Sovereignty and the Monopoly of Decision-Making

1. Executive Summary

This chapter starts from the previous chapter's conclusion: Iraq exists constitutionally and institutionally and possesses actual capabilities, but does not convert mandates, resources and decisions into unified capacity equally across functions. It therefore does not ask the binary question “Is Iraq a sovereign state?” It asks where legal and actual sovereignty coincide and where a gap appears. The state defines the framework of authority; sovereignty defines its ultimate source.¹

The adopted operational definition describes sovereignty as “the state's supreme legal authority and actual capacity to exercise public functions for which no independent parallel authority may exist, within the Constitution, international law and commitments the state voluntarily undertook”. The “sovereignty gap” is the difference between the mandate granted by Constitution and law and the sustained practical ability to exercise it exclusively or through constitutionally coordinated arrangements, with traceability, oversight and accountability.

In this sense, sovereignty does not mean isolation. Iraq may enter alliances, host training missions, draw on foreign expertise, finance or technology, import energy, participate in global trade and conclude security and economic agreements. The sovereign question is not whether a relationship with the outside world exists, but who approved it, on what basis, whether Iraq can amend or terminate it, whether it grants another party independent public authority inside Iraq, and whether alternatives exist when dependence becomes a critical point of failure.

An independent national decision is not free of influences: every state operates amid interests, pressures, markets and alliances. It is a decision by a competent Iraqi institution under Constitution and law after assessing Iraq's interests, constraints and partnerships, without an unauthorised actor holding an independent right to impose or block it. The chapter therefore distinguishes consultation, influence, pressure, conditionality, coercion, veto capacity and control, and does not use “subordination” without strong evidence.

Restricting weapons cannot be reduced to “every weapon outside the Ministry of Defence”. A monopoly of legitimate force means the Iraqi state's monopoly of organised public force, whether exercised through armed forces, internal security forces, a legally established body or a regional force within constitutional powers. The test is whether the state can command that force, prevent it from using force, oversee its funding, personnel and weapons, hold those disobeying orders accountable and reorganise it lawfully.²

Undivided sovereignty coexists with federalism. Defence, foreign policy, national security and border protection are federal powers, while the Constitution permits regions to organise internal security forces, including regional guards. The Vision therefore does not equate sovereignty with centralisation. It requires clear jurisdictional boundaries, operating and data protocols, and stable coordination and dispute-resolution mechanisms.³

Sovereignty also appears at border crossings and in barrels, revenues and agreements. Borders are more than a military line: they involve security, passports, migration, customs, health, trade, data and risk. Resource sovereignty means not nationalisation, but a reconcilable chain from ownership, contracts, measurement, transport and marketing to revenue and audit. External decisions remain independent when commitments sit in an institutional register with known durations, owners and review arrangements.

The chapter adopts the “sovereignty chain” as its central instrument: constitutional mandate → institutional decision → legal authorisation → implementation instrument → chain of command → resources → implementation → oversight → accountability → review. Its baseline measures seven separate domains, not a composite index: unity of constitutional decision-making, monopoly of organised force, border control, resource sovereignty, independence of external decisions, oversight and accountability, and federal–regional coordination.

Transformation spans four stages: 2027–2030 to map sovereignty and harmonise legal foundations; 2031–2035 to integrate command chains, data and commitments; 2036–2040 to achieve high institutional sovereignty and manage critical dependencies; and 2041–2045 to embed sovereignty as a stable state attribute beyond individuals and governments. A limited programme package implements this without creating a new “Supreme Sovereignty Commission”.

2. From “The State First” to Sovereignty: Who Holds Supreme Decision-Making Authority?

The preceding chapter established the state as the continuing constitutional and institutional entity carrying public functions across changes of government, while government is temporary political leadership managing part of its institutions. This definition opens a question that chapter could not settle: if the state is the framework of public authority, who holds final decision-making power within it?

The question arises in functions that cannot accommodate a parallel public authority: who decides war and emergencies? Who orders the use of public force? Who represents Iraq externally and enters commitments? Who controls international borders? Who sets customs policy? Who determines the legal route for marketing a strategic resource? Who can revoke or modify a foreign mission approved by the state?

