Ali Zuweid's Political Programme
Legislative proposal · Digital Government, Data, Artificial Intelligence and Cybersecurity
Telecommunications, Digital Services, Spectrum and Regulatory Authority Law
A unified legislative framework placing telecommunications, spectrum and digital services under stable, technology-neutral rules, separating regulation from operation and promoting competition, investment and universal connectivity while safeguarding privacy, communications confidentiality and freedom of expression.
Executive summary
Telecommunications regulation in Iraq still rests substantially on Order No. (65) of 2004, which established the Communications and Media Commission, while the 2005 Constitution requires the Commission to be financially and administratively independent and its work to be regulated by law. In its current documents, the Commission itself confirms its continuing reliance on Order (65) as the basis for regulating telecommunications, information technology and spectrum, even as the regulatory environment has expanded to dozens of specialised regulations on interconnection, service quality, consumer protection, satellite services and digital services.[1][2][5]
The need for a new law is no longer theoretical. On 11 June 2026, the Commission and Ministry of Communications stressed the importance of completing agreements on the draft telecommunications law. On 22 September 2026, the parliamentary Transport, Communications and Governance Committee announced that it was still examining the proposed telecommunications and information technology law in preparation for its first reading. As at this document's date, Iraq therefore still faces a legislative gap between a modern market structure and a foundational legal framework more than two decades old.[3][4]
The proposal offers a replacement law, rather than a parallel one: it establishes the Commission's independence under Article (103) of the Constitution, functionally separates government policymaking, independent regulation and public-company ownership or operation, replaces broad licensing with general authorisation where scarce resources are not involved, and establishes modern rules for spectrum, auctions, interconnection, open access, shared infrastructure, universal service, consumer rights and the open internet. Spectrum regulation rests on federal competence over broadcasting-frequency and postal policy, together with the International Telecommunication Union's Radio Regulations and spectrum-management guidance.[1][11][12]
The proposal also addresses digital services within defined limits that prevent it becoming a content-censorship law. It requires contact points and legal representation for providers with an impact in Iraq, notification, transparency and objection procedures, prohibits general monitoring obligations on platforms, and requires blocking or disclosure orders to be specific, reasoned and subject to judicial review. This structure draws on modern principles in European telecommunications and digital-services legislation, adapted to Iraq's constitutional setting rather than copied literally.[13][14]
The law creates no new authority. It instead re-establishes the existing Commission's legal governance and provides an orderly transition from Order (65) and current regulations, maintaining existing licences and rights and reviewing regulations within 24 months. This reduces regulatory uncertainty and organises numerous dispersed rules into a clear legislative hierarchy without extinguishing previous financial rights or obligations.
I — Constitutional and legal context
The sector's constitutional foundation has two complementary dimensions. First, Article (103) of the Constitution recognises the Communications and Media Commission as a financially and administratively independent commission linked to the Council of Representatives and expressly requires its work to be regulated by law. Second, Article (110/Sixth) makes regulation of broadcasting-frequency and postal policy an exclusive federal competence. The required law must therefore do more than confer technical powers: it must settle the structure of independence and accountability and the distribution of federal responsibilities for managing a spectrum resource that crosses governorate and regional boundaries.[1]
The existing regulatory framework rests on Order No. (65), issued on 20 March 2004. The Commission presents the Order on its website as its founding legal document and continues to rely on it in recent regulations on interconnection, satellite telecommunications licensing and consumer protection, among others. The Telecommunications Regulation Department's services guide shows that the Commission manages spectrum, band allocation, licences, technical approvals and national schedules on this regulatory basis.[2][5][9]
Conditions have changed radically since 2004: 4G networks and preparations for 5G, fibre optics, non-geostationary satellite internet, internet exchange points, digital platforms, cloud computing, digital numbers and identifiers, and infrastructure security and continuity. In 2026 the Commission itself refers to adopting approximately 69 regulations and to a shift from traditional telecommunications regulation towards a system encompassing fibre, satellite communications, data centres and modern technologies.[16]
II — Legislative and market gaps
The first problem is an institutional legitimacy gap: the Constitution reserves regulation of the Commission's work to legislation, but its main operational foundation remains a pre-constitutional transitional order. The second is overlapping roles between the Ministry, Commission and public companies. This arose directly in parliamentary Transport and Communications Committee meetings in 2026 discussing the limits of powers and the relationship between the Ministry of Communications and the Commission. The third is the accumulation of numerous regulations without a modern legislative framework bringing licensing, competition, spectrum, rights and oversight principles into a single hierarchy.[4][16]
Current practice shows that Iraq already has relatively advanced regulatory tools in some areas: interconnection and quality-of-service regulations, a consumer-protection policy, universal-service arrangements and a national numbering plan, alongside regulation of non-geostationary satellite broadband services. The requirement is not to dismantle these tools but to give them a stable legislative basis, unify their governing principles and specify what belongs in regulations and what Parliament must determine itself.[6][7][8][9][18]
A similar gap exists in digital services. In 2024 the Commission proposed a draft framework for digital platforms and services to promote competition and protect data security, demonstrating a real regulatory need. However, intermediary liability, blocking, data requests and objection rights affect freedom of expression, privacy and judicial jurisdiction. They therefore require clear legislative rules and cannot be left entirely to implementing regulations.[10]
III — Proposed legislative policy
The proposal establishes a system of layered regulation: the law defines rights, powers, safeguards and sanctions; regulations specify changing technical details; and licences establish individual obligations. General authorisation is the default, with individual licensing an exception for scarce resources, national infrastructure or particular risks. This reduces entry costs and shifts the focus from controlling provider numbers to monitoring outcomes and competition.
