Iraq’s strategic environment and geopolitics

Population geography: where Iraqis live and why it matters strategically

By Ali Zuweid · 19 October 2026 · 10 min read

English translation published 19 October 2026. Read the Arabic original.

In its update dated 31 August 2026, the International Organization for Migration’s Displacement Tracking Matrix recorded approximately 213,900 people remaining displaced in Iraq within its monitoring of drought-related displacement. This is an estimate of the displacement that remained at that date, not the number newly displaced during the year or the total displaced for all reasons. IOM displacement data Such movement shows why knowing a country’s population total is insufficient. The state must know where people now live, what makes them move and where their next need for a school, a job or water will emerge.

In February 2025, the Ministry of Planning announced that the 2024 census had counted 46,118,793 people. Announcement of the basic results That is a reference figure for the 2024 census, not a population estimate for October 2026. Its strategic importance comes not simply from scale but from the ability to connect people to local resources, services and opportunities. If budgeting relies on an outdated population distribution while households move faster than records are updated, the state can spend more and still leave some needs outside its calculations.

An urban country, but cities are not a single category

The Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority presents census results showing 70.2% of the population in urban areas and 29.8% in rural areas. The Authority’s census overview Approximately seven in ten Iraqis therefore live in areas classified as urban. That classification does not make central Baghdad, a small town and a newly developed urban fringe equivalent cases. Service costs and job opportunities depend on density and connections to facilities, not simply on the word “urban” beside an area’s name.

A city must also be distinguished from its governorate. Baghdad Governorate’s population, for example, cannot be presented as the population of the city within any boundaries we choose and then compared with a foreign city defined by narrower municipal limits. The comparison may change if it uses the built-up area or the daily commuting zone. I do not use circulating governorate figures here to rank cities, because different tables, boundaries and reference periods may produce a misleading ranking. Before calculating, the geographical unit and the date represented by each figure must be stated.

The functional urban area definition developed by the OECD and the European Union addresses this problem by combining a city with its commuting zone, reflecting its actual economic reach. The functional urban area method I am not proposing that this definition replace Iraqi administrative boundaries, but that it add an analytical layer. A school, hospital and workplace may sit in different administrative units while serving people within one connected area. Planning each unit separately may overlook that relationship.

The distance a person must travel can therefore matter more than the number of facilities inside their district. A nearby clinic may not provide the service required. A school may be accessible by car while a child cannot reach it safely. I propose measuring coverage through travel time, cost and continuity of service alongside facility numbers. Comparisons between areas should distinguish insufficient capacity, poor access and inadequate quality: constructing another facility does not necessarily remove the obstacle preventing people from using an existing one.

Where people settle is an economic and environmental question

Drought-related displacement data indicate that the relationship between water and population also becomes a matter for urban planning. Yet movement cannot be explained by one environmental factor in every case. Falling income may interact with debt, education, services and family networks. Monitoring data do not isolate each factor’s contribution. Knowing where a displaced household is located, knowing precisely why it moved and predicting where it will settle are different questions. Each needs appropriate data and a different method.

Remaining within the same governorate does not mean that a household’s needs remain in the same place. A move from a village to a district centre may leave the governorate’s total population unchanged while shifting demand for schools, sanitation and housing within it. If funding depends only on a governorate’s aggregate allocation, the new pressure may not become visible until classrooms are overcrowded or rents rise. This is an analytical implication of internal movement, not a claim that every drought-related move followed one direction or ended in a major city.

In my view, the response requires two simultaneous assessments. In the area of origin, the feasibility of sustaining livelihoods and the costs of water, services and adaptation must be examined. In the receiving area, the needs of new arrivals and existing residents should be estimated together. Funding only one side leaves the other bearing the consequences. Supporting people to remain where viable living conditions are absent may postpone a greater loss; neglecting receiving areas may turn forced movement into lasting deprivation. Assistance should not be conditional on forcing a household to stay or return. Safe choice and its members’ rights are part of the solution.

