterprise can obtain continuing subsidies.

12. Phase Four, 2041–2045: expansion and leadership

The fourth phase ends the notion that national transformation is “a project that ends in 2045”. Its role is to place Iraqi capabilities on a higher cycle of renewal: institutions that scrutinise their objectives; an economy competing abroad; talent returning and moving through networks; cities and facilities anticipating maintenance and risks; and a state able to continue under less favourable oil conditions. Leadership here is neither a geopolitical title nor a promotional ranking. It is documented capacity to create value for markets and partners, manage regional disputes within the bounds of sovereignty, and protect citizens, rights and resources.

Reviewing existing programmes and stopping those whose underlying returns have fallen becomes part of institutional maturity. Technical and professional standards are updated periodically as technology, climate and demand change, while beneficiary experience and education, health and production outcomes are compared against reliable benchmarks appropriate to Iraq. At the end of 2045, an independent evaluation of the eighteen-year trajectory is published, alongside rules for preparing the next horizon, 2046–2060. The government may not mark every indicator “achieved” merely because the calendar has reached the final year.

By this phase, the “Iraq of the future” should be tangible in the operation of a power station, factory, school, transport service and business, in data and water protection, and in a more stable regional environment—not in conference counts or report length. Some outcomes may fall short despite sound reform because of external factors. Institutional honesty requires explaining the difference and identifying assumptions, financing or mechanisms requiring review, rather than merely adjusting the media narrative.

13. Why is a long political horizon necessary?

Three rhythms of change are difficult to compress into one government term: procedures that can be reformed in months; institutions, projects and service networks requiring several years; and the development of people, industry, trust and technology, sometimes requiring a decade or more. Confusing these rhythms produces promises of educational or industrial outcomes within a year—too short to develop a teacher, supplier or quality system—or prolongs an administrative adjustment requiring only an accountable decision and procedural redesign.

A long horizon is not a mandate for prolonged political rule or suspension of democratic alternation. On the contrary, a vision becomes nationally sustainable only by separating what may change at each election—priorities, instruments and reform pace—from what must be protected constitutionally and institutionally: the state’s legal commitments, public data, service operation, valid contracts, public-finance accountability and institutional knowledge. A new government should have the right to reprioritise the portfolio publicly, provided it discloses cancellation or postponement costs, reasons and alternatives rather than erasing its predecessor’s records.

Indonesia offers a useful institutional example: it enacted a long-term national plan for 2025–2045 and linked medium-term plans for 2025–2029 to it. This does not imply transplanting its law to Iraq, whose constitutional and centralisation structures differ. The lesson is the principle of translating a long horizon into five-year cycles that can be financed, updated and held accountable, rather than leaving it as a general declaration detached from the budget.¹⁴

Governing principle: legitimate continuity protects outcomes, standards and public memory, not a government or party. Repeated democratic correction is compatible with a long-term vision as long as the reasons for decisions, resources and results remain open to examination and review.

14. The first 100 days: putting implementation machinery to work

The hundred days run from the date the relevant executive authority assumes responsibility for launching this portfolio, not from publication of the vision document. If the government does not begin on 1 January 2027, the day-count cycle shifts without changing the reference horizon, and decisions are announced when issued under the appropriate powers. The aim is not enormous sectoral gains within 100 days, but to move the administration from announcing objectives to an initial, verifiable delivery capability.

Table (6): The first 100-day cycle; all deadlines are proposed organisational targets.

The Ministry of Planning’s existing system should preferably be used from the first day, even if some units need a temporary standardised file with documentation and sign-off procedures, rather than delaying monitoring until procurement of a new application is complete. The first report must clearly distinguish “activity” from “outcome”: meetings, referrals and indicators entered do not themselves prove a service improvement, though they reveal readiness to measure improvement later.

Figure (4): The logic of the first hundred days—establishing delivery capability rather than racing to make announcements.

15. Dependencies between the doors

An implementation schedule cannot be set for each door in isolation. Some reforms become “keys” enabling several programmes. Effective law enforcement improves investment viability; electricity, water, standards and training determine industrial and agricultural quality; identity, payments and interoperability reduce service burdens; and security and resilience protect all of them. Dependency is not a reason to await comprehensive reform in every area before starting. It is a way to identify the minimum requirements along a programme’s critical path.

Table (7): Horizontal dependencies; design examples, not an approved project list.

