Citizenship and Public Responsibility
From Belonging to Active Membership
Executive Summary
This chapter translates patriotism from a bond of belonging into active membership. Iraqi citizenship is neither nationality alone, party participation nor obedience to government. It is an equal legal status and an everyday practice combining constitutional rights, public duties, participation, accountability and the understanding that the state and public funds are common property. In this sense, citizens become parties to the compact that constitutes the state, neither beneficiaries standing outside it nor subjects subordinate to its authority. 1
The chapter's governing principle is that citizens do not forfeit fundamental rights because they fail to fulfil a duty, and duties to avoid harm, respect others' rights and protect public funds do not disappear entirely because the state fails. Yet it is the state's fairness, transparency and effectiveness that transform compliance rooted in temporary fear into legitimate, lasting compliance. The chapter therefore does not blame citizens for withdrawing without examining weak trust and inadequate channels for participation; nor does it absolve them of bribery, favouritism and violations when reasonable lawful alternatives are available.
The chapter identifies five interconnected transitions: from spectator to partner; from an isolated discourse of rights to a balance of rights and duties; from everyday disorder to respect for a fair, clear system; from treating public funds as government money to recognising them as common property across generations; and from public employment as spoils to service grounded in integrity, merit, impartiality and results.
The evidence establishes that Iraq has extensive constitutional and statutory provisions covering rights, participation, protection of public funds, taxation by law, public employment, oversight and integrity. The principal gaps concern implementation, integration of channels, clarity of responsibility, protection of whistleblowers and measurement of responsiveness. Surveys also show that weak trust, favouritism, corruption and a sense of limited influence undermine the exercise of citizenship. Baselines for volunteering, knowledge of rights, the sense of common ownership and use of complaints mechanisms remain incomplete, requiring a foundational survey in 2027. 2
Vision 2045 proposes a phased programme beginning with measurement, applied civic education, unified complaints platforms, open budgets, codes of conduct and protection of public funds. It then expands participation, compliance, digitalisation, whistleblower protection and public-service reform. By 2045, it seeks citizens who know their rights and pursue them lawfully, fulfil their duties, respect others' rights and public order, protect public funds and participate in improving the state, alongside a transparent, responsive state subject to accountability.
1. From Belonging to Active Membership
The introductory part established that Iraq possesses the necessary foundations, that its central problem is a limited ability to translate them into capacity and results, and that the 2045 project seeks a capable, productive, organised and fair state. The preceding chapter defined patriotism as a constitutional and civic bond that gives the shared state precedence over particular loyalties. This chapter identifies the instrument through which that bond becomes practice: citizenship.
The state needs more than citizens who love Iraq. It needs citizens who understand their position within it: rights holders rather than subjects, bearers of duties rather than spectators, and partners able to challenge and demand accountability rather than adversaries of institutions. Nor may the state invoke responsibility to demand that citizens bear the consequences of failures without giving them tools to remedy them. Citizenship is a reciprocal relationship strengthened by fair rules, accessible information, effective complaints and accountable authority.
2. An Operational Definition of Iraqi Citizenship
The definition brings together eight dimensions: equal legal membership; constitutional rights; duties and responsibilities; participation; equality before the law; ownership of the state and public funds; the ability to hold authority accountable; and respect for fellow citizens' rights. It can serve the rest of the Vision because it does not tie citizenship to a single religious or ethnic identity, equate it with loyalty to a government or party, or confine it to elections.
Table 1: Patriotism, citizenship, nationality and related concepts
| Concept | Substance | Boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Patriotism | A bond of belonging and commitment to the shared state and the public interest. | Provides motivation and values, but does not by itself specify rights and procedures. |
| Citizenship | Legal and civic membership: rights, duties, participation and accountability. | The operational framework that translates belonging into practice. |
| Nationality | A legal bond establishing formal membership of the state. | A condition of full citizenship, but not proof of responsible conduct. |
| Loyalty to the government | Temporary support for an authority or political programme. | May change; opposition to government does not negate citizenship. |
| Political participation | Using instruments of influence: voting, parties, protest and consultation. | One dimension of citizenship, not its complete definition. |
Source: Iraq Vision 2045 analysis drawing on the Constitution and the preceding chapter | Data period: 2005–2026 | Unit: conceptual distinction.
3. The Citizen Is Not a Spectator
Citizens become spectators when they believe that the state is solely politicians' business, that public funds do not concern them, that corruption cannot be influenced and that elections and complaints change nothing. Withdrawal may express indifference, but it can also reflect fear of retaliation, genuine incapacity, lack of information or passive protest against unresponsive institutions. The chapter therefore treats passivity not as an innate moral defect but as a consequence of citizens' experience of the state.
Table 2: From spectator to partner
| Field | Citizen as spectator | Citizen as partner |
|---|---|---|
| Information | Waits for the official account or rumours. | Seeks information, compares it and verifies it. |
| Elections | Votes on identity grounds or abstains without evaluation. | Compares programmes and outcomes and holds representatives accountable periodically. |
| Service | Seeks an intermediary or withdraws. | Uses official channels, lodges grievances and follows up. |
| Public money | Treats it as government money or money without an owner. | Scrutinises budgets and projects and protects public facilities. |
| Corruption | Treats it as inevitable or benefits from it. | Rejects and reports it and demands whistleblower protection. |
| Society | Defends only personal rights. | Defends others' rights and organises interests peacefully. |
Source: Iraq Vision 2045 team | Data year: 2026 | Implication: participation includes everyday instruments, not elections alone.