On competition, the proposal does not assume that every market needs price controls. The Commission first analyses the market, identifies significant market power and then applies the least extensive adequate remedy: transparency, non-discrimination, access, accounting separation or wholesale-price regulation. This approach aligns with modern telecommunications frameworks distinguishing general authorisation from rights to use scarce resources and linking intervention to an actual competition problem.[13]
On spectrum, the proposal combines auctions, efficiency, coverage and competition, allowing sharing, secondary leasing and technology neutrality while keeping national allocation consistent with the International Telecommunication Union's Radio Regulations. In 2026 the Commission was already discussing auction mechanisms for fixed-broadband spectrum with the Union, making statutory auction and transparency rules a practical rather than hypothetical step.[17]
For digital services, the proposal adopts responsibility with rights safeguards: platforms do not become general judges of expression, and the state does not obtain a general surveillance back door. Blocking and disclosure orders must be specific, reasoned and reviewable; general monitoring obligations are prohibited, while platforms must provide transparency, contact points and complaints procedures. This structure resembles modern digital-services legislation separating content liability from due-diligence and procedural duties.[14]
IV — Draft law
In the name of the people
Pursuant to Article (61/First) of the Constitution, the following law is enacted:
Part One — General provisions
Article (1) — Definitions
For this Law, the following terms have the meanings stated unless the context requires otherwise: 'Commission': the Communications and Media Commission; 'Council': its Board of Commissioners; 'public network': an electronic communications network used wholly or mainly to provide publicly available services; 'electronic communications service': a service normally provided for remuneration, consisting wholly or mainly of conveying signals or accessing an electronic communications network, including internet access and interpersonal communications services; 'digital service': a service provided remotely by electronic means at a recipient's request, including digital intermediary, hosting, platform and online marketplace services where subject to this Law; 'service provider': any legal person providing a network or service covered by this Law; 'online platform': a hosting service storing information at a recipient's request and disseminating it to the public; 'radio spectrum': the range of radio waves usable for radiocommunications; 'right of use': individual permission to use a scarce spectrum or numbering resource; 'interconnection': physical or logical connection between public networks enabling users of one network to communicate with users of another or access its services; 'access': making facilities, services or resources available to another provider on defined terms; 'significant market power': an economic position enabling a provider, alone or jointly, to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and consumers; 'universal service': the minimum essential telecommunications services available to everyone at appropriate quality and an affordable price; 'user': a natural or legal person using a service covered by this Law; 'intermediary service provider': a provider of mere-conduit, caching or hosting services; 'lawful order': a written, reasoned order issued by a court or an authority expressly empowered by applicable law and subject to judicial review; 'harmful interference': interference endangering a safety service or seriously or repeatedly obstructing a radiocommunications service operating lawfully.
Article (2) — Objectives
This Law aims to establish a modern, technology-neutral legislative framework for telecommunications and digital services; ensure regulatory independence and a clear relationship between regulation, policymaking and government ownership; manage spectrum, frequencies and numbering as limited public resources; promote competition, investment and innovation; expand broadband access; protect users, their privacy, freedom of expression and communications confidentiality; regulate digital services through risk-proportionate duties; strengthen network security and continuity; and subject regulatory decisions to transparency, accountability and appeal.
Article (3) — Scope
This Law applies to public telecommunications networks and services, use of spectrum, frequencies and numbering, interconnection, access and shared infrastructure, internet and satellite communications services, and digital-service providers targeting users in the Republic of Iraq or materially affecting it, without prejudice to specialised laws on audiovisual media, personal-data protection, cybersecurity or information-technology crime.
Article (4) — Governing principles
In applying this Law, the Commission shall observe technology neutrality, proportionality, necessity, non-discrimination, regulatory predictability, sustainable competition, resource efficiency, transparency, public participation and constitutional rights, imposing no obligation more burdensome than necessary to achieve a legitimate objective.
Article (5) — Protection of rights and freedoms
No provision of this Law may be interpreted or applied to permit general prior censorship of communications or content, comprehensive surveillance unsupported by a lawful order, or disruption of communications for purposes not prescribed by law. Particular regard shall be given to freedom of expression, the confidentiality of correspondence and communications, privacy, equality and access to justice.
Article (6) — Relationship with specialised laws
The more specialised provisions of personal-data protection, cybersecurity, information-technology crime, competition and consumer-protection laws apply within their respective scope. The Commission shall coordinate with competent authorities to prevent duplicate sanctions or conflicting orders. Its telecommunications regulatory powers do not confer responsibilities not expressly granted by those laws.
Article (7) — Ownership neutrality
Public, private and mixed entities and companies conducting commercial activities subject to this Law shall follow the same regulatory rules on licensing, access, service quality and competition. Public ownership confers no advantage except within a publicly announced public-service mandate financed under transparent rules.
Article (8) — Limited exceptions
Closed military and security networks are exempt from commercial-access and consumer-protection obligations, but their spectrum use remains subject to national coordination and harmful-interference prevention. The exemption does not extend to publicly available services or commercial activity; constitutional rights and judicial-order safeguards continue to apply.
Part Two — Communications and Media Commission and regulatory governance
Article (9) — Constitutional status of the Commission
The Communications and Media Commission is financially and administratively independent under the Constitution, linked to the Council of Representatives and exercises its regulatory powers independently of service providers, ministries and entities owning operators. It shall receive no direction concerning an individual regulatory decision except under law or a final judicial ruling.
Article (10) — Legal personality and representation
The Commission has legal personality and financial and administrative independence, represented by the Chair of the Board of Commissioners or an authorised delegate. Its headquarters shall be in Baghdad; regional and local offices may be established according to regulatory need.
Article (11) — Commission responsibilities
The Commission shall grant licences, authorisations and spectrum and numbering rights; manage and monitor spectrum; regulate interconnection, access and markets with significant market power; protect users and service quality; administer universal service; regulate digital services covered by this Law; settle sectoral disputes; monitor compliance; publish regulatory data; and represent Iraq technically on spectrum matters within frameworks established by law and competent foreign-policy authorities.
Article (12) — Separation of policy, regulation and operation
The federal government, through the competent ministry, shall establish general telecommunications, digital-transformation and government-investment policy under the Constitution and law. The Commission independently regulates markets and scarce resources. Neither the Ministry nor a public company it owns may license or impose regulatory obligations on its competitors.
Article (13) — Board of Commissioners
The Board comprises seven full-time members with expertise in law, economics, telecommunications, technology, public policy and finance, selected by an absolute majority of the Council of Representatives' membership from a public, merit-based nomination list following publicly reported hearings. Competence, diversity and women's representation shall be considered without party or sectarian quotas.
Article (14) — Term and renewal
Membership lasts five years, renewable once. Initial terms shall be staggered so that no more than three members' terms expire in one year. Where a replacement cannot be appointed for reasons beyond a member's control, that member may remain for up to ninety days after expiry until a successor is named.
Article (15) — Eligibility and incompatibility
A Board member must possess integrity and experience, have no final conviction for a felony or dishonourable misdemeanour, and not have held an executive position or significant ownership interest in a regulated provider during the preceding two years. During membership, executive party work, other employment and direct financial interests in regulated entities are prohibited.
Article (16) — Disclosure and conflicts of interest
Board members and senior Commission employees shall submit annual declarations of interests and assets under the law. A member shall abstain from any decision in which that member, their spouse or relatives up to the second degree have a direct interest. Recusals and their reasons shall be published with the decision unless prohibited by law.