This also matters to the meaning of national security. Concentrating people in a place exposed to the interruption of a basic service makes the consequences widespread. Density may, however, also lower the cost per person of providing that service when well organized. There is no automatic rule that concentration is dangerous and dispersal is safe. Water, electricity, transport and health systems should be assessed for their ability to continue under pressure, with alternatives considered at the policy level, without publishing sensitive details about vulnerabilities. Population distribution informs civil resilience; it does not make residents a threat category.

Housing cannot be separated from work

At the launch of Iraq’s National Housing Policy 2025–2030 in October 2025, the United Nations presented an estimated housing deficit of between 2.5 million and 3.5 million units. Housing policy launch statement This was an estimated range published at that time, not a new measurement of today’s deficit. The breadth of the range is another reason not to reduce policy to a single construction target. Where a home is located and whether a household can afford it determine how much need it actually meets.

If housing is built far from jobs and services, land may be cheaper while households spend more on daily travel and time. If support is confined to ownership, it may not reach someone who needs a rental near an uncertain job opportunity. I therefore propose comparing housing alternatives through the total cost of living and the types of household able to benefit. Changes in job location and household size should enter the assessment, rather than assuming that a completed dwelling necessarily delivers complete economic stability.

The experience of Toyama in Japan helps identify what can be measured. The city combined urban planning with public transport and encouraged residence along transport corridors. A World Bank report records an increase in the share of residents living along those corridors from 28% in 2005 to 39% in 2019. Toyama case study, page 2 This is a comparison over time in a city facing population ageing and decline, not a randomized experiment isolating each measure or a numerical target for Iraq.

Iraq starts from a different position. Its pattern of demand for schools, homes and jobs is not that of a Japanese city with an advanced ageing process. The useful lesson is to assess housing, transport and services as one decision and measure who has moved closer to what they need. This does not require light rail in every city. Regular buses, a route adjustment or better walking access may be more appropriate, depending on density and fiscal capacity. The technology should be chosen after the problem and the beneficiaries have been identified, not beforehand.

Attention to cities does not imply excluding rural areas from investment. Rural residents account for nearly three tenths of the population, enough to reject the idea that every service should be concentrated in major cities. But equity does not require an identical copy of every facility in every village. Service centres for several settlements, supported by dependable transport, can be tested, as can mobile services where appropriate. The time of women, older people and people with disabilities must enter the cost assessment, rather than assuming that every household has private transport.

From population maps to budget decisions

In its World Population Day statement published in July 2026, the Ministry of Planning emphasized turning census results into policies and connecting education and training to labour market needs within the National Development Plan. Ministry of Planning statement This is an announced policy direction, not evidence of completed implementation. The practical test I propose is whether a decision-maker can explain why a school or water network is funded at a particular location using current population demand and a documented service gap.

This begins by linking aggregated census data to school, health, water and economic activity records using compatible geographical units. Demand indicators between censuses can then be updated through birth records, enrolment, residential movement and targeted surveys. One estimate should not be copied into another and treated as a new census: each update’s source and limitations must remain explicit. Aggregated indicators should also be available for research, while personal data are protected and details that could identify small households or expose them to discrimination are withheld.

I propose that investment allocation distinguish three considerations: the number of beneficiaries, the degree of deprivation and the cost of providing the service locally. Relying on numbers alone can leave sparsely populated areas facing costs they cannot bear. Relying only on poverty can overlook rapid growth that creates new shortages. Costs must themselves be scrutinized so that an allocation formula does not reward scattered planning or unjustified expenditure. These are proposed principles for a formula open to debate and testing, not a substitute for existing legal rules or ready-made budget shares.

A limited pilot could begin with a receiving area, an area of origin and an intermediate city, without assuming that they represent all of Iraq. The baseline, investment decision and post-operation outcome should be published: whose access improved, at what cost, and who remained excluded? The design can then be corrected before expansion. This test complements the analysis of cities, corridors and infrastructure. Connecting locations does not by itself make a network productive; people must be able to use the opportunities it offers.

The census gives Iraq a common reference, but society does not stop moving on enumeration day. State capacity in this field means noticing spatial change before it becomes a service crisis or a lost opportunity, and allowing people to settle and move under dignified conditions. A useful strategic map is one that can explain how people actually live and then change public decisions accordingly.

Ali Zuweid — Researcher in strategic affairs and national security