The State First

1. Executive Summary

Part One concludes with developing the “capable citizen”: someone who belongs to a shared state, knows their rights and duties, respects fair and predictable rules, and possesses sufficient agency to initiate and build. This individual capacity, however, cannot replace public authority. No citizen, however competent, can establish general rules binding on everyone, manage public funds, regulate the national market, build electricity, water and transport networks, ensure the continuity of contracts and institutions, or monopolise the legitimate use of public force. Part Two therefore begins with a different question: which institution brings together public capacity and remains above governments, parties, sects, tribes and individuals? The answer is the state.

The state here is neither synonymous with the incumbent government nor merely the authority to issue orders. It is the continuing constitutional and institutional entity that carries public functions across changes of government. Government is temporary political leadership managing the state within the Constitution. Authority is a legitimate mandate to decide; capacity is the ability to turn that decision into an outcome. A government may therefore possess a law, budget and decision while lacking full implementation capacity in a particular function.

Iraq Vision 2045 does not diagnose Iraq as having “no state” or being a “failed state”. The evidence compiled for this chapter does not support such generalisations. Iraq is a constitutionally established state with extensive institutions, resources and actual capabilities. The 2024 census demonstrated its ability to conduct a major nationwide logistical and informational operation when decisions, coordination, resources and leadership align. Conversely, the stock of stalled projects and gaps in data, revenue collection and implementation reveal that capacity is not evenly distributed across functions. The chapter therefore adopts a more precise description: Iraq is an existing state with uneven capacities. The task is not to create the state from nothing, but to strengthen, integrate and sustain its capacity. ¹, ²

The same gap appears in public finance. According to IMF estimates for 2024, revenues and grants amounted to 39.3% of GDP, including oil revenue of 36.0%, while expenditure and net lending reached 43.5%, wages and pensions 22.0%, the deficit 4.2% and government debt 47.2%. These figures do not mean Iraq is “financially incapable”, but reveal an institutional distinction between receiving rents from a natural resource and building regular domestic revenue-extraction capacity. The arithmetic difference between total and oil revenues must not be called “tax revenue”, because that derived figure may include grants and other items. ³

2. From Developing Citizens to Building the State

Part One arranged the prerequisites for national renewal from the bottom up. Patriotism gave meaning to belonging within Iraq's shared public realm. Citizenship translated belonging into rights, duties and active membership. Law, order and discipline translated membership into reliable general rules. The chapter on emigration and withdrawal then concluded with agency: can Iraqis build a future within their country rather than finding departure or withdrawal the most rational choice? This sequence builds citizen capacity, but cannot alone build state capacity. ⁴

3. What Is the State? A Functional Definition, Not an Intellectual History

This chapter need not retrace the history of state theory since antiquity. It needs an operational definition specifying what should exist and be measurable in Iraq. The definition draws on the classical idea of the modern state as claiming the legitimate use of public force within its territory, while adding what contemporary governance literature establishes: the state is more than force. It is also an administrative apparatus and the capacity to gather resources and information, make and enforce rules, protect rights and endure across governments. ⁵

Source: evidence and analysis file V1-D02-C01; state and governance literature | Unit: public function | Reference year: 2026.

4. State, Government, Authority, Regime and Administration: The Chapter's Defining Distinctions

The most dangerous conceptual error in this part is treating these five terms as interchangeable. Then a change of government becomes a change of state, a minister's decision becomes ownership of the ministry, public administration becomes a party extension, and every form of influence becomes “authority” even when unlawful. The chapter therefore establishes the following distinctions as a glossary for the rest of the Vision.

Source: evidence and analysis file; Iraqi Constitution; OECD public-administration work | Note: “professional impartiality” does not mean refusing to implement the government's legitimate programme. ⁶

5. The State Is Not the Government

The value of this distinction becomes evident in practice. Ministers set policy within their mandates and provide political leadership, but do not own ministries, data, employees or contracts as personal or partisan assets. Governors administer according to their mandates but do not own governorates. Heads of independent or executive bodies exercise legal mandates but do not own those bodies. The budget is public money, not “the government's money”. The army, police, courts, universities, public banks and embassies are state assets and functions, not those of the winning party.

