Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Bill · Security, Defence and Sovereignty
National Defence Policy, Military Doctrine and Civilian Parliamentary Oversight Bill
A federal legislative framework connecting national security and defence policy and regulating doctrine development, civilian leadership and parliamentary oversight without politicizing the military or transferring operational command from the executive and professional chain of command.
Executive Summary
The bill begins from a clear constitutional basis: Iraqi armed forces are under civilian leadership and do not intervene in politics; Parliament legislates and oversees the executive; the Prime Minister is Commander-in-Chief; government plans and implements general policy; and national security and defence policy remain exclusive federal powers. [1]
The legislative need is not for Parliament to write a war plan or tactical doctrine, but to establish legal rules for the defence decision cycle: who formulates policy, its relationship to national security strategy, review timing, who approves doctrine, what is published or classified, how budgets relate to readiness, and how Parliament oversees without becoming an operational command.
This is especially important following Iraq's “Iraq First” National Security Strategy 2025–2030, while defence law remains dispersed across the Constitution, service and justice legislation, special arrangements and a regulatory legacy partly tracing to Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 67 of 2004. Official work in recent years has continued on studying and drafting a modern Ministry of Defence law. [3][5]
The Law therefore proposes a model combining civilian leadership, professional military advice, periodic defence policy, joint doctrine, parliamentary oversight, controlled secrecy, financial transparency and respect for international humanitarian law. It creates no new body or posts, using existing institutions while defining relationships and responsibilities.
I — Constitutional and Legal Context
1. Constitutional Basis
Constitutional Article (9) establishes civil–military fundamentals: armed forces and security agencies represent the people, operate under civilian authority, defend Iraq, may not suppress the people and do not interfere in politics or transfers of power. The Constitution prohibits militias outside the armed forces and places intelligence under civilian control and legislative oversight. [1]
Article (61) grants Parliament legislative and executive-oversight powers, including a particular role in declaring war and emergencies and approving certain senior military appointments. Article (78) makes the Prime Minister directly responsible for general policy and Commander-in-Chief, while Article (80) assigns policy planning and implementation to the Council of Ministers. Article (110/Second) makes national security policy and implementation, including establishing and managing armed forces to defend Iraq, an exclusive federal power. [1]
The boundary must therefore remain precise: Parliament sets legal rules and oversees policy, money, outcomes and legality; government develops and implements defence policy; and the Commander-in-Chief and military leadership direct command and operations within law.
2. Legislative and Institutional Baseline
Military Service and Retirement Law No. (3) of 2010, as amended, governs much of military personnel's employment status, including service, promotion, retirement and some senior-command appointment rules. It does not govern the defence policy cycle, doctrine or parliamentary oversight. [4]
The Ministry of Defence's organization remains influenced by Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. (67) of 2004. Federal Supreme Court Decision No. (241/Federal/2024) confirmed continuing legal effects concerning Ministry assets, subject to the current Constitution, while declaring part unconstitutional; the decision was published in the Iraqi Gazette. Parliament also published a study on Order (67) and the Ministry of Defence law in February 2026, reflecting continuing need for modernization. [5][6]
Parliament's rules confirm that its Security and Defence Committee follows military and security institutions and reviews strategies, plans, policies, measures and general national-defence organization rules. The bill thus does not invent an unfamiliar oversight power, but translates the existing one into clearer information cycles, reporting and safeguards. [2]
3. Current Strategic Environment
Iraq adopted the “Iraq First” National Security Strategy 2025–2030 to manage vital interests, address internal and external challenges and strengthen sovereignty, stability and development. The proposed defence policy serves as its specialized defence layer, not a competing parallel document. [3]
II — Proposed Legislative Policy
The proposal is a framework law , not a “doctrine law” freezing military thought in legislation. Doctrine must remain open to rapid technical updating; law determines who prepares and approves it, its limits and its relationship to national policy, oversight and international law.
| Area | Primary Authority | Role of Other Authorities |
|---|---|---|
| National security strategy | Federal executive | Oversight, legislation and funding under the Constitution |
| National defence policy | Council of Ministers, prepared by the Ministry of Defence under Commander-in-Chief direction | Parliamentary debate, oversight and budget approval |
| Joint military doctrine | Professional military preparation and civilian approval under this Law | Oversight of consistency and legality, not tactical detail |
| Operational plans and orders | Commander-in-Chief and military chain of command | Subsequent or concurrent accountability for policy, legality and outcomes within legal limits |
| Defence budget | Government prepares and proposes | Parliament approves and oversees; the Board of Supreme Audit audits |
The bill avoids three institutional errors: turning Parliament into a field command, making the army a political actor, and making defence secrecy immunity from oversight. It deliberately leaves detailed matters to separate legislative files, including force structure and service, Popular Mobilization, weapons monopoly, military justice, defence contracts, reserves and veterans, borders and emergencies.