The chapter therefore does not repeat state theory or capacity analysis. Its starting point is sovereignty as a rule preventing “parallel public authority”, not a ceremonial attribute. Outside the Constitution, no party, organisation, person or foreign actor possesses an independent right to use force, block sovereign decisions, dispose of public resources or bind the state to strategic commitments.

3. Defining Sovereignty and the “Sovereignty Gap”

Sovereignty in this Vision is a composite concept. “Legal sovereignty” identifies who holds a mandate under Constitution and law; “actual sovereignty” measures the mandate holder's ability to exercise it in practice. Legal rules may be clear while implementation is incomplete, and a state may be economically and militarily integrated with the world while retaining institutional decision-making. The argument therefore does not rely on phrases such as “Iraq has no sovereignty” or “lost sovereignty”.

Source: evidence and analysis file V1-D02-C02. Definitions are operational for the Vision, not judicial rulings.

4. Sovereignty Is Not Isolation: Cooperation, Dependence and Coercion

A sovereign state is not one that minimises its relationships, but one that lawfully controls the terms of entering and leaving them. Alliances, trade, investment, finance, technical assistance, training or advisory missions, and even an agreed foreign presence do not inherently negate sovereignty. The test is the structure of decisions, review rights and alternatives.

The chapter therefore adopts “open strategic autonomy”: diversifying resources, routes, technology, suppliers and reserve capacities without seeking comprehensive self-sufficiency. Independence does not mean disconnection from the world, but preserving choice as the world changes.

5. Independent National Decisions: Between Influence and Control

An independent national decision is made by a competent Iraqi institution under Constitution and law after assessing Iraq's interests, constraints and partnerships. It need not be free of pressure, negotiation or foreign preferences; international politics involves influence. It loses institutional independence when an unauthorised actor has sustained coercive or organisational capacity to impose or block it outside constitutional procedures.

Read the sequence from 1 to 7; each link is a condition for an integrated sovereign function.

Source: Iraq Vision 2045 team, drawing on the approved evidence and analysis file.

The Vision does not use this ladder to label particular countries or political forces. The same standard applies to every partner and actor: instrument of influence, lawful channel, degree of dependence, transparency, alternatives and evidence of coercion or obstruction. “Subordination” is not an analytical starting point; it is a judgment requiring stronger proof than relationships, trade or finance alone.

6. Mapping Iraq's Sovereign Decisions

The Constitution provides a clear basis for several sovereign functions. Iraq is one federal state; the federation preserves unity, independence and sovereignty. Federal authorities hold responsibility for foreign policy, national security, establishing armed forces, border protection and fiscal and customs policy, while regions organise internal security forces within their mandates. Declarations of war and emergency and treaties follow constitutional procedures distributed among the Council of Representatives, executive authority and Presidency.⁴

Source: Iraqi Constitution, 2005, and evidence file V1-D02-C02. The table does not replace legal opinions on specific constitutional disputes.

7. Legal Decisions and Actual Decisions

The chapter distinguishes de jure authority from de facto influence. The first asks who legally holds the mandate; the second asks who can influence or obstruct in practice. A mandate may exist without implementation, or apply to some institutions but not others. An implementation instrument may be lawful while funding, data or command remain incomplete. An agreement may be valid while no institutional memory brings together its duration and commitments.

8. The Sovereignty Chain and Its Gap Types

Read the sequence from 1 to 10; each link is a condition for an integrated sovereign function.

Source: Iraq Vision 2045 team, drawing on the approved evidence and analysis file.

The chain's practical value is preventing leaps from legal texts to political judgments. When a link breaks, the gap is named for that link, not for the entire state. A state may be legally strong but informationally weak in a particular function; borders may be partly automated without complete data exchange; an armed institution may be lawful while its inventory or command system requires stronger auditing.