Each programme receives a Critical Path map identifying responsibility for each prerequisite, its financing and deadline. If a wastewater treatment plant is required to operate a city or industry, final operation must not be scheduled before it. Where a prerequisite can temporarily be replaced by a lawful, safe and cheaper solution, that option is stated with a time limit and exit plan. The map must be updated quarterly as markets, energy, climate and resources change, rather than only once during budget preparation.

16. A phased map of sectoral delivery

This map governs sequencing rather than replacing sectoral doors’ objectives. Each cell states an expected “type of outcome” without inventing fixed annual percentages. Official quantitative targets are later drawn from a central indicator register after their baselines and reporting years are verified. This chapter does not infer automatic improvement simply because a phase has elapsed.

Table (8): The cross-door sequencing matrix; qualitative directions, not quantitative targets.

17. Who leads, who implements and who reviews?

Implementation requires separation of five functions: the political mandate holder, the policy or outcome owner, the portfolio’s technical manager, the financial owner and independent oversight. A “delivery unit” must not replace a minister in signing a contract, a governorate in implementation within its remit or an oversight body in investigation. Its role is to expose cross-cutting bottlenecks, support their resolution and escalate matters requiring political decisions, while recording corrective decisions and who assumed responsibility for them.

Figure (5): Allocating functions without creating a public authority parallel to the competent bodies.

Table (9): The proposed institutional accountability matrix.

Existing development-plan monitoring meetings should be activated rather than supplemented with overlapping layers. Outcome owners hold monthly operational reviews; the centre of government receives quarterly bottleneck reports; the Council of Ministers receives a semi-annual presentation of budgets and priorities within its remit; and an annual public report compares promises with results. Not every delay is escalated to the Prime Minister. The project manager’s and ministry’s powers are used first, and only matters beyond a single body’s capacity are escalated.¹⁵

18. Decision gates for projects and reforms

To avoid recreating the stock of stalled projects, major projects should not be approved according to the influence of the proposing body or the number of formal procedures completed. They should pass delivery gates before spending and repeatedly during implementation. The UK government’s project delivery standard illustrates the value of portfolio discipline and phased independent reviews. Iraqi gates, however, must be designed within applicable instructions and existing oversight capacities; UK legal structures are not transplanted to Iraq.¹⁶

Table (10): Proposed major-project gates; these labels are working tools, not new legal provisions.

The gates also have a preventive function in non-construction decisions. A new labour law requires assessment of administrative and rights impacts; a digital platform requires security, privacy and procedural-simplification assessments; an investment incentive needs a baseline for export and employment opportunities; and a training programme needs a test of effects on skills, income or employment, not merely enrolment. An additional independent review is required for novel, highly complex projects, long-term financial guarantees or clear conflicts of interest.

Governing principle: gates must not multiply signatures. Their purpose is to remove irresponsible decisions, not to impose an additional approval chain on every project.

19. Phased indicators and verification conditions

Chapter Two of Door Ten remains the detailed reference for national indicators. Here, “implementation capacity” itself is measured: record completeness, an identified owner, gate readiness, report publication, closure of corrective decisions, asset operation and service access for beneficiaries. These are structural and enabling indicators, not substitutes for unemployment, learning, industrial exports or drinking water. All operational baselines below require a unified administrative survey in 2027; “unavailable” is therefore stated explicitly rather than an invented current percentage.

Table (11): Proposed operational policy targets, neither achieved nor derived from existing national data.

The calculation method is mandatory. Priority-card coverage = portfolio priorities satisfying the five mandatory fields (definition, owner, value or documented gap, financing and review) ÷ all registered portfolio priorities ×100. The share of projects passing the gate = projects within the defined denominator that completed an independent assessment before approval ÷ all major projects approved in the same period ×100. Cancelled projects and projects continuing from previous years do not enter the “newly approved” denominator, but separate tables for both denominators should be published to prevent cosmetic improvements.

The numerical steps in Table (11) are not scientific forecasts of delivery probabilities. They are proposed operational compliance standards that can be administratively achievable once the denominator, budget and owner are known. The 2030–2045 values are reviewed once against the 2027–2028 audit and must not be silently increased or reduced to achieve a superficial percentage. For the share of projects completed within cost and time, the recommendation is first to compare performance with a 2027 baseline and publish the trend, without fixing a 2045 value now, given differences in project type and complexity.