4. Rights and Duties: A Compact, Not a Bargain
The Iraqi Constitution establishes equality, rights, freedoms and participation, and protects life, dignity, property, privacy, education, health, work, association, expression and peaceful protest within the law. It also makes protection of public funds a duty and requires taxes and fees to be imposed by law. This framework does not permit rights to become rewards for loyalty or duties to become instruments of obedience. 3
The governing principle is: “Fundamental rights do not lapse because citizens fall short, and fundamental duties do not disappear entirely because the state falls short; yet the state's fairness, effectiveness and transparency make commitment sustainable and legitimate.” Avoiding harm to others and protecting their lives and dignity are continuing duties. Broad fiscal compliance, including taxes and fees, requires a clear institutional counterpart: fair legislation, socially justified exemptions, transparent spending and services whose impact citizens can see.
Table 3: Balancing rights and duties in Iraqi citizenship
| Protected right | Corresponding responsibility, without making the right conditional upon it |
|---|---|
| Life, dignity and equality | Avoiding violence, discrimination and incitement to violence. |
| Expression, association and peaceful protest | Respecting others' right to expression and avoiding destruction or coercion. |
| Security and a fair trial | Lawful cooperation and not concealing crimes or dangers. |
| Education, health and services | Preserving facilities and avoiding misuse or attacks upon them. |
| Work and equal opportunity | Performing work honestly and rejecting bribery and favouritism. |
| Participation and accountability | Relying on facts and peaceful means, and respecting outcomes while retaining the right of appeal. |
| Property, privacy and the environment | Respecting others' property and privacy and protecting the environment and resources. |
Source: Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, and Iraq Vision 2045 analysis | Unit: framework of rights and responsibilities.
5. Respecting Order: Fair Rules, Not Blind Obedience
Order here means a clear, fair and predictable set of rules governing shared life, not submission to a person or authority. Citizenship appears in details that seem small but accumulate: queues, traffic, appointments, safety, waste, pavements, construction, fees and the use of official procedures rather than favouritism.
Table 4: Causes of weak respect for rules and citizenship-based responses
| Conduct | Possible institutional cause | The Required Response |
|---|---|---|
| Jumping a queue or bypassing a procedure | Complicated procedures, unequal enforcement and widespread favouritism. | Simplified procedures, queue numbers, a grievance route and published service times. |
| Traffic and safety violations | Weak enforcement, poor institutional examples and a high likelihood of impunity. | Automated monitoring, proportionate fines, transparency and enforcement against official vehicles. |
| Littering and encroachments | Irregular services, a lack of bins and a weak sense of common ownership. | Reliable services, digital reporting, municipal enforcement and neighbourhood participation. |
| Water and electricity theft | Intermittent services, unmetered networks, corruption or collusion. | Metering and digitalisation, fair pricing, protection for poor households and equal penalties. |
| Disregard for time | No performance standard, weak accountability and a culture focused on procedure rather than results. | Time standards, published performance and compensation or escalation when delays occur. |
Source: analysis of the detailed research report | Data year: 2026 | Implication: moral exhortation is insufficient without rules, services and equal enforcement.
6. Public Funds as Common Property
Public wealth is more than the Treasury's balance. It comprises the budget, oil revenues, taxes, fees, natural resources, land and real estate, schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, water and electricity networks, vehicles, equipment, records, data, employees' time, projects, grants and funds allocated to future generations. The Constitution establishes the inviolability of public funds and makes their protection a duty of every citizen. 4
Abuse begins with deliberate delays, absenteeism and private use of vehicles or equipment. It extends through water and electricity theft, encroachment on land, evasion, bribery and unproductive appointments to inflated contracts, embezzlement and the purchase of loyalties with public money. Petty corruption does not justify grand corruption, but it creates a social environment in which abuse carries a lower cost and money is increasingly seen as having no owner.
Figure 1: The cycle of wasted public funds and lost trust
Source: proposed theory of change for Iraq Vision 2045 | Data year: 2026 | Unit: qualitative causal relationship.
Table 5: Defining public wealth and forms of abuse
| Type of public wealth | Forms of abuse | Protection instrument |
|---|---|---|
| The budget and oil revenues | Politicised allocation, unproductive spending and weak disclosure. | An open budget, auditing and tracking programmes and outcomes. |
| Property and facilities | Vandalism, private use and neglect. | An asset register, a directly responsible official, reporting, maintenance and accountability. |
| Employees' time and service delivery | Absence, obstruction, extortion and selective treatment. | Measurement of attendance and results, a service charter, complaints and performance evaluation. |
| Water, electricity and resources | Theft, illegal connections and unlawful losses. | Electronic metering, protection for poor households and equal enforcement. |
| Land and real estate | Encroachment and non-transparent allocation. | A digital property register, public auctions and recovery of assets. |
| Data and records | Manipulation, withholding or leaks. | Data governance, permissions, audit trails and privacy protection. |
Source: the Constitution, oversight legislation and Iraq Vision 2045 analysis | Data period: 2005–2026.
7. Taxes, Fees and the Fiscal Compact
In a rent-based economy, the everyday connection between citizens and the budget weakens. The state finances itself mainly from a central resource, while citizens demand services without seeing a direct relationship between what they pay and what is spent. Moving to a productive state, however, requires a clear fiscal compact: no tax or fee without law; no collection without a receipt; no lasting compliance without fairness and transparency; and no social protection without a sustainable funding base.
