Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability Programme

1. Philosophy of parliamentary oversight

Article 61/Second of the Iraqi Constitution assigns the Council of Representatives 'oversight of the performance of the executive authority' and provides specific instruments ranging from questions to discussion of a general topic and interpellation, potentially leading, subject to constitutional requirements, to withdrawal of confidence.¹ This makes oversight an institutional function in its own right, rather than a media activity appended to parliamentary work.

My approach to oversight serves four purposes: protecting the law from obstruction or selective application; protecting public money from waste and mismanagement; protecting citizens' rights from institutional failings; and improving government decisions by exposing the gap between commitment and outcome. I regard oversight neither as permanent hostility towards the government nor as political accommodation of it. Its standards are facts, jurisdiction and results.

Good oversight does not begin with interpellation. It begins with asking the right question, gathering information, identifying the responsible authority and defining the legal, financial or administrative obligation to be assessed. If a less confrontational instrument resolves the problem, that is a success for accountability, not a retreat from it. If the facts reveal a serious failing, deception or persistent refusal to implement the law, the case moves to a stronger instrument through justified and documented escalation.

2. Governing principles

3. The boundary between oversight and executive interference

The dividing line is simple: the MP scrutinizes whether the law was implemented, whether money was spent according to its allocation, whether procedures were lawful and transparent, and whether announced outcomes were achieved. The MP does not become the authority managing the ministry, selecting the contractor, issuing an appointment order, identifying the individual beneficiary or granting exemptions.

Parliamentary investigative committees may establish facts and examine material relevant to a case under the rules of procedure, subject to an express prohibition on encroaching on matters before the courts.²

4. Map of oversight powers: who holds which power?

I will not attribute to an individual MP a power held only by a specified number of members, a committee or the Council collectively. This map is the practical foundation of every commitment in the programme.

Practical rule: the more consequential the instrument, the greater the requirements for evidence, procedural form, number of supporters and clarity of responsibility. I will therefore not begin by threatening an instrument whose conditions are not met.

5. The parliamentary oversight cycle

I adopt a consistent working cycle for every oversight case, enabling the public subsequently to know its progress and why it was escalated or closed.

Conditions for opening an oversight case

A case is opened where an identifiable public-interest issue exists, a responsible authority can be linked to jurisdiction, and initial information can be verified. I do not treat every post or allegation as a fact, but as a signal requiring verification.

Conditions for closing a case

A case closes with one of several clear outcomes: the problem is resolved and the procedure corrected; the allegation is disproved; the matter is transferred to a competent judicial or oversight authority in a way that precludes parliamentary interference in its details; the oversight instrument is completed and an outcome issued; or further action is impossible for publicly stated legal reasons. 'No follow-up' is not an acceptable ending without explanation.

6. System of annual oversight priorities

An MP cannot scrutinize everything to the same depth. I will therefore announce key oversight priorities at the start of each legislative year while retaining capacity for urgent issues. Priorities will be ranked through a scoring matrix, not by media noise.

Higher-scoring issues receive priority for research time, correspondence and committee work. Urgent matters posing an immediate threat to life, security or public money may take precedence outside the ranking, with the reason for the exception explained.

7. Parliamentary questions

A question is the principal individual oversight instrument available to a member of the Council of Representatives. The Constitution permits an MP to address questions to the Prime Minister and ministers on any matter within their remit, with only the questioner entitled to comment on the answer.¹ The rules of procedure govern written questions, scheduling of oral answers, deadlines and procedures for comments.²

When do I use a question?

• When I need a specific figure, document or official explanation.
• When a fact requires confirmation or denial by the competent authority.
• When I need to know why a law, decision or allocation has not been implemented.
• When there is a gap between the announced target and the actual result.
• When a precise answer can resolve the issue before moving to a collective instrument.

Question quality standard

A good question is focused in subject, clear in its request, answerable with a document, figure or specific statement, and free of a predetermined accusation. A question combining ten unrelated matters is weaker as an oversight instrument than ten questions organized by time and subject.

Important constitutional qualification: Article 50 of the rules of procedure uses broader wording for questions, but the Federal Supreme Court held in 42/Federal/2019 that the individual questioning power under Article 61/Seventh/A does not extend to the President of the Republic. Where there is a conflict, I will follow the binding judicial interpretation.³

8. Requests for information and documents

Oversight without documents quickly becomes argument. The rules of procedure give the Council of Representatives the power to request information and documents from official bodies on matters concerning the public interest, citizens' rights or implementation of laws. They also permit standing committees to request the documents and information they need with the knowledge of the Council's Presidency.²

As an MP, I will use the most appropriate channel according to the instrument's legal character: an individual parliamentary question to obtain data; a request within the competent committee for documents to be provided to it; or a request through the Council where the power belongs to the Council rather than the individual. I will not present personal correspondence as a binding order if the law has not granted me that authority.