Third — National Defence Policy, Military Doctrine and Civilian Parliamentary Oversight Bill
In the name of the people
Presidency of the Republic
Pursuant to approval by the Council of Representatives and ratification by the President of the Republic, and Article (61), paragraph (First), and Article (73), paragraph (Third), of the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, the following Law is issued:
National Defence Policy, Military Doctrine and Civilian Parliamentary Oversight Law No. ( ) of ( )
Chapter One — General Provisions and Governing Principles
Article (1) — Definitions
For the purposes of this Law, the following expressions have the meanings set out below:
- National defence policy: The government's highest defence document, translating national security policy into defence objectives, missions and priorities and defining the overall framework for developing, using, funding and reviewing military capability.
- Military doctrine: Approved principles guiding armed-force preparation, organization, training, education and employment at strategic, operational and tactical levels, without replacing operational orders or plans.
- Strategic defence review: Periodic assessment of the strategic environment, threats, missions, capabilities, gaps and resources, informing defence policy and force-development updates.
- Medium-term defence plan: A multi-year programme linking defence priorities to readiness, personnel, training, armament, infrastructure, maintenance and available resources.
- Democratic civilian oversight: Military subordination to constitutional civilian authorities, law, budget and parliamentary, judicial and financial oversight, preserving the professional chain of command and preventing party interference in operational command.
- Classified defence information: Information whose circulation is restricted by law or competent regulation to protect national security, operations, capabilities, sources or protective methods.
- Competent parliamentary committee: The Council of Representatives' Security and Defence Committee or its lawful successor.
Article (2) — Objectives of the Law
This Law aims to:
- Establish a permanent legal framework for national defence policy, review and connection to national security policy.
- Ensure constitutional civilian command, political neutrality and unity of military decision-making.
- Regulate doctrine preparation, approval and updating while preserving professional military competence and civilian authority.
- Define parliamentary oversight of defence policy, readiness, spending and senior leadership without transferring operational command to the legislature.
- Connect defence planning with budgeting, readiness, evaluation, transparency and accountability.
- Integrate international humanitarian law, human rights and civilian protection into planning, education, rules of engagement and weapons legal review.
Article (3) — Scope
First — This Law applies to the Ministry of Defence and Iraqi armed forces in defence policy, doctrine, planning and civilian oversight.
Second — Common principles apply to other forces or security bodies assigned national defence missions or included in joint federal defence plans, to the extent relevant without affecting their special organizational laws.
Third — This Law shall neither expand armed forces' jurisdiction into permanent domestic law enforcement nor diminish regions' constitutional powers over internal security forces within constitutional limits.
Article (4) — Governing Constitutional Principles
Defence policy and doctrine shall uphold Iraq's unity, independence, sovereignty and democratic federal system; civilian authority; defence of Iraq without suppression of its people; political neutrality; prohibition of armed formations outside legal frameworks; federal national security and defence powers; constitutional allocation of powers; rule of law; and accountability for force and public resources.
Article (5) — Relationship with National Security Policy
First — National defence policy shall align with the executive's national security strategy, foreign policy, public budget and Iraq's international obligations.
Second — Defence policy or doctrine may not create state political objectives contrary to national security documents, the Constitution or law.
Third — Conflicting lower-level defence documents shall return to the competent body for correction before approval or continued implementation.
Article (6) — Civilian Leadership and Unity of Military Decisions
First — Armed forces are constitutionally subject to civilian leadership. The Prime Minister is Commander-in-Chief and exercises powers under the Constitution and laws.
Second — Military orders shall pass through a defined lawful chain. Parallel command channels and operational orders from parties, political blocs or unauthorized domestic or foreign bodies are prohibited.
Third — External cooperation, training or support may not establish foreign command over Iraqi forces beyond what the Constitution, law and effective agreements permit.