Compliance is built by digitalising registration and payment, standardising fees, simplifying rules, protecting poor groups, sharing the burden fairly among employees, the self-employed and companies, and publishing a dashboard showing where revenues went and which services they funded. Unofficial, multiple or unclear levies undermine citizenship because they make citizens pay holders of influence rather than the state.
8. Public Service: A Responsibility, Not Spoils
Public service exercises authority on society's behalf. It must therefore rest on merit, impartiality, equality, protection of funds and data, and results. The spoils model instead treats a job as a salary, a quota, an electoral reward or an instrument of influence, turning an institution into a distribution network rather than a service-delivery body.
Table 6: Public service and the spoils model
| Norm | Public service | The spoils model |
|---|---|---|
| Purpose | Public service and measurable results. | Salary, influence and a share of the spoils. |
| Entry | Competition, competencies and a job description. | Quota-based allocation, favouritism and rewards. |
| Treatment | Impartiality, equality and time standards. | Selective treatment, extortion and delay. |
| Promotion | Performance, competence and learning. | Nominal seniority or loyalty. |
| Accountability | Evaluation, transparency and grievance mechanisms. | Political protection and weak accountability. |
| Effect | Trust, productivity and better service. | An inflated workforce, recurrent spending and lost trust. |
Source: detailed research report and public-service and disciplinary legislation | Data period: 1960–2026 | Unit: institutional comparison.
Table 7: Differentiated responsibilities within public service and public authority
| Actor | Specific civic responsibility |
|---|---|
| Employee | Delivering services fairly, protecting time, records and funds, and refusing bribes. |
| Manager | Allocating work, preventing conflicts of interest, measuring performance and protecting whistleblowers. |
| Minister | Clear policy, transparent appointments and contracts, and responsibility for outcomes. |
| Teacher, doctor and engineer | Professional standards, no exploitation of citizens' needs, and documentation of results. |
| Judge | Independence, equality, fair procedures and a reasonable time frame. |
| Security personnel | Use of force constrained by law, impartiality and protection of rights. |
| Member of Parliament | Legislation, oversight and representation, rather than distributing jobs or protecting corrupt actors. |
Source: Iraq Vision 2045 team | Data year: 2026 | Principle: responsibility grows with authority and control over funds and decisions.
9. Iraq's Constitutional and Legal Framework
Iraq has a broad legal foundation, but legislation's existence does not mean citizenship is realised. Each right and duty must be translated into an implementing body, an accessible procedure, a time standard, a grievance channel and published data. This chapter does not assume the existence of a unified federal access-to-information law currently in force. It treats adoption of such a law, regulation of exemptions and protection of privacy as a legislative gap that must be resolved.
Table 8: Iraq's legal framework for citizenship and public responsibility
| Legal text | Right/duty | Body | Implementation gap | Required Reform |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005 | Equality, rights, freedoms and participation; inviolability of public funds; taxation by law. | Council of Representatives, judiciary and executive authorities. | A gap between law and practice and unequal access. | Implementing legislation, service standards, grievances and disclosure. |
| Civil Service Law No. 24 of 1960, as amended | Regulation of employees' status, appointments and rights. | Ministries and finance and civil-service authorities. | An outdated framework and numerous exceptions. | A modern, merit-based federal civil-service law. |
| State and Public Sector Employees' Discipline Law No. 14 of 1991, as amended | Employment duties, prohibitions and penalties. | Ministries and administrative courts. | Greater focus on violations than service outcomes. | Linking discipline to a service charter, performance evaluation and grievance mechanisms. |
| Federal Public Service Council Law No. 4 of 2009 | Professional regulation of recruitment and promotion. | Federal Public Service Council. | Overlapping appointments, exceptions and pressures. | Expanding competitive recruitment and publishing data. |
| Commission of Integrity and Illicit Gains Law No. 30 of 2011, as amended | Prevention and investigation of corruption and illicit gains. | Commission of Integrity and judiciary. | Whistleblower protection, asset recovery and institutional prevention. | Whistleblower protection and prevention of conflicts of interest through legislation. |
| Federal Board of Supreme Audit Law No. 31 of 2011 | Auditing public funds and performance. | Board of Supreme Audit and Parliament. | Delayed responses to reports and weak follow-up on recommendations. | A public register of recommendations and implementation. |
| Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, as amended | Criminalisation of bribery, embezzlement and offences in public office. | Judiciary and investigative bodies. | Slow proceedings and difficulties in proving offences and recovering assets. | Digital evidence, judicial specialisation and witness protection. |
| Tax and customs legislation | Fiscal obligations and oversight of border crossings. | Finance, tax and customs authorities. | Complexity, evasion and unofficial collection. | Simplification, digitalisation, fairness and disclosure. |
| United Nations Convention against Corruption | Prevention, criminalisation, cooperation and asset recovery. | The state, through its oversight and judicial institutions. | Gaps in legal alignment and implementation across institutions. | A national compliance plan and periodic public review. |
Source: the Iraqi Constitution and legislation, and the United Nations Convention against Corruption | Data period: 1960–2026 | Note: a final legislative verification is required at each update.
