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POL-61

This is a proposal for discussion, not an enacted law.

Proposed legislation · Energy, infrastructure, water, environment and urban development

Mineral Investment and Mineral Resources Management Law

Document number
POL-61
Version
1.0
Publication/update date
7 October 2026
Scope
Republic of Iraq

Executive summary

The proposal moves mineral regulation beyond its 1988 framework to connect exploration and extraction rights with digital geological records, competition, transparency, beneficial ownership, accurate measurement and pre-funded closure. It does not assume mineral extraction is an exclusive federal competence equivalent to oil and gas. A cooperative framework respects constitutional federal, regional and governorate responsibilities, identifying the granting authority for every area and decision.

Existing institutions are retained rather than adding a heavy new authority: Industry and Minerals handles policy and standards within its competence; the Geological Survey handles knowledge and data; local and regional bodies handle rights within theirs; and a coordination council has no licensing power. Investment licences are distinguished from mineral rights, and regulators from commercially active public companies.

Known deposits shall be competitively allocated; lawful discoverers receive conditional priority. Published royalties shall be set by impact-assessed regulation rather than one rate for all minerals. Revenue enters the treasury under general financial rules, while payments, contracts and beneficial owners are disclosed. Progressive rehabilitation, closure plans and independent financial guarantees before extraction prevent exhausted-mine costs passing to the state and communities.

Current baseline

The National Investment Commission still lists Mineral Investment Regulation Law No. (91) of 1988, as amended, among applicable laws. On 12 March 2013, Federal Supreme Court Decision (10/Federal/2013) suspended Articles (13, 15 and 16) because administrative officials may not exercise judicial powers. Decision (14/Federal/2019) confirmed suspension took effect from judgment. Separating administrative sanctions from judicial competence is therefore a central constitutional requirement for replacement legislation.

On 26 August 2026, the Council of Representatives completed the first reading of the draft ‘Mineral Investment Law’, explaining that the 1988 law no longer meets sector needs and that Iraqi and foreign private investment should be enabled. Published proceedings referred it to Investment and Development, Economy, Industry and Trade, and Finance committees. POL-61 therefore offers a broader framework potentially integrated into the ongoing legislative process before final enactment.

1988Year of the principal existing mineral law
2013Suspension of unconstitutional judicial-power provisions
26 August 2026First reading of the new parliamentary bill
55.5/100Iraq's score in the EITI assessment published in 2025

Iraq's Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative page identifies Industry and Minerals as the federal regulator of mineral extraction and marketing, while mineral contracts remain described as confidential and beneficial-ownership disclosure has gaps. Existing operators include the State Company for Phosphates and Al-Mishraq Sulphur State Company; the Geological Survey continues testing, surveying and laboratory work. Reform should improve licensing, transparency and data rather than create parallel institutions.

Legislative gap

Problems addressed
GapEffectProposed treatment
Principal law nearly four decades oldPoor alignment with modern investment, digitisation and corporate governance.Comprehensive replacement, digital registry and stage-specific rights.
Previous provisions gave officials judicial powersJudicial suspension and enforcement gaps.Clear separation of administrative sanctions and judiciary.
Multiple authorities and constitutional boundariesDuplicate or conflicting licence risks.Defined competent granting authority, shared registry and inter-level coordination.
Confidential contracts and beneficial ownershipWeak revenue verification and conflict-of-interest scrutiny.Publish licences, contracts, payments and beneficial owners.
Closure treated separatelyExhausted-mine costs may pass to the state.Closure plan and independent financial guarantee before extraction.
No modern public cadastreOverlapping areas and investment/monitoring difficulties.Digital mineral registry linked to land, environmental and water data.

Proposed legislative policy

Rights progress from reconnaissance to exploration and mining. Unknown areas use simplified allocation preventing land hoarding; known deposits and strategic projects are openly competed. Compliant explorers who actually invest and discover resources receive conditional mining-application priority, so later competition does not expropriate privately created exploration value.

Public finances are protected through measurement of every produced tonne or unit, published mineral- and market-based royalties rather than arbitrary uniform rates, and reconcilable company/state revenue disclosures. Producing areas receive support transparently through budget- or revenue-law transfers rather than rigid shares outside the financial system.

The Geological Survey holds knowledge without becoming a competing regulator. Publicly funded data become open; rights-holder data are submitted to the state with limited confidentiality. Knowledge accumulates rather than disappearing when contracts end or companies leave.

Explanatory reasons

This Law is proposed to modernise mineral investment/resource management; encourage exploration and responsible private investment; distinguish investment licences and mineral rights; align competences constitutionally; improve surveys and registration; protect environment, water, health and safety; ensure closure/rehabilitation; improve revenues and disclosure of contracts, payments and beneficial ownership; and address constitutional judgments concerning Mineral Investment Regulation Law No. (91) of 1988.

Explanatory memorandum

1. Why replacement rather than partial amendment?

The problem extends beyond one article or outdated fine. Existing structures predate digital cadastres, beneficial ownership, modern waste management, closure guarantees and contemporary competition, while constitutional rulings suspended material provisions. Reconstruction is clearer than amendments preserving an outdated contradictory structure.

2. Why no new independent mining authority?

Iraq already has a ministry, Geological Survey, public companies, investment commissions and environmental, financial and local bodies. The problem is functions, data and conflicting roles rather than missing institutional names. A non-licensing coordination council and shared registry avoid another bureaucratic layer.

