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POL-31

This is a proposal for discussion, not an enacted law.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Legislative Proposal · Security, Defence and Sovereignty

States of Emergency, Civil Defence, Population Protection and Continuity of the State Law

A unified federal framework separating disaster management under ordinary laws from a constitutional state of emergency involving exceptional powers, and connecting prevention, civil defence, early warning and continuity of state institutions and essential services with strict safeguards for rights and parliamentary, judicial and financial oversight.

Document number
POL-31
Version
1.0
Publication / last updated
7 October 2026
Scope
Republic of Iraq — Federal

Executive Summary

The Iraqi Constitution establishes a precise mechanism for declaring a state of emergency: a joint request by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, approval by a two-thirds majority of the Council of Representatives, a period not exceeding thirty days renewable with fresh approval, and an obligation on the Prime Minister to present the measures and results to the Council of Representatives after the emergency ends. Iraq's legal framework nevertheless remains divided between this constitutional rule, the pre-constitutional Defence of National Safety Order No. (1) of 2004, Civil Defence Law No. (44) of 2013, and several coordination centres, operations rooms and sectoral mandates.

The draft proposes a unified law replacing the 2004 Order and the Civil Defence Law of 2013, while preserving the General Directorate of Civil Defence and existing operational institutions instead of creating a new bureaucracy. It establishes a fundamental distinction: a disaster, epidemic, industrial incident or service collapse does not automatically constitute a “constitutional state of emergency”. Risks should ordinarily be managed under ordinary laws; exceptional powers are activated only when the situation threatens the life of the nation or the integrity of the state and ordinary legal tools are insufficient.

The draft builds an “all-hazards” system beginning with a national risk register, exposure and vulnerability maps, and response and continuity plans; extending through civil defence, early warning, evacuation, shelter, critical infrastructure, reserves and exercises; and concluding with recovery and safer reconstruction. It distributes roles among a national coordinating council chaired by the Prime Minister, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Centre, the National Operations Centre, the Ministry of Interior's National Centre for Crisis and Disaster Management, and the General Directorate of Civil Defence, requiring the government to issue a matrix preventing overlapping command.

During a constitutional state of emergency, the draft prohibits administrative detention, exceptional courts, general media censorship and blanket communications shutdowns. Every restriction on movement, assembly or property must be defined, reasoned, temporary and open to challenge. Parliament, the judiciary, financial oversight and human rights oversight must continue to operate throughout the emergency, with a public register of exceptional orders, periodic reports to Parliament, and specific rules on procurement, compensation and temporary requisition.

II — Proposed Legislative Policy

Core Choices in the Draft
IssueProposed rulePurpose
Disasters and EmergenciesSeparate disaster management under ordinary law from a constitutional state of emergency.Prevent every crisis from becoming a pretext for exceptional powers.
Institutional StructureUse existing centres and agencies and connect them through a national command matrix.Avoid creating new bureaucracy and multiple decision-making rooms.
Civil DefenceRetain the General Directorate of Civil Defence and expand its legal framework to prevention, response and recovery.Use and modernise existing capabilities.
State of EmergencyConstitutional joint request + approval by two-thirds of the Council of Representatives + a period not exceeding 30 days + continuous oversight.Prevent open-ended delegation.
RightsProhibit administrative detention, exceptional courts, general censorship and blanket internet shutdowns.Protect the essence of rights and the rule of law.
Continuity of the StateMandatory plans for constitutional authorities, ministries, critical infrastructure, data and payments.Prevent an operational crisis from becoming institutional collapse.
FinancingAn emergency reserve within the budget, not a fund outside the treasury.Speed while preserving financial oversight.
RecoveryPost-incident review and safer reconstruction.Reduce recurrence of the same losses.

Statement of reasons

This Law is enacted to complete the legislative framework required by the Constitution to regulate the powers needed to administer the country during war or emergency; modernise civil defence and population protection; overcome fragmented rules across earlier transitional legislation, the Civil Defence Law and dispersed administrative rules; establish an integrated system for preparedness, response, warning and continuity of state functions and essential services while ensuring parliamentary and judicial oversight and protecting rights and freedoms; and regulate financing, procurement, compensation and accountability during crises.

Explanatory memorandum

1. Distinguishing Disasters from Constitutional States of Emergency

The draft distinguishes an incident or disaster manageable through ordinary public powers from a constitutional state of emergency arising only through the procedure in Article (61/Ninth) of the Constitution. This prevents every fire, flood, epidemic or local disturbance from becoming a pretext for exceptional powers and makes emergency powers a last resort when ordinary laws are insufficient.

2. Building on Existing Institutions

The draft does not create a new central authority parallel to existing bodies. It retains the General Directorate of Civil Defence as a specialised executive body and uses the National Crisis and Disaster Management Cell, National Operations Centre, Ministry of Interior's National Centre for Crisis and Disaster Management, and sectoral operations centres. It requires the Council of Ministers to establish a responsibility matrix preventing overlap and identifying who leads, coordinates and provides support.

3. Moving Civil Defence from Response to Prevention

The draft strengthens civil defence before incidents occur through risk classification of facilities, preventive inspection and licensing, evacuation plans, warning and firefighting systems, industrial safety, exercises, and search and rescue. It also links closure, penalties and immediate danger to safeguards of reasons, appeal and graduated measures, preventing safety powers from becoming unrestrained administrative authority.

