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POL-49

This is a proposal for discussion, not an enacted law.

Ali Zuweid’s political programme

Proposed bill · Energy, Infrastructure, Water, Environment and Urban Development

Federal Oil and Gas, Hydrocarbon Resource Management and Revenue Distribution Law

Document numberPOL-49
Version1.0
Publication and update date5 October 2026
ScopeRepublic of Iraq

Executive summary

This proposal establishes a unified federal framework for managing oil and gas as the property of all Iraqi people. It addresses the legislative gap persisting since the 2005 Constitution concerning joint management of existing fields, strategic policy for hydrocarbon development, and unified licensing, contracting, measurement, marketing, revenue deposit, oversight and distribution. Oil and gas ownership in reservoirs shall not transfer to contractors, and all sales and export revenues shall enter the federal public treasury rather than be retained or managed outside the State financial system.

The proposal establishes a Federal Oil and Gas Council including the federal government and representatives of regions and producing governorates in strategic decision-making, separating policy and regulatory functions from commercial operations of public companies and contractors. External marketing of federally produced crude oil and gas shall be through the State Oil Marketing Organization or its lawful successor. A unified national register shall cover resources, contracts, measurement and production, and no contract or transaction may fall outside the federal system established herein.

Net revenues shall be distributed under clear rules: a population-based allocation for all Iraqis, temporary corrective allocations for balanced development in damaged or deprived areas, and objectively calculated compensation to producing regions and governorates for environmental and infrastructure burdens. These shall not create regional ownership of resources or off-budget deductions. Strict rules require publication of contracts, beneficial owners, payments, production and sales, Federal Board of Supreme Audit scrutiny, prevention of conflicts of interest, and continued contracts conditional on disclosure and compliance.

Detailed provisions govern associated gas, progressively prohibiting routine flaring and ending it by 31 December 2030 at the latest, with restricted safety and emergency exceptions. Every project requires gas, emissions, water, decommissioning and rehabilitation plans and financial security for field and facility abandonment. Existing contracts and arrangements undergo an orderly transition of disclosure, review, settlement or conversion into compliant federal contracts, rather than leaving the sector hostage to permanent legal duplication.

Legislative gap and proposed policy

Problems addressed and legislative responses
ProblemEffectLegislative response
No comprehensive federal law implementing Articles 111 and 112Competing interpretations and disputes over management, contracting and marketingA comprehensive federal law defining ownership, competences, joint management and decision mechanisms
Overlap between the State’s regulatory and operating rolesWeak accountability and conflicting functionsSeparate technical regulation and oversight from public companies and contractors
Contracts, data and measurement are not unifiedDifficulty verifying production, costs and entitlementsA national contract and resource register, federal measurement system and independent audit
Disagreement over disposition of production and revenueFinancial and political disputes and delayed public entitlementsUnified external marketing, full treasury deposit and distribution under statutory criteria
Weak contract and beneficial ownership transparencyCorruption and conflict-of-interest risksPublish contracts, payments, beneficial owners and allocation outcomes
Continued associated-gas flaringEconomic waste, import dependence, pollution and emissionsProhibit routine flaring in new developments and end it in existing fields by the end of 2030
Previous contracts and arrangements outside a unified federal frameworkLegal and commercial dispute risksTransitional review, full disclosure, settlement or conversion to federal contracts within defined periods

The chosen policy is a detailed framework law fixing principles, competences, safeguards and decision mechanisms while leaving changing technical details to binding regulations and instructions issued within deadlines. It does not make the Council of Ministers or Ministry of Oil a direct commercial operator, give public companies resource ownership, or create independent regional or governorate oil shares outside the treasury and budget. Nor does it impose one economic contract model on every field: service, development-and-production or other lawful models are permitted, subject to no transfer of in-reservoir ownership, clear consideration and risk allocation, competition and transparency.

