Security as a Condition for National Renewal

1. Executive Summary

This chapter opens Part Three of Iraq Vision 2045 after Part Two completed the question of building the state internally. It established that Iraq needs a state holding public capacity, with sovereign decisions inside constitutional institutions, authority subject to law, policy and budgets converted into outcomes, and capacity protected from capture and corruption. Yet all this presupposes an environment where the state, society and economy can function. A school unable to open, a factory stopped by violence, a blocked road, a company unable to protect employees or a public institution without a continuity plan for a major shock demonstrate that administrative and legal capacity alone are insufficient without security.

Security here does not mean “the absence of every incident”. It is the ability of state and society to protect life, institutions, sovereignty and the economy from high-impact threats, prevent what can be prevented, contain what occurs, reduce losses, maintain essential functions and recover within reasonable time. Security therefore combines prevention, readiness, deterrence, response and resilience, rather than being a single measure of force numbers or spending.

Iraq's baseline requires a historical reading. The country moved from a period when terrorism and organised violence could control extensive territory and disrupt the state to one in which terrorism's impact fell substantially. The Global Terrorism Index recorded 69 terrorism-related deaths in Iraq in 2023, down from 197 in 2022, and its more recent reports noted a very large decline relative to the peaks of the preceding two decades. This strategic improvement must not be understated, but does not mean threats have disappeared or security is complete. Priorities have shifted from territory recovery alone to preventing relapse, managing organised crime, borders and regional shocks, maintaining critical infrastructure and preparing for emerging threats.¹

Public trust offers a different signal from incident counts. Arab Barometer's 2024 survey found 77% trust in the armed forces and 71% in police, far above most political institutions. This trust is a security asset because it facilitates reporting, cooperation and compliance. It does not exempt institutions from oversight or alone demonstrate operational effectiveness. The chapter therefore measures security through a multidimensional dashboard: violence trends, perceived safety, trust and legitimacy, readiness, functional continuity, the economy and investment, and rights and accountability.²

National renewal connects to security through mechanisms rather than slogans. Violence and uncertainty raise insurance, protection and transport costs, shorten investment horizons and make capital and skills more cautious about long-term commitments. Stability does not itself create a productive economy, however; security enables progress alongside the rule of law, electricity, infrastructure, financing, administration and skills. “No economy without stability” therefore does not explain every economic weakness, but identifies what becomes impossible or more expensive when risks are unpredictable.

Deterrence is broader than armament. Successful deterrence leads an adversary to expect that its objective will fail, its costs will be unacceptable, or both. It rests on actual capability, decision credibility, intelligible communication, denial capability and resilience allowing the state to continue even after a breach. This chapter leaves force and weapons details to the next and defines the standard: measurable defence and deterrence capability linked to threats, gaps and costs, not apparatus size.

Rights limits are not a token conclusion. Article 9 of the Constitution places armed forces and security agencies under civilian control, prohibits their use to repress the people or interfere in politics, and subjects the national intelligence service to civilian control, legislative oversight, law and human-rights principles. Article 15 protects life, security and liberty, while rights and freedoms provisions impose legal and judicial limits on detention and surveillance and guarantee expression and peaceful demonstration within the Constitution. These are not constraints against security; they are conditions of its durability and legitimacy.³⁴

The 2027–2045 pathway begins with what the system needs more than any new purchase: a unified national risk picture, baselines, comparable data, clear crisis leadership roles, continuity plans, joint exercises and security programmes linked to assessable outcomes. It then moves towards prevention, early warning and integration, and national resilience sustaining government and infrastructure through shocks, culminating in 2045 security that is institutionally stable above individuals, campaigns and temporary circumstances.

2. From an Honest, Capable State to a Secure Environment for National Renewal

Part Two concludes with a state defined not by its power to issue orders, but by its ability to produce public outcomes under law and integrity. Its final question was whether that state can protect the environment in which it operates. Part Three begins here. The state does not build security for its own sake; it protects the conditions of living, working, contracting, moving, learning, producing and peaceful political disagreement.