Standard information package for major cases

• The legal basis and approved administrative decision.
• The original plan, timetable and progress indicators.
• Budget allocation, actual expenditure and remaining commitments.
• Contracts, amendments and variation orders to the extent disclosure is permitted by law.
• Relevant audit, internal oversight and external oversight reports.
• Reasons for deviation from the plan, corrective measures and responsibilities.

Every document obtained through oversight will be classified as publishable; publishable after protected data are redacted; or not publishable for a specified legal reason. Confidentiality does not end follow-up; it changes how that follow-up is disclosed.

9. Committee invitations, hearings and general debate

An appearance before a committee is not an interpellation and should not be presented to the public as a finding of guilt. Its purpose is to gather deeper information, put technical data to the official and hear several parties on the same subject. The rules of procedure permit committees to invite a minister or an official of equivalent rank with the approval of a majority of committee members. They also permit invitations to deputy ministers, special-grade officials and other government employees, and recourse to experts.²

Within the competent committee, I will press for appearances to be based on an advance schedule of questions and attachments and conclude with recorded recommendations, a person responsible for follow-up and a review date. An appearance that ends with the meeting and receives no follow-up does not deliver institutional accountability.

General debate

Where an issue extends beyond one official's case and concerns the policy of the Council of Ministers or an entire ministry, at least 25 members may raise a general topic for debate under Article 61/Seventh/B of the Constitution.¹ I will use this route where an explanation of public policy or sectoral performance is needed, rather than for an isolated incident that a question or committee can address.

10. Work of parliamentary committees

The most sustained oversight takes place in standing committees because they possess sectoral expertise, accumulate case knowledge and can invite officials, request information and submit reports and recommendations. On 17 February 2026, the Council of Representatives approved an amendment to its rules of procedure reorganizing standing committees and their functions. This must be taken into account when assigning oversight cases according to current responsibilities.⁴

My approach within a committee of which I am a member

• Establish an annual register of open cases, rather than relying on ad hoc follow-up from one sitting to the next.
• Link every case to an indicator, government commitment, oversight report or legal provision.
• Request comparable periodic reports rather than general descriptive statements.
• Invite the technical official alongside the political official where the problem is technical.
• Draw on experts, universities and research centres where the committee needs specialist advice.
• Submit a documented dissenting opinion when disagreeing with a committee report, rather than obstructing the report or turning the disagreement into a personal dispute.
• Follow up on recommendations after issuance and measure their implementation rate.

If I am not a member of the competent committee, the rules of procedure permit a Council member to attend other committees' meetings and express an opinion with permission, without voting. I will exercise this right on priority matters intersecting with my oversight programme, while respecting the committee's remit and members.²

11. Parliamentary investigation where the rules permit

Parliamentary investigation is a fact-finding instrument for a complex matter, not a substitute for criminal investigation or the courts. The rules of procedure permit investigative committees and authorize them to establish facts, invite people to give statements, examine relevant material and seek expert assistance, without encroaching on matters before the judiciary.²

If a matter requires an investigative committee, I will not announce 'formation of a committee' as an individual commitment, because an MP cannot establish one alone. I will present the reasons for its formation, seek support for the required institutional mechanism, and press for its scope, duration and questions to be defined from the outset, then publish the legally disclosable findings once it is complete.

When is an investigative committee appropriate?

• When responsibility is spread across several bodies and one ministry's answer is insufficient.
• When a sequence of documents and decisions needs to be reconstructed chronologically.
• When a matter has major public impact and cannot readily be resolved through one appearance.
• When a collective report from the Council or its Presidency is needed to determine the next steps.