Statement of reasons

To implement constitutional ownership of oil and gas by all Iraqi people; regulate joint existing-field management, strategic development policy and equitable revenues; end the legislative vacuum producing divergent practices, contracts and intergovernmental disputes; unify exploration, development, production, measurement, marketing, exports and revenue deposits; strengthen transparency, audit and public-funds protection; utilise gas and reduce flaring and waste; protect environment and producing communities; and regularise previous contracts in transition to a stable, investment-supporting federal system, this Law is enacted.

Explanatory memorandum

1. Why does Iraq need this Law?

The issue is not complete absence of technical rules: Iraq has a Ministry, public companies, older legislation, extensive contracts and deep operational experience. The fundamental gap is a comprehensive post-2005 federal law connecting popular ownership to clear constitutional intergovernmental management and defining relations between the State as legislator, regulator and public owner and commercial public companies and contractors. The sector has relied on pre-constitutional laws, temporary budget provisions, political arrangements, varied contracts and judgments addressing particular disputes rather than replacing legislation.

As of 5 October 2026, no final federal oil and gas law had been enacted. Official bodies confirmed throughout 2026 that it remained a legislative priority and a version was under discussion before parliamentary submission. This proposal therefore addresses a real need for new legislation, not merely a limited amendment to Law 84 of 1985.

2. Constitutional basis

The proposal gives equal weight to popular ownership, joint existing-field management and joint strategic policy. It adopts neither operational centralisation eliminating producing regions’ and governorates’ roles nor multiple sovereign systems allowing independent external contracts, marketing and revenue collection. The solution centralises fiscal and trade sovereignty, data and standards while ensuring genuine institutional participation in technical and strategic decisions.

3. Federal Supreme Court decisions

The 15 February 2022 judgment on Kurdistan’s Oil and Gas Law has structural implications: a new federal law cannot leave room for parallel contracting, exports or revenue collection. Repeating the judgment is insufficient; practical transition needs legal review and settlement of existing contracts without abruptly stopping production or creating unnecessary investment claims. Hence mandatory inventories, a settlement committee, contract-by-contract classification and defined transition periods.

The National Oil Company judgment likewise demonstrates the danger of mixing sovereign powers with a commercial entity. No public company therefore receives policy-making powers or control over marketing or revenue distribution; commercial operations remain separate from regulatory and constitutional decisions.

4. Why a Federal Oil and Gas Council?

The Council translates ‘together’ in Article 112 into a continuing decision-making institution, rather than adding ceremonial bureaucracy. Chaired by the Prime Minister, it includes sovereign and sectoral ministers and producing-unit representatives. Strategic decisions require an enhanced majority, while exclusive federal powers remain federal. This ensures meaningful participation without undermining State unity or granting one party an absolute veto.

5. Why separate regulation and operations?

A challenge for producing States with large national companies is conflicting State roles as legislator, regulator, owner, operator and buyer. The proposal neither privatises public companies nor abolishes them. It makes them commercial operators subject to the same measurement, safety and audit rules, with a technical regulator inside the Ministry conducting inspection and compliance independently of company commercial interests.

6. Contract-model choices

The proposal neither mandates one technical service contract nor automatically adopts production sharing. Iraqi fields differ in risk, depth, infrastructure, gas, reserves and exploration needs. Multiple models are therefore permitted where they retain public in-reservoir ownership, clearly allocate consideration and risk, and undergo competition, publication and audit. Flexibility prevents the Law obstructing border, gas or high-risk exploration fields.

7. Marketing and revenue

Unified external marketing concerns more than commerce: it involves foreign trade policy, pricing, credit, sanctions, outlets and shipping contracts, and the ability to verify treasury receipt for every sold barrel or gas unit. The proposal therefore reserves external marketing to the State Oil Marketing Organization or successor, prohibits parallel sales and requires sufficient monthly data for public oversight.

8. Revenue distribution

The proposal distinguishes resource ownership from public spending distribution. Resources belong to all Iraqis and revenue enters the treasury first, then flows through population-based budgets with two constitutionally and objectively grounded additions: temporary correction for damaged or deprived areas and compensation for producing areas’ environmental and infrastructure burdens. Neither may become a permanent off-budget deduction or local oil ownership right.

