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POL-91

This is a proposal for discussion, not an enacted law.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme

Legislative proposal · Digital Government, Data, Artificial Intelligence and Cybersecurity

Telecommunications, Digital Services, Spectrum and Regulatory Authority Law

A unified legislative framework placing telecommunications, spectrum and digital services under stable, technology-neutral rules, separating regulation from operation and promoting competition, investment and universal connectivity while safeguarding privacy, communications confidentiality and freedom of expression.

Document number
POL-91
Version
1.0
Publication / last updated
7 October 2026
Scope
Republic of Iraq

Executive summary

Telecommunications regulation in Iraq still rests substantially on Order No. (65) of 2004, which established the Communications and Media Commission, while the 2005 Constitution requires the Commission to be financially and administratively independent and its work to be regulated by law. In its current documents, the Commission itself confirms its continuing reliance on Order (65) as the basis for regulating telecommunications, information technology and spectrum, even as the regulatory environment has expanded to dozens of specialised regulations on interconnection, service quality, consumer protection, satellite services and digital services.[1][2][5]

The need for a new law is no longer theoretical. On 11 June 2026, the Commission and Ministry of Communications stressed the importance of completing agreements on the draft telecommunications law. On 22 September 2026, the parliamentary Transport, Communications and Governance Committee announced that it was still examining the proposed telecommunications and information technology law in preparation for its first reading. As at this document's date, Iraq therefore still faces a legislative gap between a modern market structure and a foundational legal framework more than two decades old.[3][4]

The proposal offers a replacement law, rather than a parallel one: it establishes the Commission's independence under Article (103) of the Constitution, functionally separates government policymaking, independent regulation and public-company ownership or operation, replaces broad licensing with general authorisation where scarce resources are not involved, and establishes modern rules for spectrum, auctions, interconnection, open access, shared infrastructure, universal service, consumer rights and the open internet. Spectrum regulation rests on federal competence over broadcasting-frequency and postal policy, together with the International Telecommunication Union's Radio Regulations and spectrum-management guidance.[1][11][12]

The proposal also addresses digital services within defined limits that prevent it becoming a content-censorship law. It requires contact points and legal representation for providers with an impact in Iraq, notification, transparency and objection procedures, prohibits general monitoring obligations on platforms, and requires blocking or disclosure orders to be specific, reasoned and subject to judicial review. This structure draws on modern principles in European telecommunications and digital-services legislation, adapted to Iraq's constitutional setting rather than copied literally.[13][14]

The law creates no new authority. It instead re-establishes the existing Commission's legal governance and provides an orderly transition from Order (65) and current regulations, maintaining existing licences and rights and reviewing regulations within 24 months. This reduces regulatory uncertainty and organises numerous dispersed rules into a clear legislative hierarchy without extinguishing previous financial rights or obligations.

II — Legislative and market gaps

The first problem is an institutional legitimacy gap: the Constitution reserves regulation of the Commission's work to legislation, but its main operational foundation remains a pre-constitutional transitional order. The second is overlapping roles between the Ministry, Commission and public companies. This arose directly in parliamentary Transport and Communications Committee meetings in 2026 discussing the limits of powers and the relationship between the Ministry of Communications and the Commission. The third is the accumulation of numerous regulations without a modern legislative framework bringing licensing, competition, spectrum, rights and oversight principles into a single hierarchy.[4][16]

Current practice shows that Iraq already has relatively advanced regulatory tools in some areas: interconnection and quality-of-service regulations, a consumer-protection policy, universal-service arrangements and a national numbering plan, alongside regulation of non-geostationary satellite broadband services. The requirement is not to dismantle these tools but to give them a stable legislative basis, unify their governing principles and specify what belongs in regulations and what Parliament must determine itself.[6][7][8][9][18]

A similar gap exists in digital services. In 2024 the Commission proposed a draft framework for digital platforms and services to promote competition and protect data security, demonstrating a real regulatory need. However, intermediary liability, blocking, data requests and objection rights affect freedom of expression, privacy and judicial jurisdiction. They therefore require clear legislative rules and cannot be left entirely to implementing regulations.[10]

III — Proposed legislative policy

Legislative choice: Repeal and replace Order No. (65) of 2004 with a modern federal law, preserving current licences and regulations during the transition rather than creating an additional law that multiplies provisions.

