Ali Zuweid's Parliamentary Programme · PARL-02

Budget and Public Finance Policy

A public document prepared by Ali Zuweid Ali Zuweid

First edition: 7 October 2026 Scope: the public budget, public finance and oversight of implementation Status: a parliamentary programme document subject to public accountability

This document does not present an alternative government budget. It sets out in advance how Ali Zuweid, in the capacity of a member of the Council of Representatives, will approach the draft budget and public finance: what information he will request, which tests he will apply, how he will assess revenue, expenditure, deficits, debt, investment and equity in allocation, when he will support or oppose an amendment, how he will follow implementation and the final accounts, and what he will publish for the public.

The governing principle is that public money is neither an instrument of political bargaining nor a means of building patronage networks. Nor is it a technical subject closed to everyone except experts. The budget expresses the state's priorities in financial terms and must be understandable, examinable, measurable and accountable.

1. Purpose and limits of this document

Parliament's budget function is not to write the government's financial plan from scratch, manage ministries or select executive projects on their behalf. By virtue of its constitutional role, the government prepares the draft budget, final accounts and development plans, while the Council of Representatives exercises approval and amendment powers within constitutional and legal limits, oversees implementation and holds the executive accountable for how public money is collected and spent.

I will therefore approach the budget as a document for decision-making and accountability: are its assumptions realistic, are its priorities affordable, is spending sustainable, are deficits and debt under control, is allocation fair and explained, can projects be implemented, and is there enough information to track spending and achievement?

Limit of authority: I will not promise to establish a government project, authorize spending, appoint an employee or direct an executive department. My parliamentary role is scrutiny, legislation, transfers or reductions within my powers, proposing matters requiring government consent, voting, oversight, information requests and following implementation, accounts and outcomes.

2. Constitutional and legal basis

The Iraqi Constitution clearly distributes responsibilities: the Council of Ministers prepares the draft public budget, final accounts and development plans, then submits the draft budget and final accounts to the Council of Representatives for approval. The Constitution permits the Council of Representatives to transfer allocations between budget parts and chapters and reduce its overall amounts; where necessary, it may propose to the Council of Ministers an increase in total expenditure. The Constitution also provides that the session in which the public budget is presented does not end before its approval.

The amended Federal Financial Management Law No. (6) of 2019 adds more detailed rules for budget preparation, approval, implementation and oversight, including the powers of the Council of Representatives, spending arrangements when budget approval is delayed, and reporting and financial statement requirements. The Council's rules of procedure define the Finance Committee's responsibilities for studying the draft budget, supplementary budgets and financial legislative proposals and monitoring revenue and expenditure implementation. They also require the Council of Ministers' opinion on amendments proposed by the committee, other committees or members where a financial burden would result.

These limits are not formalities. Federal Supreme Court jurisprudence has affirmed that the legislature must not become a substitute for the government in initiating financial measures or in amendments that affect the substance of executive authority or impose financial obligations outside the constitutional framework. Any amendment I propose or support will therefore be governed by two questions before its substance is considered: Does the Council of Representatives have this power in the first place, and has the required constitutional and legal procedure been followed?

Allocation of responsibilities for the budget and public finance
Level	Role	What this role does not mean
Council of Ministers	Prepare and submit the draft budget, final accounts and development plans in accordance with the law.	Preparing the draft does not exempt it from oversight or from providing the Council and public with necessary data.
Council of Representatives	Approval, allocation transfers, lowering the ceiling, proposing increases in total expenditure where necessary, voting and oversight.	It is not a budget implementation authority or a substitute for the government in managing spending and projects.
Finance Committee	Technical and legislative scrutiny, hearings and clarification, recommendations, and monitoring implementation within its remit.	It does not replace the Council in the final decision or the Ministry of Finance in implementation.
Member of the Council of Representatives	Reading and analysis, requesting information through available instruments, submitting comments and proposals under the rules, voting and publishing a position.	An individual member does not hold the Council's or committee's powers and does not direct executive spending.
Federal Board of Supreme Audit and oversight bodies	Audit and oversight under their governing laws, issuing professional reports and findings.	Their reports are not replaced by political decisions and must not be ignored in parliamentary assessment.