Warnings take a practical form: green when the phase threshold is met with independent evidence; amber for a correctable deviation or delayed information publication; and red for a fault affecting legality, financing, safety or data credibility. The colour is not a verdict on a minister or employee. It triggers a corrective process specifying the cause of deviation, the responsible body and a closure date. An indicator has not succeeded if its percentage improves by silently removing difficult cases from the denominator.

20. The fiscal framework for the phases

Financing is not an extra chapter filled with large numbers. Chapter Four of Door Ten details the vision’s financing architecture, funds, partnerships and investment. Here, the fiscal decision gate preceding each phase is defined. In the early years, permanent commitments must not be launched on the strength of high oil prices or temporary financing. Operating and maintenance costs are presented before capital allocation, and programme and performance budgeting is piloted as a clear layer over applicable accounting and appropriation requirements.¹⁷

Each programme’s costs are divided into legal setup, systems and data; investment and assets; annual operation and maintenance; transition, training and legitimate social compensation; contingent commitments and guarantees; and the cost of inaction. A ministry’s ability to spend a sum must be distinguished from the value it generates for citizens or the economy. Calling a programme “strategic” does not exempt it from financing feasibility. On the contrary, testing requirements increase as life-cycle costs or the difficulty of reversing a decision increase.

Figure (6): The rule of phased financing; a budget alone does not produce an outcome.

When resources tighten, protection goes first to fundamental legal commitments, safety, essential services and maintenance whose interruption would destroy a more costly asset; then to ready, high-impact projects; then to work that can be postponed after assessing delay costs; and finally to work that should be stopped. “Cut investment first” must not become a quick accounting solution, nor may the central bank be made to finance the government deficit at the expense of its monetary mandate. The Ministry of Finance submits stress paths to the Council of Ministers showing how lower prices, reduced volumes and delayed revenue affect liquidity, payments and critical assets.

21. Three scenarios and stress tests

The vision faces at least three compound risks: fiscal/oil, water/climate, and security/supply-chain risks. The risk function within Planning, Finance and competent bodies maintains a register updated quarterly according to shock probabilities and their effects on critical programmes. Hypothetical tests disclose their assumptions—for example, oil prices falling 20% below the reference path, export volumes declining 15%, or seasonal water supplies in an agricultural area falling 25%. These percentages are stress-test examples, not predictions or measured Iraqi values.

Table (12): Shocks for planning, not prediction.¹⁸

A new economic event during implementation may change exchange rates, oil prices or terms of trade, as economic news during October 2026 illustrated. Such events belong in an “assumption update annex” identifying the date, value, source and resulting decision; they must not be used to alter every baseline series fixed when the chapter was drafted. Transformation management must make assumption updates a legitimate institutional procedure, rather than an opportunity to reconstruct the plan politically at every crisis.¹⁹

22. An applied comparison of four experiences

These comparisons were chosen not as “successful countries” to imitate, but because they address different functions within Iraq’s problem: monitoring a vision, delivering priorities, connecting long-term and five-year plans, and controlling major projects. Their constitutional systems, populations, economies and resources differ. Their numerical outcomes and legal structures must therefore not be transferred to Iraq.

Table (13): Comparative lessons and the limits of transfer.²⁰

Malaysia’s lesson is clear: a central unit can break a complex problem into steps, responsible bodies and deadlines, but risks “meeting the indicator without achieving the purpose”. Indicator auditing and impact measurement must therefore be independent of the team rewarded for delivery. Oman’s experience demonstrates the value of publishing reports and connecting bodies without requiring a new ministry. The UK experience shows that a major project needs review gates and a defined termination decision before delay becomes an established fact.²¹

23. Cross-sector implementation programmes

Nine shared operational programmes are proposed, not nine new entities. The Council of Ministers may merge or reallocate them according to assessments of competence, cost and human resources, provided their core functions and indicators remain. Each programme spans the phases, but begins with an initial output in 2027 and expands only after a readiness test.

T10-01 | A limited priorities and delivery office at the centre of government

It adopts rules for selecting a limited set of Council of Ministers priorities, holds monthly reviews, escalates disputes beyond a single ministry’s ability to resolve, and maintains a decision register. It neither contracts nor undertakes expenditure or criminal oversight.

T10-02 | The national project and dependency register

It builds on IDMS, defines a unified project and programme identifier, and links appraisal, listing, contract, expenditure, delivery and operation to location, beneficiaries, risks and data version.

T10-03 | Linking the budget to outcomes and operation

The Ministry of Finance and sectoral bodies gradually develop programme cards linking allocations to outputs, while retaining line-item budget requirements until the necessary legal and accounting changes are complete.