3. Why separate mineral rights from investment licences?

Investment legislation provides conditions, incentives and guarantees, but limited public minerals should not pass through general investment approval alone. Investors must know that land or exemptions do not replace technical/financial resource competition or environmental approval.

4. Why no uniform royalty rate?

Construction stone, phosphate, sulphur and high-value minerals differ radically, as do low-grade ores and costly processing. Uniform rates may surrender profitable-resource revenue or close marginal projects. Transparent methods and impact-assessed regulatory schedules shall specify reference prices and calculations.

5. Closure is part of licensing, not a later phase

Major public risks arise when ore is exhausted or operators fail, leaving pits, dams and polluted water. Future promises are insufficient: closure plans and guarantees precede extraction, are periodically revalued and released only against verified work.

6. Public companies

Phosphate, sulphur and other public companies are retained without assuming privatisation or abolition. Public operators should not judge their own licences or exemption from disclosure, environment and safety. Commercial and regulatory functions separate, with common measurement and audit rules.

Harmonisation with existing legislation and institutions

Boundaries with the existing system
Reference or institutionRetained responsibilitiesPOL-61 additions
Investment Law 13 of 2006Investment licensing, incentives and guarantees within its scope.Separates resource rights; investment approval is not a mining licence.
Environmental Protection and Improvement Law 27 of 2009Environmental approval, supervision and penalties.Links mining licences to baselines, closure and financial guarantees.
Ministry of Industry and MineralsStatutory federal policies and functions.Common standards, registry, reports and clearer regulatory/operational separation.
Geological SurveySurveys, data and technical analysis.National data repository and digital layers without comprehensive commercial licensing powers.
Regions and governoratesConstitutional and statutory local powers.Maps granting bodies and records decisions in a shared registry.
Investment commissionsStatutory investment licences.Coordination window without merging mineral decisions into general approval.
Public mineral companiesExtraction, manufacturing and marketing under their laws.Disclosure, measurement, environment and closure requirements like any operator.

Transition and implementation requirements

Initial post-legislation stage
PeriodAction
Within 12 monthsInventory rights, contracts and quarries; issue core regulations; update mineral-investment/quarry instructions.
Within 12 monthsRegister existing rights, coordinates, granting bodies, beneficial owners and legal status.
Within 18 monthsAlign existing rights with measurement, data, closure, guarantee and disclosure requirements.
Within 24 monthsConnect cadastre layers to land, environment, water, antiquities and infrastructure data according to readiness.
PeriodicallyUpdate surveys, royalty schedules, strategic-mineral lists and transparency/compliance reports.

Transition needs careful legal management because the Mineral Investment Bill entered Parliament in August 2026. Integrating modern provisions before voting is preferable to parallel laws on the same subject.

Financial and implementation impact

No reliable national implementation cost is possible before inventorying licences, quarries, data, laboratories and maps. Regulatory costs can partly use existing institutions; surveys, digitisation and laboratories require capital; closure costs fall on operators through guarantees rather than the treasury.

Fiscal-impact calculation
ItemMethodInitial funding source
Digital mineral cadastreDigitised maps/rights, cloud/central infrastructure, security, linkage and maintenance.Public appropriation and reasonable cost-based service fees, without making registration profit-driven.
Geological surveysCost per kilometre/area by survey, flight, analysis and sampling type.Budgets, cooperation programmes and lawful survey contracts.
Supervision and measurementMine/quarry counts × inspection frequency × laboratories and calibration equipment.Budgets and lawful cost-based oversight fees.
ClosureThird-party remaining-work costs plus contingency and monitoring.Periodically updated operator guarantees.
Abandoned sitesInventory and risk classification followed by independent site-specific studies.Recovery from responsible parties where possible, then priority-based public budgets.

Mining revenues shall not be earmarked outside treasury for ministries or operators. Unified public finance and budget appropriation reduce conflicting incentives. Budgets may support producing authorities or affected communities under published rules after actual revenue materialises.

Relevant international standards

Three common modern principles inform the proposal: staged exploration/mining rights with conditional discoverer priority; closure financial assurance to protect states from abandonment or insolvency; and transparent licences, contracts, payments and beneficial ownership central to EITI standards.

No single foreign model is copied. Iraq's constitutional institutions require federal, regional and governorate cooperation, using international resource-classification, waste and closure standards without importing institutions unsuited to local powers.

Sources and references

  1. Iraqi Council of Representatives — Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005.
  2. Iraqi Council of Representatives — First reading of the Mineral Investment Bill, 26 August 2026.
  3. National Investment Commission — Mineral Investment Regulation Law No. 91 of 1988, as amended.
  4. Federal Supreme Court — Decision 14/Federal/2019 on effects of Decision 10/Federal/2013 suspending Articles 13, 15 and 16 of the Mineral Investment Law.
  5. National Investment Commission — Applicable investment and labour regulations and laws.
  6. National Investment Commission — Investor Guide and Investment Law No. 13 of 2006, as amended.
  7. Ministry of Justice — Legal principle on Environmental Protection and Improvement Law No. 27 of 2009 applicability.
  8. Ministry of Justice — Iraqi Official Gazette: First Amendment to Ministry of Industry and Minerals Law No. 38 of 2011.
  9. Ministry of Industry and Minerals — Geological Survey laboratory rehabilitation, 26 August 2026.
  10. State Company for Phosphates — Official website and phosphate extraction/processing.
  11. Al-Mishraq Sulphur State Company — Official website and sulphur extraction/manufacturing.
  12. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative — Iraq country profile, validation and extractive-sector governance.
  13. World Bank — Mining governance, mine closure and financial assurance references.

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