10. The Iraqi Baseline: What We Know and What We Do Not
Iraq does not yet have a unified, regular national survey measuring citizenship and public responsibility in all their dimensions. The baseline therefore combines election data, probability surveys and selected administrative indicators, clearly distinguishing documented figures from gaps. The latest methodologically documented Arab Barometer survey in Iraq was conducted in 2024 with a stratified probability sample of 2,408 adults in 17 governorates and disclosed geographical and population exclusions. However, the detailed values used in this chapter remain those from the 2019 and 2021 reports where direct verification was possible. 5
Table 9: Baseline for citizenship, participation and public responsibility in Iraq
| Indicator | Value | Source and method | Limitations on use |
|---|---|---|---|
| High trust in government | 22% | 2021; Arab Barometer; representative telephone survey, sample of 1,016. | A trust indicator, not an assessment of every state body. |
| Satisfaction with government performance | 24% | 2021; same source and method. | Affected by the period's context and the pandemic. |
| Security and order rated good/very good | 52% | 2021; same source and method. | Shows that trust is selective rather than a blanket rejection. |
| Belief that corruption is very widespread | 68% | 2021; Arab Barometer. | General perception, not a measure of the sums involved. |
| Perception that government is combating corruption | 27% | 2021; Arab Barometer. | Measures perceptions, not case outcomes. |
| Frequent use of connections to obtain a job | 94% | 2019; face-to-face interviews, sample of 2,461. | A survey response, not an appointments register. |
| Belief that bribery is necessary for better education / better healthcare | 53% / 56% | 2019; Arab Barometer. | Perceptions of access to services. |
| Considering emigration / among young people | 37% / 48% | 2021; Arab Barometer. | Intentions, not actual migration. |
| Turnout in Council of Representatives elections | Approximately 43% | 2021; Electoral Commission data. | Registered-voter definition used in that election's announcement. |
| Turnout in governorate council elections | Approximately 41% | 2023; Electoral Commission data. | The electoral base differs from that of 2021. |
| Maturity of digital government services | 21/100 | 2022; GEMS assessment; 30 services and 13 institutions. | Does not measure every channel or developments after 2022. |
| Knowledge of rights, volunteering, use of complaints and ownership of public funds | To be established in 2027 | Foundational national survey plus administrative data. | A priority data gap. |
Source: Arab Barometer 2019 and 2021; Independent High Electoral Commission; GEMS assessment; detailed research report | Data period: 2019–2024. 67
These indicators must not be combined into a single score without a survey designed for that purpose. Low trust may reflect experiences of services or politics and does not establish weak citizenship. High participation likewise does not establish the quality or impact of choices. The 2027 survey should therefore establish knowledge, behaviour, channels and disparities, linking them to actual administrative data such as complaint response times, the share of competitive appointments, digital payments and performance evaluations.
11. Disparities Within Iraq
The practice of citizenship varies with access to services, information, safety and opportunity, not with some fixed essence of a community or governorate. Experiences of conflict, displacement or discrimination may make citizens more cautious towards institutions, while education and digital connectivity may expand opportunities for participation without guaranteeing impact. Every indicator should therefore be disaggregated by governorate, urban/rural location, age, sex, education, income, employment sector, unemployment, disability, displacement, desire to emigrate, and residence in Iraq or the diaspora.
Table 10: Disparities that must be measured within Iraq
| Group | Possible explanation of differences | Measurement and policy requirement |
|---|---|---|
| Governorate / central–local level | Disparities in services, responsiveness and channels. | Representative samples and a local responsiveness indicator. |
| Urban/rural | Gaps in access to institutions, the internet and transport. | In-person, digital and mobile channels. |
| Young/older people | Emigration, frustration and digital skills. | Youth-centred design rather than a seasonal campaign. |
| Women/men | Safety, time, work and care responsibilities. | Measuring obstacles, not intentions alone. |
| Education and income | Knowledge of rights and the cost of participation. | Accessible materials and legal assistance. |
| Public sector/private sector/unemployed | Different degrees of dependence on the state and different incentives. | Analysis of sector, conflicts of interest and risks. |
| Displaced people, returnees and affected populations | Documentation, trust, justice and property. | Safeguards and no exclusion from the sample. |
| Persons with disabilities | Accessibility of information, platforms and facilities. | Accessibility standards and user testing. |
| Iraqis Abroad | Political rights, consular services and connections to expertise. | A separate diaspora survey and participation channels. |
Source: detailed research report | Data year: 2026 | Principle: groups are not morally classified; explanations are institutional and social.
12. Political and Civic Participation: Quality Before Numbers
Citizenship cannot be reduced to elections, and active citizens are not necessarily party members. Participation encompasses voting, peaceful protest, trade unions and associations, volunteering, petitions, complaints, consultations, oversight of local projects and digital initiatives. Its success is measured by impact, continuity, representativeness and institutional responsiveness, not only by participant numbers.
Table 11: Instruments of political and civic participation and their quality criteria
| Instrument | Quality question | Measurement indicator |
|---|---|---|
| Voting | Is it based on programmes and outcomes? Is information available? | Electoral integrity, awareness of programmes and accountability after elections. |
| Political party | Does it organise interests within the law or redistribute spoils? | Transparent financing, internal democracy and separation of party and state. |
| Protest | Is it peaceful and protected, and is there a response? | Protection, a negotiation process and publication of the response. |
| Trade unions and associations | Do they represent their members and enjoy independence? | Internal elections, transparency and negotiating capacity. |
| Complaints and petitions | Are they tracked through a reference number, deadline and decision? | Response rate, quality of resolution and the right to escalate. |
| Local consultations | Do they influence the budget and projects? | Representation of different groups, public minutes and an institutional response. |
| Digital tools | Do they broaden access or exclude those unable to use them? | Digital identity, data protection and a non-digital alternative. |
Source: Iraq Vision 2045 team | Data year: 2026.
13. Applied Civic Education
A course in which students memorise slogans or institutional names is not enough. The civic education needed teaches citizens how to exercise rights and fulfil duties: how to read the Constitution, submit a complaint, verify news, understand budgets and taxes, respect time and queues, reject favouritism, resolve disputes, protect the environment and participate in civil defence and community service.