3. Governing principles

1) Realism before optimism

I will not base a decision on an optimistic oil price, export volume or non-oil revenue assumption without alternative scenarios and sensitivity testing.

2) Sustainability before temporary popularity

Permanent spending needs a permanent funding source or a sustainable financing plan; one year's funding is insufficient to justify a long-term commitment.

3) Outcomes, not merely the size of an allocation

A larger allocation is not a success if the authority cannot implement it or if no measurable public outcome is defined.

4) Comprehensiveness and a unified fiscal picture

I reject assessment of the budget in isolation from funds, special accounts, debts, guarantees, arrears and contingent liabilities.

5) Equity that can be explained

Fair allocation does not always mean arithmetic equality; it means published criteria linked to population, need, service gaps, cost and implementation capacity.

6) Protecting vulnerable groups

Any reform to subsidies, revenue or expenditure must assess its effect on poverty, incomes and essential services before adoption.

7) No spending without impact and no commitment without a cost

Every new spending decision must state its current and future cost, funding source and effect on deficits and debt.

8) Final accounts are part of the decision cycle

Budget approval is not enough; allocations must be compared with expenditure and outcomes, and final accounts and audit reports must inform the next budget.

4. The parliamentary budget work cycle

I will approach the budget as a continuous annual cycle, not a single voting session. Review begins before the draft arrives whenever data are available, continues through debate, voting and implementation, and ends with evaluation and final accounts that feed into the following year.

BaselineActual results of previous years

AssumptionsOil, growth, revenue and costs

Draft scrutinyRevenue, expenditure, deficit and debt

Disciplined amendmentWithin powers and assessed fiscal impact

Reasoned voteA published position and clear reasons

Implementation follow-upPeriodic reports and deviations

Final accountsActual expenditure and achievement

Institutional learningCorrecting the following year's budget

At every stage I will distinguish three kinds of question: legal questions of authority and procedure; financial questions of realism, sustainability and risk; and performance questions about whether spending will produce a service, public asset, social protection or measurable outcome.

5. Budget scrutiny matrix Budget Review Framework

My decision will not rest on a single aggregate figure or a provision attracting media attention. I will use a consistent matrix to compare the draft with previous outcomes, the state's fiscal capacity and stated objectives.

Draft budget scrutiny matrix
Area	Scrutiny test	Evidence required	Warning sign
Revenue realism	Are estimates supported by verifiable quantitative assumptions?	Oil price and volumes, tax and customs collection, profits and transfers, and previous years' performance.	Optimistic assumptions without an alternative scenario
Spending sustainability	Are permanent expenditures covered by resources that can be sustained?	Medium-term revenue path, permanent commitments, and salary, pension and subsidy costs.	Funding a permanent commitment with temporary revenue
Quality of expenditure composition	Does the draft balance operations, maintenance and investment?	Economic and functional classifications, previous execution rates and costs of operating new assets.	Higher allocations without corresponding implementation capacity
Deficit	Is the deficit justified, financed and affordable?	Funding sources, oil sensitivity, borrowing needs and debt service.	A large deficit predicated on a high oil price
Public debt	How will new borrowing affect the debt stock, debt service and risks?	Domestic and external stocks, maturities, interest, currency and guarantees.	Borrowing to cover recurring current spending without reform
Geographic equity	Are allocation criteria published and consistent with need?	Population, poverty, service gaps, costs, damage and implementation capacity.	Unexplained allocations or disparities without criteria
Social impact	Who bears the cost of decisions and who benefits?	Analysis of poverty, incomes, prices and service access, and effects of taxes, fees and subsidies.	Fiscal reform shifting the burden onto the most vulnerable groups
Public investment	Is the project ready, viable and capable of completion?	Study, design, land, contracting, timetable, total cost, previous spending and future commitments.	A new project without readiness or amid a backlog of stalled projects
Transparency	Can money be traced from allocation to spending and outcome?	Complete schedules, classifications, open data, in-year reports and final accounts.	Broad headings or accounts outside the overall picture
Deferred commitments	Have costs been pushed into the future rather than disclosed now?	Arrears, multi-year contracts, guarantees, partnerships, and pension or contractual obligations.	Concealing a present cost in later years
Implementation feasibility	Is the allocation commensurate with actual performance and the time remaining?	Execution rates, contracting capacity, funding availability and the spending-release schedule.	A jump in allocations without addressing implementation bottlenecks
Ex-post oversight	Are reports sufficient to establish what was achieved?	Ministry of Finance reports, final accounts, Board of Supreme Audit reports and agencies' responses.	Repeated violations without correction