Article (7) — Military Political Neutrality
Armed forces and personnel shall remain politically neutral. Military status, units, weapons, facilities or resources may not benefit a party, candidate, campaign or political dispute. Confidential professional defence advice to constitutional authorities through official channels is not political interference.
Article (8) — International Law and Civilian Protection
First — The Ministry shall integrate Iraq's binding UN Charter, international humanitarian law and international human rights law obligations into policy, doctrine, education, training, plans and rules of engagement.
Second — Military command shall ensure appropriate legal advice for planning and force, documenting legally significant decisions consistent with military secrecy.
Third — Civilian and civilian-property protection, reduction of incidental harm, target verification and feasible precautions shall be permanent operational principles within applicable international law.
Chapter Two — National Defence Policy Cycle
Article (9) — Hierarchy of Defence Documents
In descending order: national security strategy; national defence policy; strategic defence review; medium-term defence plan; joint and specialist doctrine; then operational plans and orders. Lower documents may not alter powers or rules established by higher documents or law.
Article (10) — Contents of National Defence Policy
To the necessary extent, without exposing operational secrets, national defence policy shall include:
- Assessment of the strategic environment, defence interests, threats and risks.
- Armed-force missions, limits of use and deterrence, defence and readiness priorities.
- Principles of force development, joint operations, mobilization, reserves and sustainment.
- Priorities for protecting borders, airspace, waters, corridors and strategic facilities within jurisdiction.
- Policy-level principles for air defence, military cyber defence, electronic warfare, reconnaissance and early warning, without operational detail.
- Principles for education, training, defence industry, research, development and international cooperation.
- A multi-year financial framework and principles for prioritization and readiness measurement.
- Measurable policy-review indicators that do not reveal sensitive details.
Article (11) — Preparation of Defence Policy
First — The Minister of Defence shall prepare draft policy with the Army Chief of Staff and relevant commands, consulting federal bodies responsible for national security, foreign affairs, finance, planning, borders and emergencies as relevant.
Second — The draft shall go to the Commander-in-Chief, then the Council of Ministers for consideration and adoption as government defence policy.
Third — Legal, financial and institutional assessments shall demonstrate consistency with the Constitution, national security strategy and expected resources.
Article (12) — Frequency and Review
First — National defence policy shall be adopted at least every four years.
Second — Review shall begin within twelve months of a new government's formation if the current document expires or a fundamental strategic change occurs.
Third — The Council of Ministers may order exceptional review on the Commander-in-Chief's or Minister's proposal following a qualitative change in security, obligations or resources.
Fourth — Existing policy continues insofar as constitutionally and legally compatible until its successor is adopted, preventing a planning vacuum.
Article (13) — Public Version and Classified Annex
First — Government shall publish a public policy version stating principles, priorities, missions, the general financial framework and monitoring indicators.
Second — A classified annex may contain assessments, capabilities, vulnerabilities, scenarios and information whose disclosure would specifically harm national security or operations.
Third — Classification may not merely avoid political embarrassment or conceal waste, violations or administrative failure. Decisions remain subject to applicable legal rules.
Article (14) — Strategic Defence Review
The Ministry shall conduct a strategic defence review with or before policy preparation, assessing threats, missions, capability structure, readiness, personnel, stocks, maintenance, infrastructure, training, sustainment, international cooperation and priority gaps. Findings shall inform the medium-term plan and funding requests.
Article (15) — Medium-Term Defence Plan
First — The Ministry shall prepare a rolling plan of three to five years, updated annually.
Second — The plan shall link missions, capabilities and readiness indicators with investment programmes, lifecycle costs, operations, maintenance and training.
Third — Major armament or infrastructure projects outside plan priorities require a reasoned decision stating necessity, funding and effects on other programmes, respecting budget, contracting and defence procurement laws.
Article (16) — Affordability Test
Policy and force-development plans may not rest on unrealistic financial assumptions. With Finance and relevant bodies, the Ministry shall disclose gaps between ambitions and resources, prioritize alternatives and not conceal future operating and maintenance obligations within initial purchase costs.
Chapter Three — Management of Military Doctrine
Article (17) — Function of Doctrine
Doctrine is a unified professional framework guiding thinking, planning, training and joint employment. It is not itself an operational order, authorizes no force beyond constitutional and legal limits and does not prevent adaptation within mission and approved rules.
Article (18) — Preparation and Approval of Doctrine
First — The Army Chief of Staff, through competent doctrine and educational bodies, shall prepare joint and specialist doctrine in consultation with relevant commands.