Table 12: From rote civic instruction to applied citizenship
| Dimension | Rote-learning model | Applied citizenship |
|---|---|---|
| Content | Symbols, slogans and a single narrative. | The Constitution, institutions, rights, duties and plural histories. |
| Learning method | Memorisation and knowledge tests. | Student councils, simulations, projects, decisions and accountability. |
| Public money | A theoretical concept. | A small-scale school budget and project monitoring. |
| Participation | Symbolic voting. | Genuine council elections, minutes and a response from school management. |
| Service | A ceremonial activity. | Safe, evaluated and non-compulsory volunteering hours. |
| Integrity | General moral instruction. | Scenarios involving favouritism, bribery, reporting and protection. |
| Information | Passive reception. | Source verification, digital responsibility and privacy. |
Source: detailed research report and comparative civic-education experience | Data year: 2026.
Pilots begin in schools representing different governorates, with learning measured through conduct and ability: writing a valid complaint, analysing a simple budget, holding a debate, organising student elections, undertaking an environmental project and managing disagreement. The curriculum must not be used to glorify government or test political loyalty.
14. International Experience: Mechanisms, Not Ready-Made Models
Table 13: International lessons in citizenship, public service and participation
| Experience | Starting Point | Instrument | Lesson for Iraq | What Cannot Be Transferred |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Finland and Denmark | Relatively high trust, public-service standards and fiscal compliance. | Reliable services, transparency, local administration and open data. | Link compliance to service quality and fairness. | Accumulated institutional capacity cannot be transferred quickly. |
| Estonia | A small state that built a digital relationship after independence. | Digital identity, interoperability and the once-only principle for entering data. | A unified platform, trackable complaints and reduced need for personal connections. | Scale, homogeneity and implementation speed differ. |
| Germany | Rebuilding democratic citizenship after authoritarianism and war. | Independent political education, pluralism and constitutional protection. | A professional civic-education institution, not a propaganda body. | The historical context and party system differ. |
| Brazil / Porto Alegre | Weak trust and a need to connect citizens to local budgets. | Participatory budgeting, meetings and publicly declared priorities. | Defined local pilots with resources and decisions that can be tracked. | Do not generalise before safeguarding representation and preventing capture. |
| Singapore | Building a highly disciplined, merit-based public-service apparatus. | Competitive recruitment, remuneration and responsibility, digitalisation and anti-corruption. | Professional services, measurement of outcomes and simpler procedures. | Political restrictions and centralisation cannot be transplanted into Iraq's system. |
Source: OECD; e-Estonia; literature on German political education; participatory budgeting; public-service studies | Data period: 1989–2026. 8
The comparative conclusion is that campaigns alone do not change behaviour. Trust, compliance and participation improve when schooling is paired with practical skills, platforms with responses, taxation with transparency, employment with merit, and budgets with decisions whose effects citizens can see.
15. The Iraqi Citizen in the 2045 Vision
Table 14: Stages in building active citizenship, 2027–2045
| Phase | Interventions | Outcomes | Transition Condition | Risks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2027–2030: Establishing knowledge and measurement | National survey; civic-education reform; rights and duties guides; complaints platform; codes of conduct; public-wealth charter. | Published baseline, usable channels and evaluated pilots. | Independent measurement and actual responsiveness rather than a campaign. | Politicised programmes or platforms launched without resolving problems. |
| 2031–2035: Expanding participation and compliance | Local consultations; volunteering; digital fees; open budgets; whistleblower protection; public-service reform. | Increased use, responsiveness and competitive recruitment. | Linking participation to decisions and budgets. | Resistance from vested interests and digital exclusion. |
| 2036–2040: Embedding public responsibility | Community oversight; performance evaluation; extensive simplification; governorate data; widespread applied civic education. | Less favouritism and bribery and better services and compliance. | Continuity of funding and measurement across governments. | Digitalising favouritism rather than eliminating it. |
| 2041–2045: Stable active citizenship | Reviewing laws; independent institutions; updating the charter; partnership between citizen and state. | Protected rights, fulfilled duties, influential participation and competent service. | Protecting freedoms, pluralism and data. | A return to propaganda or institutional regression. |
Source: Iraq Vision 2045 team | Data year: 2026 | Targets are proposed for successive phases.
Figure 2: Theory of change for citizenship and public responsibility
Source: proposed theory of change for Iraq Vision 2045 | Data year: 2026 | Unit: causal relationship.
16. Indicator and Target Dashboard
The targets below are proposals of the Vision, not official figures. Where a valid baseline is unavailable, it will be established through the 2027 foundational national survey of citizenship and public responsibility. Increases or reductions will then be measured against that baseline. Definitions, samples, weights and coverage must accompany every published result.