4. Continuity of State Functions and Services during Crises

The draft addresses the minimum legislative requirements for continuity of constitutional authorities, ministries, payments, records and essential services during emergencies. It does not turn business continuity into a permanent development programme; it specifies the preparedness, alternative operation and recovery duties without which the legal response cannot function, leaving detailed sectoral standards to relevant legislation.

5. Rights and Freedoms in Exceptional Circumstances

Exceptional authority is not a law-free zone. The draft therefore requires necessity, proportionality, temporal and geographical limits, publication and judicial review. It prohibits creating new administrative detention, exceptional courts or general communications shutdowns merely upon declaration of an emergency, and protects inviolable rights. It also keeps the Council of Representatives, judiciary and oversight bodies functioning throughout the crisis.

6. Stronger Oversight of Emergency Orders

The draft combines prior parliamentary oversight when approving an emergency declaration, continuous oversight through periodic reports and relevant committees, individual judicial review of decisions, and financial and integrity auditing. It also establishes a central register of exceptional orders so that temporary decisions do not become untraceable practices.

7. Rapid Expenditure without Sacrificing Integrity

The provisions recognise that response cannot always accommodate lengthy procurement cycles, but require records of need, price, supplier, receipt and approval, retain competition where circumstances permit, and require subsequent publication of basic information. A reserve within the general budget is used instead of creating an emergency fund outside the treasury and oversight.

8. Recovery and Learning after a Disaster

Legal duties do not end when rescue ends. The draft connects recovery with damage and needs assessment, requires causes of failure to be addressed before rebuilding, and mandates post-incident review and specific corrective actions. This is consistent with the “Build Back Better” principle in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.

9. Federal, Regional and Local Relations

The Law adopts the principle that field command begins at the level capable of managing the incident and requests support when capacity is exceeded, respecting the constitutional responsibilities of the Kurdistan Region and governorates. The objective is interoperability, information exchange and support, rather than centralising management of every local incident.

Transitional Provisions and Implementation Requirements

Proposed Implementation Stages after Publication
PeriodCore Legal and Regulatory Outputs
From Publication to 90 DaysForm a transition team, inventory existing instructions and plans, prepare draft regulations, and ensure uninterrupted civil defence and operations centres.
From 90 to 180 DaysIssue core regulations, adopt the responsibility matrix, and unify the incident command system, emergency order template and central register.
From 6 to 12 MonthsApprove the national risk register, national response plan and state functions continuity plan, and update governorate and sectoral plans.
From 12 to 24 MonthsComplete critical infrastructure continuity plans, integrate warning channels, develop stocks and exercises, and conduct an initial audit of bodies' readiness.
Up to 36 MonthsComplete capital requirements for existing facilities according to risk-based priorities, without postponing action on imminent dangers.

Financial and Implementation Implications

The draft primarily reorganises existing functions and structures and therefore does not assume creation of a new federal authority or parallel apparatus. Additional costs mainly concern multi-channel warning systems, protection, response and communications equipment, training and exercises, backups and alternative sites, and upgrading civil defence centres and strategic stocks according to actual readiness gaps.

No unified public data support a reliable national cost figure without an inventory of assets, centres, equipment and service levels in each governorate and sector. The Law therefore requires competent bodies to establish an asset and gap baseline and life-cycle costs before including investments in the budget. Unexpected expenditure is covered by an emergency reserve within the general budget rather than an off-budget fund.

Brief International References and Comparisons

Comparative Principles Relevant to Legislative Design
ReferenceRelevance Used in the Draft
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030Understanding risk, risk governance, investing in resilience, and improved preparedness, response and recovery; used as principles rather than literal implementation obligations.
United Kingdom — Civil Contingencies Act 2004Separate civil preparedness duties from exceptional powers, and subject emergency regulations to short time limits and parliamentary oversight.
Canada — Emergencies ActContinuous parliamentary oversight of exceptional powers and an independent retrospective review after the declaration ends.
South Africa — Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002Integrated risk management, multiple levels of disaster management centres, and volunteers organised within an official system.
International Health Regulations and the World Health Organization's Joint External Evaluation ApproachKeep technical leadership of health emergencies with health bodies and connect it to a multisectoral response, rather than subordinating medical decisions to a general security structure.

Sources and references

  1. Iraqi Council of Representatives — Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, particularly Article (61/Ninth) on declarations of war and states of emergency.
  2. Defence of National Safety Order No. (1) of 2004, archived legislative text.
  3. Civil Defence Law No. (44) of 2013, legislative text published in the domestic laws database.
  4. Iraqi Council of Representatives — Decisions and Recommendations of the Session of 23 August 2026, including the first reading of the draft first amendment to the Civil Defence Law.
  5. Ministry of Justice — Iraqi Gazette, Issue 4847, 10 November 2025, containing Instructions on the Structure and Functions of the Prime Minister's Office No. (1) of 2025.
  6. Ministry of Justice — Technical Endorsement Workshop for the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation, 18 November 2025.
  7. World Health Organization — Joint External Evaluation of Iraq's Core Capacities under the International Health Regulations, report published on 1 May 2025 concerning the mission of 17–21 September 2023.
  8. World Health Organization — International Health Regulations (2005).
  9. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction — Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030.
  10. United Kingdom — Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
  11. Canada — Emergencies Act.
  12. South Africa — Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002.

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