Iraq’s strategic environment and geopolitics

The Shatt al-Arab and the Gulf: how does maritime access give a state weight?

By Ali Zuweid · 13 October 2026 · 10 min read

English translation published 13 October 2026. Read the Arabic original.

The International Maritime Organization’s register for the Strait of Hormuz and the Middle East listed 106 confirmed maritime incidents as of 13 October 2026. This is a dated cumulative count, not an estimate of every possible incident or the number of ships disabled on a single day. Confirmed incidents register For Iraq, the record takes the question of maritime access beyond an abstract debate about coastline length. A berth may be ready for a ship while risks along the sea route prevent its arrival or make the timing and cost unpredictable.

The strength of a maritime outlet consists of several links: the right of access, a usable navigational channel, a functioning port, connections to the domestic economy and an international route that can be used. Expanding one link cannot deliver its full benefit if another fails. Does the sea therefore give a state weight simply through access to it, or through the ability to turn access into a reliable service? How does developing the Shatt al-Arab differ from improving commercial ports and oil export terminals, although all are concentrated in southern Iraq?

The Shatt al-Arab is part of a system, not the name for every outlet

The geography needs to be distinguished first. The humanitarian Logistics Cluster’s description separates access to Umm Qasr through the Khor Abdullah waterway from the Shatt al-Arab route to Basra, and also identifies offshore oil-loading terminals. Iraq’s maritime entry points This older reference is used for a stable geographical distinction, not as evidence of present operating capacity or permissible draught. Iraq’s imports and exports cannot all be reduced to the river channel. Nor does developing a container port automatically resolve every requirement of river navigation and oil shipping.

The Shatt al-Arab also has a legal and historical significance that transport costs alone cannot capture. The river-frontier protocol attached to the Iraq–Iran treaty signed on 13 June 1975 specified the thalweg: in the document’s wording, the median line of the main navigable channel at its lowest navigable level. Treaty and protocol This reference establishes a documented historical basis for discussion; it does not offer a determination here on implementation details or any current dispute. Boundary questions require examination of the relevant instruments, maps and procedures, rather than resolution through a general political description.

This helps explain why boundary delimitation and channel management must be distinguished. Removing a navigational obstruction, updating a hydrographic survey, organising vessel movements and preventing pollution are different functions from changing a state boundary. Regular technical coordination can serve both parties without being presented as a surrender of sovereignty. Equally, a decision with legal consequences should not be concealed beneath a vague technical label. State capacity includes identifying the nature of a decision and the competent authority before implementing it.

Water introduces another dimension that berth construction cannot resolve. A 2021 paper in Environmental Earth Sciences examined the relationship between freshwater discharge and saltwater intrusion in the Shatt al-Arab estuary. Discharge and salinity study Its findings are not used as a direct measurement of today’s salinity. They establish why assessing the estuary requires attention to the interaction between freshwater and the sea, rather than depth alone. I therefore propose assessing navigation, dredging and coastal projects alongside their effects on water, ecosystems and livelihoods. Shipping gains are insufficient if their costs are transferred to Basra’s residents without evaluation or mitigation.

A port’s value begins with predictable service

In July 2024, IMO announced a support mission for a maritime single window at the northern and southern Umm Qasr ports. At the time, it estimated that more than 80% of Iraq’s imported goods passed through Umm Qasr. Support mission announcement The percentage must remain tied to its source and date, and an establishment announcement is not proof that every function was complete in 2026. It nevertheless demonstrates that procedural improvements at an existing node can affect a large share of trade without opening another berth.

A maritime single window is not simply another name for any digital programme. It concerns the exchange of information about a ship’s arrival, stay and departure among the relevant authorities. Customs systems address goods procedures, while port community systems connect other actors and services. IMO guidance emphasises shared data and interoperability, alongside cyber-risk management. Maritime single window guidance Requiring the same information to be entered into three platforms may digitise duplication rather than remove it. The practical test is whether duplication falls while checks, accountability and continuity during outages remain effective.

Iraq’s customs receipts provide evidence of the significance of administrative reform, but not a complete measure of port efficiency. UN Trade and Development’s ASYCUDA report for 2025 records a 128% rise in Iraqi customs revenue between 2023 and 2024. ASYCUDA report That comparison alone cannot isolate digitalisation from changing trade values, tariffs, compliance and other factors. Nor does increased revenue establish that a container left the port faster. Collection indicators must be separated from service time and cost, so success in one function does not exempt the others from measurement.