9. A Monopoly of Force: The State, Not One Ministry

Institutional sovereignty is incomplete when organised public force within the territory claims an independent right to use violence under authority outside the constitutional order. This does not mean every lawful force must report to the Ministry of Defence. Iraq has armed forces, internal security forces, legally established agencies and regional security forces with constitutional mandates. The criterion is one ultimate legal authority and the capacity to command, prohibit, oversee and hold accountable.

10. The Institutional Map of Iraqi Force

The chapter presents institutions only insofar as sovereignty analysis requires, without locations, depots, deployments or operational details. A legal basis alone does not prove complete integration; nor does the absence of a published organisational instrument in the evidence file justify inventing a law number.

Source: the Constitution and laws in evidence file V1-D02-C02. The purpose is a governance map, not an operational map.

11. The Popular Mobilization Commission: Legal Status and Governance Pathway

Analysis starts from law, not political rhetoric. Law No. 40 of 2016, published in the Iraqi Gazette, establishes that the reconstituted Popular Mobilization Commission is part of the armed forces and linked to the Commander-in-Chief. Its formations and personnel are subject to military laws, with political and party affiliations severed within its ranks.⁵

Regarding subsequent legislation, as of the 17 August 2026 data freeze, the verified official sources provide no evidence of a replacement law published and in force in the Iraqi Gazette. Council of Representatives records show a newer bill progressing through the legislative process and reaching its first reading. Law No. 40 of 2016 therefore remains this chapter's applicable reference; a bill is not treated as law before enactment and official publication.⁶

Legislation does not settle implementation. The Commission faces the same test as every armed institution: who gives orders? Are personnel, weapons and funding registered? Are service, discipline and use-of-force rules auditable? Can the state reorganise and enforce accountability when orders are violated? This approach makes the chapter neither a political defence nor an accusation against an actor, but a symmetrical institutional assessment.

12. Weapons, Politics and Civilian Firearms

Equal political competition is incomplete when a political competitor holds an independent right to use organised force that the state cannot command, restrain or hold accountable. This is a general institutional rule, not an accusation against a particular actor. Individuals' political affiliation is a right regulated by law, and peaceful political activity is a right. The problem begins when a political organisation itself claims an independent right to public force.

Civilian firearms are a different regulatory matter involving licensing, registration, ownership transfers, carrying rules, traceability, licence withdrawal and enforcement. Weapons Law No. 51 of 2017 provides the framework. In 2026, the Ministry of Interior continues weapons-registration campaigns, with an official electronic service through the Ur portal and registration offices in governorates. The chapter uses no comprehensive figure for unlicensed weapons because the evidence file provides no methodologically sound denominator.⁷

13. From Collecting Weapons to Governing Force and Institutional Integration

Collecting weapons is an event; establishing a monopoly of force is long-term institution-building. DDR means disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in transition from conflict. SSR is broader, encompassing security-sector reform, law, oversight and professionalism. Integration brings individuals or formations into a formal structure under standards; regularisation settles legal and organisational status. Treating these terms as synonyms produces misguided policy.⁸

14. The Federal State and Undivided Sovereignty

Sovereignty belongs to the single Iraqi state, while functions are exercised through a federal system. Undivided sovereignty does not mean administrative centralisation, and the federal government is not the whole Iraqi state. Constitutionally established regional powers do not diminish sovereignty; they form part of its organisation. Risk arises when gaps in mandates, data or funding become independent sovereign decisions in exclusively federal fields.

15. The Kurdistan Region and Security Forces: Integration, Not Abolition

The Constitution grants regional authorities the right to organise internal security forces, including police, security and regional guards. It is therefore incorrect to classify every regional force as “outside the state”. Conversely, this power grants no independent right to war, foreign policy or defence of international borders apart from the federal system.

The regional government and Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs have pursued organisational reform and unification for years. Official regional sources describe it as an ongoing process requiring further progress. The chapter therefore invents no “Peshmerga unification” percentage. Proper measurement rests on auditable components: units, personnel, salaries, command, systems, funding and service standards, linked to federal–regional protocols for shared or overlapping sovereign functions.⁹

16. Democratic Civilian Control of Force

Constitutional civilian control is not partisan control of the military. Elected government sets policy and decides within its mandate; military and security leaders implement professionally; Parliament oversees budgets and policy; and oversight bodies, law and courts review legality and accountability. Professional national forces answer to the state and stay outside party competition.