9. Gas and flaring

Gas is a major source of structural waste in Iraqi energy. The World Bank lists Iraq among the largest flaring countries, and Iraq endorses Zero Routine Flaring by 2030. The proposal converts political commitment into law: no routine flaring in new fields, elimination in existing fields by the end of 2030, measurement, disclosure and narrow safety exceptions. Unrestricted methane venting is expressly prohibited as a substitute.

10. Transparency

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative data show Iraq still needs substantial disclosure and governance improvements, particularly for public companies, contracts and beneficial ownership. The proposal therefore goes beyond a general transparency statement, requiring contracts, amendments, beneficial owners, payments and production to be published, granting full audit access and narrowly limiting commercial confidentiality.

Alignment with existing legislation and decisions

Relationship with principal existing frameworks
Existing frameworkStatusProposal’s effect
Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005 — Articles 111 and 112Direct constitutional basisTransforms principles into management, distribution and development institutions and rules
Federal Supreme Court decisions 59/2012 and 110/2019 — 15/2/2022Final and bindingUnifies licensing, contracting, marketing and revenues and creates a transition for earlier contracts
Federal Supreme Court decision 66 and consolidated cases 71/157/224 of 2018Invalidated substantive National Oil Company Law provisionsSeparates sovereignty and regulation from operations and requires separate legislation addressing remaining provisions
Hydrocarbon Resources Conservation Law No. 84 of 1985Pre-constitutional technical frameworkProgressively replaced after new technical regulations within 18 months
Ministry of Oil Organisation Law No. 101 of 1976, as amendedOlder institutional frameworkRetained temporarily, with an updating bill submitted within one year
Federal Financial Management Law and budget lawsTreasury and expenditure regulationMakes federal revenue deposit and settlement permanent rather than temporary annual rules
Environment, integrity, labour and public-company lawsComplementary general legislationRemain applicable, supplemented by sector-specific requirements

Enactment should accompany a parallel programme updating the Ministry of Oil Law and resolving the National Oil Company Law’s legal status. Leaving old or truncated provisions after constitutional judgments would recreate the overlap this proposal seeks to end.

Transitional provisions and implementation requirements

The proposal uses phased transition rather than immediate disruption. Contracts and data are inventoried within 90 days, existing fields registered within 180 days, and contract, measurement and transparency rules established within six months. Non-unified previous contracts enter review and settlement normally lasting twelve months after inventory, with limited necessary extension. Technical Law 84 of 1985 remains temporarily until replacement regulations, no later than eighteen months.

Legislative implementation timetable after commencement
Maximum periodRequirementLead body
90 daysInventory existing contracts, licences, revenues, debts and guaranteesOil Ministry + Finance + Federal Board of Supreme Audit + regional bodies
180 daysApprove existing-field register; contract, transparency, beneficial ownership and measurement rules; form settlement committeeCouncil + Council of Ministers + Ministry
9 monthsSafety, data-management and local-content rulesMinistry, regulator and Environment Ministry
12 monthsAbandonment, flaring, emissions and infrastructure-access rules; submit Ministry of Oil Law updateCouncil of Ministers and competent ministries
18 monthsComplete replacement of the technical framework of Law 84 of 1985Council of Ministers and Ministry
By 31/12/2030End routine flaring in existing fieldsOperators, Ministry and regulator

Financial and implementation impact

The proposal creates no specified government capital-spending programme or general financial figure reliably estimable without detailed institutional, contractual and digital-system data. Implementation therefore requires an official cost assessment within 90 days, distinguishing regulation, measurement and data, audit and contractual settlement costs from capital investment borne by operators under contracts.

Expected direct costs include strengthening regulation, unifying databases, electronic measurement and audit, contract and beneficial ownership portals, and settlement and valuation experts. Budgets and reasonable regulatory fees deposited in the treasury may fund these functions. Gas capture, flaring elimination and abandonment costs primarily belong in field plans and contracts, determined project by project rather than through an unrealistic aggregate.