Table 15a: Citizen, participation and behaviour indicators
| Indicator | Baseline | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2045 | Body | Frequency | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Knowledge of five fundamental constitutional rights | To be established in 2027 | 50% | 65% | 75% | 85% | Statistics Authority / Education | Every two years | Low until measured |
| People who believe citizens have a role in solving problems | To be established in 2027 | +10 points | +18 | +25 | +30 | Statistics Authority / Planning | Every two years | Low |
| Electoral participation | Approximately 43% in 2021 | 55% | 60% | 65% | 68% | Electoral Commission | Each electoral cycle | Medium |
| Annual civic/voluntary participation | To be established in 2027 | 15% | 25% | 35% | 45% | Youth/statistics authorities | Annually/every two years | Low |
| Use of an official complaints channel when needed | To be established in 2027 | 25% | 40% | 55% | 70% | Council of Ministers/governorates | Annual | Low |
| Complaints answered within the standard time | Administrative baseline in 2027 | 60% | 75% | 85% | 90% | Each institution/Council of Ministers | Quarterly | Medium |
| Acceptance of favouritism | 2027 baseline | 20% reduction | 40% reduction | 60% reduction | 75% reduction | Statistics/integrity authorities | Every two years | Low |
| Perception that bribery is necessary to obtain services | 2027 baseline | 15% reduction | 35% reduction | 55% reduction | 70% reduction | Integrity/statistics authorities | Every two years | Low |
| Viewing public money as shared property | 2027 baseline | +10 points | +20 | +30 | +40 | Statistics/education authorities | Every two years | Low |
Source: documented baselines and the Vision's proposed targets | Data period: 2021–2045 | Unit: percentage/percentage point.
Table 15b: Institutional, service and public-wealth indicators
| Indicator | Baseline | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2045 | Body | Frequency | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eligible government payments made electronically | To be established in 2027 | 35% | 60% | 80% | 95% | Ministry of Finance/Central Bank | Quarterly | Medium |
| Schools implementing applied civic education | 0% under the programme definition | 30% | 70% | 90% | 100% | Ministry of Education | Annual | High for administrative data |
| Institutions with an audited code of conduct | Administrative baseline in 2027 | 50% | 75% | 90% | 100% | Public Service Council/Commission of Integrity | Annual | Medium |
| Competitive appointments as a share of new appointments | To be established in 2027 | 40% | 65% | 80% | 90% | Public Service Council | Annual | Medium |
| Citizen satisfaction with public services | 2027 baseline | +8 points | +16 | +24 | +30 | Statistics authority/Council of Ministers | Annually/every two years | Low |
| Completion time for priority services | 2027 baseline for each service | 20% reduction | 40% reduction | 60% reduction | 70% reduction | Digital Centre/ministries | Quarterly | Medium |
| Employees undergoing actual performance evaluation | 2027 baseline | 50% | 70% | 85% | 95% | Public Service Council/ministries | Annual | Medium |
| Documented volunteering hours per 1,000 adults | To be established in 2027 | +50% | Twice the baseline | Three times the baseline | Four times the baseline | Youth/statistics authorities | Annual | Low |
| Public projects with a public progress dashboard | 2027 baseline | 50% | 75% | 90% | 100% | Ministry of Planning/governorates | Quarterly | Medium |
Source: proposed Vision targets; these do not become official before adoption of the baseline and measurement method | Data period: 2027–2045.
17. Proposed Programmes and Policies
Table 16a: Implementation programme package — measurement, knowledge and participation
| Programme | Problem/objective | Lead and Partners | Period | Cost / Financing | Indicator and risks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| National Citizenship and Responsibility Survey | Absence of a unified baseline. | Statistics Authority and Ministry of Planning; universities and scientific council. | 2027, then every two years | Low; budget and technical assistance | Publication of data, methodology and weights; risk of politicisation. |
| Applied Civic Education | Rote curricula and limited practical knowledge. | Ministry of Education; higher education and civil society. | 2027–2035, followed by updates | Medium; public budget. | Skills assessment and school coverage; propaganda risk. |
| Citizen Voice Platform | Fragmented complaints and no tracking. | Prime Minister's Office/Digital Centre; governorates and oversight bodies. | 2027–2030 | Medium; public budget and digital transformation. | A unified reference number, response times and escalation; risk of a platform that resolves nothing. |
| Open Citizen Budget | Limited understanding of revenues, spending and projects. | Ministries of Finance and Planning; Board of Supreme Audit. | 2027–2031 | Low–medium. | Accessible, downloadable publications; risk of delayed data. |
| Public Money Protection Charter | Treating public funds as government money. | Council of Ministers/Commission of Integrity; education and municipal authorities. | 2027–2029 | Low | Asset rules, reporting and recovery; risk of remaining merely a campaign. |
| Code of Conduct and Public Service | Unequal treatment and conflicts of interest. | Public Service Council; Commission of Integrity and ministries. | 2027–2030 | Low | Compliance audits, complaints and standardised penalties. |
| Volunteering and Community Service | Weak organised participation. | Ministry of Youth; governorates and organisations. | 2027–2045 | Medium; budget and partnerships | Documented hours and impact; risk of coercion or exploitation. |
| Local Youth Participation | Youth exclusion and limited influence. | Governorates and youth authorities; universities and municipalities. | 2028–2035 | Medium | Advisory councils and documented decisions; risk of token representation. |
Source: detailed research report and Iraq Vision 2045 analysis | Data year: 2026 | Costs are categories, not appropriations.