Second — The Minister shall submit joint strategic doctrine for Commander-in-Chief approval after verifying policy and legal consistency.
Third — Operational and specialist doctrine shall be approved at regulatory levels, consistently with joint doctrine and defence policy.
Fourth — Doctrine shall be reviewed periodically and after wars, major operations, technological changes and new threats.
Article (19) — Joint Operations Principle
Doctrine shall integrate land, air and naval forces, Army aviation, air defence and supporting capabilities through joint command and control and interoperable information, communications and logistics, unifying effort and reducing duplication. Organizational details shall follow armed-forces laws and competent regulations.
Article (20) — Armed Forces' Core Missions
Within law, doctrine shall prioritize Iraq's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, borders, airspace, waters and strategic interests; deterrence and readiness against aggression, armed threats and military-type terrorism; and lawful civil-authority support during disasters and emergencies.
Article (21) — Internal Security Support
First — Police and law enforcement ordinarily handle daily internal security.
Second — Domestic military support is exceptional, legally authorized and limited by mission, location, duration, command chain and force rules.
Third — Support does not transfer criminal investigation or judicial-police functions to the armed forces except under express law.
Article (22) — Rules of Engagement
The competent military authority shall issue written, understandable rules for each operation type, consistent with mission, national law and applicable international law. They shall define authority for force, escalation, protection, reporting and review, undergo legal review before approval, and allow urgent lawful self-defence measures.
Article (23) — Legal Review of Weapons and Means and Methods of Warfare
The Ministry shall establish permanent institutional review of new weapons, ammunition and methods before adoption, development or acquisition for use, under Iraq's binding international obligations, particularly prohibitions and restrictions on means and methods of warfare.
Article (24) — Education, Training and Lessons Learned
Doctrine shall enter college, institute and training curricula covering command, staff, joint operations, international humanitarian law, human rights, professional ethics, resource management and lessons learned. An institutional process shall collect exercise, operation and incident lessons and convert them into traceable training and doctrine updates.
Article (25) — Technology, Resilience and Sustainment
Doctrine and planning shall consider developments in unmanned systems, air defence, electronic warfare, communications, military cyberspace, sensing and data analysis, prioritizing network protection, sustainment, maintenance and operations under supply or communications disruption, without single-source technological dependence threatening independence or readiness.
Chapter Four — Allocation of Civilian and Military Responsibilities
Article (26) — Commander-in-Chief Responsibilities
Within constitutional and legal limits, the Commander-in-Chief exercises supreme command, directs policy implementation, approves joint strategic doctrine, monitors readiness and major operations, ensures a unified command chain and refers matters requiring government decisions, funding, agreements or legislation to the Council of Ministers.
Article (27) — Minister of Defence Responsibilities
The Minister provides civilian leadership and manages policy, resources and administrative and financial oversight, separating civilian political decisions from technical military command. Constitutionally accountable to Parliament for Ministry performance, the Minister may not bypass the prescribed command chain with tactical unit orders except in legally permitted cases and forms.
Article (28) — Army Chief of Staff Responsibilities
The Chief of Staff exercises lawful professional command, provides independent military advice to the Minister and Commander-in-Chief, oversees readiness, training, joint planning and doctrine implementation, and clearly states military risks, required resources and expected outcomes of proposed options.
Article (29) — Military Advice and Lawful Orders
First — Commanders may give frank professional advice through official channels. Differing assessments are not misconduct unless accompanied by disobedience of a lawful order or prohibited political activity.
Second — Manifestly unlawful orders or orders involving crimes or grave legal violations need not be obeyed. Service, discipline and military justice laws shall regulate objection, reporting and responsibility.
Third — Essential strategic decision and order records shall be preserved for authorized review and accountability.
Article (30) — Institutional and Intergovernmental Coordination
Government shall establish permanent coordination among Defence and relevant federal security, intelligence, diplomatic, financial and civilian bodies, coordinating with Kurdistan Region and governorate authorities where missions affect their powers or territory, respecting exclusive federal defence and national security powers and other constitutional competences.
Article (31) — War and Emergency
This Law does not alter constitutional conditions, majorities or procedures for declaring war or emergency. Defence orders, reports and exceptional powers shall follow the Constitution and law, with parliamentary, judicial and financial oversight continuing insofar as constitutionally and legally permitted.