Germany's experience offers a mechanism, not a model to copy: parliamentary oversight, the specialist committee and Parliamentary Commissioner strengthen the subordination of force to law without making Parliament an operational command. Iraq's lesson is a clear distinction between legitimate civilian decisions and professional implementation, supported by effective fiscal and legal oversight.¹⁰

17. Controlling Borders: From Border Security to Integrated Border Management

Borders are where sovereign functions meet daily: security, entry of persons, passports and migration, trade, customs, drugs and smuggling, health and agriculture, transport, money and information. No single military or security force can manage them all. Integrated border management connects institutions, data and risk management, distinguishing lawful travellers and shipments from threats rather than treating every crossing as a security incident.

18. Border Crossings and Customs: Automation Is Not Integration

ASYCUDA is the clearest current implementation pathway on which to build. Cooperation with UNCTAD began in 2021; Iraq launched ASYCUDAWorld, an official operating portal exists, and the General Commission of Customs continues in 2026 to complete automation requirements and improve procedures. The system's existence does not automatically prove that all federal and regional Iraqi crossings use the same data or that every transaction is digital.¹¹

Every figure's geographical coverage must be stated. Automated-centre counts in project documents are not equivalent to the total number of lawful Iraqi crossings, and a federal body's revenues do not automatically represent all Iraq. Reform therefore begins with a master registry distinguishing crossing points from customs centres, permanent from seasonal crossings, and federal from regional ones.

19. Air and Maritime Sovereignty: An Institutional, Not Operational, Perspective

This chapter remains at institutional level. Air sovereignty means competent Iraqi authorities regulate civil aviation, issue permissions, manage civilian airspace and connect these functions with security and defence decisions. Maritime sovereignty means Iraqi institutions and laws regulate ports, waters under Iraqi jurisdiction, transport, trade and safety. Air-defence systems, radars, locations and naval deployments are unnecessary here; they belong to sectoral security and defence discussions.

20. Resource Sovereignty: Rules, Not Nationalisation

Resource sovereignty is the state's capacity to define lawful exploitation rules, measure production, flows, marketing and revenues, and make the chain auditable. It requires neither direct state operation nor a ban on foreign-company contracts, and does not turn every commercial dispute into a “sovereignty” issue. The test is whether the state can know the resource, identify the competent authority, reconcile flows and revenues, and review contracts and decisions.

Read the sequence from 1 to 9; each link is a condition for an integrated sovereign function.

Source: Iraq Vision 2045 team, drawing on the approved evidence and analysis file.

21. Oil and Gas: A Case Study in Institutional Sovereignty

The Constitution establishes oil and gas as the property of all Iraqi people in all regions and governorates and outlines a management structure involving the federal government, regions and producing governorates. In February 2022, the Federal Supreme Court also ruled on the unconstitutionality of the Kurdistan Region's Oil and Gas Law. This central legal element must be distinguished from subsequent political and fiscal settlements.¹²

On 27 September 2025, Kurdistan Region oil exports resumed through the pipeline to Türkiye under federal–regional arrangements involving companies, with marketing through SOMO. The regional government announced that 19.59 million barrels were exported through SOMO during the last 95 days of 2025. In the update through 17 August 2026, the federal Ministry of Oil continues publishing national export statistics through SOMO. Limited official verification did not establish cancellation of the Region's oil-delivery and marketing mechanism. The chapter therefore treats the existing mechanism as an operational baseline, without inventing a separate regional 2026 volume if none was published.¹³

22. Water: Sovereign Negotiation, Not Absolute Control

Transboundary water exposes the limits of absolute conceptions of sovereignty. Iraq cannot unilaterally control every cross-border flow, but can strengthen sovereign capacity through four assets: reliable hydrological data, a continuing negotiating institution, monitorable agreements and domestic demand management that reduces vulnerability. This dimension is measured not by a slogan of “control over water”, but by negotiating capacity, legal protection, information and alternatives. Water-security details are deferred to the specialised part.