Article (17) — Termination of membership
Membership may end before expiry only through resignation, permanent incapacity, loss of an eligibility condition, serious breach of duties or final conviction, by a reasoned decision of the Council of Representatives after allowing a defence. The decision may be challenged before the competent court.
Article (18) — Board leadership and executive administration
The Board shall elect a Chair and Deputy Chair from its members for two years, renewable once. It shall appoint a chief executive by a published decision following an open competition, defining duties and powers to separate regulatory decision-making from administrative execution.
Article (19) — Decision-making procedures
Regulatory decisions shall be taken at meetings with a quorum comprising a majority of members, by a majority of those present; the Chair has the casting vote in a tie. Decisions shall be written, reasoned and dated, stating their legal and factual basis and avenues of appeal.
Article (20) — Public consultation
The Commission shall consult publicly for at least thirty days on draft regulations and general regulatory decisions materially affecting the market; this period may be shortened for a reasoned necessity. It shall publish a summary of comments and how they were addressed without disclosing trade secrets or protected data.
Article (21) — Regulatory impact assessment
Before issuing substantial regulations, the Commission shall conduct a proportionate assessment of economic, competition, rights and technical impacts, explaining alternatives considered and the choice of regulatory instrument. Limited technical decisions may follow a simplified process.
Article (22) — Transparency and regulatory data
The Commission shall publish registers of licences and spectrum and numbering rights, regulatory decisions, service-quality measurements, market summaries, complaint indicators, universal-service contracts and annual implementation reports in searchable, reusable formats unless publication is prohibited by law.
Article (23) — Institutional coordination
The Commission shall conclude published coordination memoranda with the Ministry of Communications, Competition Council, personal-data protection authority, National Cybersecurity Centre, Central Bank and sectoral authorities as needed. These shall define information exchange, duplication avoidance and mechanisms for overlapping responsibilities without diminishing statutory powers.
Part Three — Market entry and licensing
Article (24) — General authorisation principle
Electronic communications services not involving scarce resources or national-infrastructure obligations may be provided under general authorisation based on registration and compliance with uniform conditions published by the Commission. Individual licences may be required only in cases specified by this Law.
Article (25) — Individual licensing cases
Individual licences are required to operate a large-scale public network using exclusively licensed spectrum, provide public mobile communications, provide satellite services requiring landing rights or spectrum resources, operate major international infrastructure, or conduct any activity justifying individual licensing because of resource scarcity or substantial security or competition effects.
Article (26) — Licence conditions
A licence shall specify service scope, duration, resource-use rights, coverage, quality, financial obligations, security, continuity and reporting requirements, and renewal or transfer procedures. It may not contain conditions unrelated directly to the regulatory objective or unjustifiably restrict use of a particular technology.
Article (27) — Competitive licence awards
Where spectrum or resource scarcity limits licence numbers, licences shall be awarded through an open, neutral, non-discriminatory competitive process balancing economic efficiency, coverage, quality, competition and investment. Competition documents, evaluation criteria, results and selection reasons shall be published.
Article (28) — Fees and charges
Regulatory fees shall be proportionate to actual administrative costs. Charges for rights to use scarce resources may be determined by auction, benchmarking or a published economic methodology. Fees may not protect an incumbent provider or exclude new entrants.
Article (29) — Licence duration and investment predictability
Licence terms shall permit recovery of long-term investments while preserving competition. The Commission shall announce renewal or reallocation conditions reasonably before expiry. Rights may not be withdrawn before expiry except under Article (31) or on grounds expressly provided in the licence and law.
Article (30) — Transfers and changes of control
Individual licences or control of licensees may be transferred only with Commission approval after assessing competence, compliance, competition effects and service continuity, coordinating with the competition authority where statutory notification thresholds are met.
Article (31) — Suspension and revocation
A licence may be suspended or revoked only following written notice identifying the breach and allowing reasonable time to remedy it, unless an imminent, serious threat affects safety, security or continuity of an essential service. Decisions shall be reasoned and appealable; revocation must consider subscriber service continuity and orderly transfer.
Article (32) — Regulatory testing
The Commission may grant time- and scope-limited experimental authorisations to test new technologies or service models, with reasoned partial exemptions from non-essential requirements. No exemption may cover user rights, security, data protection or harmful-interference prevention.
Article (33) — National provider register
The Commission shall establish a unified electronic register of licensed and registered providers containing contact details and each authorisation's type, scope, duration and status. Its non-confidential portion shall be publicly available.
Article (34) — Providers outside Iraq
A digital-service provider without an establishment in Iraq, exceeding a size or impact threshold defined by regulation, shall appoint a legal representative and contact point in Iraq to receive notices and lawful orders. Appointment alone does not create a tax establishment except under tax laws.
Article (35) — Public-service continuity
A licensee providing a widely used public service shall prepare business-continuity and subscriber-transfer plans for cessation, insolvency or licence expiry. The Commission may impose necessary, proportionate temporary arrangements to prevent serious interruption.
Part Four — Radio spectrum and radiocommunications
Article (36) — National spectrum policy
Frequency policy shall be managed federally under the Constitution and Iraq's international obligations. The Commission shall prepare the national spectrum plan and frequency-allocation table after consulting civilian, security, military and private-sector bodies, publishing their non-confidential parts.
Article (37) — Planning and international coordination
The Commission shall update the national allocation table based on the International Telecommunication Union's Radio Regulations and relevant international decisions, conducting technical coordination and international notifications under applicable governmental procedures.
Article (38) — Allocation, allotment and assignment
Spectrum management shall distinguish allocation of bands to radio services, allotment to usage categories and assignment of frequencies to a user or station. Granting a right of use creates neither a permanent right nor private ownership of spectrum.
Article (39) — Licence-exempt use
The Commission shall designate bands for general or licence-exempt use and set technical power limits and interference-prevention conditions, reviewing them periodically to expand shared and efficient spectrum use where technically possible.
Article (40) — Methods of granting usage rights
Spectrum rights shall be awarded through auctions, competitive comparison or reasoned administrative assignment according to the band's nature and demand. Exclusive assignment must be preceded by publication of its justification, duration and efficiency and coverage conditions.
Article (41) — Spectrum auctions
Auctions shall promote efficient use and prevent monopolisation and collusion. Spectrum-holding caps, coverage obligations and suitable reserve prices may be imposed. Rules shall be published sufficiently in advance and results subjected to audit.
