The Professional National Army

1. Executive Summary

This chapter begins with the question left by “Security as a Condition for National Renewal”: if Iraq needs a credible capacity for deterrence and defence under the law, what kind of armed forces can perform that function? The preceding chapter established that security is an enabling condition, not an unrestricted mandate for force; that deterrence extends beyond weapons; and that readiness, resilience and legitimacy are components of the security outcome itself. This chapter therefore begins neither with the army's size nor with equipment lists. It begins with the mission the state wants to accomplish, then builds doctrine, force design, personnel, logistics and financing around it.

The governing research conclusion is that Iraq does not need a “larger army” as a goal in itself. It needs a defence system that repeats an auditable cycle: national security → military mission → doctrine → planning scenarios → capability requirements → force design → personnel and training → command and control → logistics and maintenance → procurement, manufacturing or partnership → measurable readiness → periodic review. When this chain breaks, a state can possess expensive platforms without possessing capability. When it is complete, every dinar, training hour and contract becomes part of an intelligible defence function.

The Iraqi Constitution establishes the overriding limits that no doctrine or personnel plan may exceed. Article 9 subjects the armed forces and security services to civilian authority, assigns them the defence of Iraq, and prohibits their use to suppress the people or interfere in political affairs and transfers of power. Article 78 makes the Prime Minister Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, while Article 110 makes national-security policy and the establishment and management of armed forces to secure the borders and defend Iraq an exclusive federal competence. These provisions do not automatically produce professionalism, but they define “national” and “professional”: loyalty to the Constitution and the state, not to a temporary government, a party or an individual commander.¹

The public baseline does not permit a comprehensive numerical assessment of Iraqi readiness, and this is not a gap to fill with journalistic estimates. Operational availability rates, ammunition stocks, system faults, specialised training hours, and communications and deployment details are, to a substantial extent, information that should remain internal or secret. The chapter therefore adopts a dual model: a detailed internal leadership dashboard measuring mission-specific readiness, and an aggregate public dashboard assessing the soundness of the system without revealing operational secrets. Conversely, firm public facts do exist: a clear constitutional framework; an official national-security strategy; announced institutional activity concerning doctrine; military expenditure of approximately $6.18 billion in 2024 according to the SIPRI series presented by the World Bank; a legally established Military Industrialisation Commission; and international cooperation in military education, leadership and resource management.²

Transformation through 2045 is built not on successive platform purchases, but on four phases. The first, 2027–2030, establishes the force's actual condition through a national defence review, institutionalises the doctrine cycle, establishes baselines for readiness, personnel and dependencies, and links programmes to a multiyear defence plan. The second, 2031–2035, builds the joint force: command and control, joint training, maintenance and logistics, officer and non-commissioned-officer career paths, and reserves—if the review demonstrates a need for them. The third, 2036–2040, deepens domestic sustainment and selected technologies and reduces critical dependencies. The fourth, 2041–2045, does not declare the army “complete”; it establishes an institution capable of redesigning itself whenever threats, technology or resources change.

The measure of success in 2045 is neither a global ranking nor a military parade. Success means that the state knows the mission, the capability it requires, readiness according to a stable definition, life-cycle costs, and what can continue if the supplier changes; whether education and promotion produce professional leaders; whether maintenance, ammunition and training are funded; whether reserves—if adopted—can actually be called up; and whether the institution remains neutral and under civilian control. The army thereby becomes part of the “outcome-oriented state”: a force that can be relied upon and, at the same time, audited and reviewed without exposing what must remain secret.

2. From National Security to the Military Instrument: The Bridge That Closes the Contextual Gap

The preceding chapter established that security in Iraq Vision 2045 means the capacity of the state and society to protect life, institutions, sovereignty and the economy; prevent what can be prevented; contain events, reduce their effects and recover from them within the law. It also defined deterrence as preventing hostile action by persuading an adversary that its objective will fail or its cost will be unacceptable, through capability, credibility, communication, denial and resilience. Readiness was defined as the capacity for an orderly, rapid transition from normal conditions to response, and resilience as absorbing shocks, maintaining functions, recovering and adapting. These definitions are the starting point here and are not reconstructed.