The proposal establishes a system of layered regulation: the law defines rights, powers, safeguards and sanctions; regulations specify changing technical details; and licences establish individual obligations. General authorisation is the default, with individual licensing an exception for scarce resources, national infrastructure or particular risks. This reduces entry costs and shifts the focus from controlling provider numbers to monitoring outcomes and competition.

On competition, the proposal does not assume that every market needs price controls. The Commission first analyses the market, identifies significant market power and then applies the least extensive adequate remedy: transparency, non-discrimination, access, accounting separation or wholesale-price regulation. This approach aligns with modern telecommunications frameworks distinguishing general authorisation from rights to use scarce resources and linking intervention to an actual competition problem.[13]

On spectrum, the proposal combines auctions, efficiency, coverage and competition, allowing sharing, secondary leasing and technology neutrality while keeping national allocation consistent with the International Telecommunication Union's Radio Regulations. In 2026 the Commission was already discussing auction mechanisms for fixed-broadband spectrum with the Union, making statutory auction and transparency rules a practical rather than hypothetical step.[17]

For digital services, the proposal adopts responsibility with rights safeguards: platforms do not become general judges of expression, and the state does not obtain a general surveillance back door. Blocking and disclosure orders must be specific, reasoned and reviewable; general monitoring obligations are prohibited, while platforms must provide transparency, contact points and complaints procedures. This structure resembles modern digital-services legislation separating content liability from due-diligence and procedural duties.[14]

IV — Draft law

A legislative proposal within Ali Zuweid's Political Programme
In the name of the people
Pursuant to Article (61/First) of the Constitution, the following law is enacted:

V — Statement of reasons

This Law is enacted to implement constitutional provisions on the independence of the Communications and Media Commission and statutory regulation of its work; modernise telecommunications and information-technology legislation for broadband networks, satellite communications and digital services; manage spectrum, frequencies and numbering efficiently and transparently; promote competition, investment and open infrastructure access; expand universal service and protect user rights, communications confidentiality and freedom of expression; regulate digital-service liability and procedures without general monitoring; and consolidate dispersed rules by replacing Order No. (65) of 2004 with a stable federal framework subject to parliamentary and judicial oversight.

VI — Explanatory memorandum

1. Why replacement rather than partial amendment?

Order (65) performed an important founding role by establishing the sector regulator, but arose in a transition before the current Constitution and most contemporary digital telecommunications developments. The sector now constitutes an effective legislative system built on dozens of regulations. Adding more regulations onto the old foundation increases jurisdictional conflicts and disperses essential safeguards—limits on blocking, surveillance, sanctions and appeals—across instruments below statutory level. The proposal therefore rebuilds the legislative hierarchy rather than patching its founding text.

2. Regulatory independence does not remove accountability

The proposal translates Article (103) into a clear model: the Commission makes individual decisions independently but is linked to the Council of Representatives, with an audited budget and public annual report. The law prevents parliamentary oversight becoming instructions on particular licences or disputes. Independence is essential for competition and investment and protects the state from conflicts where a government entity owns a commercial operator.

3. Regulating the Ministry and public companies

The proposal preserves the Ministry of Communications' role in government policy, public investment and ownership under relevant legislation, while preventing it regulating competitors of state companies. Public infrastructure becomes accessible on equal terms, with accounting and functional separation where vertical integration exists. This addresses a particularly sensitive sectoral issue without compulsory privatisation or ownership transfer under this Law.

4. Spectrum is a limited public resource

The proposal treats spectrum as a defined usage right rather than private property, allowing auctions, competitive comparisons and administrative assignment according to the band. This aligns with the Union's Radio Regulations and guidance, which make national frequency tables, international coordination, monitoring and transparency essential to spectrum management.[11][12]

5. Competition before retail control

The proposal focuses on wholesale markets, infrastructure, interconnection and access. Effective remedies for control of essential facilities can enable competition to improve retail offers without permanent administrative pricing. Stronger Commission intervention remains available when analysis establishes significant market power and lighter remedies fail.

