Iraq’s strategic environment and geopolitics

Iraq: a connector state or a transit territory?

By Ali Zuweid · 19 October 2026 · 11 min read

English translation published 19 October 2026. Read the Arabic original.

On 2 October 2026, Türkiye’s energy ministry announced that Baghdad and Ankara were working towards a broader agreement following the oil transportation contract signed in August. Discussions covered oil and gas infrastructure, refining, petrochemicals and electricity, alongside a stated ambition to develop Ceyhan’s role as an energy hub. Turkish energy ministry statement These are objectives and negotiating directions, not projects demonstrated to be complete. They nevertheless deserve to be read from the Iraqi side with a specific question: as the network in which Iraq participates expands, which economic functions and decision-making rights expand with it, and which remain at the other end?

In my article on the Development Road and transport corridors, I examined commercial demand, service provision and the cost of commitments. The issue here extends beyond the viability of a journey to the state’s position within the relationship. By a connector state, I mean a country that provides valuable connectivity, participates in setting its rules and can protect its interests when partners disagree. By a transit territory, I mean a situation in which the land and its inhabitants bear part of the cost while decisions about use, returns and alternatives remain beyond their influence. This is an analytical distinction, not a fixed international classification or a predetermined verdict on every Iraqi project.

More connections do not necessarily mean more choice

A study by Gita Gopinath, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Andrea Presbitero and Petia Topalova, published in the IMF Working Papers series in 2024, found that nonaligned countries were playing a growing role in connecting geopolitically distant trading blocs. It cautioned that this change did not necessarily establish genuine diversification or reduced strategic dependence. Changing Global Linkages This is a research finding based on particular data and a specified model, not a declaration that Iraq has become one of these countries or that moving goods between other parties automatically gives it autonomy.

The mechanism deserves examination: goods may pass through more countries while their essential component, financier or final buyer remains the same. The route of dependence then changes more than its degree. For Iraq, I propose mapping relationships by function rather than counting flags at signing ceremonies. Diversifying buyers does not necessarily compensate for a transport monopoly, and several operators do not create an alternative if they all depend on one outlet. Relative autonomy requires an alternative usable at an affordable cost and within a tolerable time, not a proposed option that has yet to begin operating.

Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman’s study of weaponized interdependence is useful here. It links the ability to exploit network centrality to effective jurisdiction over key nodes and the institutions capable of exercising it. International Security, 2019 Its principal cases concern financial and information networks; its findings cannot be transferred to a land route as if these were identical systems. The distinction between an asset’s presence within a territory and the institutional capacity to determine its use is nevertheless relevant when testing claims that geographical location alone creates influence.

I do not infer that Iraq’s objective should be to obstruct others or turn every connection into an instrument of pressure. A customer who fears arbitrary decisions will seek another option, even at a higher cost. A state can increase its importance through a dependable service and rules protecting participants while retaining its lawful powers. There is a difference between a defined right to take exceptional action, with grounds and review, and a service that may stop because of a conflict whose limits users cannot establish. The former can enter a risk assessment; the latter undermines the confidence on which the connectivity project itself depends.

The contract determines what the map cannot show

The oil agreement announced on 1 August 2026 illustrates this distinction. According to Türkiye’s energy ministry, BOTAŞ signed a one-year transportation agreement with SOMO and the North Oil Company, allocating the two Iraqi companies capacity of 750,000 barrels a day. Agreement announcement Allocated capacity is not a verified volume of daily exports. The contract’s duration is also much shorter than the life of the infrastructure it uses, making the renewal of rules and access conditions part of the route’s security alongside its technical integrity.

The published announcement alone does not allow a judgment on every charge, compensation provision or dispute mechanism. It would be irresponsible to assume that these are fair or unfair without the relevant texts. What can be proposed is a review standard: can Iraq establish the cost of use and its expected adjustment, its rights during interruption, and the conditions for renewal and exit? Do purchase or transportation commitments match an actual ability to supply? The wider the gap between an investment’s life and the period of guaranteed access to a complementary connection, the more important it becomes to address the risk before committing to further expansion.

Broader cooperation may deliver genuine benefits that a narrow agreement cannot readily provide. A company with expertise, operations and a market can add value for its Iraqi partner. Combining finance, operation and marketing in one relationship nonetheless requires clearer disclosure of how risk is allocated, because a change in one component may affect the rest. I propose testing alternatives at the level of functions: what can be assigned to another provider, what requires alternative investment, and what depends on another state’s consent? This prevents close partnership from being equated automatically with monopoly, or numerous partnerships from being equated with the disappearance of dependence.