An important functional boundary follows: national security is broader than the army. Diplomacy, the economy, policing, intelligence, border management, critical infrastructure, health, energy and communications all contribute to the state's capacity to withstand shocks. The army carries the military component of this system: deterring military aggression, defending territory and sovereignty, generating high-intensity force when civilian and security instruments are insufficient, and supporting civilian authorities in exceptional circumstances defined by law. The army thus remains an essential instrument within a security system, not the entire security system.

This transition adds another fundamental constraint: “Security protects the civilian sphere; it does not replace it.” The chapter therefore defines professionalism not as the army's ability to intervene in every crisis, but as its ability to know when to use military force, when to provide temporary support, and when responsibility must return to the police and civilian institutions. Permanent military involvement in everyday policing may appear to increase security presence immediately, but it consumes defence training, confuses rules governing force and chains of accountability, and adapts the institution to a mission that is not its natural function.

3. What Is a Professional National Army? Mission Before Platform

A professional national army is the public armed force established and led under the Constitution and the law to defend Iraq and its sovereignty. It is politically neutral, subject to constitutional civilian leadership, designed around reasonable missions and threats, and capable of joint operations and sustainment, so that personnel, platforms and budgets become operational, measurable and reviewable capability. “National” describes the reference point for loyalty and mission; “professional” describes how the institution is built and operated. Neither means abundant ceremonies, ranks or technology.

The “mission before platform” rule prevents two opposing errors. The first is purchasing a system because it is available or because it represents a political or technological symbol, then looking afterwards for its place within the force. The second is defending an existing structure merely because it exists. The correct approach begins: threat or scenario → mission → required effect → necessary capability → baseline → gap → alternatives → life-cycle cost → dependencies → decision. The decision may lead to procurement, modernisation, training, reorganisation, maintenance, partnership or project cancellation. Procurement is not an inevitable outcome.

In this sense, “defence policy” differs from “military strategy”, “doctrine” and “force design”. Policy determines what the state wants from the defence sector, why, and what resources are acceptable. Military strategy determines how the military instrument is used to achieve defence objectives. Doctrine provides the shared principles guiding preparation and employment. Force design determines the combination of personnel, organisation and capabilities. Operational plans, by contrast, address a specific situation and fall outside this public document.

4. Armed Forces' Missions and Their Constitutional Limits

The governing constitutional principle is not the “strength of the army”, but the legitimacy of its function. Article 9 does not place the armed forces outside the state: it makes them representative of the people's components, subjects them to civilian leadership, assigns the defence of Iraq as a central function, and prohibits their use to suppress the people or interfere in political affairs or transfers of power. It also prohibits military militias outside the armed forces and restricts electoral activity by serving military personnel while preserving their right to vote. This principle is the test for any expansion of missions, structures or personnel policies.³

Accordingly, the core military mission comprises defending territory and sovereignty, deterring external aggression, military protection of airspace, defending borders against military or high-intensity armed threats, and protecting strategic facilities in wartime when they form part of the defence effort. The armed forces may support civilian authorities during disasters, emergencies or high-intensity threats where the law permits, provided that the mission has a defined objective, duration, chain of command, rules for the use of force and exit plan.

Government, party competition, civilian administration, everyday policing, routine criminal investigation and service administration should not become ordinary military missions. The reason is not merely theoretical. Every hour, resource and element of doctrine devoted to permanent policing carries an opportunity cost for defence training; every prolonged overlap of jurisdiction complicates accountability and blurs citizens' expectations of the army and police. A professional army can support the state when needed, but does not become an “institution for every crisis”.

Source: Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005.

5. Iraq's Baseline: What We Know, What Needs Measuring, and What Must Remain Secret

An assessment of the army cannot usefully begin with an international estimate of troop numbers or website rankings of the “strongest armies”. Headcount does not tell us how many units can perform a mission; a platform does not tell us whether it is available; spending does not tell us what it produced. The chapter therefore adopts an “institutional-capability” baseline: it establishes what can be publicly substantiated, classifying the remainder either as a data gap to be filled internally or as legitimate secrecy whose contents should not be published in the first place.

