National Financing of the Vision

Chapter profile

Table (1): Chapter profile, boundaries and relationship to the Vision’s phases.

This chapter takes up the question posed by Chapter Three: once the Vision’s objective, indicator and outcome owner are known, what is its real funding source? How will the service continue operating after the facility opens or the credit ends? The answer is not an unspecified “2045 budget” or a fund able to finance everything. It is a portfolio of qualified projects and programmes linked to a medium-term fiscal framework, distinct sources and auditable risk limits.

Governing rule: activity is not an outcome; a licence is not implemented investment; an appropriation is not a disbursement; and a disbursement is not an operational asset. Today’s financing does not release the state from tomorrow’s operating costs.

1. Executive summary

Iraq’s problem is not an absence of financing capacity. It has substantial oil resources, established financial and investment bodies, a large domestic market, oversight, legislative and financing institutions, private companies and international partners. The problem is that some resources are highly volatile flows, while some obligations are long-term. A project whose construction is financed may remain inoperable because it lacks water, electricity, maintenance, staff or the capacity to deliver the service. A multi-decade renaissance therefore cannot be financed by adding up announced project values and comparing them with the budget of a single oil-revenue year.

In the IMF’s framework for 2024, revenue and grants stood at 39.3% of GDP, including 36.0 percentage points in oil revenue, while total expenditure was 43.5%, the deficit 4.2%, and wages and pensions 22.0% of GDP. The Fund’s report estimates accumulated domestic arrears at the time at approximately IQD 14 trillion. This figure is neither the Vision’s budget nor necessarily new public debt, but it demonstrates that available appropriations, cash flow and capacity to meet obligations are not synonyms. The Fund’s projections for 2025 and 2026 are not final outcomes and must not be presented as such.¹

During preparation of the 2024–2028 National Development Plan, the Ministry of Planning presented a preliminary investment estimate of approximately IQD 182 trillion, comprising an expected 141.8 trillion from the public sector and 40.2 from the private sector within that preparatory framework. This is an initial planning figure for a five-year plan defined in terms of capital formation, not a total bill for Vision 2045 or expenditure already incurred; it cannot be multiplied across four periods. Alongside these estimates, the Iraq Development Fund was established under Regulation No. 3 of 2023, and instructions for partnerships with the private sector were issued in 2024. The starting point is therefore to evaluate existing arrangements before calling for new structures.²

The proposed model distinguishes six portfolios that must not be added together indiscriminately: the state budget and reprioritisation; management of the oil cycle and non-oil revenue reform; the Iraq Development Fund and co-investment; domestic capital and foreign direct investment; partnerships and external development finance; and verified savings from controlling waste. Each channel has a legally responsible owner, a source of funds, a type of obligation, a timetable and risks. The same financing must not be counted twice: the state’s contribution to the Fund is not new investment when counted again within a Fund project.

By 2045, success will not mean exceeding a symbolic budget for the Vision. It will mean productive assets, skills and services with funded maintenance; public finances able to withstand weak oil-revenue years without disrupting essential salaries, consequential services and viable investment; visible debt, partnerships and guarantees consistent with repayment capacity; and a growing share of productive private capital and domestic assets in the portfolio, measured by actual outcomes rather than promises.³

Figure (2): Four mandatory gates before a financial commitment. | Editable analytical diagram.

2. The central question and chapter boundaries

The governing question is: what system converts oil revenue, revenue collection, domestic and foreign investment, funds, partnerships and development borrowing into a single transformation portfolio that can be paid for, operated and overseen, while preventing both “obligations without money” and “money without outcomes”? This is a question of financing governance, not merely a list of sources.

Table (2): What falls within financing and what remains in the specialist chapters.

3. A national financing glossary and rules of evidence

Table (3): A glossary preventing confusion between money, authorisation, obligations and outcomes.

Every amount used in this chapter must be classified: an Iraqi fact with a statement and year; a published institutional estimate with its assumptions; an unrealised planning target; a hypothetical test scenario; or a policy recommendation. Figures with differing definitions must not be combined in one equation, and an international ratio must not be transferred to Iraq as an automatic target.