6. The State Is More Than Authority: From the Right to Decide to the Capacity to Implement

A state or government may possess authority to issue an order while results remain absent. This is the gap between the power to decide and the capacity to implement. A law, decision or budget allocation is one prerequisite for implementation, not implementation itself. Iraq Vision 2045 therefore adopts a single chain as the basic unit for diagnosing every public policy.

7. An Institution's Existence Does Not Establish Its Capacity

Public debate often counts inputs as evidence of strength: ministries, employees, budget size, legislative density, committees or oversight agencies. These describe the “form of the state” or the scale of its resources but do not answer the capacity question. Capacity means converting inputs into reliable public functions that can be predicted and audited.

Source: evidence and analysis file V1-D02-C01 | Unit: operational distinction.

8. Iraq: An Existing State with Uneven Capacities

The chapter bases its diagnosis on a matrix of dimensions rather than a slogan. Some Iraqi state functions show relative capacity on which to build; others are moderate, some relatively weak, and some cannot be assessed nationally because unified baselines are absent. This disaggregation prevents two opposite errors: denying existing state capacity and treating institutions and laws as sufficient proof that functions work.

Source: evidence and analysis file V1-D02-C01 | Note: these assessments must not be combined into an overall score without a methodology and complete data.

9. The 2024 Census: When the Conditions for Capacity Come Together

Diagnosis needs a positive example to avoid becoming a narrative of incapacity. The 2024 Population and Housing Census provides one. Official main results recorded 46,118,793 people. The operation gave the state a current national database after decades without a comprehensive census, supported by federal, regional and local cooperation and extensive logistical and informational organisation. ⁷

10. Stalled Projects: When Budgets Do Not Become Operational Assets

Conversely, in October 2024 the Ministry of Planning announced 2,612 stalled projects, including 1,321 belonging to ministries and 1,291 to governorates, with 997 projects addressed or restarted under the ministry's definition. Vision 2045 does not use this as a “failure rate”, because the evidence file does not establish a unified denominator for all projects. It nevertheless demonstrates a large stock of implementation gaps between budget allocation and assets entering service. ⁸

11. The Baseline: What We Know and What We Do Not

The Vision does not impose a single baseline year on indicators produced in different years. It uses the latest documented value for each indicator, recording its year, definition and coverage. It also distinguishes perception indicators from administrative records, the federal government from Iraq as a whole, and approved budgets from actual expenditure. These are not merely technical precautions; they prevent measurement dashboards from becoming artificial certainty.

Sources: Ministry of Planning/Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority; IMF; WGI; Open Budget Survey; Arab Barometer. ⁹, ¹⁰, ¹¹, ¹², ¹³

12. The State Is a Prerequisite for Every Reform — Not a Substitute for Sectoral Reform

The value of capacity becomes evident when different problems are tested with the same instrument. This does not mean every Iraqi problem results from state weakness or that capacity reform replaces sectoral expertise. It means every policy needs an “institutional vehicle” to make implementation possible. When that vehicle is weak, even sound policy stalls.

Source: Iraq Vision 2045 analysis and evidence file; sectoral details are deferred to their specialised parts.

13. Why Does Development Falter When State Capacity Is Low?

State-capacity literature connects accumulated investment in legal and fiscal capacities to what states can later accomplish in resource collection, market regulation, rights protection and policy implementation. It also warns against making “state capacity” an all-purpose explanation: economic outcomes are shaped by technology, global markets, human capital, geography and policies themselves. The Vision therefore treats capacity as necessary but insufficient. ¹⁴, ¹⁵

Figure 1: The negative cycle of weak capacity

Not every link operates automatically, but the cycle illustrates a testable causal direction. Changing rules or selective enforcement increase the price of contracting, protection and intermediation. Delayed projects or assets that fail to enter service lower the social return on public investment. Weak domestic revenues increase fiscal dependence on rents. When citizens or businesses see no fair return from rules, incentives for compliance and cooperation decline.

Figure 2: The positive cycle of capacity-building

14. State Strength Is Not State Size

Political debate often confuses a large state with a strong state. The number of ministries says nothing about how quickly they coordinate. Employee numbers say nothing about skills or productivity. Budget size says nothing about allocation quality. Numerous laws may signal complexity rather than capacity. Numerous agencies may increase overlap rather than control. The chapter therefore shifts the test of strength from “How much does the state possess?” to “What functions can it perform?”