Article (42) — Technology and service neutrality
Spectrum rights shall be technology- and service-neutral as far as possible, restricted to a particular technology or generation only where necessary to prevent interference, ensure safety or international compatibility, or achieve another legitimate objective.
Article (43) — Secondary trading and leasing
Spectrum rights may be transferred or leased wholly or partly with Commission approval, provided competition, technical obligations and coverage are not harmed. Approved transactions shall be published in the spectrum register.
Article (44) — Sharing and dynamic use
The Commission shall promote spectrum sharing, dynamic use, geographic databases and other efficiency tools where technically feasible, with safeguards against interference and for primary-service protection.
Article (45) — Emergency and public-safety spectrum
Sufficient resources shall be allocated to emergency, public-safety, warning and search-and-rescue services. The Commission shall coordinate interoperability among emergency responders without granting monopolies beyond functional necessity.
Article (46) — Satellite services and orbits
The Commission shall regulate earth stations, landing rights, satellite services and non-geostationary systems under transparent, neutral rules, coordinating registrations, orbits and frequencies with the International Telecommunication Union through competent official channels.
Article (47) — Monitoring and interference prevention
The Commission may operate spectrum-monitoring systems, take measurements, investigate harmful interference and issue immediate technical cessation orders where necessary. Entry onto private property or equipment seizure requires judicial permission or a legally prescribed exception.
Article (48) — Device and equipment conformity
The Commission shall establish type-approval and conformity arrangements for telecommunications and radio equipment and may recognise reliable international certificates reciprocally. A device or device category may be prohibited only on legitimate, published, appealable technical or security grounds.
Article (49) — Spectrum revenues
Spectrum auction and usage-right revenues shall accrue to the public treasury after deduction of amounts legally allocated for regulatory expenditure or universal service. Commission staff remuneration shall not depend on fine levels or spectrum revenues.
Part Five — Numbering, international connectivity and internet resources
Article (50) — National numbering plan
The Commission shall establish and administer the national plan for telecommunications numbers, codes and identifiers, allocating resources objectively, transparently and without discrimination. Providers acquire no permanent ownership of allocated numbers.
Article (51) — Number portability
The Commission shall ensure number portability between mobile and fixed providers wherever technically and economically feasible, without prohibitive user charges, setting a completion deadline and compensation for unjustified delay.
Article (52) — Emergency services
In coordination with competent authorities, the Commission shall designate a national emergency number or numbering system and require providers to offer free calls and caller-location identification to the extent necessary for assistance, respecting data protection.
Article (53) — Caller identity and spoofing prevention
The Commission shall establish technical rules authenticating communications origins and combating caller-number spoofing and fraudulent messages without preventing legitimate privacy-protecting uses. Providers shall cooperate in tracing fraud sources under the law.
Article (54) — Internet resources and identifiers
The Commission shall coordinate with bodies responsible for domain names, internet addresses and exchange points to promote IPv6 transition, resilience and neutrality. It may intervene in international-resource allocation only within national jurisdiction and recognised technical rules.
Article (55) — International connectivity and landing points
Establishment and operation of international gateways, cables, landing points and communications shall be open to licensed competition. An exclusive monopoly may be granted only by law for exceptional necessity. Infrastructure wholly or partly publicly financed shall carry open-access obligations on transparent, non-discriminatory terms.
Article (56) — Internet exchange points and neutral facilities
The state shall encourage neutral internet exchanges and multi-operator interconnection facilities. Providers with market power in transit or international-access services shall meet non-discrimination and transparency obligations where the Commission so decides following market analysis.
Part Six — Competition, interconnection, access and infrastructure
Article (57) — Market analysis
The Commission shall identify and periodically review relevant markets using competition-law and sector-economics principles, publishing its methodology and findings. Specific market-power obligations may be imposed only after that power is established by a reasoned decision.
Article (58) — Identifying significant market power
Assessment shall consider market share, infrastructure control, entry barriers, independent pricing ability, vertical integration, switching costs, network effects and access to scarce resources. No single criterion shall be applied mechanically in isolation.
Article (59) — Remedial obligations
Where necessary, the Commission may impose transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, access, interconnection and wholesale-price control or benchmarking obligations on providers with significant market power. Obligations shall be reviewed as markets change and removed once effective competition exists.
Article (60) — Interconnection
Public-network providers shall negotiate interconnection in good faith on fair, transparent, non-discriminatory terms, oriented towards cost where the Commission requires. Interconnection may not be disconnected to users' detriment without notifying the Commission and arranging a suitable alternative.
Article (61) — Reference offers
The Commission may require a provider with market power to publish a reference interconnection or access offer covering prices, service levels, timelines and technical procedures, and may amend it after public consultation to ensure fairness and efficiency.
Article (62) — Accounting separation
Vertically integrated or state-owned operators may be required to maintain separate accounts for regulated activities and submit audited cost data to prevent cross-subsidisation and discrimination between their business units and competitors.
Article (63) — Access to passive infrastructure
The Commission may require sharing of towers, ducts, poles, buildings, network sites, dark fibre and other passive facilities where duplication is uneconomic, environmentally or urbanistically harmful, or obstructs competition, on fair and reasonable terms.
Article (64) — Rights of way and installation
Rights of way, excavation and network deployment shall use uniform, transparent permits with fixed deadlines. Local authorities shall coordinate with the competent national one-stop service. Multiple charges for the same right require a legal basis and a corresponding service.
Article (65) — Coordination of civil works
Bodies implementing new roads, energy, water, sewerage and public projects shall, where feasible, incorporate necessary fibre and telecommunications ducts or routes into designs and coordinate shared excavation to reduce cost and disruption.
Article (66) — Open access to public infrastructure
State-owned or publicly financed telecommunications infrastructure shall be available to qualified providers transparently and without discrimination, at cost-based prices allowing a reasonable return, except for parts involving classified national security or proven technical necessity.
Article (67) — Functional separation where interests conflict
Where a dominant operator combines monopoly wholesale infrastructure with retail services and less intrusive obligations cannot prevent discrimination, the Commission may, with competition-authority approval, require functional separation or independent governance arrangements. Structural separation requires legislation or a judicial ruling under applicable laws.
Article (68) — Network sharing
Operators may share passive or active infrastructure, with Commission approval where required, provided sharing does not exchange competitively sensitive information, reduce competition or unjustifiably prevent independent expansion.
Article (69) — National roaming
The Commission may require national roaming temporarily or in defined areas to address coverage gaps, emergencies or universal-service projects, on fair terms with cost-oriented compensation, without allowing roaming to become a permanent substitute for investment.