International measures provide a useful distinction. The World Bank’s Container Port Performance Index measures vessel time in port, including waiting and time at berth. Port index methodology Its Logistics Performance Indicators methodology separately includes import-container dwell time between unloading and departure from the port. Logistics indicators methodology A ship can leave promptly while its cargo remains for days. I therefore do not regard a single number as a sufficient representation of overall performance, and do not use an unverified international ranking to judge a particular Iraqi port.

I propose publishing median service times alongside the time within which 90% of transactions are completed, broken down by cargo and procedure, with explicit start and end points. This is a measurement proposal, not a statement about current Iraqi port performance. Its benefit is that an average can conceal a group of shipments facing severe delays, while firms also plan stock levels and financing around the risk of lateness. Figures should then be connected to the cause of waiting, rather than attributing another agency’s procedure to the terminal operator or allowing agencies to exchange responsibility for a delay nobody measures.

Singapore’s lesson and the limits of comparison

In January 2026, Singapore’s Maritime and Port Authority reported container throughput of 44.66 million twenty-foot equivalent units in 2025, up 8.6% from 2024. Annual port results A TEU is a measure of handling volume, not necessarily a count of individual containers, and it does not measure domestic value added. Singapore’s Ministry of Transport describes the country’s role as a transhipment and maritime-services hub. The maritime hub’s function Throughput alone is therefore not a target to transplant to Iraq, which must also serve its domestic market, industry, agriculture and different export activities.

The transferable element is organising service around the movement of the ship and its cargo. MPA explains that digitalPORT@SG provides a single window for ship clearance and connects its further development with coordination of maritime resources and services. Maritime services platform The page does not establish that digitalisation alone caused throughput growth, nor does it remove the effects of location, shipping networks and accumulated investment. It presents an institutional function that can be tested in Iraq: does the system enable authorities to make decisions from consistent information, or merely add an electronic interface to conflicting procedures?

Investment conditions also differ. A port handling international transhipment competes for liner networks and service frequency, while a port serving Iraq’s economy needs reliable connections to producing and consuming areas. In June 2025, the World Bank approved US$930 million to improve railway infrastructure and services between Umm Qasr and Mosul. Iraq railway project This was financing approval, not completion of the network. Its analytical significance is to place the port within a land-transport system: doubling quayside handling cannot deliver the same benefit if goods cannot leave the yard.

Expansions at Al-Faw and Umm Qasr, and services on the Shatt al-Arab, should consequently be assessed as complementary functions, without assuming operating capacities that recent data have not established. Comparisons must include maintenance, labour, energy and inland connections, rather than construction costs alone. Removing a constraint in an existing facility may have greater impact than an expansion without sufficient demand. Expansion may, in turn, become necessary when demand demonstrates the limits of smaller improvements. The choice requires evidence on flows, schedules and costs, not rhetorical competition between port names.

Maritime influence extends beyond the port boundary

The EIA’s assessment of maritime oil chokepoints connects Gulf oil flows with the Strait of Hormuz. Maritime chokepoints assessment Developing a port within the Gulf therefore does not, in itself, establish a sea route bypassing the strait. It may improve access to the sea without removing risks further along the route. This does not diminish the value of port investment; it prevents that investment from being assigned a function its geography cannot perform. The distinction connects with the separation of supplier, route and source of risk in the analysis of Iraq’s regional environment.

In my assessment, national management of maritime access needs a joint programme involving transport, ports, customs, environmental and water authorities, with explicit powers and indicators that do not define success incompatibly. These institutions should locate delays in decisions or cargo movements, then choose administrative reform, physical investment or external cooperation according to the problem. The customs and trade facilitation proposal can support legislative discussion of part of this system, while remaining a proposal rather than enacted law.

Tonnage is not enough if the benefits remain detached from the surrounding economy. Investment appraisal should examine the skilled employment, services and production that benefit from the port, alongside the costs of pollution, congestion and land use borne by residents. I propose linking expansion to periodic review of demand, performance and environmental effects, while protecting maintenance from becoming the first item cut under budget pressure. Maritime capacity is an asset requiring continuous operation, not a final achievement demonstrated by an opening photograph.

A maritime outlet gives a state weight when using it becomes reliable, economically useful and compatible with protection and cooperation. Rights, rules, interests and risks will continue to coexist in the Shatt al-Arab and the Gulf. What Iraq can change is how much of that geography becomes a functioning service, and how many workable choices it retains when that service can no longer operate as expected.

Ali Zuweid — Researcher in strategic affairs and national security