T10-04 | Resolving the backlog of stalled projects and stopping waste

It establishes an objective review of stalled projects according to rescue, modification and termination options, protecting contractual rights, documenting each decision’s effects and refusing to equate resolving paperwork with delivering a service.

T10-05 | A package of rapid, high-impact results for citizens

It selects basic services that can be repaired within available resources and powers, measuring access time, quality, service continuity and beneficiary complaints rather than photographing openings.

T10-06 | Federal–local coordination agreements

It establishes lawful working-agreement templates between funding and implementing bodies, clarifying ownership of assets, operation and data, rights, and mechanisms for resolving financial and administrative disputes.

T10-07 | A school for public programme and project managers

It trains delivery, finance, contract, planning and data staff through Iraqi cases and practical assessment, with a competency record, rather than relying solely on lectures or certificates.

T10-08 | The risk, assumption and stress-test register

It brings together data on oil, water, security and logistics shocks, sets a threshold for triggering portfolio reprioritisation, and documents how any update affects objectives and people’s rights.

T10-09 | Independent evaluation, learning and public communication

It publishes lessons from success and failure and the reasons for changed decisions, commissions competent audit and evaluation bodies to assess benefits and impacts, and enables citizen objections and data correction.

24. The implementation and financing matrix

The matrix presents the initial assignment, one owner and a relative cost rather than an unsupported monetary estimate. “Low/medium/high” refers to expected complexity and resources relative to monitoring and administrative development programmes; these labels cannot serve as financial appropriations. Actual values are estimated in dinars through a 2027 study, separating capital expenditure from operation, maintenance and contingent liabilities.

Table (14): The initial national operational matrix; detailed costing follows the 2027 studies.

Each programme has its own risk register, sectoral partner and legal mandate. The Council of Ministers must not assign “making a legal change” to an administrative department capable only of submitting a proposal, nor list a “new fund” as a financing source before it is lawfully established and funded. Public-finance scrutiny prevents a partnership contract or exemption from becoming a permanent commitment outside the fiscal framework.

25. Transformation costs and financing priorities

The records used for this chapter do not contain a reconciled national cost for programmes and sectors through 2045. Adding project costs from different years or duplicated projects would not validly produce one. The professional alternative is a “life-cycle cost register” for each programme, recording its price, year, maturity stage, committed and uncommitted amounts, funding sources and risks. The Ministries of Finance and Planning review the register before including the first medium-term package, highlighting services requiring staff, maintenance and energy after opening.

Financing priorities are ranked against six criteria whose weights are publicly set in advance: sovereign or humanitarian necessity; the scale and spatial variation of the verified service gap; net economic and social value; design, procurement and implementation readiness; financing and maintenance capacity under a shock scenario; and dependencies the programme unlocks for others. High ranking scores alone cannot override a legal prohibition, safety threat or lack of feasibility. These are exclusion conditions, not weaknesses to offset with points elsewhere.

Table (15): Breaking financing down into testable acceptance conditions.

26. Risk register and preventive measures

The greatest implementation risk is not one delayed project, but the accumulation of small deviations without an alert or corrective authority. The register therefore ranks risks by probability, impact and detectability rather than giving every crisis equal political weight. Internal national-security and personal data remain legally protected, while summaries of fiscal and service risks that citizens and legislators need to understand are published.

Table (16): An initial risk register; probabilities are measured later rather than assigned invented numerical scores.

27. Public participation and spatial equity

The vision needs institutional acceptance, not a permanent mobilisation campaign. Because citizens experience reform in specific places, consultation begins with service users, workers, businesses, farmers, universities, governorates, districts and subdistricts within their lawful roles. Participation does not give every party a general veto. It improves design, exposes unseen costs and ensures that groups bearing transition costs are not excluded from compensation, information or redress.

The government adopts simplified outcome cards in clear Arabic, with verified numbers, their years and scope; a map of service projects where safety and rights permit; and an objection channel providing a case number and response deadline. Raw household, patient, facility-security or employee records do not go on a public platform. Aggregate data are used, applying safeguards and the right to correct data. Deprivation programmes compare services across governorates, then urban and rural areas and neighbourhoods wherever reliable data are available. Otherwise, the measurement gap and a plan to close it are disclosed.