4. Iraq’s baseline: fiscal capacity is not a single balance

The first test of the capacity to finance the Vision is an unembellished description of the starting point. The IMF provides a suitable comparative fiscal reference year in 2024: government revenue and grants of 39.3% of GDP, oil revenue of 36.0%, current expenditure of 35.5%, capital expenditure of 8.1% and a deficit of 4.2%. Calculated from the Fund’s publication, oil accounts for approximately 91.6% of revenue and grants in this framework (36÷39.3). This is a derived arithmetic ratio, not a separate official tax statistic. It must not be mixed with the World Bank’s estimated oil shares for 2025 without explaining the differing series and definitions.⁴

Table (4): A baseline distinguishing source, coverage and year.⁵

This study has no consolidated, audited statement of the expenditure required for every Iraq Vision 2045 project, the full national stock of implicit liabilities and operating allocations, or each governorate’s private financing gap. The data gap is therefore explicit; the chapter does not produce a “total value of the Vision” through extrapolation or by inflating five-year targets into twenty-year totals.

5. The constitutional, legal and institutional framework

Federal Financial Management Law No. 6 of 2019, as amended, governs the budget cycle, appropriations, commitments, accounts and oversight. The Vision team has no authority to spend a dinar or establish a financial vehicle outside legal mandates. The Iraq Development Fund is attached to the Council of Ministers and has legal personality and financial and administrative independence under Regulation No. 3 of 2023, published in the Iraqi Gazette, issue 4731. That regulation establishes broad investment and financing functions; it must not be inferred that the Fund is a central bank or an off-budget sovereign savings fund.⁶

Investment and Partnership Instructions No. 1 of 2024 were issued for centrally funded bodies. They allow service, management and lease contracts and various construction partnership models, with requirements concerning feasibility studies, costs, land, transparency and Ministry of Planning review. These instructions do not mean that every partnership is permitted without limits or that the state bears no risk. Their existence does not remove the need to verify applicable laws and amendments when a particular contract is signed.⁷

Table (5): Distributing functions without creating a “ministry for financing the Vision”.

6. The Vision’s financial architecture: a portfolio, not a promotional account

The financial architecture rests on three transparent layers. The first is the “macro framework”, estimating the feasible path of revenue, expenditure, debt, reserves and oil risks over three to five years, updated annually. The second is the “transformation portfolio”, containing projects and programmes that have passed feasibility, market and impact gates. The third is the “programme and project”, identifying who pays for construction and operation, who bears contingent liabilities and who owns delivery of the service outcome. This also covers small projects with high human-development returns, not just major infrastructure.

Table (6): The framework for a multilevel financing architecture.

Figure (3): Financing starts with ceilings and sustainability, not a project announcement. | Editable analytical diagram.

7. How can transformation costs be estimated without inventing an aggregate figure?

The Vision’s cost cannot be estimated by multiplying an average chapter cost by the number of chapters. Chapters are policy documents, not a list of independent engineering projects. Irrigation, industrial development, water and energy programmes may address a single shared asset, while operating risks may be invisible in construction estimates. Measurement therefore starts with a project register using unique identifiers and links capital, commitments and dependencies to outputs across ministries and governorates. A road serving an industrial city must not be counted twice, under both “industry” and “transport”.

Table (7): A lifecycle cost ledger for every intervention in the Vision.⁸

Financing programme costs in scenarios are calculated in “present value” terms when comparisons span different years, with the discount rate and method stated. Annual cash-account data remain necessary to establish the capacity to pay when obligations fall due. Economic viability for society, financial viability for the contractor and budget affordability must be distinguished; success on the first does not remove the need for the second and third.

8. Oil as a tool for financing transformation, not a guarantee for every commitment

Oil remains the dominant source of public revenue at the outset of the Vision, but its governing use must change. First, the stability of essential functions and their obligations is managed; then sound capital investment and its maintenance are protected; and only then are real surpluses, after settling obligations and arrears and measuring risks, directed towards assets and capabilities less dependent on oil. Not every barrel or price increase should be divided into an automatic savings share before the deficit, debt, operating requirements and liquidity are known.⁹

Table (8): Shifting oil revenue’s function from survival to capability.