12. Interpellation: an accountability instrument, not a performance

Interpellation has greater political impact than a question or general debate, so the Constitution imposes clearer requirements: a member of the Council of Representatives, with the approval of 25 members, may interpellate the Prime Minister or ministers to hold them accountable on matters within their remit. Debate on an interpellation may not take place until at least seven days after its submission. The Constitution also permits interpellation of officials of independent bodies under the procedures relating to ministers.¹

The rules of procedure require an interpellation request to state the subject, facts, principal points, reasons and grounds. It must not concern matters outside the government's remit or a private or personal interest of the questioner, and must not reopen a matter already decided by the Council unless new facts have emerged.²

I will not extend the scope of interpellation by political analogy. Federal Supreme Court decisions have invalidated legislative extensions beyond constitutionally specified offices, including provisions concerning interpellation of governors under the Council of Representatives Law. The governing standard is therefore the constitutional text and binding judicial interpretation, rather than common practice.⁵

13. Confidence and withdrawal of confidence in oversight

Withdrawal of confidence does not automatically follow every political or administrative disagreement. For a minister, the Constitution links raising the confidence issue to a specific procedure after an interpellation debate and requires a request signed by fifty members unless the minister requests it personally; it also sets a waiting period before the decision. For the Prime Minister, the Constitution prescribes a different route, including a request from the President of the Republic or one-fifth of Council members following interpellation, with withdrawal decided by an absolute majority of all Council members.¹

My commitment is not to 'bring down' officials in advance, but to apply a declared standard: if the oversight case establishes serious failure, a violation, deception or incapacity warranting consideration of confidence, I will state my basis, determine my position according to the facts and law, and work to build support where the instrument is collective.

14. Oversight of implementation of laws, regulations and the government programme

A. Implementation of laws

After a law is enacted, a frequently neglected stage begins: has the executive issued the required instructions, established the structures mandated by the law, provided allocations and met deadlines? Have unintended effects emerged that require legislative amendment?

Each year I will select a group of high-impact laws and follow their 'implementation gap' through questions, committee reports and data from the relevant bodies. If the problem lies in the text itself rather than implementation, it will be referred to the legislative process within Ali Zuweid's legislative package.

B. Implementing regulations and instructions

I do not draft instructions on the government's behalf, but scrutinize whether they comply with the law without obstructing a legislative provision or adding restrictions without a legal basis. Where there is a suspected departure from the text, the sequence is: request the text and legal basis, analyse the departure, use a question or committee work, then pursue the appropriate judicial or legislative route if necessary.

C. The government programme

Granting confidence to the government must be followed by measurement of its commitments. I will translate government programme provisions into trackable indicators: objective, baseline, responsible authority, deadline, funding, outcome and verification source. I will not confuse 'a delayed target' with 'an official's failure' before examining the reasons for delay, resources, circumstances and changes that have occurred.

15. Oversight of major projects, contracts and expenditure

Major projects combine financial, technical and scheduling risks. Oversight should therefore examine governance and results, rather than manage implementation. I will focus on periodically comparable indicators: original and current cost; contract duration and extensions; financial and technical completion; variation orders; reasons for suspension; payments and advances; tests or acceptance procedures; and disputes, penalties or compensation.

Government contracts

I do not regard parliamentary oversight as an opportunity to influence contract awards. If indications emerge of conflicts of interest, unjustified discrepancies, contract splitting, repeated variation orders or payments without progress, the correct route is to request documents through institutional channels, seek assistance from the competent oversight body, and then use a question, appearance or committee case as appropriate.

Expenditure

Oversight covers compliance with appropriations, actual spending, spending without impact, accumulated advances, budget transfers, deferred liabilities and repeated audit findings. Budget policy, voting on its provisions and public finance standards are addressed separately in PARL-02 | Budget and Public Finance Policy to avoid duplication.

16. Follow-up on reports of the Board of Supreme Audit, the Commission of Integrity and oversight bodies

Reports by oversight bodies are not archival material. In July 2026, the Council of Representatives discussed the Federal Board of Supreme Audit's report for 2025 and directed its distribution to the competent committees and follow-up on its measures. This is a practical example of turning a report from a document into an accountability process.⁶ The Commission of Integrity and Illicit Gains Law also requires the Commission's President to submit an annual report to the Council of Representatives and Council of Ministers within 120 days of year-end. The Council of Representatives received the Commission's 2025 report in April 2026.⁷

Follow-up approach

1. Break down the report by ministry or body, type of violation, and amount or impact.
2. Distinguish a procedural finding from a financial loss, suspected criminal conduct or systemic failing.
3. Request the relevant body's response on corrective action, deadline and responsible official.
4. Track whether the finding recurs in a later report.
5. Refer matters requiring legislation to the competent committee and those requiring investigation to the competent authority, without confusing roles.
6. Publish the 'follow-up status' for the public wherever legally possible.

I will prioritize findings recurring across multiple years, because repetition often indicates that the problem is no longer an isolated incident but a failing in the system, incentives or internal controls.