Source: prepared by Iraq Vision 2045 based on the evidence file.

15. A Strong State Is Neither an Authoritarian Nor a Bloated State

State strength in this Vision means constrained, not absolute, capacity. An institutionally strong state implements decisions while remaining subject to the Constitution, courts and oversight. An authoritarian state compensates for weak legitimacy and oversight through greater coercion. A state can also be large but inefficient: spending and employing extensively, producing many licences, rules and platforms, yet remaining slow and fragmented.

Source: evidence file; constitutional safeguards are part of the definition of capacity, not an appendix to it.

16. The State First Does Not Mean the State in Everything

In this Vision, “the state first” does not imply a centrally directed economy. A strong state also knows its limits. It provides public goods that markets cannot adequately supply, protects property, contracts, competition and safety, addresses external harms and market failures, invests in infrastructure and people, and prevents monopoly and exploitation. It does not become the default producer of activities that private businesses or society can provide efficiently under fair rules merely because it can.

17. Who Owns Public Institutions?

Institutional ownership is among the strongest tests of the state. Ownership here is not real-estate ownership. The question is: for whom does a ministry, governorate, university, hospital, public company, public bank, embassy or independent commission work? The constitutional and institutional answer is the public interest within the law, not whoever temporarily manages it. Officials hold powers, not ownership; employees hold jobs, not public assets.

18. The State Above the Party: Governing, Not Owning the State

Democracy needs parties to organise competition and programmes and produce accountable governments. This chapter therefore neither attacks parties nor demands “apolitical” management of the state. Government is inherently political. The problem begins when a party moves from temporarily governing to informally owning an institution, making appointments, contracts, resources, administrative decisions and institutional identity part of its network rather than the state system.

Source: OECD and the Federal Public Service Council within its constitutional and legal remit. The chapter specifies no number of political positions before an approved legal classification. ¹⁶, ¹⁷

19. Representation, Power-Sharing and Institutional Capture

“Quota-based allocation” is not used here as a slogan explaining every failure. Iraq is plural, and group representation, minority protection and power-sharing in defined periods or domains can support stability and prevent exclusion. The institutional question is when representation shifts from guaranteeing participation to permanent ownership of an office or institution.

Source: power-sharing and state-capture literature and Iraq-specific studies; terms are used analytically, not as accusations. ¹⁸, ¹⁹

20. The State Above Sect and Ethnicity — Without Erasing Pluralism

A state above sect and ethnicity does not mean a single-identity state, abolition of religion, sect or ethnicity, or denial of the Kurdistan Region or communities' constitutional rights. Its institutional meaning is simpler and more precise: public institutions do not become permanent property of a sect or ethnic group; law does not change according to beneficiaries' identities; professional functions are not allocated as collective property rights; and public money is not divided unconstitutionally among networks claiming representation.

21. The State Above the Tribe — The Tribe Within Society

Tribes in Iraq perform social, cultural and solidarity functions and may contribute to social mediation, assistance and voluntary settlements within the law. The modern state does not require erasing these ties. The dividing line is the type of authority exercised. When a private bond becomes a force that obstructs judgments, shelters wanted persons, imposes extrajudicial penalties, threatens employees or compels appointments or contracts, it moves from society into parallel public authority. Reference studies of Iraqi tribes and customary law themselves show overlap between social roles and dispute settlement, requiring clear legal boundaries rather than denial of the social structure. ²⁰

22. Formal and Informal Institutions: From Individuals and Intermediaries to Institutions and Rules

Societies do not function through formal rules alone. Alongside laws, ministries and courts are norms, networks, relationships, intermediaries and repeated practices influencing conduct. Informal-institution literature distinguishes types according to their relationship with formal institutions: they may complement, accommodate, substitute for absent functions or compete with them. This chapter adds “capture” as a separate Iraqi analytical lens when private networks use formal institutions themselves for private benefit. ²¹

Source: Helmke & Levitsky and informal-institution literature; “capture” is a separate analytical addition in this project. ²²

23. A Federal State Is Not a Weak State

Iraq is constitutionally federal. “The state first” must therefore not become a project returning every function to Baghdad. State strength does not equal centralisation, just as transferring powers does not equal successful decentralisation. A high-capacity system assigns functions to the level able to perform them, ensures money, data and accountability follow those functions, and provides coordination and dispute-resolution mechanisms for overlaps.