The first established fact is that Iraq is not starting from zero. A National Security Strategy 2024–2028 was officially approved in 2024; Iraqi authorities announced mechanisms in 2026 to activate a new/updated national-security strategy; and the Ministry of Defence held an official conference in 2025 on “Military Doctrine for the Iraqi Army”. However, the public sources used in the research do not provide a complete published national doctrine against which its coherence with force design can be measured. The chapter therefore does not claim that “Iraq has no doctrine”. It records an access and publication gap and makes the defence review the instrument connecting strategy, doctrine and capability.⁴

Second, Iraqi military expenditure in 2024 was approximately $6.18 billion according to the SIPRI series presented by the World Bank. This is a useful financial comparison, but an input rather than an output. It does not, on its own, reveal the distribution of costs between personnel, training, maintenance, ammunition and investment, or the resulting level of readiness. The chapter therefore sets no fixed target as a percentage of GDP; instead, it requires the budget to follow from threats, missions, capability gaps and fiscal capacity.⁵

Third, a Military Industrialisation Commission exists, along with international partnerships in policy, strategy, force development, resources, leadership and military education. These are institutional capacities on which to build. Conversely, no unified public dashboard exists for operational-readiness rates, trained reserves, repair times or critical dependencies, and some of these values must remain internal. The first phase therefore begins by establishing a defence data dictionary that divides indicators into publicly aggregated, sensitive but aggregable, and operationally secret information.

Source: Iraqi Council of Representatives, Session (18), 19 April 2026.

6. National Military Doctrine: The Bridge Between Policy and Force

Military doctrine is neither a statement of general values nor a description of the army's equipment. Its function is to give forces a shared perspective on preparation, training and operations within known political and strategic objectives, while preserving commanders' professional judgement in application. Iraqi doctrine should therefore derive from five sequential questions: what must be defended militarily? What scenarios are reasonable? What outcome is required—prevention, denial, containment, or defence and continuity? What joint capabilities are needed? And what constraints arise from law, finances, geography and partnerships?⁷

The evidence favours a framework of “active national defence”, defensive in purpose and based on deterrence by denial, resilience and joint capability. This does not mean proclaiming an offensive or defensive doctrine as a slogan. It means making aggression difficult to succeed, detecting it early, protecting the force and vital national interests, maintaining endurance, and possessing a lawful and proportionate response when the mission requires it. This framework accords with the preceding chapter's definition of deterrence without repeating its philosophy: here, deterrence becomes a set of force-design questions.

Doctrine must distinguish constants from variables. The constants are civilian leadership, defence of the state rather than the temporary political order, political neutrality, the law, civilian protection, sustainment and readiness standards. The variables are force structure, technology, reserve size, training formats, investment proportions and partnerships. This distinction is essential because doctrine that freezes around a platform or formation becomes a justification for the status quo rather than an instrument for testing it.

Because public sources do not permit a full audit of the current doctrinal text, the first reform is not to write a new document from outside the institution, but to build a “doctrine cycle”: national strategy → defence policy → military strategy → joint doctrine → specialist doctrines → training and exercises → lessons learned → review. Doctrine thereby becomes a learning system, not a book on a shelf.

6.1 The National Defence Review: The Decision That Precedes the Numbers

The National Defence Review 2027–2028 is the instrument that converts the vision into a usable baseline. A single document—with classified and public layers—must address priority military threats, missions, current capabilities, readiness gaps, alternatives, life-cycle costs, personnel, dependencies and fiscal capacity. It is not a temporary committee producing a report, but the beginning of a periodic review cycle whose findings shape budgets, procurement, training, industry and reserves.

The review's greatest value lies in preventing a leap from “a sense of a shortfall” to “purchasing a platform”. An air-defence gap, for example, may concern detection, sharing the operational picture, maintenance, training, ammunition or C2 integration, rather than necessarily the number of platforms. A land-force gap may concern mobility, sustainment or communications. The capability gap must therefore be defined after measuring the entire mission, and material and non-material alternatives tested before a decision.

7. Force Design and Joint Command and Control

The greatest force-design error is to begin with the existing organisation and then defend it. Once missions and capabilities are defined, the state decides what belongs in a permanent high-readiness core, what can rotate between training, maintenance and readiness, and what can be generated through genuine reserves, partnerships or contracted support. The proportions of these tiers cannot be fixed publicly or before the review. Simply adopting them, however, transforms the question from “How many soldiers?” into “What response time is required, at what readiness level, and at what capability cost?”