Article (32) — Missions and Deployments outside Iraq
First — Participation abroad requires competent executive approval, a clear legal basis and defined mission, duration, engagement rules, funding and force status.
Second — Parliament, through its competent committee, shall receive timely notice of substantial foreign missions and information enabling legislative, financial and oversight powers.
Third — Participation amounting to or connected with a declaration of war shall follow special constitutional procedures.
Chapter Five — Civilian Parliamentary Oversight
Article (33) — Scope of Parliamentary Oversight
Parliament shall constitutionally oversee policy and Defence Ministry and armed-forces performance, particularly legal compliance, consistency with national security, general readiness, budget execution, major programmes, personnel rights, institutional discipline, constitutionally approved appointments, and operation and emergency reports within constitutional and legal limits.
Article (34) — Informing Parliament of Defence Policy
First — The Council of Ministers shall lodge the public policy version with Parliament within thirty days of adoption.
Second — The classified version or classified summary shall be provided to the competent committee in closed session as necessary for oversight.
Third — Parliament may debate and recommend within its powers, without replacing government policy planning and implementation or Commander-in-Chief authority.
Article (35) — Annual Defence Report
In each year's first quarter, the Minister shall report publicly to Parliament on the previous year: policy implementation, non-sensitive aggregate readiness, training, personnel, spending, major programmes, discipline, serious incidents, international cooperation and oversight-recommendation progress. A classified committee annex may accompany it.
Article (36) — Hearings and Information Requests
Under parliamentary rules and law, the competent committee may hear the Minister, commanders and officials and request necessary documents and data. Sessions may be wholly or partly confidential to protect classified information, but classification may not block oversight of underlying conduct, expenditure or legality.
Article (37) — Parliamentary Handling of Classified Information
First — Parliament's presidency, with competent bodies, shall establish written arrangements for classified defence information's storage, circulation and examination.
Second — Officials accessing classified information shall neither disclose nor exploit it outside oversight, subject to applicable liability.
Third — In withholding disputes, the executive shall give reasoned classification and expected-harm explanations and consider less restrictive alternatives such as secure-site access or redacted summaries.
Article (38) — Senior Military Leadership
Constitutional requirements for Cabinet recommendation and parliamentary approval of the Chief of Staff, deputies and division commanders or above shall be observed. Professional biographies and eligibility, integrity and experience criteria shall be provided, without irrelevant information.
Article (39) — Defence Budget Oversight
First — Defence appropriations shall contain sufficient detail for Parliament to assess major programmes, readiness and sustainment, with a classified annex where necessary.
Second — Estimates shall distinguish personnel, operations, maintenance, training, investment, armament, infrastructure and multi-year obligations as far as possible.
Third — Secrecy may not exempt spending from legal and financial oversight or Federal Board of Supreme Audit review within its powers.
Article (40) — Parliamentary Investigation and Follow-Up
Serious indications of institutional failure, waste, grave violations or incidents of public consequence may trigger constitutional and lawful parliamentary oversight and investigation. The committee shall neither interfere in ongoing judicial investigations nor command units directly, and shall refer suspected crimes to competent authorities.
Article (41) — Oversight Limits and Operational Non-Interference
Oversight grants no member or committee authority to issue operational orders, select targets, direct units or change field plans during execution. Accountability for policy, legality, resources and outcomes remains separate from immediate military command unless otherwise constitutionally or legally prescribed.
Chapter Six — Transparency, Accountability and Evaluation
Article (42) — Balanced Defence Transparency
The Ministry shall maximize transparency compatible with national security, periodically publishing unclassified policy, general structure, aggregate budget, recruitment, training, lawful contract information, annual reports and non-sensitive oversight results, protecting information whose disclosure causes specific security harm.
Article (43) — Records and Traceability
A unified Ministry system shall preserve strategic decisions, major programme plans, allocations, amendments and reasons, and evaluation results, enabling competent oversight and courts to trace responsibility and spending under lawful, secure retention, classification and destruction rules.
Article (44) — Internal Oversight and Audit
The Ministry shall strengthen inspection, audit and internal oversight of readiness, discipline, administration, spending and procedural integrity, with sufficient functional independence to access records and report to the Minister and authorized bodies, without replacing external oversight or courts.
Article (45) — Defence Performance Indicators
Policy and medium-term plans shall set measurable readiness, training, maintenance, sustainment and programme indicators, reporting at appropriate executive and oversight levels. Indicators shall measure outcomes and actual capability, not merely spending or asset numbers.