This bridge prevents two deviations: security becoming a closed sector detached from society and the economy, and every civilian issue becoming a security matter. Unemployment, water, housing, protest and economic policy are not inherently security mandates. Some consequences may be pressures or risk multipliers, but management remains civilian unless a specific legal threat emerges. Calling every crisis “national security” expands exceptions, reduces transparency and encourages shifting responsibility from competent institutions to agencies of force.

3. Operational Definition: Security Sufficient for National Renewal

Security sufficient for national renewal means preventive, protective, deterrent and resilient capability that makes major threats detectable and manageable, sustains life, institutions and the economy within acceptable risk, and uses force under law, jurisdiction and accountability. “Sufficient” matters: the aim is not unrealistic elimination of risk, but reducing probability, impact and disruption to levels permitting state and society to operate and plan.

Three frequently conflated terms must also be separated. A threat is an actor, event or process with the capability and intent or potential to cause harm. Risk estimates the probability and scale of harmful effects in a particular context. Vulnerability is a weakness making harm easier or greater. A threat may remain constant while risk falls as vulnerabilities are closed; some risks, such as major natural disasters, involve no deliberate adversary at all.

4. The Iraqi Baseline: From Recovering Territory to Managing Evolving Risk

A security baseline cannot be a snapshot. Since 2003, Iraq has passed through radically different phases: extensive violence, insurgency and sectarian conflict; ISIS's rise and territorial control in 2014–2017; state recovery of territory and declining terrorist violence; and a stage focused on sustaining improvement, preventing relapse and managing broader risks. Vision 2045 therefore compares today's Iraq not only with wartime peaks, but with the needs of a country seeking growth, investment and institutional stability over two decades.

Source: Institute for Economics & Peace; Arab Barometer 2024. Note: missing values are not filled with estimates.

This baseline reveals an important paradox: Iraq has far greater security assets than at the conflict's peak, yet lacks an integrated national dashboard measuring readiness, resilience, risk costs and the rights of people dealing with security agencies as consistently as terrorism data. Phase one is therefore also about knowledge, not merely equipment.

5. Threat Map: What Are We Protecting Iraq Against?

The evidence map combines threats of different kinds that must not be placed on one scale. External military threats differ in actors, tools and timing from terrorist cells; organised crime differs from critical-infrastructure outages; and drought is a pressure potentially increasing displacement and tension, not a security “enemy”. The map's function is to select the right instrument, not expand the definition of security.

6. Theme One — No Economy Without Stability

“No economy without stability” is valid when understood as a cost mechanism. Enterprises expecting interruption, violence or threats to staff add guards, insurance, alternative transport and larger inventories, or reduce working hours and investment. Banks unable to assess risks tighten financing conditions. Transport firms reroute, investors postpone long-lived assets, and skilled workers move where they can plan. The result is not “the disappearance of the economy”, but shorter horizons, higher costs and lower productivity.

The peace dividend is the space declining violence creates for people, land, projects and trade to return. It is not guaranteed income. Violence may fall without cities becoming production centres if electricity, law, financing and services remain weak. This chapter therefore links the peace dividend to the state's ability to convert stability into investment, employment and infrastructure, attributing no economic improvement to security alone.

From this chapter's perspective, economic security in Vision 2045 means a dependable operating environment: one incident should not cause prolonged stoppage; transport, energy and communications should not remain single points of failure; and government should have known continuity and recovery plans. Economic policies themselves belong in the economic parts; this chapter builds the continuity condition.

Methodological note: causality operates through intermediate channels, not a fixed quantitative equation.

7. Theme Two — No Investment Without Security

Risk does not automatically stop investment; difficult environments attract it when returns are high or risks priceable. Yet unpredictable risk changes investment's type, not merely volume. Investors favour short, quickly recoverable, easily exited projects or demand higher returns. This runs counter to Vision 2045's need for factories, networks, infrastructure and knowledge projects with long horizons.

“Security for investment” must therefore be measured through business experience, not state rhetoric. Required indicators include risk-related insurance costs, security-driven interruptions, transport or operating delays and official responses to incidents. Where no unified national series exists, one should be established in 2027 through investor and business-environment surveys rather than assuming figures.