Across evidence-based scenarios, capabilities recur whose value exceeds that of many higher-priced assets: joint command and control, situational awareness, communications, integrated air defence, transport, engineering, logistics, maintenance, military medicine and training. These capabilities act as force multipliers: an isolated platform remains an asset, whereas a platform integrated with decision-making, information, supply and training becomes a capability.

Joint command and control does not necessarily mean creating a new command. Joint structures and functions already exist in Iraq. The professional question is whether they produce joint decisions, a common operational picture, compatible communications, joint planning and exercises, and clear delegation boundaries. The defence review should measure decision flows from the political to the military-strategic level, information-sharing times in exercises, system compatibility, and the extent to which integration findings are closed after retesting.

Interoperability begins within the state before extending to external partners. The first layer is within each service: consistent communications, maintenance and training standards. The second is between Iraqi services: shared data, procedures and exercises. The third involves partners where needed. Supplier diversification therefore has no inherent value if it creates incompatible logistical, software and ammunition islands. Interoperability must formally become a criterion in every major capability project.

Methodological note: public indicators do not include numbers, locations or detailed operational-readiness rates.

7.1 Capability-Planning Scenarios: What Is Useful Across More Than One Threat?

Scenarios are not used here to predict a war, identify an adversary or define an operational axis. Their function is to test whether a proposed capability is useful in multiple circumstances and merits priority over a more specialised capability. The chapter tests four abstract planning patterns: relative stability with sovereignty-protection requirements; a limited aerial, missile or unmanned threat; a high-intensity armed threat exceeding internal-security instruments; and a regional shock disrupting some supply lines. Their value lies in revealing capabilities that recur in most circumstances without publishing any operational plan.

When command and control, situational awareness, communications, transport, integrated air defence, logistics, maintenance, engineering, military medicine and professional leadership recur across scenarios, they become strong candidates for priority. A capability serving only a highly specific scenario, assuming a single adversary, or relying on support that cannot be sustained requires more demanding testing before funding. This does not mean expensive platforms are unnecessary; it means their value is measured by what they add to the joint mission, not by what they represent in isolation.

Methodological note: the scenarios are framed generally to protect operational secrecy.

8. Military Personnel: From Establishments and Ranks to a Skills System

There is no scientific answer to the optimal force size before force design. Technology, reserves, deployment missions and readiness rates radically alter personnel needs. Workforce planning must therefore become an extension of force design: every post linked to a mission, skill, cost and development path. This distinguishes increasing headcount from filling a genuine skills shortage, and a role requiring a permanent service member from one suitable for a technician, civilian defence employee or reservist.

The personnel system begins with selection, job definition and assessment, but does not end there. It requires clear career paths for officers, non-commissioned officers, technicians and civilian defence staff; promotion based on merit, education and experience; rotation that broadens joint experience without undermining specialisation; and retention policies for scarce skills. Military Service and Retirement Law No. (3) of 2010 provides a framework for service and career progression, but the vision measures its success by its ability to produce a skills system rather than merely establishments and ranks.⁸

A professional officer is not produced by a single course. Professional military education must link national strategy to doctrine, joint leadership, resources, logistics and the capability life cycle. It also needs an Iraqi lessons-learned repository that turns exercise findings and experience into updated curricula and doctrine. External partnerships are useful when they transfer teaching methods, instructor preparation and curricula, not when the institution remains dependent on an external instructor to produce each new generation.

The non-commissioned-officer corps is one area of transformation that may deliver greater value than many purchases. Its role is not to replicate a foreign model, but to maintain daily standards and technical expertise, train personnel, lead at lower levels, translate officers' decisions into disciplined execution, and provide a career path that retains experience rather than losing it with every cycle. The review should therefore establish a baseline for NCO functions, educational pathways and retention before setting target proportions.