Article (46) — Review after Major Operations and Incidents
After major operations and serious incidents, the Ministry shall review lessons, causes, lawful orders, engagement rules, readiness, logistics and protection. Administrative or professional review shall be separate from criminal investigation where offences are suspected, with relevant findings lawfully referred.
Chapter Seven — Transitional and Final Provisions
Article (47) — Relationship with Other Organizational Legislation
This is a framework for policy, doctrine and civilian oversight, not a replacement for laws on military service and retirement, military justice, Popular Mobilization, security and intelligence bodies, defence contracts, emergencies, weapons or budgeting. Regulations and instructions shall align without repealing special-law powers.
Article (48) — Harmonizing Defence Ministry Organization
When preparing or updating Defence Ministry and armed-forces legislation, the Council of Ministers shall align it with this Law and the Constitution and remove outdated transitional or organizational provisions, preserving continuity of legal positions, operations and service.
Article (49) — Transitional Deadlines
First — If no current national defence policy exists at entry into force, preparation shall begin within ninety days and finish within twelve months.
Second — Within one hundred and eighty days, the Ministry shall regulate the doctrine cycle, weapons legal review, annual reporting and general readiness indicators.
Third — Within one hundred and eighty days, Parliament's presidency shall establish classified-information arrangements needed for oversight.
Article (50) — Financial Impact
Administrative and organizational obligations shall use lawful existing appropriations unless the Budget Law provides otherwise. This Law itself creates no new formations, posts, allowances or purchasing obligations. Additional costs require prior assessment and lawful budget inclusion.
Article (51) — Regulations and Instructions
Within one year of entry into force, the Council of Ministers may issue implementing regulations and the Minister instructions within their powers. Neither may expand force authority or restrict constitutionally or legally established oversight.
Article (52) — Entry into Force
This Law enters into force ninety days after publication in the Official Gazette.
Statement of reasons
To entrench constitutional civilian command; establish a clear defence policy cycle linked to national security strategy and budgeting; regulate doctrine preparation and updating; strengthen parliamentary and financial oversight without operational interference; and ensure political neutrality, unified military decisions and respect for international humanitarian law and human rights, this Law is enacted.
Fourth — Explanatory Memorandum
1. Why Does Iraq Need a Defence Framework Law?
The problem is not a complete absence of military legislation: service, retirement, justice and armed-body laws and organizational decisions exist. What is missing is a unified legal layer governing the relationship among national security, defence policy, doctrine, budgeting and oversight. This gap exposes some strategic decisions to discontinuity between governments, leaves secrecy and oversight unclear and permits inconsistent planning-document standards.
The bill therefore adopts a limited-purpose framework, leaving detailed force structure, service, armament, justice and contracts to specialist laws. This reduces conflict and permits doctrine updates without amending legislation whenever threats or technology change.
2. Why Does Parliament Not Approve Military Doctrine Article by Article?
The Constitution gives Parliament legislation and oversight, but makes the Prime Minister Commander-in-Chief and assigns policy planning and implementation to the Cabinet. The design therefore ensures professional preparation and civilian executive approval of doctrine, while Parliament receives general policy, reports and classified annexes needed for oversight. This prevents politicized tactics while keeping force subject to democracy and law.
3. Distinguishing Policy, Doctrine and Plans
Defence policy asks what Iraq must defend, which missions and priorities matter and what capabilities it can afford. Doctrine asks which professional principles guide force preparation and use. Plans and orders determine action in specific situations. Confusing levels produces either vague, ineffective law or legislation freezing unsuitable military details.
4. Parliamentary Oversight and Secrecy
Effective defence oversight needs information, but publishing everything may harm forces and national security. The bill uses public policy and annual reports alongside classified committee annexes. The executive must explain withholding and explore secure-site access or redaction. The principle is secrecy for sensitive information, not for legality or the underlying expenditure.
5. Limits on Domestic Military Use
The bill aligns with professional principles prioritizing external defence and deterrence for the military and daily internal security for law enforcement. It also recognizes Iraq may need military support against armed threats, disasters or exceptional circumstances, requiring lawful authority, a defined mission, location, duration, force rules and command chain.