Article (70) — Virtual operators and wholesale services
The Commission shall establish an entry framework for virtual network operators and wholesale providers where this promotes competition and innovation, and may require wholesale access from dominant providers following market analysis.
Article (71) — Mergers and substantial changes
Commission approval of a licence or spectrum transfer does not remove competition-law merger-approval requirements. The Commission and competition authority shall exchange technical and economic analysis while preserving confidentiality.
Article (72) — Prohibition of anticompetitive regulatory conduct
Award of spectrum resources or licences may not be tied to buying services or infrastructure from a particular entity. Regulatory discrimination favouring public or private companies is prohibited. Government telecommunications procurement shall follow applicable competition and transparency rules.
Part Seven — Universal service, user rights and the open internet
Article (73) — Universal-service objective
The state shall ensure voice connectivity and adequate broadband access of acceptable quality at affordable prices, prioritising rural and remote areas, low-income groups, persons with disabilities and essential education and health facilities.
Article (74) — Universal-service fund
The universal-service account shall be administered independently and ring-fenced within the Commission, financed by contributions prescribed by regulation within a reasonable, proportionate ceiling, appropriations and lawful grants. Its funds may not finance general Commission expenses, media activities or purposes unrelated to expanding service.
Article (75) — Selecting universal-service projects
Underserved areas shall be identified using updated coverage maps and demand data. Projects shall be awarded through reverse auctions or transparent tenders wherever possible, publishing costs, geographic objectives, indicators and outcomes, and preventing duplicate funding of areas adequately served commercially.
Article (76) — Affordability
Social tariffs or targeted assistance for eligible users may replace across-the-board price cuts, with verifiable eligibility and preserved competition. The Commission shall periodically review the essential-service level against actual social and economic uses.
Article (77) — Accessibility for persons with disabilities
Providers shall offer accessible communications alternatives, notices, contracts and support, and equal access to emergency services for persons with disabilities, under standards issued with competent authorities.
Article (78) — Pre-contract information
Before contracting, users shall receive clear information stating the full price, speeds or essential performance indicators, data allowances and restrictions, contract duration, renewal and termination conditions, fair-use policy and complaints and compensation procedures.
Article (79) — Billing and credit
Bills and tariffs shall be understandable and verifiable. Deducting amounts or activating paid services without express consent is prohibited. Providers shall offer free tools to monitor usage, disable add-on services and opt out of commercial messages.
Article (80) — Service quality
The Commission shall set measurable network and service-quality indicators and publish periodic comparisons by governorate and area. Reports must distinguish overall averages from actual peak-time performance.
Article (81) — Outages and compensation
Subscribers to essential services are entitled to automatic compensation or credit where unjustified outages exceed a period set by regulation, except proven force majeure. Regulatory compensation does not prevent court claims for greater compensation where damage is established.
Article (82) — Customer service and complaints
Providers shall offer a free, accessible complaints channel, assign each complaint a reference number and respond within a prescribed period. Users may escalate to the Commission after exhausting the first stage or expiry of the response deadline.
Article (83) — Switching providers and terminating contracts
Initial consumer contracts shall not exceed the duration prescribed by regulation. Termination without penalty is permitted following substantial unilateral changes to terms or persistent quality deterioration. Early-termination charges shall be proportionate to the actual remaining benefit or subsidised device.
Article (84) — Comparative transparency
The Commission shall establish a neutral electronic tool or accredit independent tools comparing prices, quality, coverage and terms, requiring providers to supply accurate data in a standard format.
Article (85) — Open internet
Internet-access providers shall treat traffic equally without blocking, throttling, discrimination or paid commercial prioritisation, subject to reasonable congestion and security management and execution of a clear lawful order.
Article (86) — Traffic management
Traffic management shall be transparent, proportionate and temporary, not based on content, source or destination beyond technical necessity. Degrading competitors' services or exempting affiliated services from restrictions in ways materially harming competition is prohibited.
Article (87) — Public communications and warnings
Providers shall transmit public warnings issued by competent authorities during emergencies under pre-established technical protocols. The system may not be used for propaganda or messages unrelated to public safety.
Article (88) — Marketing privacy
Automated marketing calls or messages to consumers require revocable consent where required by data-protection law or applicable regulations. A free, clear means to refuse future messages must be available.
Part Eight — Digital services, platforms and intermediaries
Article (89) — Scope of digital-services regulation
This Part applies to digital intermediary services, platforms and online marketplaces targeting users in Iraq. It grants the Commission no general editorial authority over journalism or media content. Liability for unlawful content remains governed by relevant substantive laws.
Article (90) — Contact point and representation
Providers subject to Article (34) shall publish an accessible contact point for authorities and users in Arabic or Kurdish according to service coverage. For substantive complaints, communication must not rely solely on fully automated tools.
Article (91) — Terms of use
Terms shall use clear language and explain grounds for account or content restrictions, recommendation and advertising mechanisms, objection procedures and child-protection policies. No term may bar users from Iraqi courts where those courts have lawful jurisdiction.
Article (92) — Notices of unlawful content
Hosting providers shall offer a mechanism for individuals and competent bodies to notify content allegedly violating a specified law, identifying its location, legal grounds and necessary information. Political or moral objection alone is insufficient grounds for mandatory removal.
Article (93) — Lawful content orders
Providers may be required to remove or block content or disclose user data only through a specific lawful order stating its legal basis, affected content or account, scope, duration and appeal procedures. Cross-border orders shall respect jurisdictional rules and international law.
Article (94) — Prohibition of general monitoring
Intermediary providers may not be required to monitor all transmitted or stored information or conduct general proactive searches for unlawful activity. This does not prevent specific, proportionate measures addressing a particular risk or implementing a lawful order.
Article (95) — Reasons for restrictions
When a platform restricts content, an account or access under its rules or a lawful order, it shall notify the user of the reasons, basis, action and means of objection, unless notification is temporarily prohibited by law to protect an investigation or person at risk.
Article (96) — Objection mechanism
Platforms exceeding a user threshold prescribed by regulation shall provide a free internal objection procedure for content-removal or account-suspension decisions. Reconsideration shall, wherever practical, be undertaken by a person or system functionally independent of the original decision.
Article (97) — Advertising transparency
Users must be able to recognise advertisements, identify advertisers and understand the principal reason for targeting. Targeting minors or sensitive groups using sensitive personal data contrary to data-protection law is prohibited.