Military discipline in this chapter means lawful professional obedience, not blind obedience. The existence of a Military Penal Code and a Military Criminal Procedure Law confirms that discipline operates within the law, not outside it. Doctrine and education must explain the duty to execute lawful orders, commanders' responsibility, reporting and investigation mechanisms, defence rights and international humanitarian law. A professional army is more disciplined because it adheres more closely to its mission and the law, not because it is less subject to review.⁹

8.1 Preventing Politicisation and Partisanship: An Institution of the State, Not a Competitor

Political neutrality is a distinct formal pillar because it is a condition for capability continuity. An institution whose command and promotion standards change with every government loses knowledge and trust and enters a cycle of short-term loyalties. Article 9 directly prohibits interference in political affairs and transfers of power and restricts candidacy and campaigning by serving military personnel. Yet the text requires institutions: auditable appointment and promotion standards, documented exceptions, prohibition of campaign use of ranks or facilities, constitutional education, and channels protecting professional commanders from unlawful pressure.

Civilian control must also be distinguished from politicisation. Civilian control means that elected constitutional authorities set policy and resources and decide on the use of force, while military commanders advise and execute professionally. Politicisation means that promotion, command or units become extensions of partisan or electoral interests. The former is a condition of democracy; the latter damages both democracy and readiness.

9. Training and Professionalism: From Course Counts to a Readiness Cycle

Numbers of courses and graduates measure activity, not professionalism. Professional training is measured by what units and formations can do afterwards, and by the institution's ability to identify failure, correct it and retest. The vision therefore adopts a cycle: individual → specialist → unit → formation → joint → exercise → independent assessment → correction → retesting. Each level has a mission-linked success standard.

A joint exercise should not measure combat alone. It must test decision-making, communications, logistics, transport, medicine, engineering and sustainment, because failure in any one can halt capability. Simulation should be used where it reduces cost and increases repetition in complex skills, with After-Action Review linked to a repository of lessons, doctrine and curricula. Training that neither changes a standard nor closes a gap becomes an event rather than a learning system.

External training creates value when it becomes a repeatable Iraqi capability. Every partnership should ask: how many Iraqi instructors can now teach the curriculum? Have the materials been localised? Has an assessment system been built? Can the institution repeat the course after the partner leaves? This criterion matters more than the number of externally supported courses delivered.

10. Equipment Development and Readiness: Possessing a Platform Does Not Mean Possessing Capability

An equipment decision is the outcome of the planning chain, not its beginning. No major system enters the force through a transaction alone: it needs personnel, training, ammunition, maintenance, infrastructure, communications, support contracts, C2 integration and integration with other capabilities. The decision criterion is therefore the “cost of a ready capability”, not the “contract value”. Before contracting, a Capability Case must establish the mission, gap, alternatives, compatibility, life-cycle cost, time to operational introduction, dependencies, and modernisation and exit plans.

Iraq's announced M-SAM contract illustrates the value of this logic without becoming a procurement recommendation. The official source linked the contract to airspace protection and referred to training Iraqi technical and combat personnel and phased delivery. The lesson is not that the system's name is the solution, but that air defence is itself a chain: detection, identification, warning, decision, lawful interception, assessment and restoration of readiness, supported by maintenance, ammunition, communications and air integration. A single contract therefore cannot be treated as proof that the gap is closed, nor should quantities or locations be proposed in a public document.¹⁰

Air power is measured by functions, not registered aircraft numbers: airspace protection, interception, transport, reconnaissance, training and support. Meaningful measurement requires qualified pilots and technicians, mission-appropriate training hours, ammunition, maintenance, operational availability and C2 integration. These details should be measured internally. The vision can publish aggregate indicators such as implementation of training plans, the share of maintenance performed through accredited Iraqi capacity, and trends in reducing critical dependence without revealing combat readiness.

Land power is measured by mobility, communications, protection, engineering, supply, medical support and cooperation with air forces, not the number of brigades. Naval power is designed for Iraq's coastline and mission: protecting maritime space, facilities and limited waterways, and surveillance—not imitating navies with different coastlines and commitments. Unmanned capabilities are introduced when they solve a known problem, integrate with command and control, and have maintenance, data and an alternative when jamming occurs or suppliers change. This chapter does not turn that into a drone-warfare plan or a cybersecurity section.

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Weapon System Sustainment.