Practical rule: I will not use the matrix to produce a promotional 'score' for the budget. Its function is to identify strengths and failings and establish what needs amendment, clarification or an oversight safeguard before a final position is taken.

6. Revenue: oil and beyond oil

6.1 Oil revenue and the oil price

Because oil remains central to Iraqi public finance, the first budget test concerns oil assumptions as a whole, not price alone. I will request an integrated assessment covering the assumed price, export volume, production and transport costs, relevant discounts or contractual obligations, and the exchange rate used, then compare it with actual results in previous years and a conservative scenario of lower prices or volumes.

I will not treat higher oil prices as automatic justification for expanding permanent expenditure. Oil revenue is cyclical and volatile, whereas salaries, pensions, subsidies and operating obligations continue. The decision standard will therefore be what the state can afford if the following year is less favourable than the year in which the budget is prepared.

6.2 Non-oil revenue

Increasing non-oil revenue is an important fiscal objective, but what matters more is the nature of the increase. I will distinguish increases generated by broadening the base, improving collection, closing leakages and digitalization from those produced by raising fees and taxes on a narrow base or essential services without measuring social and economic effects.

Any substantial non-oil revenue estimate must specify its legal basis, collecting authority, previous collection baseline, the measure expected to generate the increase and its timing. If it requires a new law or regulation not yet issued, I will not treat it as guaranteed revenue.

6.3 Earmarked revenue, fees, profits and transfers

I will request that earmarked revenue, service fees, public enterprise profits, transfers, grants and similar resources be shown in a traceable form, and that any exception to budget comprehensiveness be legally specified and explained. The purpose is to prevent 'financial enclaves' whose true size and use are difficult for Parliament and the public to determine.

7. Current and investment expenditure

7.1 Current expenditure

I will examine current expenditure according to its function rather than its label. Salaries, supplies, maintenance, transfers, subsidies, debt service and administrative costs differ in nature and scope for reduction. I will distinguish expenditure essential to service continuity from expenditure that can be controlled or redesigned.

I will not support arbitrary across-the-board cuts that treat a hospital like an administrative directorate or maintenance of a vital asset like non-essential spending. Nor will I assume every increase in current expenditure is inherently bad if it prevents service collapse, preserves a public asset or meets a legal obligation; the reason, cost and outcome must, however, be clear.

7.2 Investment expenditure

Public investment is not measured by the number of listed projects or allocation value alone. I will prioritize analysis of the 'investment portfolio': viable, completable ongoing projects before new ones, completion costs, progress rates, existing contracts, bottlenecks, and whether opening a new asset creates operating and maintenance costs omitted from later years.

I will oppose listing immature projects merely to achieve an apparent political or geographic distribution. An unready project reserves an allocation and then stalls, leaving the service need unresolved.

9. Deficits, public debt, borrowing and sovereign guarantees

9.1 Deficit

I will not treat a deficit as a figure detached from its cause. It may be justified in exceptional circumstances or to finance high-return investment, and may be dangerous if it funds recurring current spending without a reform path. I will request the planned deficit, the expected deficit under a conservative oil scenario, its funding source and its effect on liquidity, debt and debt service.

9.2 Public debt

I will review domestic and external debt stocks, maturities, interest rates, currencies, creditor identities where legally disclosable, and expected debt service. I will reject reducing debt soundness to a single ratio: the stock may be manageable while maturities, interest costs or concentration in short-term instruments pose risks.