Article (98) — Online marketplaces
Online marketplaces shall verify traders selling to consumers, display essential traceability information and offer reporting channels for unlawful goods or services. Platforms shall not become licensing authorities for activities legally regulated by another body.
Article (99) — Transparency reports
Large platforms shall periodically report numbers of authority orders, notices, restriction decisions, objections and outcomes, and use of automated moderation tools, protecting data and trade secrets and avoiding disclosures harmful to investigations.
Article (100) — Platforms with significant impact
Regulations may define significant-impact platforms in Iraq by user numbers, activity volume and service nature, imposing proportionate additional obligations on risk management, transparency, child protection and cooperation with accredited researchers.
Article (101) — Systemic-risk assessment
Significant-impact platforms shall assess risks of misuse for serious crime, coordinated manipulation, harm to minors' rights and widespread public-safety threats, taking mitigating measures that entail no general monitoring or political, religious or social discrimination.
Article (102) — Conditional intermediary-liability exemptions
Mere-conduit providers are not liable for transmitted information if they neither initiate transmission, select the recipient nor modify the information. Caching or hosting providers are not liable for third-party content merely through hosting where statutory conditions and procedures are met. This does not affect the actual content creator's or trader's liability for their acts.
Part Nine — Network security, communications confidentiality and lawful requests
Article (103) — Network and service security
Providers shall adopt proportionate technical and organisational measures managing network and service risks. Detailed cybersecurity requirements shall be governed by specialised legislation; the Commission shall coordinate with the National Cybersecurity Centre to avoid duplicate reporting and audits.
Article (104) — Incident reporting
Providers shall report incidents causing widespread interruption or materially affecting network integrity under uniform thresholds and deadlines. A joint reporting portal between the Commission and competent cybersecurity authority may be used.
Article (105) — Communications confidentiality
Providers and their employees may not listen to, intercept, record or disclose communications content or related data except with the concerned person's consent or as permitted by applicable law, with a judicial order where constitutionally required.
Article (106) — Lawful interception
This Article creates no new interception power. Providers' obligation to supply technical interception capability is limited to implementing orders of competent courts under applicable procedural and criminal laws. Execution shall be confined to the person or identifier, duration and scope specified, with confidential audit records available for judicial review.
Article (107) — Data retention
General, indefinite retention of all users' traffic data may not be imposed. Any retention duty requires express legislation specifying categories, duration, purpose and authorised accessing body, respecting necessity, proportionality and data protection.
Article (108) — Restricting or shutting down service
Internet or telecommunications shutdowns or service blocking across a broad geographic area require a statutory basis and written decision by the competent authority identifying a serious, specific threat, after establishing that less restrictive measures are inadequate. The decision must specify scope and duration and undergo urgent judicial review. General shutdowns may not suppress criticism, peaceful protest or circulation of lawful information.
Article (109) — Public-authority requests
Public-authority requests to providers for data, blocking or restrictions shall be documented and issued through auditable official channels. An annual aggregate statistical report shall state request numbers and types unless publication is prohibited by a specialised law.
Article (110) — Supply-chain security
The Commission, coordinating with security and cybersecurity authorities, may impose risk standards on critical-infrastructure equipment and suppliers based on documented technical assessments. No supplier or country of origin may be prohibited without reasons or solely for commercial considerations.
Article (111) — Emergency network continuity
The Commission and competent authorities shall establish requirements for backup power, alternative routes, recovery plans and priority for vital communications during disasters. Priority arrangements must be specific and temporary and may not permit unlawful use of communications content.
Part Ten — Oversight, enforcement and disputes
Article (112) — Information-request powers
The Commission may request information necessary to implement this Law from regulated entities through a decision specifying purpose, scope and deadline. Personal data or trade secrets may not be requested where aggregate or less intrusive data achieve the purpose.
Article (113) — Regulatory inspection
Authorised Commission staff may enter business premises at reasonable times after notice to inspect regulatory records and equipment. Entry into homes or non-public places, or seizure of devices and data, requires judicial permission unless a legally recognised flagrante delicto situation exists.
Article (114) — Notice and remediation plans
Where appropriate, breaches shall first be addressed through notice specifying the facts, violated provision and correction deadline. The Commission may accept and monitor a remediation plan.
Article (115) — Compliance orders
Where a breach remains unremedied or a risk is urgent, the Commission shall issue a reasoned order to stop or correct conduct, refund amounts, improve service or provide specified safeguards, limited to what is necessary to remove the breach.
Article (116) — Administrative fines
For a serious breach, a legal person may receive an administrative fine not exceeding two per cent of its total Iraqi revenues in the preceding year, rising to four per cent for deliberate repetition or extremely serious breaches. Regulations shall specify severity, duration, benefit obtained, cooperation and financial-capacity criteria, guaranteeing defence rights and judicial appeal.
Article (117) — Coercive daily fines
A coercive daily fine may not exceed five ten-thousandths of annual domestic revenue for each day of delay in complying with a final order, with an overall ceiling of five per cent. It may be imposed only after service of the order and expiry of the compliance period.
Article (118) — Restitution and regulatory compensation
The Commission may require providers to refund unduly collected amounts or provide credits or standard compensation to affected subscribers under published regulations. This does not prevent civil compensation claims before courts.
Article (119) — Urgent measures
Where an imminent threat affects public safety or essential-network continuity, or severe harmful interference occurs, an immediate temporary measure may last up to thirty days. The affected party shall receive reasons and an urgent opportunity to object. Renewal requires a reasoned decision or judicial order according to the measure's nature.
Article (120) — Inter-provider disputes
The Commission shall decide disputes over interconnection, access, sharing, roaming and regulatory resources within ninety days of a complete file, and may order interim measures protecting service continuity. Parties may pursue arbitration or court proceedings where legally permitted.
Article (121) — Sectoral mediation
The Commission may offer voluntary mediation in technical or commercial disputes. Mediator proposals bind parties only by agreement; a mediator may not subsequently participate in regulatory adjudication if mediation fails.
Article (122) — Judicial appeal
Final Commission decisions may be challenged before the competent administrative court within statutory periods and procedures. The court may stay execution where urgency and risk of serious harm exist and a stay does not conflict with the public interest.
Article (123) — Sanctions transparency
The Commission shall publish final sanction decisions once enforceable, redacting secrets and protected data and identifying the breach and sanction basis, for deterrence and regulatory consistency rather than defamation.
Article (124) — Referral of acts to courts
The Commission shall refer suspected criminal conduct to the Public Prosecution or competent authority. This Law creates no content or information-technology crimes parallel to those governed by specialised criminal laws.