10.1 The Capability Decision Gate: Before a Contract Becomes a Long-Term Commitment

Every major capability programme needs a decision gate proportionate to its cost and risks. This document does not propose uniform bureaucracy for every small purchase; it requires greater depth as costs rise, life cycles lengthen and decisions become harder to reverse. Before contracting, the capability case must establish the mission, scenario and baseline gap; compare non-material alternatives—doctrine, training, organisation or integration—with material alternatives; and demonstrate compatibility with C2 and existing systems, alongside lifetime acquisition, operation, maintenance, ammunition, infrastructure and training costs.

The case must also address time to operational introduction, not merely delivery; dependence on the supplier, software and technical data; export restrictions or crisis-support constraints; domestic maintenance capacity; and modernisation and decommissioning plans. These questions prevent a deal being measured by a platform's arrival while capability remains in training, maintenance or integration for years. They also identify when partnership or upgrading existing assets is more worthwhile than new procurement.

The decision gate also requires retrospective review: did the capability achieve the performance used to justify it? Were sustainment costs within estimates? Did unanticipated dependencies emerge? Did technology or threats alter the original requirement? A stopping or restructuring stage matters as much as an initiation stage, because institutional professionalism means being able to terminate a programme that no longer fulfils its mission, rather than continuing merely because the state has already spent money on it.

11. Logistics, Maintenance and Sustainment: The Invisible Backbone

A force unable to supply itself and maintain its equipment is not ready, however advanced its platforms. Logistics is not “rear support” in a secondary sense: it is a combat capability determining how long the force can continue. It includes fuel, ammunition, parts, transport, storage, medical supply, inventory tracking and contracting. It must therefore feature in exercises and be measured internally through resupply and repair times, rather than static inventory reports.

Life-Cycle Cost is the financial concept that prevents the purchase of a capability the state cannot operate. The initial price excludes training, ammunition, fuel, maintenance, technicians, contracts, modernisation, infrastructure and disposal at the end of the system's life. GAO reports on weapon-system sustainment show that operations and support can constitute a large share of lifetime costs in the cases studied. No American percentage is transferred arithmetically to Iraq, but the principle holds: a procurement decision commits financial and technical obligations for years.¹¹

Defence independence does not mean manufacturing everything. One of its most realistic forms is possessing sufficient maintenance capacity, technical data, skills, spare parts and alternatives to prevent an essential capability stopping when a supplier changes. In some cases, “procurement + deep domestic maintenance” provides greater sovereignty than “nominal manufacturing” dependent on external engineers, data and components beyond Iraq's control.

The first phase therefore establishes a critical defence-dependency register, classifying spare parts, ammunition, maintenance, software, communications, training and technical data as acceptable dependence, dependence requiring diversification, or critical dependence requiring an alternative, stockpile or domestic capability. Quantities and vulnerabilities are not published; only the trend in reducing critical dependencies is disclosed.

12. Reserves and National Mobilisation: Tested Capability, Not a Paper Figure

The reserve question begins not with “Do we want national military service?”, but with the mission requiring additional forces and the time needed to generate them. The answer may be a permanent professional force, voluntary reserves, contracted reserves, a particular military-service model or a combination. Any choice must compare readiness, cost, fairness, training infrastructure, labour-market effects and mobilisation. According to official verification through 27 August 2026, the proposed National Military Service Law completed its first reading in the Council of Representatives on 19 April 2026 and had not become an effective law on which the vision's targets could be based.¹²

The governing definition of reserves matters more than their size: a “countable” reservist is someone registered in a clearly defined legal category, assigned a specialism and mission, with valid training completed within a specified period, equipment or an equipment plan, and the ability to be called up through a tested system, with rules protecting civilian employment and rights. Anyone failing these conditions is excluded from the ready-reserve indicator, even if their name is registered.

Finland and Singapore offer two mechanisms, not models to copy. Finland shows that reserves are linked to assignments, refresher training and the law; Singapore demonstrates the value of actually testing mobilisation while recognising the burden on families and employers. Iraq's lesson is to begin with a limited pilot involving particular skills or units, measure call-up, equipping and integration times and labour-market effects, and expand only if the model proves its value.¹³¹⁴

Compulsory conscription, if reconsidered legislatively, remains a defence-policy option rather than a national value in itself. “Building patriotism” is not sufficient justification for its cost. The review must demonstrate a defence requirement for a wider reserve base that alternatives cannot provide, supported by training and equipment infrastructure, fair application, and protection of education and employment. Otherwise, the system may produce large numbers with superficial training and high economic costs, without readiness.