The Ministry of Finance publishes periodic public debt data and reports. I will treat publication as the beginning of oversight, not its end: borrowing must be linked to the purpose it financed, whether the financed asset or programme was delivered, and the cost future budgets will bear.

9.3 Borrowing

When new borrowing is proposed, the test will be: why cannot reprioritization finance the purpose? Is the borrowing for a productive project, an emergency obligation or a structural deficit? What is its full cost, what are the repayment terms, is there exchange-rate risk, and what is the alternative?

9.4 Sovereign guarantees

A sovereign guarantee is not 'free' merely because it requires no immediate payment. It is a contingent obligation that may become actual debt. I will therefore request identification of the beneficiary, purpose, maximum amount, call conditions, probability of the guarantee being called, obligations of the guaranteed party and impact on overall fiscal risks, within the powers defined by the Financial Management Law and applicable legislation.

10. Public investment and stalled projects

I will treat an investment project as a full-lifecycle financial commitment: study, design, land, contracting, implementation, equipment, operation and maintenance. The annual allocation is only part of the cost. Listing a new project will not establish seriousness unless its total cost, financing stages and implementation readiness are clear.

For stalled projects, I will request classification before additional money is injected: a project may be stalled by funding shortages, a contractual dispute, poor design, changed need, corruption or administrative failure, or a security or land issue. The remedy differs with the cause. An unviable project does not become viable because the state has already spent money on it.

Project test before supporting an allocation

Is the public need demonstrated and non-duplicative?
Is the project legally, technically and contractually ready enough to permit spending?
What is the total cost, what has been spent and what remains?
What public outcome is expected, and when will it begin?
Are future operation and maintenance costs included in the fiscal framework?
Is there a lower-cost alternative achieving the same purpose?
Does the implementing body's record justify expanding its investment portfolio?

11. Governorate allocations and equity in distribution

I will not equate 'equity' with equal allocations to governorates, nor accept allocations unexplained by a public criterion. Fair distribution may require a combination of population, poverty, service gaps, accumulated deprivation, cost of service delivery, damage or special obligations, and realistic implementation capacity.

I will call for allocation criteria to be presented so citizens can understand why their governorate received a particular amount and what would change if the data changed. I will also monitor the differences between allocation, actual funding and expenditure, because equity on paper is not realized when funds remain unreleased or unspent.

Where major disparities exist between governorates, the question will not only be 'who received more?', but 'is the difference explained by a published, legitimate criterion, and did it reduce a real gap?'

12. Multi-year commitments, funds, special accounts and off-budget expenditure

12.1 Multi-year commitments

A multi-year contract or programme must be presented with its total cost and payment schedule, not merely its first-year cost. I will request disclosure of future contractual commitments so the current budget does not appear cheaper than it is, only for the state later to discover that much of its future budgets has already been committed by past decisions.

12.2 Funds and special accounts

A fund or special account may serve a legitimate purpose, but must not become a parallel financial channel weakening budget comprehensiveness. I will request its legal basis, resources, expenditure, balance, withdrawal rules, auditing body and treatment in public financial reports.

12.3 Off-budget expenditure

I will apply greater caution to expenditure or financial commitments outside the main schedules. The first requirement is to establish the legal basis, then incorporate them into the state's consolidated fiscal picture, including contingent liabilities, payment arrears and obligations of public enterprises or bodies that may ultimately fall on the Treasury.

13. Procurement, contracts and secret or sensitive expenditure

13.1 Procurement and contracts

The budget allocates money, but value for public money is also determined during contracting. I will connect allocation oversight with procurement risks: contract splitting, unjustified direct contracting, repeated variation orders, additional costs, delays, weak competition, and contracts beginning without readiness or realistic funding.

I will not ask Parliament to manage the tender or choose the contractor; that is executive interference. I will request data enabling scrutiny of results: what did the state buy, at what cost, over what implementation period, with what completion rate, and why was any substantial increase or extension needed?