6. Universal service as a targeted mechanism

The Commission already has universal-service projects benefiting remote areas. The law therefore creates no separate new fund, but turns the existing account into a ring-fenced statutory mechanism based on coverage-gap mapping and competition for subsidies, preventing funding in commercially served areas that would crowd out private investment.[8]

7. Digital services without general monitoring

Iraq's actual need for platform regulation is evident in the Commission's 2024 consultation. However, the legislation distinguishes procedural and transparency duties from deciding whether speech is lawful. Platforms provide notice, objection and transparency channels; mandatory removal or disclosure requires a specific lawful order. General monitoring of everything users publish is prohibited, an essential principle preventing providers becoming permanent surveillance bodies.[10][14]

8. Open internet and shutdowns

The proposal establishes non-discriminatory internet traffic treatment with defined technical and legal exceptions, limiting broad shutdowns through necessity, proportionality, written reasons and judicial review. It separates network management and response to genuine threats from using infrastructure to restrict lawful information circulation.

VII — Alignment with existing legislation and regulations

Core legislative-alignment map
Existing instrumentProposed treatmentReason
Order No. (65) of 2004Repeal and replacement upon commencementEstablish a constitutional commission under modern legislation, with an orderly transition for licences and regulations.
Commission regulations on interconnection, service quality, consumer protection, frequencies, universal service and satellite servicesTemporary continuation followed by review within 24 monthsPrevent a regulatory vacuum while removing duplication and conflict.
Competition and Anti-Monopoly Law No. (14) of 2010Complementarity, not replacementThe Commission addresses sectoral market power; the competition authority retains competition-law and merger responsibilities within its powers.[15]
Consumer Protection Law No. (1) of 2010Complementarity with more specific sectoral rulesTelecommunications rights concerning contracts, bills, quality and switching require sector-specific provisions.
Personal-data protection, cybersecurity and information-technology crime lawsReferral and coordinationPrevent parallel powers over surveillance, data processing or criminal investigation.
Legislation governing the Ministry of Communications and public companiesRole alignmentSeparate policy, ownership and operation from independent regulation and prevent discrimination in public infrastructure.

VIII — Transitional provisions and implementation requirements

Stage One — First 6 months: Prepare general-authorisation and consultation rules, update the licence register, plan functional separation and prioritise regulatory review.
Stage Two — 6 to 18 months: Issue new frameworks for spectrum, auctions, interconnection, access, user protection and digital services, and create a unified database of decisions, markets, quality and available spectrum.
Stage Three — 18 to 24 months: Complete review and consolidation of old regulations, conduct the first comprehensive market analysis, publish coverage and universal-service gap maps, and adopt separate accounting for monopolistic public infrastructure.

The transition requires a combined legal, technical and economic team within the Commission, involving the Ministry of Communications, Federal Board of Supreme Audit, competition authority and cybersecurity and data bodies. No new independent institution is required, reducing delay and administrative expansion risks.

IX — Financial and operational impact

The proposal creates real implementation obligations but cannot justify a fixed financial figure without detailed data on staffing, existing systems and monitoring contracts. Main costs involve updating spectrum-management, register and licensing systems; building market-analysis and service-quality tools; developing complaints and open-data portals; and strengthening regulatory-economics and digital-law capabilities. Existing institutions, offices and monitoring systems are reused, avoiding the establishment cost of a new authority.

Financial-impact estimation method
ItemImpact typeCalculation method before appropriation
Updating spectrum and monitoring systemsCapital expenditure + maintenanceInventory existing systems and required gaps before procurement.
Licensing, transparency and complaints portalsLimited capital expenditure + operationsIntegrate with existing government infrastructure and adopt open standards.
Economic and legal recruitment and trainingAnnual operating costsAnalyse workload and skills rather than automatically expanding staffing.
Universal serviceSpecific project financingAddress gaps through competitive tenders and a disclosed funding shortfall.
Spectrum revenuesVariable public revenueAuctions or usage-right fees based on economic assessment of the market and band.