The operational instrument is a “price and volume test” for every project and programme: a conservative oil baseline, higher oil prices, and a combined shock to export prices and volumes. Testing prices alone is insufficient because production, transport and global demand can also disrupt flows. Protection priorities must be defined from the outset so that an oil shock does not become delayed contractor payments or cuts to services for poor people.¹⁰

9. The general budget and reprioritising expenditure

The budget is the broadest legal vehicle for financing institutional reform, services and public capital. Reprioritising expenditure does not mean assuming that “current spending is bad and investment spending is good”. Maintaining a school and training a teacher may yield greater benefits than an unfinished complex, while a capital project may require permanent operating expenditure. The test is the impact of each dinar, its opportunity cost and the obligation it creates. Fiscal space therefore cannot be generated by uniform percentage cuts across ministries or indiscriminate delays in paying their obligations.

As the 2027 budget moves towards programme and performance budgeting, as announced by the Ministry of Finance in 2026, the proposal is first to attach a register of outcomes, costs and contracts to the traditional budget while retaining appropriation and accounting functions, then improve the programme layer gradually. The announcement of a transition must not be treated as proof of completed implementation, nor should it be claimed that a “Vision budget” has replaced the general budget.¹¹

Table (9): Fiscal space is realised in the accounts, not in speeches.

10. Developing non-oil revenue: collection before assumptions

Non-oil revenue strengthens state resilience when it rests on the productive base and fair compliance, rather than arbitrary fee increases. The Vision begins by improving registration, linking customs, taxation and economic activity, and simplifying procedures. It then addresses unjustified exemptions and evasion under the law while protecting people on low incomes; it does not rely on assumed receipts from an unapproved tax increase.¹²

Table (10): Non-oil revenue as institutional and economic capacity.

Success cannot be measured solely by an increase in revenue relative to GDP, because changes in oil prices or output alter the denominator. Non-oil revenue should be published in value terms, relative to non-oil GDP, and by type and sector, showing the effects of settlements, arrears, inflation and enforcement. Final tax-policy decisions remain governed by the relevant laws, not by the Vision’s implementation chapter.

11. Controlling waste: proven savings, not a fiscal slogan

Waste is the use of a resource without an acceptable outcome. It may arise from corruption, defective design, poor contracting, an asset that never enters service or a subsidy that fails to reach eligible recipients. Media estimates of “billions in waste” cannot be converted into a ready funding line. Savings enter the financing plan only when a contract, operation or demand actually changes and an audited comparative document demonstrates the effect.

Table (11): From claims of waste to a verifiable savings register.

In 2024, the Ministry of Planning announced that there were 2612 stalled projects. This institutional fact identifies a stock requiring assessment, but it is not a “state failure rate”, because the announcement provides no consistent national denominator, and it does not justify calculating savings equal to total allocations. The aim is a decision register distinguishing projects worth completing from those worth stopping, examining contracts, rights, the value of works and beneficiaries.¹³

12. A fiscal stabilisation fund: a function distinct from investment

A fiscal stabilisation fund—if legally approved after assessing its compatibility with treasury accounts and existing rules—would address oil-revenue volatility by holding liquid government resources during periods of real surplus and using them under published rules when exceptional shortfalls occur. Its purpose is to prevent abrupt interruptions to services, operations and priority investment, not to maximise returns from high-risk investments. It must not be portrayed as an existing entity or credited with unrealised revenue, and it should not be layered onto existing, reformable financial arrangements without assessment.¹⁴

Table (12): The proposed stabilisation fund is a function, not financial promises.

13. Sovereign intergenerational savings: a conditional institutional option

An intergenerational sovereign savings fund serves a third function, distinct from day-to-day treasury operations and the existing investment-focused Iraq Development Fund. If Iraq adopts it after testing fiscal sustainability and establishing a real surplus, it should manage a long-term financial-asset portfolio under professionally independent investment rules, a declared objective, legislative and financial oversight, and risk-management standards consistent with the Santiago Principles. A savings fund does not become “sovereign” simply by being named so, nor can it cover a current deficit by announcing high investment returns.¹⁵

This chapter proposes a sequencing rule: first reconcile debt and arrears and secure operations; second establish an oil-related fiscal rule and trust in the accounts; then examine creating a savings fund or developing an existing legal function if evaluation shows that this would be more efficient and transparent. No fixed annual deposit percentage should be set before the revenue base, risks and sustainability gate are settled. Domestic savings assets must not justify choosing politically connected companies or financing loss-making activities.