13.2 Secret or sensitive expenditure

Some expenditure may have a security or sovereignty-related character preventing full disclosure. Legitimate confidentiality does not mean absence of oversight. I will press for the greatest practicable degree of lawful control and audit, with secrecy confined to information the law requires to be protected, rather than the amount itself, responsibility or the existence of a competent audit process where the law permits disclosure.

14. Allocation transfers, parliamentary amendments and in-year changes

Transfers can correct allocations, but without controls they may hollow out priorities approved by the Council. I will examine every substantial transfer by the source of the amount, its new purpose, its impact on the programme reduced, and whether it meets an emergency need or compensates for poor planning.

When proposing a parliamentary amendment with a financial burden, I will comply with procedures requiring consultation and the Council of Ministers' opinion under the rules of procedure, and with constitutional limits preventing Parliament from replacing the executive in budget preparation. If the amendment raises total spending, I will treat it as a proposal to the government under Article (62) of the Constitution, not a unilateral order to increase expenditure.

Substantial in-year amendments must not pass as incidental information. If revenue, obligations or priorities change enough to alter the budget's structure, I will call for the appropriate legal instrument, disclosure of the effect on deficits, debt and programmes, and comparison of the amended version with the original.

15. Final accounts, implementation reports and Board of Supreme Audit reports

Final accounts are the test that turns the budget from promises and estimates into actual figures. I will treat their approval and discussion as integral to financial oversight, not a historical formality detached from the new budget.

At a minimum, I will compare approved, amended and actual revenue, expenditure and deficits, and allocation, funding and spending for programmes and projects, examining overruns, unspent amounts, arrears and accounts remaining unsettled.

The Ministry of Finance's in-year reports provide a regular basis for tracking implementation; the Federal Board of Supreme Audit's reports provide an independent audit perspective within its remit. I will not merely refer to them generally, but follow recurring findings, agencies' responses, and whether failings were corrected or reproduced in a new year.

Approved budgetWhat the law authorized

Amended budgetWhat changed during the year

Actual implementationWhat was collected and spent

AuditViolations and findings

RemediationRecovery, correction or referral

The next budgetPreventing recurrence

16. Policy for difficult cases

16.1 A broadly sound budget containing unacceptable provisions

I will first attempt to amend, remove or restrict the provision within the available powers and procedures. If disagreement remains, I will assess its weight: is it a limited flaw that can be isolated, or a fundamental provision creating a constitutional violation, a major financial burden or an expenditure heading beyond oversight?

Standard: I will not use a minor flaw to obstruct the state, or use the soundness of most provisions to conceal a fundamental failing.

16.2 A delayed budget

I will treat delay as an exceptional situation to be shortened, while respecting the Financial Management Law's temporary spending mechanism, including monthly spending within legal limits and continuation of ongoing projects subject to the conditions. I will monitor whether this temporary mechanism is becoming a permanent substitute for parliamentary oversight and budget approval.

Standard: continuity of the state and essential services without opening a new spending channel unauthorized by law.

16.3 Emergency expenditure

In war, disaster or an economic or health shock, the state may need greater speed. I will require a clear legal basis, ceiling and duration, funding source, responsible authority and subsequent audit mechanism, with publication of disclosable data after the reason for urgency has passed.

Standard: speed does not remove responsibility, and emergencies must not become open-ended powers.

16.4 Requests to increase expenditure

I will not support higher spending merely because an agency or area requests it. I will require a defined cost, reason, outcome, funding source or offsetting reduction where possible, and assessment of its effect on deficits and debt. If it requires an increase in total expenditure, I will follow the constitutional procedure treating it as a proposal to the Council of Ministers.

Standard: every additional dinar needs a better explanation than the desire to spend it.

16.5 A substantial in-year amendment

If oil, revenue or obligation assumptions change, or a major financial need emerges, I will request a clear comparison between the original plan and the new proposal, a fiscal impact statement and use of the appropriate legal instrument, rather than expansion through circulars or administrative reallocations exceeding what the law authorized.

Standard: substantial fiscal policy changes must be visible and open to voting and oversight.