Security must not become the sole explanation for weak Iraqi investment. Investors also face the rule of law, contract enforcement, land, electricity, financing, procedures and corruption. This chapter uses a multifactor model: security raises or lowers the “risk premium”, while other institutions determine whether the opportunity itself is executable.

The relationship can also run in reverse. Investment creating jobs, local connections and stable opportunities may support stability in some settings, but not automatically: unemployment does not directly “cause terrorism”, and development does not remove political, ideological or organisational motives for violence. Single-cause explanations are therefore rejected.

For investors, labelling a city or sector “safe” is insufficient. Decisions involve more precise questions: can the site remain accessible, can staff and suppliers keep moving, is a clear body responsible for incident response, can operations resume within a known period, and are there legal compensation and dispute-resolution mechanisms when security events interrupt obligations? Institutional, verifiable answers reduce unpriceable risk. The state should therefore measure business experience of security interruptions, recovery times and protection costs, rather than merely ask about “investment attractiveness”.

Another important phenomenon needs monitoring: investors who distrust state protection buy private security where possible. Guards, walls, protected transport, insurance and reserve inventories increase. Large projects may absorb these costs while small ones cannot. The result is not just higher expenses but a less competitive market, where firms able to buy protection are more likely to survive. Good public security is therefore an economic public good: it reduces costly private solutions and lets smaller firms operate under the same rules.

Regionally, long-term investment needs to know how the state responds when external shocks spill inward. Baghdad cannot eliminate regional tension, but can reduce its effects through clear continuity plans, alternative transport and communications, rapid civilian–security coordination and consistent official messages preventing rumours from multiplying risk. Resilience thus forms part of the investment climate: businesses ask not only how likely a crisis is, but whether it will become prolonged disruption because the state has not rehearsed its response.

This chapter therefore sets no investment target attributable to security alone. The economic chapter will measure investment, production and financing across all their determinants. Here the target is removing the “unnecessary risk premium”: known risks become assessable, responses predictable, and security interruptions and recovery times decline. If these conditions are met without improved investment, the state must examine other constraints rather than blame security or use it to conceal problems in law, electricity, financing and administration.

8. Theme Three — No State Without Deterrent Capability

A state unable to prevent an adversary imposing its will through force cannot guarantee sovereignty, however good its civilian institutions. Deterrence begins not with platform or troop counts, but with the question: what action do we want the adversary to avoid, and why would it believe the cost exceeds the gain?

The chapter adopts a simplified four-part deterrence model: actual capability, credibility of necessary action under lawful decisions, communication making the message intelligible, and denial making objectives harder to achieve. Resilience strengthens deterrence further: if an adversary knows disabling one function will not paralyse the state, attack becomes less valuable in its calculations.

Note: this model defines deterrence philosophy only; military capability details belong in the next chapter.

Deterrence differs by actor. Other states assess costs, interests, escalation and exit options. Terrorist groups may not respond to punishment threats similarly; denial, network and financing disruption and intelligence become more important. Organised crime responds to detection, confiscation and punishment probabilities. These differences rule out a one-tool-for-every-threat strategy.

Legitimacy also contributes to deterrence. “Sovereignty and the Monopoly of Decision-Making” established that final public-force authority belongs within constitutional institutions. A further conclusion follows: force outside a clear, accountable decision chain does not necessarily add net national deterrence; it may confuse signals and command and invite miscalculation. Clear civilian decisions, jurisdiction, chains of command and professional capability are therefore themselves components of deterrence.

9. Readiness and Resilience: Security That Endures Through Shocks

National readiness depends less on size than on clarity about who does what and when. It requires executable crisis plans, backup communications, joint exercises, government-continuity arrangements and known responsibilities for ministries, governorates and private operators of vital functions. This chapter need not publish sensitive details; it needs evidence that every critical function has a tested continuity plan.

National resilience extends deterrence from protecting facilities to protecting functions. The question is not only whether a plant, centre or network can be protected, but whether energy, water, transport, communications and health continue at acceptable levels if one node fails, with alternatives, stocks, repair teams and decision communications available. This approach avoids exposing operational weaknesses and measures service continuity.