The proposal seeks to reduce four fiscal leakages: unauditable costs, undocumented measurement differences, off-treasury sales or revenue, and wasted associated gas. Publication and unified audit also reduce uncompetitive pricing and conflicts of interest. No specific savings should be claimed before an audited baseline exists.

Comparative and international foundations

The proposal does not copy another country’s law. It uses common modern-resource principles: regulatory–operator separation, competitive allocation, unified resource and contract registers, contract and beneficial ownership publication, payment audit, abandonment security and field-level flaring and emissions management. This aligns with EITI transparency requirements and the World Bank’s initiative to end routine flaring by 2030, endorsed by Iraq.

Three Iraqi characteristics cannot be imported from foreign models: constitutional ownership by all the people, shared existing-field management and policy-making, and the acute dependence of the federal budget on oil revenue. Distribution, intergovernmental agreement and marketing oversight consequently receive greater weight than in many conventional petroleum laws.

Sources and references

  1. Iraqi Council of Representatives — Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005. Articles 110, 111, 112, 115, 121 and 130, particularly oil and gas ownership, joint management and strategic policy. Official source.
  2. Federal Supreme Court — decision 59/Federal/2012 and consolidated 110/Federal/2019, 15 February 2022. Unconstitutionality of Kurdistan Region Oil and Gas Law No. 22 of 2007 and consequences for production, contracts and audit. Official source.
  3. Federal Supreme Court — principles of decisions 59/Federal/2012 and 110/Federal/2019. Published principles on federal competences, popular ownership, oil management and budget obligations. Official source.
  4. Federal Supreme Court — decision 66 and consolidated 71/157/224/Federal/2018. Unconstitutionality of Iraqi National Oil Company Law No. 4 of 2018 provisions infringing federal or shared competences. Official source.
  5. Federal Supreme Court — decision 49 and consolidated 83/Federal/2022. Invalid executive measures completing National Oil Company establishment before legislative treatment of annulled provisions. Official source.
  6. Federal Supreme Court — decision 224 and consolidated 269/Federal/2023, 21 February 2024. Oil and non-oil revenue obligations and audit in fiscal relations with the Kurdistan Region. Official source.
  7. Iraqi Ministry of Environment — environmental legislation register. Records Hydrocarbon Resources Conservation Law No. 84 of 1985, published in Iraqi Gazette No. 3068 on 21/10/1985. Official source.
  8. Oil Exploration Company/Ministry of Oil. Current competences and reference to operations under Hydrocarbon Resources Law No. 84 of 1985. Official source.
  9. Iraqi Council of Representatives — decisions of session 14, March 2026. Emphasises enactment of the Oil and Gas Law and unified management of production sources, transport and distribution. Official source.
  10. Parliamentary Oil, Gas and Natural Resources Committee — 4 May 2026. Identifies the bill as a legislative priority and requests government submission. Official source.
  11. Iraqi Council of Representatives — statement of 6 September 2026. Confirms discussion of an Oil and Gas Bill version before parliamentary submission. Official source.
  12. Federal Supreme Court and General Budget Law 2023–2025. Judicial and legislative revenue-transfer, audit and settlement provisions, used here to identify the need for permanent rules instead of temporary annual provisions.
  13. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) — Iraq. The 2025 validation result and governance, disclosure, contract, public-company and beneficial ownership data. Source.
  14. World Bank — Global Gas Flaring Tracker 2026. Iraq’s continued position among major flaring countries and the importance of gas capture for energy security and emission reduction. Source.
  15. World Bank — Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 initiative. Iraq is an endorsing government; the initiative seeks elimination of routine flaring by 2030 and prevention in new developments. Endorsers and Initiative text.
  16. International Monetary Fund — Iraq Article IV Consultation, 2025. Indicators of fiscal reliance on oil revenues and oil-sector projections for 2024–2026, used to assess the importance of fiscal governance, not as contractual or production targets in this Law. Source.

Last verification of legislative and institutional status and live sources: 5 October 2026.

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