Source: Iraqi Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence; OECD multilevel-governance work. ²³

24. Federal and Coordinating Capacity

The Iraqi state operates across levels: the federal government, Kurdistan Region and governorates not incorporated into a region, alongside local administrations under relevant legislation. Overall state capacity results from these levels' interaction in shared and overlapping functions, not federal-government performance alone. Every national indicator must therefore declare its scope: all Iraq, the federal government, governorates outside a region, or inclusion of the Region as well.

25. State Continuity Across Governments

A continuing state does not mean unchanging policy for twenty years. Every elected government has the right to adjust priorities within the Constitution and law. Democratic change, however, does not require lost files, contracts cancelled without evaluation, replacement of the professional apparatus or data collection restarted from scratch. Continuity means changing policy from a position of knowledge rather than lost memory.

26. Human and Administrative Capacity: The Size of the Apparatus Is Not Its Capacity

No high-capacity state exists without people able to operate it. Human capacity encompasses senior leadership; technical specialisms; management, procurement, data, legal and financial skills; recruitment and promotion systems; training; performance evaluation; workforce planning; and knowledge transfer. It does not equal public-sector headcount, and no argument should rely on aggregate employee numbers without a consistent coverage definition.

27. Fiscal and Extractive Capacity: Oil Revenue Is No Substitute for Revenue Institutions

Iraq has considerable capacity to mobilise oil rents, but this differs from extractive capacity in the institutional sense: collecting taxes, customs duties, fees and amounts due from a broad base lawfully, regularly and auditably. IMF figures for 2024 show total revenues and grants near 39.3% of GDP against oil revenues of 36.0%. The arithmetic difference of 3.3 percentage points is not “tax revenue”, but a derived difference that may include grants and other items. It must not be given a definition the source did not publish. ²⁴

28. Informational Capacity: A State That Cannot See Itself Cannot Manage Itself

The modern state needs to know its population and where people live, active businesses, employees, land and property, public assets, projects, spending, taxes, beneficiaries, licences and risks. This does not mean collecting everything into one central database or creating an all-seeing state. It means reference registers with owners, update responsibilities and quality standards, and lawful, secure exchange where public functions require it.

Figure 3: Proposed map of the state's core registers

29. Regulatory Capacity: Less Complex and More Enforceable Rules

The state appears in markets through licensing, building standards, food safety, labour, the environment, competition, business registration, disclosure, inspections and sanctions. Regulatory quality is measured neither by approval counts nor penalty severity. Good regulation identifies a risk or public interest, chooses a proportionate instrument, makes rules understandable, reduces unnecessary friction, monitors compliance, allows challenge and revises rules when they fail to achieve their purpose.

30. The State's Capacity to Deliver Projects

Public investment is the test connecting the fiscal state with the implementing state. Budgets can allocate, the Ministry of Planning can list projects and sector authorities can contract, but a public asset exists only when completed, accepted, operated and maintained. An indicator of “projects completed” must therefore first define a project, its accepted baseline schedule, cost tolerance and the point at which the asset is considered in service.

31. Capacity and Legitimacy: A Reciprocal Cycle, Not a Single Equation

Capacity and legitimacy interact but are not identical. An institution can deliver services quickly while its decisions remain illegitimate because they violate rights or exceed its mandate. A political system can possess electoral and constitutional legitimacy yet weaken in practice if it cannot implement decisions and provide core functions. The Vision therefore recognises multiple sources of legitimacy: the Constitution, elections, rights, fairness, participation, procedure and outcomes.