17. Ali Zuweid's criteria for voting on the budget

I will state my position on the draft budget using consistent tests, rather than bargaining for local or personal benefits. This does not mean every criterion must be perfect for a budget to pass; budgets inherently involve trade-offs. There are nevertheless limits that must not be crossed, and material information without which a vote should not be taken.

Decision tests before voting
Test	Decisive question	When does a failing become fundamental?
Constitutionality and authority	Do the draft and amendments respect the distribution of powers and procedures?	A provision or amendment exceeds the Council's authority or violates a binding judgment.
Revenue realism	Can the core assumptions withstand a conservative scenario?	Where the budget's balance relies on unjustified or unverifiable assumptions.
Sustainability	Can the state afford its commitments after year-end?	Permanent spending funded by a temporary boom or increased debt without a corrective path.
Deficits and debt	Are the financing level and risks understood and justified?	A large deficit or borrowing without a clear purpose or an affordable servicing plan.
Priorities	Does expenditure reflect state functions and essential needs?	A severe imbalance among mandatory spending, investment, maintenance and essential services.
Equity	Can resource distribution be explained by published criteria?	Major unexplained disparities or political allocations without a verifiable criterion.
Social impact	Have the effects of taxes, fees, subsidies and spending on vulnerable groups been assessed?	Shifting the cost of fiscal reform to low-income groups without alternatives or reasonable compensation.
Investment	Are projects ready, viable and implementable?	Extensive allocations to immature projects or continued stalling without a remedy.
Transparency	Can we determine where money goes and how it will be tracked?	Major opaque headings or commitments outside the fiscal picture without legal justification.
Final accounts and learning	Have previous years' results been used to correct the draft?	The same imbalances recur, and essential reconciliations needed to understand the fiscal position are absent.

Approach to determining my position

Sufficient information: I will not take a final position on a material financial provision if the essential data needed to assess it are unavailable.
Correction before rejection: Where a failing can be amended lawfully, I will begin with amendment and clarification rather than move directly to a final political position.
Distinguishing fundamental from secondary issues: I will not equate a formal error with a constitutional violation or major fiscal risk.
Public explanation: I will publish a summary explaining my vote, the principal amendments I supported or opposed, and remaining reservations.
No personal bargaining: I will not tie my budget position to a benefit, appointment, contract or privilege for an individual or entity connected to me.

18. Fiscal transparency and public disclosure

Transparency does not mean publishing an enormous file citizens cannot read. It means information that is complete, timely, comparable and understandable. International fiscal transparency standards emphasize comprehensive, clear, reliable and timely reporting and disclosure of risks, obligations and actual outcomes, rather than the original budget alone.

Iraq's Ministry of Finance publishes in-year reports and data on budget implementation and public debt. I will use officially published material and press through available parliamentary instruments for more regular publication, consistent classifications and comparability between the budget, implementation and final accounts.

What I will publish as an MP

A brief pre-vote memorandum setting out the main financial and legal observations informing my position.
A clear record of my votes on the budget and any material financial amendment where voting is public and publishable.
A post-approval summary showing changes between the initial draft and final law on matters I followed.
Periodic tracking of the main implementation deviations: revenue, expenditure, investment, deficit, debt and governorate funding, subject to availability of official data.
A list of matters referred or followed up with the Finance Committee or oversight bodies, including outcomes to the extent publication is legally permitted.

19. Ali Zuweid's accountable commitments

Practical commitments the public can verify
Commitment	What I can do individually	What requires institutional cooperation
Publish the voting approach	I commit to publishing my criteria and the explanatory memorandum for my position.	None.
Request sufficient data	Use the instruments available to me and through committee membership if applicable.	Some requests and procedures require the committee, the Presidency or a number of MPs.
Reject executive interference	Refrain from directing expenditure or contracting, or imposing a project or contractor.	Reinforcing this separation requires general institutional rules and practice.
Follow implementation	Review published reports and document issues.	Appearances, investigations and some oversight procedures require a committee or the Council.
Follow final accounts	State a position on delay or gaps and follow reports.	Final approval and official Council recommendations are collective work.
Examine borrowing and guarantees	Request data and publish my assessment.	Approval and the final decision lie with the Council under the law.
Equitable distribution	Publish my criteria and object to unexplained allocations.	Changing distribution requires the legal process, committee involvement and voting where necessary.
Correction rather than performance	Start with data and a feasible solution before escalating.	Higher-level instruments such as investigations or decisions require institutional support.