Table (13): Four functions whose assets and outcomes must not be conflated.¹⁶

14. The existing Iraq Development Fund: investment without conflating it with reserves

The Iraq Development Fund matters because Iraq need not invent a “new investment fund” before testing an existing institution. Regulation No. 3 of 2023 places it under the Council of Ministers, gives it legal personality and financial and administrative independence, and permits it to invest alone or in partnership in companies, funds and projects, obtain credit facilities and issue financial instruments within the regulation and relevant laws. Its objectives include developing non-oil resources, addressing investment gaps and mobilising private capital. This does not establish that any project announced by the Fund has become an operational asset or that its portfolio has realised returns.¹⁷

Table (14): Using the Iraq Development Fund without turning it into a parallel treasury.

The Vision does not propose removing the Fund board’s legal role or establishing a higher council outside its regulation. It proposes clearer separation between public-policy decisions and professional investment decisions, a published conflict-of-interest policy, risk and investment committees as legally permitted, sectoral and credit concentration limits, and external audit review. If these safeguards require a regulatory or legislative amendment, the proposal must follow the legislative route; this chapter does not assume that they are in force today.

15. Domestic capital and productive finance

Domestic capital is not a pool of liquid money waiting for a national slogan. Deposits, savings, household and corporate investments, money outside banks and varied credit instruments exist, but directing them towards production requires a legal foundation, protection of property and contracts, risk and return information, and company accounts open to examination. According to the World Bank Enterprise Survey used in the investment chapter, V2-D04-C05, only 2.3% of the formal firms covered had a bank loan or line of credit in 2022, and most investment in the sample was internally financed. This is a finding for a specific sample, not a percentage covering all Iraqi projects.

Table (15): Instruments for mobilising Iraqi capital towards production.

Compelling banks to allocate lending shares to a government project without sound risk pricing may turn weak financing of production into non-performing loans. The Vision therefore treats credit as the result of better projects, data, collateral and enforcement. The preferable state role is to provide infrastructure, services, market information and standards, and bear only public risks that investors cannot manage efficiently, rather than guarantee their profits.

16. Foreign investment: from announced commitments to flows and assets

Foreign direct investment, or FDI, can bring capital, technology, markets, standards and management, but it is not equivalent to every foreign contractor’s agreement, investment licence or dollar-denominated loan. UNCTAD’s Iraq fact sheet in the World Investment Report 2025 shows net inward flows of negative USD 7.458 billion in 2024. A negative figure reflects net financial movements under balance-of-payments accounting; it does not prove the absence of investment assets or agreements in the country. Meanwhile, in September 2025 the International Finance Corporation, IFC, announced a package of new investments and partnerships approaching one billion dollars. The announced value must not be added to the net flow or described as “a billion received by the treasury”.¹⁸

Table (16): The foreign investment journey and levels of evidence.

The Vision requires balanced partnerships: the right to lawful profit repatriation alongside tax payment; fair contractual guarantees alongside the state’s right to regulate the environment, labour and competition; and an agreed legal dispute-resolution mechanism. If a large project requires land, a public service and a government purchase guarantee, the value of that public contribution should be disclosed and entered in portfolio costs, rather than describing the entire project value as “free foreign capital”.