Figure 4: The capacity–legitimacy cycle

32. Why Are International Indicators Not a Final Verdict?

No single international score answers “How much capacity does the Iraqi state have?” WGI combines multiple perception sources and supports comparison and trend analysis, not direct administrative auditing. The Open Budget Survey measures budget transparency, participation and oversight under a defined methodology; its 2023 edition covers documents and events through the end of 2022. GTMI measures enabling GovTech maturity, not the quality of government as a whole. B-READY measures the business environment through specified pillars. Surveys measure a sample's experience or perceptions. ²⁵, ²⁶, ²⁷

33. The Constitutional Framework: A Foundation for a High-Capacity State

“The State First” does not assume that the 2005 Constitution prevents building a capable state. The Constitution provides a broad foundation: federal statehood; separation of powers; a federal executive responsible for planning and implementing public policy; exclusive federal powers in specified fields; rules for non-exclusive powers and relations with regions and governorates; a Federal Public Service Council; and independent and oversight bodies. It also prohibits shielding administrative decisions from challenge, an important limit on executive authority. ²⁸, ²⁹, ³⁰, ³¹

Source: Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, and official Federal Supreme Court sources/decisions verified in the evidence file. ³², ³³, ³⁴

34. What Can We Learn from International Experience? Transfer the Mechanism, Not the State

Iraq Vision 2045 seeks no ready-made model. Iraq differs in scale, pluralism, federal structure, rent-based economy and institutional history. Comparison is valuable for extracting a specific mechanism and testing whether it fits Iraq's Constitution and capacities.

Sources: OECD on Germany; e-Estonia; World Bank on Georgia; OECD/World Bank on Indonesia; World Bank comparative literature on public administration in Singapore. ³⁵, ³⁶, ³⁷, ³⁸, ³⁹

35. The Vision for the Iraqi State in 2045

The project needs a final definition protecting it against two opposing interpretations: one equating a “strong state” with a central ruler above constraints, another reducing the state to a service platform without public authority. The adopted definition connects legitimate authority with capacity, capacity with rights, federalism with cohesion, and politics with professional administration.

36. The Nine Dimensions of Iraqi State Capacity

Source: proposed national framework in evidence file V1-D02-C01. Sovereign/legitimate coercive capacity is a boundary condition detailed in the next chapter.

Sovereign and legitimate coercive capacity appears here as a boundary condition: a state cannot be described as high-capacity if public authority itself is distributed among independent centres outside the constitutional chain. Measurement of weapons, borders, decisions on war and sovereign relations is deferred to Chapter Two, “Sovereignty and the Monopoly of Decision-Making”, to avoid taking over that chapter's remit.

37. Measuring State Capacity: Nine Scores Before Any Composite Index

The project proposes piloting an “Iraqi State Capacity Index” as a measurement system, not a propaganda number. During 2027–2029, the nine dimensions should be published separately. They should not be averaged: a state may have strong information capacity but weak implementation, or strong collection but weak rights protection. An average may conceal the dimension determining actual failure.

Source: methodological decision in evidence file V1-D02-C01.

38. Indicators and Targets: From Available Figures to Accountable Management

The following targets are proposed policy commitments, not forecasts. Where baselines are absent, no figures are invented; values are first established in 2027–2029. Each target derives from one of four sources: a suitable international benchmark, a gap against a service standard, a calculated improvement from a baseline, or a constitutional/legal requirement to be fully met.

Sources: evidence file; WGI; OBS; Ministry of Planning; Arab Barometer. Future figures are policy targets, not forecasts. ⁴⁰, ⁴¹, ⁴²

39. State-Building Stages, 2027–2045

Source: evidence file V1-D02-C01. Phased targets are management instruments, not forecasts.

40. The Ten Implementation Programmes

Iraq does not need twenty new agencies under the banner of capacity-building. The chapter therefore consolidates proposals into ten programmes and prioritises reforming functions within existing institutions. Creating a new body is a last resort when a function demonstrably lacks a legal owner or conflicts of interest prevent its performance within the existing structure.

41. Implementation and Responsibility Matrix

The matrix does not use the phrase “relevant authorities”. Every programme needs a lead able to close decisions, specified partners, a legal instrument, an indicator and declared risks. In federal–regional matters, the chapter assumes no federal power beyond its remit; the legal arrangement itself becomes part of the design.

Source: evidence file V1-D02-C01; final powers are defined when legislation/regulations for each programme are prepared. No function is assigned beyond the legal text.

42. Costs and Funding: There Is No Single Bill Called “State-Building”

State-building is not a single construction project with a reliable total cost. Some reforms are financially inexpensive legislative changes with high political costs, such as classifying positions and ending proprietary claims over mandates. Others require major transformational investment, such as cleaning, linking and securing registers and modernising finance and collection systems. The chapter therefore uses qualitative cost categories until feasibility studies and technical designs exist for each programme.