An external relationship also needs an enforceable domestic foundation. Article 8 of Iraq’s Constitution connects foreign relations to good neighbourliness, shared interests, reciprocity and respect for international obligations. Iraqi Constitution In my view, applying this to connectivity projects begins by identifying who makes commitments, who regulates and who reviews results. If state institutions disagree, the disagreement should be resolved through known procedures rather than passed on to a partner, producer or local population. Coherent decision-making does not mean abolishing different responsibilities; it means avoiding promises that the institutions concerned cannot jointly deliver.

The Baltics and Vietnam test different propositions

On 9 February 2025, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity confirmed that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had synchronised their grids with continental Europe after ending their synchronous connection to the Russian and Belarusian system. Confirmation of completed synchronisation The three states did not secure their choice through isolated self-sufficiency, but through an alternative connection. For Iraq, this supports a useful distinction: reducing reliance on a particular relationship may require more external cooperation, provided its rules, risks and controllability differ.

The cost of creating the alternative does not disappear behind the political outcome. In December 2023, the European Commission recorded more than €1.23 billion in project grants from the Connecting Europe Facility for Energy. Financing and coordination announcement Iraq’s environment differs from membership in a common European market with its regulatory and financing structures. The example therefore establishes that an alternative requires institutions, funding and preparation. It cannot promise that constructing a new Iraqi connection will deliver the same outcome or justify disregarding its cost.

Vietnam tests the difference between trade passing through a country and production changing within it. In a June 2025 IMF working paper, Tatjana Schulze and Weining Xin examined six Asian countries. For 2018–2022, they found evidence of increased domestic content in Vietnam’s strategic-sector exports to the United States relative to a synthetic counterfactual, while evidence for the other five countries remained less conclusive. Trade reallocation study, abstract and findings This is a research paper rather than a settled consensus, but it shows why what is produced inside a country must be examined rather than relying on growth in gross exports.

I do not infer that Iraq can reproduce Vietnam’s industrial trajectory simply by building a corridor. The study does not test Iraq, and productive conditions, markets and institutions differ. What can be applied is its separation of economic functions. A fee for moving a foreign product should be distinguished from a specialised Iraqi service and from a factory that uses imported inputs to add domestic production. All three activities may be useful, but their differences alter the skills, income and external dependence involved. The description “connector country” therefore needs activity-specific accounting before it becomes an economically convincing claim.

Both comparisons carry another qualification: choosing a new partner or attracting new production does not remove exposure to external decisions. The risk may move to a different final market, technical standard or financing condition. I believe success is measured not by the disappearance of dependence—an unrealistic standard—but by institutions’ capacity to identify it, spread it and manage a particular interruption. That includes protecting commercial data, establishing audit rights and sustaining domestic skills so that Iraq can explain network performance without depending entirely on one operator’s report.

An Iraqi test for a connector state

I propose that Iraq’s transport, energy, finance and planning institutions jointly assess each major connectivity project by relating its return to decision-making rights. They should measure what remains in the economy as wages, profits, services and domestic production after deducting relevant inputs and costs. They should examine the share of traffic or revenue dependent on one partner and the time and cost required to activate an alternative. Iraqi contractual and regulatory powers during interruption or a change of operator should then be reviewed. These are proposed indicators, not audit results claiming that current projects have passed or failed them.

The indicators should not be compressed into one score that conceals trade-offs. A profitable project may be highly concentrated; a less profitable one may be valuable as a backup. The appropriate decision depends on the additional cost to the treasury and the probability and consequences of interruption, rather than labelling any backup route an unlimited strategic necessity. Assessments should also disclose whether the estimated benefit belongs to an operator, the budget, producers or residents. These accounts are connected but are not identical, and one may improve at another’s expense.

I also propose presenting this assessment to the appropriate oversight bodies before making long-term commitments, while publishing a summary that protects commercial secrets and exposes assumptions and public costs. This should include reviewing benefits for governorates through which projects pass and whether local businesses can access the opportunities created. Residents’ satisfaction should not be inferred merely from a facility’s proximity. These requirements connect to border and transit governance, because an international rule does not implement itself when a transaction reaches an Iraqi institution. External confidence needs domestic consistency that the state can demonstrate.

Iraq is not choosing between openness and sovereignty in the abstract. It is choosing between terms of openness that increase its room for action and terms that increase flows without a comparable increase in capability. The cooperation statement issued at the beginning of October provides an opportunity to make this distinction before new arrangements are fixed. Iraq becomes a connector state when it can explain what it contributes, what it gains and what it will do if conditions change. However many lines are drawn across it, the map cannot answer these questions on its behalf.

Ali Zuweid — Researcher in strategic affairs and national security