23. Protecting Political Decisions from External Influence

The chapter does not list countries influencing Iraq. Sovereignty standards must be symmetrical to remain state policy rather than adversarial rhetoric. For every external partner, assess the instrument of influence, degree of dependence, lawful channel, transparency, alternatives and proven capacity to coerce or obstruct decisions. Strong partnerships are not inherently subordination; tense relationships are not inherently independence.

24. Foreign Forces and Security Agreements: Updated Through 17 August 2026

The chapter distinguishes the international coalition, bilateral security relations and the NATO mission. According to the joint statement published on 27 September 2024, the first phase of the coalition's military mission inside Iraq ended by late September 2025. The second permits continued support from Iraq for counter-ISIS operations in Syria until at least September 2026, subject to conditions and consultations. On 17 August 2026, this second phase remained within its announced timetable. This means neither “the same mission continuing inside Iraq” nor “withdrawal from every military partnership”. ¹⁴

NATO Mission Iraq is a non-combat advisory capacity-building mission established at the Iraqi government's request. In March 2026, NATO moved all mission personnel from Baghdad/the Middle East to Joint Force Command Naples in response to the regional security situation, while continuing the mission from there. NATO's page updated in June 2026 confirms that the mission remains in place and respects Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹⁵

The sovereignty test for any presence or mission is its legal or political basis, mission, approving Iraqi authority, duration, command, scope of powers and review or termination mechanism. The chapter does not combine “coalition”, “NATO” and “bilateral advisers” into a single figure.

25. A Register of Sovereign Commitments

The state needs a unified register preserving sovereign institutional memory across governments. This does not mean publishing every security annex. It requires two layers: a complete government register classified by security level and a public register containing legally disclosable information. The purpose is to prevent lost deadlines and commitments and conflicting instruments when ministers and governments change.

26. Strategic Dependence: Managing Single Points of Failure

The Vision does not seek self-sufficiency. States rely on markets, technologies and partners. The problem begins when one resource, route or system becomes a single point of failure the state cannot overcome within an acceptable period. The chapter therefore defines critical dependence as dependence whose interruption can disable an important sovereign function without a timely activatable alternative.

27. Sovereignty Is Daily Practice, Not Rhetoric

Sovereignty appears in thousands of small procedures more than in speeches. Who issues force orders? Who registers weapons? Who supervises crossings? Who accepts customs declarations and collects duties? Who measures oil, markets it and receives revenue? Who signs agreements? Who issues flight permissions? Who reviews decisions and holds violators accountable? Clear, documented and traceable answers turn sovereignty from a political value into institutional capacity.

28. The Baseline: Seven Dashboards, Not One Number

The chapter creates no composite “Iraq Sovereignty Index”. Averaging force, borders, oil, agreements and trust can conceal collapse in a sensitive dimension behind improvement elsewhere. Measurement starts with seven independent dashboards. After at least three years of consistent data, the value of a composite indicator can be assessed.

29. Indicators and Targets Through 2045

The Vision uses 100% targets only when legal comprehensiveness is itself the objective: registering every official institution, entering every lawful crossing in the register, ensuring every force has a legal basis and command chain, and recording every agreement within the register's definition. Crime rates, clearance times and trust receive no arbitrary percentages before baselines are established.

Targets are phased and functional. Missing values are not filled in; baselines will be established during 2027–2030.

30. Vision 2045 and the Four Transition Stages

31. High-Impact Implementation Programmes

Sovereignty needs no new apparatus above the state. Existing institutions lead programmes within their mandates, using legislation for genuine legal gaps rather than merely announcing reform. Costs are classified qualitatively because a total “cost of restoring sovereignty” is indefensible. Some programmes are financially low-cost but politically demanding; others have high transformational costs because of infrastructure, integration and technology.

32. Implementation and Funding Matrix

Costs are categorical, not monetary. The specific monetary reference available in the evidence file is the ASYCUDA project; it is not used to price integrated border management as a whole.