43. 2045 Scenarios: What Happens If Capacity Is Not Built?

The Vision does not assume that implementing programmes automatically produces the intended state. Scenarios distinguish institutional pathways; they are not probability forecasts. The deciding factor is not ministries or expenditure, but the share of functions the state can perform predictably without relying on individuals, relationships and exceptions.

Source: scenario framework in evidence file V1-D02-C01. These are analytical pathways, not probability forecasts.

44. Risks: Capacity-Building Can Go Astray

State reform itself carries risks. The gravest are using “the state first” to justify removing constraints, restoring centralisation in the name of coordination, invoking merit to exclude communities, or replacing an old quota network with a new one under professional labels. Warning indicators and bodies responsible for mitigation therefore form part of the design.

Source: evidence file V1-D02-C01. Assessments are qualitative and reviewed periodically during implementation.

45. A Stronger State Under the Constitution, Not Above It

Rights safeguards cannot be appended after the state is designed; they form part of capacity's definition. A state unconstrained by law may issue orders, but undermines sustainable capacity by turning implementation into personal will and weakening trust, review and learning. The Constitution is no obstacle to a strong state; it is the foundation making its strength legitimate and stable.

46. Boundaries with Subsequent Chapters

This chapter preserves its boundaries so Part Two progresses logically. It establishes the state's meaning, capacity, institutional ownership, impartiality, continuity and federalism, without exhausting subjects requiring separate treatment.

Source: the official index and Operational Guide for Iraq Vision 2045.

47. Conclusion: From State Size to State Capacity

The first conclusion is that Iraq does not begin from a vacuum. A state, institutions, resources and capacities exist on which to build. The 2024 census demonstrates that the state can mobilise extensive organisation, data and coordination when conditions align. At the same time, stalled projects and gaps in registers, collection and implementation reveal uneven capacity across functions and show that structure does not guarantee outcomes.

The second conclusion is that the 2045 project's criterion of strength must change. We do not count ministries, employees, laws and committees and call the result a strong state. We ask: does an institution know what it seeks? Does a decision have a basis, funding and an owner? Is it implemented? Are outcomes measured? Is accountability completed? Does learning become institutional memory? This shifts the state from size to capacity, announcement to delivery, and individuals to institutions.

Consolidated References

1. Iraq Vision 2045: Operational Guide, approved 2026 edition; official Vision index; introductory and Part One chapters, final versions 1.0.

2. Iraqi Ministry of Planning/Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority, main and final results of the 2024 General Population and Housing Census, and investment-project announcements and follow-up.

3. Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005; Iraqi Council of Representatives website; and Federal Supreme Court decisions/interpretations used in the evidence file to verify articles and mandates.

4. Council of Ministers and its General Secretariat, relevant decision and government-performance portals.

5. Federal Public Service Council, constitutional and legal framework for federal public employment within its mandate.

6. Federal Board of Supreme Audit, constitutional framework, oversight mandates and published reports.

7. International Monetary Fund, Iraq: 2025 Article IV Consultation, with 2024 fiscal indicators used in this chapter.

8. World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2024 values and methodology; World Bank governance and Business Ready materials.

9. Open Budget Survey 2023, Iraq country results; methodology note that the assessment covers documents/events through 31 December 2022.

10. Arab Barometer, Iraq 2024 survey release on institutional trust and public attitudes.

11. OECD, Policy Framework on Sound Public Governance; Public Employment and Management; Government at a Glance; Multi-level Governance; OECD Economic Surveys: Germany 2025.

12. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, for the classical formulation of the modern state and separation between office and personal ownership of administrative means.

13. Besley & Persson, state capacity literature on legal/fiscal capacity; Francis Fukuyama, governance and state capacity; and contemporary reviews of state-capacity concepts and measurement.

14. Helmke & Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda”, Perspectives on Politics.

15. EUAA, Country of Origin Information: Iraq — Arab Tribes and Customary Law.

16. e-Estonia, X-Road interoperability documentation.

17. World Bank documentation on public-service reforms in Georgia and comparative administrative capacity; OECD/World Bank work on decentralisation and subnational capacity in Indonesia; comparative public-administration material on Singapore.