To prevent perverse incentives, the proposal separates Commission financing from individual fines and transfers spectrum revenues to the treasury after disclosed statutory deductions. It ring-fences universal-service funding for its purpose and subjects it to separate audit.

X — Rights safeguards and oversight

The law erects five barriers to regulatory excess: necessity and proportionality in every intervention; prohibition of general content and communications monitoring; lawful orders and judicial safeguards for data disclosure and interception; appeals against regulatory decisions and sanctions; and transparency of regulations, general orders and implementation data.

The shutdown provision is particularly important because broad restrictions on digital infrastructure simultaneously affect expression, education, trade, government services and emergencies. A general security description is insufficient: the decision requires a specific threat, defined scope and duration, judicial review and proof that less restrictive alternatives are inadequate.

For platforms, the proposal provides neither absolute immunity nor automatic liability for everything users write. It combines creator responsibility, conditional intermediary exemptions and transparency, notice and objection duties. This balance prevents excessive liability driving preventive removal of all controversial content.

XI — Relevant international comparison

Comparative elements adaptable to Iraq
ReferenceCore ideaUse in the proposal
International Telecommunication Union — Radio Regulations 2024 and spectrum-management guidanceAllocation tables, international coordination, efficiency, interference prevention and transparencyTechnical foundation for the spectrum Part without copying treaty provisions literally into domestic law.[11][12]
European Electronic Communications Code — EECCGeneral authorisation, separate scarce-resource usage rights, interconnection, access and universal serviceReduce individual licences and link intervention to market analysis and consumer protection.[13]
European Digital Services Act — DSAContact points, transparency, notice mechanisms, legal representation and graduated dutiesRegulate platform procedures without general prior content censorship.[14]
Current Iraqi practiceInterconnection, universal service, quality, consumer protection, numbering and satellite regulationPreserve tools already functioning and place them under unified legislation.[5][6][8][18]

XII — Sources and references

  1. Iraqi Council of Representatives, Iraqi Constitution, especially Articles (103) and (110).
  2. Communications and Media Commission, Legal documents — Order No. 65 of 2004.
  3. Communications and Media Commission, Discussion of the draft Telecommunications Law with the Ministry of Communications, 11 June 2026.
  4. Iraqi Council of Representatives, Transport, Communications and Governance Committee discusses proposed Ministry of Communications and Telecommunications and Information Technology laws, 22 September 2026.
  5. Communications and Media Commission, Telecommunications regulations.
  6. Communications and Media Commission, Service quality, consumer protection and performance indicators.
  7. Communications and Media Commission, Interconnection service regulation.
  8. Communications and Media Commission, Universal service, projects and regulations.
  9. Communications and Media Commission, Telecommunications Regulation Department services guide and national numbering plan.
  10. Communications and Media Commission, Public consultation on the framework regulation for digital platforms and services, 2024.
  11. International Telecommunication Union, Radio Regulations, 2024 Edition.
  12. International Telecommunication Union, Guidance on the regulatory framework for national spectrum management.
  13. European Union, European Electronic Communications Code — Directive (EU) 2018/1972.
  14. European Union, Digital Services Act — Regulation (EU) 2022/2065.
  15. Iraqi Ministry of Justice, Competition and Anti-Monopoly Law No. (14) of 2010; and Consumer Protection Law No. (1) of 2010 in the Ministry's published laws database.
  16. Communications and Media Commission, Statement on telecommunications regulation, digital sovereignty and the number of regulations, 22 August 2026.
  17. Communications and Media Commission, Discussion of the fixed-broadband spectrum auction and universal-service projects with the International Telecommunication Union, 2026.
  18. Communications and Media Commission, Regulation licensing broadband services through non-geostationary satellite systems (NGSO).

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · POL-91 · 7 October 2026

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