Article (125) — Unlicensed operation and deliberate interference
Anyone deliberately operating a transmitter or network requiring an individual licence after warning, or deliberately causing harmful interference endangering emergency or safety services, shall be punished under the Penal Code or relevant criminal legislation. Final equipment confiscation requires a judicial ruling.
Article (126) — Limitation of regulatory proceedings
Administrative-fine proceedings may not commence more than three years after discovery of a breach or five years after its occurrence. Any formal investigative action notified to the offender suspends limitation.
Part Eleven — Finance and parliamentary oversight
Article (127) — Commission budget
The Commission shall prepare and submit its annual draft budget through legal channels under public financial-management rules, transparently recording revenues and expenditure. It may not be financed directly from a particular fine in return for a specific investigation or decision.
Article (128) — Accounts and audit
Commission accounts are subject to Federal Board of Supreme Audit examination and parliamentary oversight. Annual audited statements shall disclose regulatory fees, resource revenues, the universal-service account and treasury transfers.
Article (129) — Annual report to the Council of Representatives
The Commission shall submit and publicly publish an annual report to the Council of Representatives on competition, prices, quality, coverage, spectrum, universal service, complaints, decisions and appeals, and financial data.
Article (130) — Accountability without intervention in individual cases
The Council of Representatives shall oversee the Commission through reports, hearings and interpellation under the Constitution and law. Oversight may not become direction in an individual licensing, dispute or investigation file pending before the Commission.
Part Twelve — Transitional and final provisions
Article (131) — Repeal of Order No. 65 of 2004
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. (65) of 2004 is repealed from this Law's commencement. Decisions, licences and regulations issued under it remain effective until expiry, amendment or replacement under this Law, insofar as they do not conflict with it.
Article (132) — Continuity of existing licences
Existing licences, spectrum rights and regulatory contracts continue under their terms until expiry and may be aligned by agreement or upon renewal. Transitional provisions may not extinguish financial obligations or acquired rights of the state or subscribers.
Article (133) — Review of existing regulations
Within twenty-four months, the Commission shall review all current telecommunications, information-technology and digital-services regulations, consolidate them or repeal conflicting and duplicate provisions, and publish a schedule showing each regulation's status and replacement reference.
Article (134) — Continuity of commissioners and staff
The existing Board, executive administration and staff shall continue their duties until appointments under this Law are completed, for a transition not exceeding twelve months. Acquired employment rights shall be protected under law.
Article (135) — Alignment of government ownership and operation
Within eighteen months, the Ministry of Communications and public-company owners shall submit a plan separating policy, ownership and operational roles functionally and in accounting. Public companies shall comply with this Law's open-access and non-discrimination rules within thirty-six months.
Article (136) — Existing digital-service obligations
Existing digital platforms and services shall have twelve months from implementing regulations' commencement to complete registration, representation, complaints channels and transparency requirements. Obligations concerning lawful orders or urgent safety or data protection apply immediately under the relevant law.
Article (137) — Regulations and instructions
Within its competence, the Commission shall issue implementing regulations and instructions within eighteen months, prioritising general authorisation, spectrum, interconnection, consumer protection, public consultation and internal appeals during the first six months.
Article (138) — Periodic legislative review
Five years after commencement, the government and Commission shall submit a legislative evaluation to the Council of Representatives addressing competition, investment, coverage, rights, innovation and adequacy of digital-services regulation, proposing evidence-based amendments.
Article (139) — Commencement
This Law enters into force one hundred and eighty days after publication in the Official Gazette, except provisions specifying particular transitional periods.
V — Statement of reasons
This Law is enacted to implement constitutional provisions on the independence of the Communications and Media Commission and statutory regulation of its work; modernise telecommunications and information-technology legislation for broadband networks, satellite communications and digital services; manage spectrum, frequencies and numbering efficiently and transparently; promote competition, investment and open infrastructure access; expand universal service and protect user rights, communications confidentiality and freedom of expression; regulate digital-service liability and procedures without general monitoring; and consolidate dispersed rules by replacing Order No. (65) of 2004 with a stable federal framework subject to parliamentary and judicial oversight.
VI — Explanatory memorandum
1. Why replacement rather than partial amendment?
Order (65) performed an important founding role by establishing the sector regulator, but arose in a transition before the current Constitution and most contemporary digital telecommunications developments. The sector now constitutes an effective legislative system built on dozens of regulations. Adding more regulations onto the old foundation increases jurisdictional conflicts and disperses essential safeguards—limits on blocking, surveillance, sanctions and appeals—across instruments below statutory level. The proposal therefore rebuilds the legislative hierarchy rather than patching its founding text.
2. Regulatory independence does not remove accountability
The proposal translates Article (103) into a clear model: the Commission makes individual decisions independently but is linked to the Council of Representatives, with an audited budget and public annual report. The law prevents parliamentary oversight becoming instructions on particular licences or disputes. Independence is essential for competition and investment and protects the state from conflicts where a government entity owns a commercial operator.
3. Regulating the Ministry and public companies
The proposal preserves the Ministry of Communications' role in government policy, public investment and ownership under relevant legislation, while preventing it regulating competitors of state companies. Public infrastructure becomes accessible on equal terms, with accounting and functional separation where vertical integration exists. This addresses a particularly sensitive sectoral issue without compulsory privatisation or ownership transfer under this Law.
4. Spectrum is a limited public resource
The proposal treats spectrum as a defined usage right rather than private property, allowing auctions, competitive comparisons and administrative assignment according to the band. This aligns with the Union's Radio Regulations and guidance, which make national frequency tables, international coordination, monitoring and transparency essential to spectrum management.[11][12]
5. Competition before retail control
The proposal focuses on wholesale markets, infrastructure, interconnection and access. Effective remedies for control of essential facilities can enable competition to improve retail offers without permanent administrative pricing. Stronger Commission intervention remains available when analysis establishes significant market power and lighter remedies fail.
6. Universal service as a targeted mechanism
The Commission already has universal-service projects benefiting remote areas. The law therefore creates no separate new fund, but turns the existing account into a ring-fenced statutory mechanism based on coverage-gap mapping and competition for subsidies, preventing funding in commercially served areas that would crowd out private investment.[8]
7. Digital services without general monitoring
Iraq's actual need for platform regulation is evident in the Commission's 2024 consultation. However, the legislation distinguishes procedural and transparency duties from deciding whether speech is lawful. Platforms provide notice, objection and transparency channels; mandatory removal or disclosure requires a specific lawful order. General monitoring of everything users publish is prohibited, an essential principle preventing providers becoming permanent surveillance bodies.[10][14]
8. Open internet and shutdowns
The proposal establishes non-discriminatory internet traffic treatment with defined technical and legal exceptions, limiting broad shutdowns through necessity, proportionality, written reasons and judicial review. It separates network management and response to genuine threats from using infrastructure to restrict lawful information circulation.