17. Public–private partnerships: financing is not free

A public–private partnership, or PPP, is not itself a source of income. It is an arrangement for constructing or operating an asset or service, with a contract allocating risks, performance requirements and payments. The private partner may initially finance construction, but who pays thereafter? Users through charges, the treasury through availability payments, or a combination? The Vision therefore chooses partnerships only after comparison with conventional public procurement, lifecycle costs, sustainability, and effects on tariffs and rights.¹⁹

Investment and Partnership Instructions No. 1 of 2024 for centrally funded bodies allow several contract models. Before an opportunity is announced, they require technical, financial, legal and environmental feasibility studies, updated costs and land free of impediments; they regulate offering opportunities, competition and Ministry of Planning review. This existing framework should be strengthened through a fiscal-risk assessment function in the Ministry of Finance, rather than launching a “new partnership law” without understanding what is missing from implementation of the current framework.²⁰

Table (17): PPP risks to the treasury are not zero.²¹

The Vision recommends the IMF–World Bank PFRAM 2.0 model or an equivalent method to estimate flows, obligations, guarantees, liquidation and the results of demand, interest-rate and inflation scenarios. The national register should cover partnerships involving public bodies, governorates and the Fund wherever public guarantees arise, while distinguishing ownership, contracts and responsibility. PPPs must not be used to remove debt or expenditure from oversight merely because the first payment is deferred for five years.

18. External development finance, loans and guarantees

Development loans and concessional financing from international institutions may provide longer maturities, technical support and procurement management, but they remain debt or support with specific conditions. The full ceiling of a framework agreement must not be treated as an amount already drawn and immediately spendable. Priority should go to projects with substantial public impact that face a commercial financing gap and cannot be deferred without clear harm, while assessing loan currency, interest, grace periods, counterpart requirements and operating capacity.²²

Table (18): External development finance and its limits.

The priority is not maximising announced borrowing, but maximising net assets and services after debt. A consolidated annual report should disclose signed loans, drawn and undrawn amounts, fees, obligations and fulfilled conditions, linking every drawdown to a project code, portfolio and outcome. A grant should be measured by its outcome and the duration of its function, not merely its nominal size.

19. Public debt, bonds and financial mobilisation instruments

Borrowing, treasury bonds and debt instruments are not “resources” in the ultimate economic sense: they transfer spending power across time in exchange for repayment obligations against future revenue. Debt may finance an asset that increases productivity, generates revenue or reduces public costs, but it becomes a risk when continuously used to cover current expenditure or an uncorrectable structural deficit. This chapter sets no numerical debt ceiling or interest cost for 2045, because these variables change with oil, growth, prices, the outstanding stock and refinancing sensitivity.²³

Table (19): Rules for sovereign debt and financing transformation.

A deeper domestic debt market requires transparent risk pricing, reliable information and coordination with the central bank within its legal independence, so that monetary stability does not bear the cost of uncontrolled fiscal expansion. Central bank reserves must not be used to buy Vision projects or repay government debt as though they were “surplus oil deposits”. Currency depreciation is not a net financing instrument free of inflation and import costs.

20. Spatial equity and the federal distribution of projects

National financing does not mean concentrating money in a capital-city project or only in governorates that can readily attract investors. The Vision is federal. Investment distribution requires criteria covering service gaps, poverty, resources, population needs, location, productivity and risks, rather than rent-based shares or superficial equality in project counts. Every decision must respect the powers of the federal government, regions and governorates and applicable fiscal legislation.²⁴

Table (20): Testing spatial equity within an implementable portfolio.

The annual financing portfolio should be accompanied by a public map recording authorised and executed financing and operational assets for each governorate and field, distributing outputs by beneficiary rather than contractor location. Equity does not mean identical expenditure everywhere. A neglected governorate may initially require a higher cost per user; subsequent comparison should then assess service quality and access, not amounts alone.

21. Public assets and enterprises, maintenance and lifecycle costs

Protecting existing assets from deterioration is one of the largest invisible sources of financing. Building a new hospital while equipment in an operating hospital is out of service, or maintaining a water channel while the intake infrastructure is collapsing, presents different choices that require comparison. The state also owns companies, land and assets that could be managed better. But an asset sale is not recurring income, privatisation alone does not equal efficiency, and public property may be disposed of only under the law, valuation, competition and the rights of workers and beneficiaries.

Table (21): Asset management as a conditional source of savings and sustainability.