Source: Finnish Government / Ministry of Defence; Singapore Ministry of Defence (MINDEF); Iraqi Council of Representatives on the status of the national military service proposal.

13. Protecting Borders and Sovereignty: Military Defence, Not Border-Crossing Administration

The distinction between Border Defence and Border Security must remain clear so the army does not absorb the responsibilities addressed in the next chapter. Military border defence means preventing or deterring cross-border military or high-intensity armed threats and protecting territory and sovereignty. It requires situational awareness, command and control, mobility, support, lawful firepower and sustainment. Control of crossings, smuggling, drugs, crime and border ports belongs primarily to law enforcement, internal security, customs, intelligence and the judiciary.

This chapter does not reopen the question “Who controls the borders?”, settled in the sovereignty chapter, nor specify deployments or locations. It requires a design criterion: can the force identify a military threat, move an appropriate capability, sustain it and integrate it with air power and other capabilities across extensive and varied terrain? Iraq's geography increases the value of situational awareness, mobility, logistics, engineering and communications more than it justifies general numerical expansion.

When a military threat overlaps with smuggling or a domestic network, the response is joint, but jurisdictions do not disappear. The army addresses the high-intensity threat within its mission, while the police, border guards, border-port authorities and intelligence services address crime, crossings and investigation. The next chapter develops this civilian and security system in detail.

14. Building Defence Industries and Capabilities: Selective Sovereignty, Not Self-Sufficiency

The existence of the Military Industrialisation Commission means the vision does not begin by asking “Should we establish an institution?” The Commission already exists under Law No. 25 of 2019 and states that its objectives include meeting armed-forces needs, reducing imports and developing personnel. The real question is therefore: what must genuinely become Iraqi to improve readiness and sustainment, what remains more rational to purchase, and what requires a partnership transferring knowledge, maintenance or production? 18¹⁵

The Make–Buy–Partner framework prevents symbolic industrialisation. “Make” is appropriate where demand is sustained, the technology is attainable, quality is achievable and sovereign or economic value is clear. “Buy” is appropriate where technology is highly complex, need is urgent or scale is uneconomic. “Partner” is appropriate where maintenance, assembly, knowledge or data rights can be transferred, or domestic suppliers developed. The decision is measured not by a nominal “local content” share, but by capability availability, quality, life-cycle costs and reduced critical dependence.

The Military Industrialisation Commission stated through the Iraqi News Agency that domestic-production contracts in 2023–2024 saved more than $700 million compared with imports. This announced institutional figure establishes activity, but does not become conclusive evidence of efficiency in this chapter unless the comparison methodology is audited: are specifications, quantities, quality, delivery and life cycles equivalent? The vision therefore treats it as a signal requiring independent audit, not an argument for assuming domestic production is always cheaper.¹⁶

Candidate areas for testing begin where sustainment value is greatest: maintenance, repair and upgrading of existing platforms; selected parts and components; ammunition with recurring demand where demand and quality are established; equipment, vehicles and components; and potentially subsystems developed with civilian industry. Expansion into more complex platforms is not a political goal; it follows accumulated skills, markets, feasibility and military testing.

Source: Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, Secretariat of Defence Industries, to draw on the mechanism for building a defence-industry ecosystem rather than copy its scale.

15. External Partnerships and Dependencies: Partnership for Institutional Independence

External partnership does not contradict sovereignty when priorities, decisions and outputs are Iraqi. NATO Mission Iraq is a non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission undertaken at Iraq's request, covering policy and strategy, force generation and development, resource management, leadership and professional military education. It continued working in 2026 under modified arrangements because of regional conditions. This matters because it demonstrates that Iraq has an existing cooperation structure that can move from “activities” to “capability transfer”.¹⁷

The vision subjects every partnership to four tests: does it transfer capability or provide an ongoing service? Does it leave an Iraqi instructor, technician or curriculum capable of replication? Does it expand Iraq's options or tie it to a single supplier? Is it measured by Iraqi outcomes or numbers of visits and courses? Every partnership programme must have a clear “independence output”: a function the Iraqi institution becomes able to perform itself, or through a supplier network whose risks can be controlled.