Table 16b: Implementation programme package — integrity, services and compliance
| Programme | Problem/objective | Lead and Partners | Period | Cost / Financing | Indicator and risks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Whistleblower Protection | Fear of retaliation and weak evidence. | Council of Representatives/Commission of Integrity; judiciary and oversight bodies. | 2027–2031 | Low for legislation; medium for operations. | Legislation, a confidential channel and compensation; risk of identities being exposed. |
| Tax and Fee Compliance | Complexity, evasion and low trust. | Ministry of Finance; Central Bank and municipalities. | 2027–2035 | Medium; collection savings. | Digital registration and payment, and satisfaction; risk of arbitrary collection. |
| Project Monitoring Portal | Limited citizen visibility of projects and costs. | Ministry of Planning; governorates and Board of Supreme Audit. | 2027–2030 | Medium | Progress, costs, images and contracts; risk of outdated data. |
| Local Advisory Councils | Occasional consultations with little influence. | Governorates/municipalities; civil society and trade unions. | 2028–2035 | Low–medium. | Minutes, responses and budgets; risk of local capture. |
| Public Employees Serving Citizens | A culture of procedure rather than outcomes. | Public Service Council; ministries and training institutes. | 2027–2036 | Medium | Service standards, evaluation and satisfaction; employee resistance. |
| Simplifying Procedures and Eliminating the Need for Connections | Complexity that creates intermediaries. | General Secretariat/Digital Centre; ministries. | 2027–2040 | Medium–high. | Fewer steps, shorter times and digital use; risk of digitalising complexity. |
| Annual Citizenship and Responsibility Index | Fragmented indicators and discontinuity. | Ministry of Planning and Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority; scientific council. | 2028, then annually | Low | A unified dashboard and auditing; risk of becoming a propaganda ranking. |
Source: detailed research report and Iraq Vision 2045 analysis | Data year: 2026.
18. Implementation and Responsibility Matrix
Table 17: Implementation and responsibility matrix
| Programme | Type | Lead | Partners | Baseline | Start | Completion | Cost | Financing | Indicator | Verification | Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| National survey and index | Statistical/institutional | Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority and Ministry of Planning | Universities, governorates and a scientific council | Council of Ministers decision and an independence protocol | 2027 | Permanent operation | Low | Budget / technical assistance | Publication of the database and findings | Methodological audit | Politicisation | Scientific council and publication of instruments |
| Civic education | Educational | Ministry of Education | Higher education, cultural bodies and organisations | Curriculum amendment and activity rules | 2027 | 2035/permanent | Medium | Budget | Coverage and learning | Independent assessments | Propaganda | Pluralist content and a rights-based review |
| Citizen Voice | Technical/administrative | Prime Minister's Office/Digital Centre | Ministries, governorates and oversight bodies | Decision to unify complaints and establish time standards | 2027 | 2030 | Medium | Public budget/digital transformation | Response within the deadline | Platform records | Weak responsiveness | Automatic escalation and publication of performance |
| Open budget | Fiscal/transparency | Ministry of Finance | Ministry of Planning, Board of Supreme Audit and Parliament | Unified publication instructions | 2027 | 2031 | Low–medium | Budget | Timely publication | Finance portal | Unintelligible data | An accessible version and open data |
| Public-service code | Regulatory | Federal Public Service Council. | Commission of Integrity, ministries and trade unions | A binding code and conflict-of-interest rules | 2027 | 2030 | Low | Budget | Compliance and complaints | Annual audit | Internal resistance | Training linked to evaluation |
| Whistleblower Protection | Legislative/rights-related | Council of Representatives and Commission of Integrity | Judiciary, Board of Supreme Audit and human-rights bodies | Whistleblower and data protection legislation | 2027 | 2031 | Low–medium | Budget | Protected reports and outcomes | Anonymised reports | Retaliation or leaks | An independent channel, compensation and penalties |
| Digital compliance | Fiscal/technical | Ministry of Finance | Central Bank, customs authorities and municipalities | Simplification, standardised fees and electronic payment | 2027 | 2035 | Medium | Collection savings/public budget | Share of payments | Financial data | Exclusion of poor people | Alternatives, exemptions and assistance |
| Project monitoring | Technical/oversight | Ministry of Planning | Governorates, Board of Supreme Audit and private sector | Publication and update instructions | 2027 | 2030 | Medium | Public budget/projects | Updated dashboards | Project register | Embellished data | Auditing, georeferenced images and reporting |
| Volunteering and local councils | Social/local | Ministry of Youth and governorates | Universities, organisations and municipalities | Safety and non-coercion rules | 2027 | 2045 | Medium | Public budget/partnerships | Hours and decisions | Records and evaluation | Exploitation and propaganda | Voluntary choice, representation and auditing |
| Simplification of procedures | Administrative/technical | General Secretariat and Digital Centre | Ministries, Public Service Council and private sector | Regulatory review and removal of steps | 2027 | 2040 | Medium–high. | Public budget/efficiency savings | Time and steps | User-journey measurement | Digitalising favouritism | Redesign before digitalisation |
Source: Iraq Vision 2045 team | Data year: 2026 | Costs: low, below US$5 million; medium, US$5–25 million; high, US$25–100 million; transformational, above US$100 million over the programme cycle.
19. Rights Safeguards
Safeguards are implemented through judicial and human-rights review, narrowly defined restrictions, non-digital alternatives, privacy and data-minimisation rules, independent measurement, published methodologies, and a ban on using platforms or school and state programmes for electoral propaganda. “Respecting order” must not become a ban on assembly or criticism, and “protecting public funds” must not become a reason to withhold the information citizens need to scrutinise them.