Resilience also requires clear responsibility. The ministry owning a vital function is responsible for its continuity plan; security bodies protect it against threats within their mandates; regulators set minimum standards; and private service operators comply with alternative plans and regular tests. Critical-infrastructure protection must not transfer electricity, water or communications management to security agencies. Security provides protection, information and coordination; technical and economic management remains with civilian specialists.

The practical test is “continuity of function, not merely survival of the asset”. A facility may remain intact while service fails because communications, supplies or operating teams are lost; a damaged facility may still provide service through temporary alternatives. Continuity plans must therefore include recovery-time objectives, critical alternatives, authorised decision-makers, public communications and return from emergency to normal operations. Sensitive operational details remain inside institutional plans; publishable measures include plan coverage, testing regularity and finding-closure times.

Exercises are not displays. Their value lies in “what changed afterwards”: documented findings, correction owners, deadlines, retesting and closure. Dozens of exercises without changes to plans, communications or powers measure activity rather than readiness. Readiness therefore follows the previously established outcome-oriented state logic: plan → exercise → gap → correction → verification → institutional learning.

Note: the principle is transparent performance without publishing information that could increase vulnerability.

10. Theme Four — The Strong State and the Police State

This distinction is crucial in a security discussion because success can be mistakenly measured by fear of the state or disappearance of opposition. Police states may create outward calm through expanded surveillance, exceptions and political criminalisation, but weaken security's own sources: trust, cooperation and legitimacy. Citizens afraid to report or believing institutions are used politically against them withhold information prevention needs.

Source: Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005.

The Iraqi Constitution provides a clear standard. Armed forces and security agencies are subject to civilian authority, must not repress the people or interfere in politics, and the national intelligence service operates under civilian control, legislative oversight, law and human-rights principles. Civilian control is therefore part of force design, not an external limitation imposed upon it.⁵

Any security measure restricting rights needs a legal basis, legitimate purpose, necessity, proportionality, duration and review. “National security” alone cannot bypass this chain. The Constitution protects life, security and liberty, conditions deprivation or restriction on law and judicial decisions where required, prohibits torture and protects expression, peaceful demonstration, privacy and correspondence under constitutional safeguards.⁶

This yields a “securitisation test”. Before moving a civilian issue into national-security logic, five questions must be answered: what is the specific threat rather than the broad political description, what harm is expected, why are ordinary civilian instruments insufficient, what is the security body's legal jurisdiction, and when does ordinary civilian management resume? Without reviewable answers, a security label likely expands exceptions rather than solves the problem. Peaceful protest remains civilian activity even if inconvenient to government; drought remains a resource and development issue unless specific security risks require limited, lawful intervention.

State strength also appears in ending exceptional measures. A measure initially justified by real risk can lose its justification as circumstances change; it therefore needs a review date, an official responsible for extension or termination and a challengeable effect where law permits. This prevents accumulated exceptions becoming permanent administration. The Vision aims not to reduce agencies' capacity, but to focus it on real threats rather than exhaust it on unrelated civilian or political tasks.

11. Trust and Security Legitimacy

Trust is not general political satisfaction. Citizens may trust the army more than government or police more than parliament; each institution and question must therefore be measured separately. In Arab Barometer's 2024 survey, armed forces and police were the only listed institutions trusted by a large majority. This advantage can strengthen community relations, but neither prevents investigation of abuses nor replaces readiness and effectiveness indicators.⁷

Trust has practical security effects: citizens report sooner, cooperate with investigations, believe warnings and follow emergency instructions when institutions seem legitimate and impartial. Conversely, abuses, selectivity or politicisation may produce short-term results while weakening long-term information flows and cooperation. Security legitimacy is therefore a component of capability, not public-relations material.

12. International Comparisons: Transfer the Mechanism, Not the System of Government

No single country represents an “Iraqi security model”. Comparisons help when they reveal transferable mechanisms: organising civilian cooperation, building continuity, balancing security and rights, and making interministerial responses testable.

Methodological note: comparisons use mechanisms only; countries' outcomes and political systems are not templates to copy.