Any restructuring of a public asset requires independent assessment of effects on competition, pricing, employment and social protection, and application of the law governing disposal of state property and auction conditions where applicable. The estimated value and reasons for choosing rehabilitation, leasing, partnership or sale should be published. A public enterprise’s losses must not be transferred to the Development Fund merely to make them disappear from treasury accounts.

22. Procurement, fiscal transparency and reducing leakage

In financing the Vision, waste prevention does not begin with a criminal investigation after money is lost. It begins with defining the need, feasibility, design, specifications, competition, bid evaluation, variations, measurement, disbursement, acceptance and operation. A cheap contract may become expensive through change orders, delays and maintenance costs; a large contract may conceal conflicts of interest or project splitting. The complete process should therefore be published to the extent legally required, protecting personal data and legitimate security and commercial secrets.

Table (22): From transparency to secure financing throughout the contracting cycle.

The project uses IDMS, which the Ministry of Planning is updating, linking it lawfully to budget, procurement and payment records rather than creating an isolated financing platform. However, announcing the existence of a system does not prove that records are fully reconciled or that all units participate. The first phase should test a sample of the largest projects against contracting, payment and acceptance documents and responses from service stakeholders.²⁵

23. Oil scenarios and shock-resilience testing

A single financing path to 2045 cannot be written on the assumption that oil prices, exchange rates or interest rates will remain unchanged for twenty years. The Vision handles uncertainty through a rolling framework: a conservative reference scenario, a price shock, a volume or export shock, and a combined scenario incorporating implementation delays and emergency expenditure. Shocks may coincide with changes in food prices, debt or interest rates; simulation must therefore extend beyond net oil revenue alone.²⁶

Table (23): Recurring financing scenarios and response parameters.

The chapter assigns no artificial numerical sensitivities to these scenarios because a unified cash database for the entire Vision portfolio is unavailable. What must be available immediately is a Ministry of Finance model covering prices, volumes, expenditure, debt, and enterprise and partnership obligations, testing the cost of recovery from arrears and abrupt cuts. Values should be adopted after treasury data are verified and forecasts updated annually, with the Ministry of Planning and the central bank participating within their mandates.

24. Financing phases for 2027–2045 and transition conditions

Table (24): Financing follows implementation conditions, not the calendar alone.

These phases are consistent with C01; they are not four closed budgets. A qualified project may start before its phase if its dependencies and financing capacity are established. A politically attractive project may be deferred in 2040 if it has not passed its data, financing and contract gates. Annual renewal of the fiscal framework remains mandatory however long the Vision’s horizon. The twenty-year horizon defines the destination and outcome ownership; it does not freeze loan interest or the price of a barrel.

25. The Vision financing indicator dashboard

This chapter does not repeat the forty national indicators established in C02; it sets out twelve indicators to track the quality of financing for those outcomes. Where no accurate baseline exists, the first target is to establish one in 2027–2028, rather than set a cosmetic reform percentage. The financing dashboard is designed at programme, institution and governorate levels; it does not combine heterogeneous scores into an opaque ranking of ministries.

Table (25): A dashboard for financing quality, not a list of pledges.

The ministry should read NF01–NF12 alongside the service and impact indicators in C02. A higher NF03 ratio, for example, does not establish better education or health unless those outcomes appear; it does, however, prevent the mistake of opening assets without operating expenditure. NF09 remains statistically independent: balance-of-payments investment flows are not equivalent to licences or to the value of announced investment agreements.

26. Implementation programmes for financing governance

Table (26): Eight programmes to implement the financing function without establishing eight bodies.

The programmes should not all be launched at once through separate technology tenders. They should be piloted on a limited portfolio of Vision priorities: a water service, electricity-network rehabilitation, an education system, a transport corridor and a local production chain. Expansion follows proof that institutions can bring together contracts, payments, maintenance and outcomes. Each programme must cost training, data, systems and annual operations; it is not merely software or a dashboard.

27. A matrix of programmes, responsible bodies and conditional sources

Table (27): The conditional financing matrix; “potential” is not “available”.

The chapter assigns no fixed percentage of the Vision’s budget to each source. The mix may change with duration, project type, market capacity, interest rates, security conditions, water and land locations. In an actual project, every row of the matrix requires an amount, approval date, spending authority, contract and clear outcome owner before inclusion as “available financing”.