The Ministry of Planning’s workshops in Nineveh and other governorates show that strengthening local planning capacity and publishing monitoring matrices are not later details, but conditions for the plan’s success on the ground. The state administration should therefore draw on governorates and municipalities rather than rely solely on delayed central reports that fail to reflect diverse local circumstances.²²

28. Monitoring, evaluation, learning and correction

Periodic collection of indicators is insufficient; they must lead to decisions. The monitoring cycle has four layers: monthly operational project updates; quarterly reviews of dependencies and risks; an annual report on programme outcomes, reasons for deviations and Council decisions; and deeper independent evaluation at each phase’s end and after major projects are completed. Some substantive outcomes, such as education, health and climate, have different reporting intervals because change requires surveys or years. A monthly value must not be fabricated for something measured annually or less often.

Figure (7): The outcome cycle; publishing a report does not complete monitoring.

A deviation is classified into one of five cases: faulty measurement requiring correction; a changed external assumption; implementation delayed by removable causes; a design that failed to produce impact despite implementation; or a choice that has lost viability and should be stopped. Each needs a different remedy. Punitive instructions should not be issued for delays caused by missing allocations, nor should a programme receive funding merely because it spent money without results. Evaluation goes to the Council of Ministers within its remit, and findings consistent with rights and the public interest are published.

From the first year, a “decision register” records codes, dates and reasons for rejecting alternatives; an “assumption register” covers oil, water, population, costs and capacity; an “indicator register” preserves definitions, denominators, sources and data versions; and a “dependency register” shows which reforms were delayed by other projects. These records prevent knowledge loss between ministerial and gubernatorial teams and make the 2030, 2035 and 2040 reviews a logical continuation of readable decisions rather than a fresh start.

29. What successful implementation looks like in 2045

Success in the 2045 phase is not measured by declaring “the vision achieved” or by one international ranking. The test consists of seven questions. Can the government identify its vital few priorities and finance them lawfully? Can ministries and governorates implement and operate projects within known costs and timeframes? Do citizens know service standards and have a way to challenge failures? Are statistical, fiscal and project records consistent and sufficiently open to oversight? Can essential services and the economy withstand fiscal, security or climate shocks with limited damage? Does the private sector generate value, jobs and repeated exports beyond the oil circuit? Do institutions continue learning and correcting after governments change?

When independent evidence and sustained trends substantiate the answers, Iraq becomes more capable, better organised, more productive and more influential. If some dimensions are achieved and others are not, the vision must not conceal the shortfalls. The political and ethical value of a long-term undertaking rests not on claims of perfection, but on revealing results, the costs of choices and the ability to complete what remains.

30. Conclusion and the bridge to national indicators

This chapter concludes that transformation management is the function that turns adjacent plans across the vision’s doors into an operable state programme. The first phase builds knowledge, prioritisation, feasibility and basic services; the second consolidates institutions and repeatable outcomes; the third expands production, value and innovation; and the fourth preserves the state’s capacity for renewal and leadership. Alongside them, rights, sovereignty, the Constitution, independent oversight and the ability to revisit decisions remain constraints that cannot be suspended in the name of speed or continuity.

The next chapter, V4-D10-C02, “National Indicators”, takes this architecture and turns it into a register of definitions, sectoral outcomes, outputs, measurements, denominators and pathways for 2030, 2035, 2040 and 2045. It should not repeat the phases or rebuild a delivery unit. Instead, it tests the right question and source for each national objective and how its impact can become visible to citizens and institutions. In this way, an indicator does not become a numerical slogan, nor a phase a period without results.

Governing principle: implementation in summary—priority belongs not to the most attention-grabbing project, but to the decision that removes a bottleneck, generates a measurable outcome and protects Iraq’s ability to achieve the next result.

31. Register of gaps to be closed

• The denominator of all projects, ongoing projects and operationally completed projects: reconcile IDMS, the budget and acceptance records; responsible body: Planning; initial audit in 2027.

• Compliance with time, cost and quality for major projects: compare contracts, baselines and versions; Planning and the owning body; 2027–2028.

• Operating and maintenance costs for new assets: life-cycle models linked to the budget; the Ministry of Finance and service bodies; from 2027.

• Service outcomes by governorate, rural/urban area and population group: records and surveys with published methods; statistics and sectoral authorities; 2027–2029.

• Coverage of major projects by independent feasibility gates: audit the dated decision and report register; Planning; from 2027.

• Outcomes and benefits of corrective and termination decisions: a decision register and evaluation after 12/36 months; the centre of government and oversight bodies; from 2028 onwards.