13. A Vision for a Secure Iraq in 2045 and Its Scenarios

By 2045, the Vision does not seek a “threat-free Iraq”. It seeks a state that knows its risks, detects danger early, prevents most preventable harm, deters aggression, contains incidents, sustains government, infrastructure and the economy, recovers quickly and uses force under law and oversight. Success means lower risk while preserving an open society and constitutional state.

Methodological note: scenarios are testing tools, not forecasts.

14. Transformation Phases, 2027 to 2045

Note: progression conditions concern achievements, not formal dates.

15. Indicators and Targets: From Incidents to System Capability

Success cannot mean merely fewer incidents. Violence may fall because of temporary regional circumstances or changing adversary behaviour. The dashboard therefore combines security outcomes, social experience, readiness, continuity, economy and rights. No single composite “Iraq Security” score is used in the first edition.

Note: targets are policy commitments, not forecasts, and are fixed after baseline establishment where necessary.

16. Implementation Programmes: Focused, High-Impact Functions

Iraq does not need a new agency for every security function. The rule is to develop functions within existing institutions unless the gap is demonstrably an absent mandate. The following package groups evidence-based recommendations into seven manageable, measurable functions.

Note: no new institution is created where an existing function can be developed.

17. Implementation, Cost and Financing Matrix

Costs here exclude force armament and combat procurement; the next chapter builds those on threats, capability gaps and plans. This chapter covers assessment, data, strategic training, exercises, continuity, management and learning systems. Available numerical illustrations are insufficient for national adoption, so this version fixes no aggregate figures before scope and implementation studies.

Note: detailed costs follow phase-one scope and implementation studies; no overall national-security reform figure is adopted.

18. Risks and Safeguards: Preventing Security from Becoming a Source of Risk

Note: likelihood assessments are qualitative, not mathematical probabilities.

The chapter's governing safeguards are constitutional civilian leadership; defined jurisdiction; a legal basis for any restriction; necessity and proportionality; duration limits and review; a right of appeal where applicable; prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment; protection of privacy and correspondence under the law; freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; a distinction between protest and violence; judicial and institutional accountability; and no use of readiness or risk indicators to justify collective political restrictions. These safeguards are incorporated into programme design, not added after implementation.

19. Conclusion: Security That Can Be Relied Upon, Not Feared

Security in Iraq Vision 2045 is neither a permanent state of emergency, nor the density of deployments, nor “security first” rhetoric. It is an institutional capacity that enables citizens to live and work, investors to plan, and the state to protect its sovereignty, institutions and infrastructure, while making adversaries recognise that their objectives will not be easily achieved—and keeping force itself subject to the Constitution and the law.

This chapter establishes four conclusions. There can be no sustainable economy amid widespread, unpredictable risk; no long-term investment without a security environment whose risks can be priced and from which recovery is possible; no sovereign state without deterrence and the capacity to endure; and no sustainable security if the instruments of protection become instruments of political control. The equation for Part Three is therefore capability + legitimacy + readiness + resilience, rather than material capability alone.

This chapter has deliberately stopped short of the detailed military question. It has identified what must be protected, why Iraq needs deterrence, the constraints that make force legitimate, and what should be measured at the national-security level. It remains to define the military institution that carries a fundamental part of this function.

References

1. Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, especially Articles 9, 15, 37, 38, 40, 46, 61, 109 and 110, as relevant to each citation.
2. Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2024 and subsequent reports on terrorism trends in Iraq.
3. Arab Barometer, Wave VIII, Iraq report / Iraqi public opinion report, fieldwork conducted in 2024.
4. Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index, used to check the general direction of security and peace, not as a national operational baseline.
5. World Bank materials and reports on Iraq concerning conflict, development and investment, and analysis of the channels through which violence and uncertainty affect economic performance.
6. United Nations and IOM materials on displacement, human security and resilience insofar as they directly relate to the chapter's subject.
7. Comparative official sources on comprehensive security in Finland, resilience in Estonia, regional stability in Jordan, post-conflict transition in Colombia, and institutional capacity in Singapore.