17. Oversight of appointments and offices within the Council's remit

Oversight of appointments does not mean interference in ordinary executive recruitment. My participation is limited to cases where the Constitution or law gives the Council of Representatives a role in selection, approval or accountability, or where a government appointment process reveals a general violation of the law or public service standards warranting institutional scrutiny.

For offices referred to the Council of Representatives by the Constitution or law, assessment will use criteria of specialist competence, integrity, independence, conflicts of interest, professional record and legal requirements. Voting on appointments and major constitutional decisions is addressed in PARL-04 | Standards for Voting, Confidence, Appointments and Constitutional Decisions.

18. Service indicators, human rights and international agreements

A. Service indicators

I will not measure services solely by impressions formed during visits. Every service case must include indicators suited to its nature: supply hours, coverage, breakdowns, waiting times, completion rates, design and actual capacity, cost per beneficiary, or quality and safety indicators. Field visits are a useful oversight right when used to verify data, rather than to stage a display of managing the facility.²

B. Human rights and freedoms

Human rights are a distinct oversight field, not a social addendum. I will address allegations concerning detention, treatment, discrimination, restrictions on freedoms or access to services by documenting the facts, identifying the competent authority and seeking assistance from relevant committees and bodies, while protecting victims' data and withholding information that may put them at risk. The judiciary retains jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes and disputes; the MP's function is to scrutinize policy, procedure and compliance with the law.

C. International agreements

After an agreement or treaty is ratified under the constitutional and legal framework, oversight concerns the legislation, reports, measures or funding to which state institutions have committed. I will follow agreements directly affecting rights, sovereignty or public money through the competent committee, without claiming that an MP personally implements an international obligation.

19. Mechanism for escalating an oversight case

Escalation is not political punishment; it is movement from one instrument to another as facts change or responses fail. Every case need not pass through every level, but bypassing lower levels requires a clear reason, such as imminent danger, serious evidence or repeated refusal to act.

20. How do I avoid performative or malicious oversight?

Oversight loses its value when it becomes a means of settling scores or producing media clips. I therefore commit to rules that prevent exaggeration of disputes and protect the official's right to respond alongside the public's right to know.

• I will not describe conduct as corruption unless established facts or a competent authority justify doing so; I will use 'indicator', 'suspicion' or 'possible violation' according to the level of proof.
• I will not publish a truncated document in a way that changes its meaning, or use an anonymous leak as conclusive evidence.
• I will not seek interpellation before identifying the facts, supporting grounds and responsibility.
• I will give the authority concerned an opportunity to respond within the parliamentary procedure.
• If an allegation on which I based follow-up proves incorrect, I will publish the correction with equal clarity.
• I will not tie continuation of a case to political antagonism; if the failing is remedied, I will announce its closure even where I disagree politically with the authority concerned.
• I will distinguish political accountability from criminal liability; the latter is determined by the judiciary under the law.

21. Publishing oversight outcomes and the public register

I will publish a public oversight register on my website, allowing cases to be tracked from opening to closure within what the law permits to be disclosed. The purpose is not to display a large volume of correspondence, but to show the process, outcome and current stage.

Periodic report

Every three months, I will publish an oversight report showing open and closed cases, overdue responses, outcomes and progress on annual priorities. I will also publish an annual report bringing together outcomes, lessons and changes that required a legislative or voting process.

I will not publish personal information about citizens who submit complaints, details whose publication is prohibited by law, or material affecting an ongoing investigation or national security. When withholding material, I will explain the category of reason for withholding it, unless disclosing even that reason is prohibited.

22. Indicators of an MP's oversight performance

I do not regard a high number of questions or interpellations as evidence of quality in itself. A good indicator should measure discipline, results and transparency, while recognizing that an MP does not control the government's response or the decision of a majority of the Council.

23. Ali Zuweid's accountable commitments

These commitments measure what is under my direct control: preparing the case, using the correct instrument, follow-up, attendance, transparency and publication. For decisions requiring a majority, committee action or cooperation with other MPs, I will assess myself on what I did to build support and satisfy the requirements, rather than claim a collective outcome as an individual decision.

24. Relationship to the legislative package and Iraq Vision 2045

This document does not rewrite draft laws. Ali Zuweid's legislative package defines what I seek to introduce, develop and enact, while this document defines how I scrutinize the executive and use accountability instruments after legislation and during policy implementation.

Nor is it a government implementation plan. Iraq Vision 2045 represents the proposed long-term strategic framework for the state and government. My parliamentary role here is to examine implementation, weigh evidence, ask questions, follow up and vote within constitutional powers. I do not promise to build a road, hospital, power station or project; I promise to scrutinize the government as it carries out responsibilities within its remit.