20. Monitoring indicators

I will not reduce parliamentary financial performance to the number of statements, objections or amendments. A good indicator measures whether oversight produced clarity, correction or a better decision.

Transparency of position: The proportion of major financial decisions with a published explanation of my vote or position.
Case closure: The proportion of financial findings reaching a documented outcome: correction, a persuasive explanation, referral for oversight, amendment or reasoned closure.
Follow-up on implementation reports: Regular review of official data throughout the year, rather than limiting work to budget approval.
Follow-up on supreme audit: The number and nature of material findings in Board of Supreme Audit reports for which the authority's response was tracked.
Quality of amendments: Assess whether amendments I supported addressed a defined failing and stated their fiscal impact, rather than simply counting amendments.
Publication commitment: Issue promised summaries and reports within reasonable timeframes and in readable formats.

These indicators alone do not measure performance quality; one case with a major financial impact may matter more than dozens of letters. Figures must therefore be read alongside descriptions of outcomes.

21. Relationship to the legislative package and Iraq Vision 2045

This is one of four documents in Ali Zuweid's Parliamentary Programme. It does not duplicate the political programme or the legislative package of proposed and draft laws. That package answers: What do I seek to legislate or develop through legislation? This document instead answers: How will I exercise an MP's function when a decision concerns public money?

Nor does this policy replace Iraq Vision 2045. The Vision is a long-term strategic and implementation framework for the state and government, while this document defines how an MP examines the funding, results, risks and commitments of any government plan and maintains the separation between parliamentary oversight and executive administration.

Rule: The Vision proposes the state's direction, the legislative package defines legal instruments, and the parliamentary programme defines how the parliamentary mandate is exercised. No layer should substitute for another.

22. Legal and official sources

This document draws on provisions in force and officially published sources available as of its update date, with international references on transparency and budget governance. If any general description conflicts with a later applicable provision, the Constitution, applicable law and binding Federal Supreme Court decisions take precedence.

Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005 — Iraqi Council of RepresentativesParticularly provisions on parliamentary sessions, powers of the Council of Representatives, the budget and final accounts, and powers of the Council of Ministers.
Rules of Procedure of the Iraqi Council of RepresentativesFinance Committee responsibilities and procedures for examining draft laws and amendments creating financial burdens.
Federal Financial Management Law No. (6) of 2019 — Iraqi Gazette, issue 4550Rules for budget preparation, approval and implementation; powers of the Council of Representatives; and spending arrangements when approval is delayed.
Law No. (4) of 2020 — First Amendment to the Federal Financial Management Law
Federal Financial Management Law, as amended — Ministry of JusticeA version published through the Ministry's translated legislation section.
Federal Public Budget Laws — Ministry of Finance
In-year Reports — Ministry of FinancePeriodic state accounts reports used to monitor implementation during the year.
Public Debt Reports — Ministry of Finance
Budget Implementation by Ministry and Institution — Ministry of Finance
The Finance Committee and Completion of Final Accounts Discussions — Council of Representatives, 21 September 2026
Federal Supreme Court — Republic of IraqDecisions and jurisprudence on limits to financial initiative and amendments to budget laws, including disputes relating to Budget Law No. (13) of 2023.
International Monetary Fund — Fiscal TransparencyPrinciples of comprehensive, clear, reliable and timely fiscal reporting and risk analysis.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development — Principles of Budgetary GovernanceA comparative reference on fiscal discipline, the medium-term framework and quality of budget management.

Budget and Public Finance Policy — Ali Zuweid's Parliamentary Programme — PARL-02 — Updated 7 October 2026.