6. International Law and Weapons Legal Review
Iraq is party to the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, making integration of international humanitarian law into education, planning, engagement rules and weapons review a necessary legal and professional practice. [8] The defence concept also rests on UN Charter self-defence and the prohibition of threats or force contrary to the Charter. [7]
7. Federal–Regional Relations
The Constitution exclusively assigns national security policy and armed-force establishment and management to federal authorities while granting regional internal-security powers. The bill avoids detailed regulation of regional internal-security forces, requiring coordination for joint federal defence missions or direct regional or governorate effects, respecting constitutional powers.
Fifth — Harmonization with Existing Legislation
| Reference | Relationship to the Bill | Proposed remedy |
|---|---|---|
| Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005 | Civilian command; parliamentary, governmental and Commander-in-Chief powers; federal defence competence | No amendment; the bill implements principles and establishes procedures |
| Military Service and Retirement Law No. (3) of 2010, as amended | Service, ranks, appointments and rights | Remains effective; only conflicting references or procedures require review when the subsequent armed-forces law is enacted |
| Current Defence Ministry organization and surviving provisions of Order No. (67) of 2004 | Ministry organization, civilian leadership and parts of its structure | Should be replaced by a modern Defence Ministry/armed-forces law with transitional safeguards against gaps |
| Popular Mobilization Authority and security and intelligence laws | Formations with specific security or defence roles | This Law applies only to participation in federal defence policy or missions, to the relevant extent |
| Military justice and discipline laws | Responsibility, orders, offences and discipline | Lawful-order and accountability provisions complement rather than replace them |
| Budget, audit and contract laws | Defence funding and expenditure oversight | Financial and contractual details remain in specialist laws, with required linkage to the defence plan |
Sixth — Financial and Implementation Impact
Direct financial impact: Relatively low: the bill itself creates no institution, allowances or posts. Most duties organize planning, reporting, audit and harmonization within existing institutions.
Limited transitional costs may arise for classified-document systems, weapons legal-review capacity and standardized readiness indicators and annual reporting. Reliable figures require internal data on existing systems and staff, so the bill deliberately avoids an invented numerical estimate.
Core deadlines: Begin policy preparation within 90 days if no current document exists; complete it within 12 months; and issue doctrine, weapons-review and classified-information procedures within 180 days.
Seventh — Brief International Comparison
The bill draws on comparative approaches without transplanting a foreign model. The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security establishes democratic political control and political neutrality of armed forces and security bodies. It is a comparative reference, not a treaty obligation for Iraq. [9]
Germany offers a strong example of an independent parliamentary commissioner supporting military oversight and personnel rights. The Iraqi bill does not create that institution at this stage, avoiding institutional expansion before assessing need. [10]
British practice illustrates the value of periodic defence documents linking strategic conditions and missions to resources and modernization, informing the proposed “defence policy + strategic review + medium-term plan” cycle. [11]
Eighth — Sources and References
- Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005 — Iraqi Council of Representatives and Supreme Judicial Council. Relevant articles include 9, 61, 73, 78, 80, 109 and 110. Council of Representatives; Supreme Judicial Council.
- Rules of Procedure of the Iraqi Council of Representatives. Security and Defence Committee powers, including military oversight and review of defence strategies, plans and policies. Official source.
- Iraq's “Iraq First” National Security Strategy 2025–2030. Published through Iraqi government bodies. Ministry of Justice.
- Military Service and Retirement Law No. (3) of 2010, as amended. Iraqi Legislation Database; published in Iraqi Gazette Issue 4143. Iraqi Legislation Database.
- Federal Supreme Court Decision No. (241/Federal/2024). Published in Iraqi Gazette Issue 4805, addressing part of Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 67 of 2004 concerning the Ministry of Defence. Ministry of Justice.
- Iraqi Council of Representatives — Study of Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 67 of 2004 / Iraqi Ministry of Defence Law. Published on 17 February 2026. Official source.
- Charter of the United Nations. Particularly Articles 2(4) and 51 on prohibition of force and self-defence. United Nations.
- International Committee of the Red Cross — Iraq's Status under International Humanitarian Law Treaties. Includes the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. ICRC Treaties Database.
- OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. Comparative reference on democratic oversight and military political neutrality. OSCE.
- German Bundestag — Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces. Comparative model for parliamentary oversight and personnel rights protection. Bundestag.
- UK Ministry of Defence — Defence Command Paper 2023. Comparative example of defence policy modernization linked to strategic conditions and resources. GOV.UK.
POL-21 · Security, Defence and Sovereignty · Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · 5 October 2026