20. Risks and Conditions for Success
Table 18: Risk matrix
| Risk | Likelihood | Effect | Warning Indicator | Responsible Body | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Blaming citizens instead of reforming the state | High | High | A discourse of duties without service indicators. | Council of Ministers/Parliament | Link every duty to institutional reform and measurement of fairness. |
| Continued corruption while demanding compliance | High | High | Unchanged favouritism, bribery and complaints. | Commission of Integrity/judiciary/government | Transparency, whistleblower protection and accountability for major actors. |
| Using order to restrict freedoms | Medium | High | Expanded criminalisation and arrests for expression. | Judiciary and Human Rights | Narrow definitions, judicial review and compensation. |
| Weak institutional responsiveness | High | High | Accumulating complaints and declining return use of the platform. | Council of Ministers and governorates | Time standards, escalation and publication of performance. |
| Volunteering becoming propaganda/exploitation | Medium | Medium | Coercion of students or partisan use. | Youth/education authorities | Voluntary choice, safety and independent evaluation. |
| Resistance to public-service and recruitment reform | High | High | Exceptions and appointments outside competition. | Public Service Council/Parliament | Publish every appointment, proceed gradually and ensure a fair transition. |
| Weak fiscal transparency | High | High | Delayed budget and execution data. | Finance/oversight authorities | A binding publication timetable and open data. |
| Weak whistleblower protection | High | High | Leaked identities or employment penalties. | Commission of Integrity/judiciary | Legislation, an independent channel and compensation. |
| Digital exclusion and data misuse | Medium | High | Low usage among rural and poor populations and data leaks. | Digital Centre/communications authorities | In-person alternatives, accessibility, privacy and audit trails. |
| Weak federal–local coordination | High | Medium | Different platforms and standards. | Council of Ministers/governorates | A national standard, local flexibility and a data agreement. |
| Persistent favouritism despite digitalisation | High | High | Intermediary accounts or back-channel interference. | Oversight bodies/Digital Centre | Audit trails, randomisation and separation of powers within workflows. |
| Absence of a baseline | High | Medium | Unverifiable targets. | Planning / Statistics | The 2027 survey and publication of anonymised raw data. |
Source: detailed research report and Iraq Vision 2045 analysis | Data year: 2026 | Unit: qualitative assessment.
21. Conclusion
Citizenship is not a demand that citizens remain silent, pay or obey, nor a demand that the state provide everything without social responsibility. It is a compact that clearly distributes rights, duties and instruments: citizens are rights holders, partners and responsible actors; the state protects rights, provides services and is accountable; those exercising authority bear greater responsibility because they control decisions, money and force.
A capable state emerges not merely from large agencies but from a stable relationship that makes law predictable, information accessible, complaints effective, ownership of public funds understood, public employment a trust, and participation possible and safe. Citizens then cease to be spectators of the state or its adversaries, becoming partners in its reform and protection.
23. Data Gap Register
Extract the Iraq tables from Arab Barometer Wave VIII, 2024, and link them to the questions used in 2019 and 2021 before the next review.
Establish a national baseline for knowledge of rights and duties, use of complaints, volunteering, public funds, compliance and confidence in citizens' ability to influence decisions.
Unify complaints and grievance data across ministries and governorates, using common definitions of response, resolution and escalation.
Publish rates of competitive recruitment and exceptions, coverage of performance evaluation, absenteeism and service times at institutional and governorate levels.
Build documented data on losses from everyday abuse of water, electricity, assets and employees' working time, avoiding unverifiable aggregate media estimates.
Verify the current legislative position on access to information, whistleblower protection and personal data with each subsequent edition.
Establish independent samples of Iraqis abroad, persons with disabilities, displaced people and returnees to ensure their experiences are not omitted from the national index.
Consolidated References
1. Iraq Vision 2045: Operational Guide; the three introductory-part chapters; and chapter V1-D01-C01, “Patriotism as a Necessity, Not a Luxury”, final editions, 2026.
2. Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005; and civil-service, disciplinary, Public Service Council, integrity, financial-audit, criminal, tax and customs legislation, according to the legal review adopted in the research report.
3. Independent High Electoral Commission, results and turnout rates for 2021 and 2023; and Arab Barometer, Iraq Country Reports, Waves V–VIII, 2019–2024.
4. World Bank, GEMS Maturity Index, Iraq 2022; United Nations Convention against Corruption; OECD, Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions.
5. e-Estonia; literature on German political education; participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre; and studies of Singapore's civil service, used to draw comparative lessons rather than copy models.
Footnotes and Detailed References
Iraq Vision 2045: Operational Guide, Version 1.0; chapters V1-D00-C01, V1-D00-C02 and V1-D00-C03; and chapter V1-D01-C01, “Patriotism as a Necessity, Not a Luxury”, final versions, 2026.↩︎
Detailed research report for chapter V1-D01-C02, “Citizenship and Public Responsibility”, 2026; the Iraqi Constitution, probability surveys, legislation and administrative data form the evidentiary foundation.↩︎
Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, particularly the principles of equality, rights, freedoms, participation, protection of public funds and imposition of taxes and fees by law. Consult the official text for detailed legislative quotations.↩︎
Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, Article 27: public funds are inviolable and their protection is a duty of every citizen.↩︎
Arab Barometer, Wave VIII Technical Report, Iraq fieldwork 13 May–19 July 2024: a stratified probability sample of 2,408 adults in 17 governorates, with disclosed exclusions including Duhok, Halabja and displaced people in camps.↩︎
World Bank, Government Electronic and Mobile Services (GEMS) Maturity Index, Iraq assessment 2022: an overall score of 21/100, assessing 30 services and 13 institutions; the index does not automatically cover all subsequent developments.↩︎
Independent High Electoral Commission: announced turnout rates for the 2021 Council of Representatives elections and 2023 governorate council elections. Voter bases and circumstances differ between the two cycles, so the comparison must not be treated as a purely behavioural change.↩︎
International comparisons extract mechanisms without assuming that models can be replicated: OECD on trust and public service; e-Estonia on identity and interoperability; Germany on political education; Porto Alegre on participatory budgeting; and Singapore on a professional civil service.↩︎