VII — Alignment with existing legislation and regulations
| Existing instrument | Proposed treatment | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Order No. (65) of 2004 | Repeal and replacement upon commencement | Establish a constitutional commission under modern legislation, with an orderly transition for licences and regulations. |
| Commission regulations on interconnection, service quality, consumer protection, frequencies, universal service and satellite services | Temporary continuation followed by review within 24 months | Prevent a regulatory vacuum while removing duplication and conflict. |
| Competition and Anti-Monopoly Law No. (14) of 2010 | Complementarity, not replacement | The Commission addresses sectoral market power; the competition authority retains competition-law and merger responsibilities within its powers.[15] |
| Consumer Protection Law No. (1) of 2010 | Complementarity with more specific sectoral rules | Telecommunications rights concerning contracts, bills, quality and switching require sector-specific provisions. |
| Personal-data protection, cybersecurity and information-technology crime laws | Referral and coordination | Prevent parallel powers over surveillance, data processing or criminal investigation. |
| Legislation governing the Ministry of Communications and public companies | Role alignment | Separate policy, ownership and operation from independent regulation and prevent discrimination in public infrastructure. |
VIII — Transitional provisions and implementation requirements
The transition requires a combined legal, technical and economic team within the Commission, involving the Ministry of Communications, Federal Board of Supreme Audit, competition authority and cybersecurity and data bodies. No new independent institution is required, reducing delay and administrative expansion risks.
IX — Financial and operational impact
The proposal creates real implementation obligations but cannot justify a fixed financial figure without detailed data on staffing, existing systems and monitoring contracts. Main costs involve updating spectrum-management, register and licensing systems; building market-analysis and service-quality tools; developing complaints and open-data portals; and strengthening regulatory-economics and digital-law capabilities. Existing institutions, offices and monitoring systems are reused, avoiding the establishment cost of a new authority.
| Item | Impact type | Calculation method before appropriation |
|---|---|---|
| Updating spectrum and monitoring systems | Capital expenditure + maintenance | Inventory existing systems and required gaps before procurement. |
| Licensing, transparency and complaints portals | Limited capital expenditure + operations | Integrate with existing government infrastructure and adopt open standards. |
| Economic and legal recruitment and training | Annual operating costs | Analyse workload and skills rather than automatically expanding staffing. |
| Universal service | Specific project financing | Address gaps through competitive tenders and a disclosed funding shortfall. |
| Spectrum revenues | Variable public revenue | Auctions or usage-right fees based on economic assessment of the market and band. |
To prevent perverse incentives, the proposal separates Commission financing from individual fines and transfers spectrum revenues to the treasury after disclosed statutory deductions. It ring-fences universal-service funding for its purpose and subjects it to separate audit.
X — Rights safeguards and oversight
The law erects five barriers to regulatory excess: necessity and proportionality in every intervention; prohibition of general content and communications monitoring; lawful orders and judicial safeguards for data disclosure and interception; appeals against regulatory decisions and sanctions; and transparency of regulations, general orders and implementation data.
The shutdown provision is particularly important because broad restrictions on digital infrastructure simultaneously affect expression, education, trade, government services and emergencies. A general security description is insufficient: the decision requires a specific threat, defined scope and duration, judicial review and proof that less restrictive alternatives are inadequate.
For platforms, the proposal provides neither absolute immunity nor automatic liability for everything users write. It combines creator responsibility, conditional intermediary exemptions and transparency, notice and objection duties. This balance prevents excessive liability driving preventive removal of all controversial content.
XI — Relevant international comparison
| Reference | Core idea | Use in the proposal |
|---|---|---|
| International Telecommunication Union — Radio Regulations 2024 and spectrum-management guidance | Allocation tables, international coordination, efficiency, interference prevention and transparency | Technical foundation for the spectrum Part without copying treaty provisions literally into domestic law.[11][12] |
| European Electronic Communications Code — EECC | General authorisation, separate scarce-resource usage rights, interconnection, access and universal service | Reduce individual licences and link intervention to market analysis and consumer protection.[13] |
| European Digital Services Act — DSA | Contact points, transparency, notice mechanisms, legal representation and graduated duties | Regulate platform procedures without general prior content censorship.[14] |
| Current Iraqi practice | Interconnection, universal service, quality, consumer protection, numbering and satellite regulation | Preserve tools already functioning and place them under unified legislation.[5][6][8][18] |
XII — Sources and references
- Iraqi Council of Representatives, Iraqi Constitution, especially Articles (103) and (110).
- Communications and Media Commission, Legal documents — Order No. 65 of 2004.
- Communications and Media Commission, Discussion of the draft Telecommunications Law with the Ministry of Communications, 11 June 2026.
- Iraqi Council of Representatives, Transport, Communications and Governance Committee discusses proposed Ministry of Communications and Telecommunications and Information Technology laws, 22 September 2026.
- Communications and Media Commission, Telecommunications regulations.
- Communications and Media Commission, Service quality, consumer protection and performance indicators.
- Communications and Media Commission, Interconnection service regulation.
- Communications and Media Commission, Universal service, projects and regulations.
- Communications and Media Commission, Telecommunications Regulation Department services guide and national numbering plan.
- Communications and Media Commission, Public consultation on the framework regulation for digital platforms and services, 2024.
- International Telecommunication Union, Radio Regulations, 2024 Edition.
- International Telecommunication Union, Guidance on the regulatory framework for national spectrum management.
- European Union, European Electronic Communications Code — Directive (EU) 2018/1972.
- European Union, Digital Services Act — Regulation (EU) 2022/2065.
- Iraqi Ministry of Justice, Competition and Anti-Monopoly Law No. (14) of 2010; and Consumer Protection Law No. (1) of 2010 in the Ministry's published laws database.
- Communications and Media Commission, Statement on telecommunications regulation, digital sovereignty and the number of regulations, 22 August 2026.
- Communications and Media Commission, Discussion of the fixed-broadband spectrum auction and universal-service projects with the International Telecommunication Union, 2026.
- Communications and Media Commission, Regulation licensing broadband services through non-geostationary satellite systems (NGSO).
Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · POL-91 · 7 October 2026