33. What Can We Learn from International Experience?

The comparison principle is “transfer the mechanism, not the state”. No international case matches Iraq's federalism, security history or distribution of institutions and resources. Comparison helps explain sequencing, verification, oversight, links between disarmament and political and institutional development, and the distinction between unified command and comprehensive centralisation.

34. Scenarios Through 2045

35. Risks and Early-Warning Indicators

36. A Monopoly of Force Under the Law, Not Above It

No disarmament based on sectarian or ethnic identity; no collective punishment; no suppression of opposition in sovereignty's name; no partisan use of the military; no abolition of federalism; no open-ended emergencies; no unlawful seizure or detention; no bypassing courts; no unlimited security surveillance; and peaceful political activity remains protected. Every transition from armed action to politics must open civic space rather than close it.

The greater the state's monopoly of force, the more important safeguards become, because citizens should not need private force to protect their rights. Legitimate public force is stronger when it can be challenged, reviewed and held accountable, not when immune from them. Judicial independence, courts, access to justice and enforcement of judgments are left to the next chapter.

37. Conclusion: Closing the Sovereignty Gap

Sovereignty is not isolation. Iraq can remain open, allied, trading and using foreign technology and finance, provided decisions originate in competent Iraqi institutions, relationships remain reviewable and others receive no independent public authority. Sovereignty also does not mean centralisation: a single federal state can constitutionally distribute powers without dividing sovereignty among competing entities.

Nor does the state need to monopolise every individual firearm. It needs exclusive authority over organised public force. Lawful civilian weapons are regulated through licensing and registration; organised political or military force may not independently decide to use force outside the constitutional order.

Sovereignty appears daily in decisions, weapons, crossings, borders, barrels, revenues and agreements. A sovereign state knows who decides, who implements, under what authorisation, with which funds, how outcomes are reviewed and how overreach is sanctioned. The 2045 project thus becomes “closing sovereignty gaps and translating constitutional mandates into full institutional practice”, not “recovering lost sovereignty”.

A monopoly of decisions and force is nevertheless insufficient. Force vested in the state can itself become dangerous without general rules binding officials, citizens, institutions and parties. This chapter therefore hands over the next question:

Consolidated References

1. Iraq Vision 2045: Operational Guide, approved 2026 edition; official index; preceding final chapters, especially V1-D02-C01, “The State First”.

2. Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, particularly Articles 1, 9, 61, 73, 78, 109, 110, 111, 112 and 121.

3. Iraqi Ministry of Justice, Iraqi Gazette: Ministry of Interior Law No. 20 of 2016; Counter Terrorism Service Law No. 31 of 2016; Popular Mobilization Commission Law No. 40 of 2016; Weapons Law No. 51 of 2017.

4. Federal Supreme Court, February 2022 judgment concerning the Kurdistan Region's Oil and Gas Law.

5. Iraqi Ministry of Oil and State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO), export data and statistics and relevant official arrangements, 2025–2026.

6. Kurdistan Regional Government/Ministry of Natural Resources, statements on the agreement, resumption of oil exports and marketing through SOMO, 2025.

7. Ministry of Finance/General Commission of Customs, ASYCUDAWorld and customs-procedure automation; UNCTAD, Iraq customs modernisation project.

8. Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Ur portal, civilian firearms registration and licensing services and campaigns, 2026.

9. Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs/joint statement of 27 September 2024 on ending the coalition mission and transition; US Department of Defense materials on the transition timetable through September 2026.

10. NATO, NATO Mission Iraq, 2026 updates; SHAPE, mission posture adjustment and personnel relocation to Naples in March 2026.

11. United Nations, Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS).

12. DCAF, literature on security-sector governance and the monopoly of legitimate force.

13. IOM/WCO, integrated border-management and risk-management frameworks.

14. Bundeswehr/Bundestag, materials on civilian and parliamentary oversight of Germany's armed forces.

15. United Nations and OHR, experience in Colombia and Bosnia and Herzegovina; Northern Ireland legislation; official Bangsamoro process sources; Singapore Customs/TradeNet.

16. Evidence, analysis, sources and proposed targets file V1-D02-C02, frozen on 14 August 2026, the chapter's primary research reference.