28. Risks, safeguards and closing loopholes

Table (28): The financing risk register and its institutional safeguards.

Preventing harm is a financing condition, not a “side cost” after completion. Transferring ownership of a public service or pricing it must not extinguish a legal right or exempt investors from worker safety, environmental duties or consumer protection. Contract confidentiality must not become a barrier to oversight bodies or parliament. Genuine trade secrets should be protected, while public burdens and essential obligations are published to the fullest extent permitted by law.

29. A hypothetical financial test for an infrastructure project

The following example is entirely hypothetical; it is neither an existing Iraqi project nor a budget for the Vision. Assume a service asset costing IQD 100 billion to construct, requiring 6 billion annually for operation and maintenance over ten years, and renewal costing 20 billion at the end of the fifth year. Inflation, discounting, taxes and financing payments are omitted to simplify the example; in practice, these elements must be calculated formally. The undiscounted arithmetic lifecycle cost here = 100 + (6 × 10) + 20 = IQD 180 billion, not merely 100 billion.

Table (29): Comparison does not establish PPP superiority merely because construction payments are deferred.

The example shows that “finding IQD 100 billion for construction” does not complete the decision. If the body cannot afford 6 billion in annual operations, the project becomes idle or generates arrears. Private financing does not make the cost disappear: it converts it into fees, payments, obligations and possible guarantees. In an actual comparison, differences in value are determined by the cost of money, risk allocation, quality, lifespan and equity, not a predetermined ideological position.

30. The annual national report on financing the Vision

The chapter proposes incorporating a “Vision Financing Statement” into the budget and its monitoring process, rather than issuing a separate bulletin without implementation force. The annual statement would present approved and realistic resources; signed and executed private investments; Development Fund assets, returns and risks where legally publishable; PPP payments and future obligations; loans, guarantees, arrears and operating expenditure for new assets. It would then compare financing with C02 outcomes and the C03 performance system.²⁷

Table (30): A Vision Financing Statement model that survives changes of government.

A statement cannot be properly “reviewed” by republishing the same report every year without versioning, correction and explanations of differences. If a baseline, project description or PPP payment year changes, the reason and previous version must be published. Public data should be made available in examinable formats wherever possible, with lawful exceptions for security secrets, privacy and protected commercial information. Appeal and audit pathways remain available under the law.

31. The success criterion and conclusion

Iraq Vision 2045 does not become financeable merely by saying that oil wealth is abundant or investors will come, nor by opening another fund. Financing succeeds when the state knows what it needs, what it can afford in a difficult year, what the private sector should finance and bear the risks of, what beneficiaries pay, how to protect the rights of those unable to pay, and who is accountable for an asset that never enters service.

In 2045, parliament, citizens and competent bodies should be able to trace every dinar, guarantee and obligation from the law to the cash source, contract, operational asset and outcome. Public finances must not be eroded to make the renaissance look rapid; nor should the state hide behind fiscal discipline to avoid viable, necessary investment. Financing the Vision means integrating fiscal sustainability, productive investment and equitable services.

Governing rule: national financing is not the amount of money announced, but the ability to fulfil every state commitment and deliver lasting outcomes without appropriating future generations’ resources.

32. Data gaps and updating decisions

• The aggregate cost of Iraq Vision 2045 is not established. A register of programmes/projects and services, including lifetime costs and controls against double counting, must precede any total estimate.
• Final national revenue and expenditure data for 2025–2026 require reconciliation with Ministry of Finance statements and monetary data, alignment of the framework with the IMF, and avoidance of treating them as perpetual projections.
• The Iraq Development Fund’s accounts, asset holdings, obligations and audited returns cannot be inferred from the objectives in its regulation or public activity statements.
• Federal and local PPP obligations and guarantees require a unified register; announcing a contract is insufficient to establish the present value of its obligations.
• Estimated savings from tackling waste must not be recorded as realised revenue before accounting verification and audit.
• The chapter does not establish a new sovereign fund or compulsory financing source. These are legal and financial options conditional on accounts, sustainability and independent review.