In 2024, a process was officially announced to end the international coalition's military mission in Iraq and transition to bilateral security partnerships. This environment makes sustainment more urgent: any capability dependent on an irreplaceable instructor, technician, software programme or component is a potential point of failure. Uncontrolled diversification, however, creates the opposite problem: incompatible spare parts, ammunition, software and standards. The objective is therefore “strategic diversification” that reduces critical dependence without destroying interoperability and sustainment.¹⁸

16. Secrecy and Accountability: What Must Not Be Published, and What Must Not Be Concealed

Defence requires legitimate secrecy, but secrecy is not an automatic designation for everything connected to the military institution. Operational plans, locations, deployments, vulnerabilities, detailed readiness, precise stock levels and intelligence are not published. General policy, reform objectives, aggregate spending, neutrality rules, professional standards, programme progress and aggregate training, sustainment and dependency indicators can—and should—be published after security review.

The choice is not between “complete transparency” and “complete secrecy”, but between data layers. The first is operationally secret and measured internally. The second is sensitive but aggregable, such as trends in availability, maintenance or closure of exercise gaps. The third concerns governance and finances and should be public to an appropriate degree. This system protects capability from exposure and protects the state against secrecy becoming a veil for mismanagement.

Civilian oversight does not mean politicians directing tactics, just as professional autonomy does not mean isolating the army from budgets and the law. Civilian authorities set policy, resources and final decisions; military leadership advises, develops forces and executes within the mission. Parliament and authorised oversight bodies need access sufficient for scrutiny while protecting classification. Secrecy protects a defined military capability; neutrality, sound expenditure and reform indicators are not automatically secrets.

17. International Comparisons: Design Mechanisms, Not Armies to Copy

There is no “model country” whose army size or doctrine Iraq can copy. Differences in geography, alliances, population, economy and threats make literal transfer misleading. Comparisons are therefore used to extract mechanisms: how did a country link reserves to missions? How did it test mobilisation? How did it build industry as an institutional chain? How did it turn planning into a review cycle? How did it incorporate sustainment costs into procurement decisions?

Finland helps define reserves as a capability linked to assignments and training, not a population figure. Singapore helps test mobilisation and address the burden of service on the economy and families. Türkiye illustrates that a mature defence industry is an ecosystem of firms, skills, research, procurement and financing, not a single state factory. NATO's defence-planning process offers the logic of political guidance → capability requirements → implementation → review, without transferring alliance objectives to Iraq. GAO literature helps make sustainment and life-cycle costs part of acquisition decisions.

The governing principle is to transfer force-design mechanisms, not another country's army size; testing methods, not percentages; and the logic of building knowledge and maintenance capacity, not the slogan of “self-sufficiency”. Comparison thereby becomes an instrument for reducing risk, not ornamentation in the text.

Source: official Finnish, Singaporean and Turkish authorities; NATO Allied Command Transformation; U.S. Government Accountability Office.

18. The Vision for the Iraqi Army in 2045

The professional national army in Iraq in 2045 is a politically neutral national armed force, subject to constitutional civilian leadership and the law, operating under a unified and updatable national-defence doctrine, and translating threats and missions into joint force design. It has trained personnel, commanders and non-commissioned officers; balanced, maintainable and sustainable capabilities; genuine reserves if the review demonstrates their necessity; and a selective domestic maintenance and production base that reduces critical dependencies. It can defend territory, borders and sovereign space and deter aggression without unfunded expansion or technological dependence that prevents Iraqi decision-making.

We know the vision has been achieved when the state can answer annually—internally and with reliable figures—questions about missions, required ready units/capabilities, C2, training and logistics gaps, life-cycle costs, dependencies, skills, maintenance-programme progress and exercise results; and when it can present the public with an aggregate version demonstrating that spending follows a plan, training and maintenance have not become whatever remains after salaries and purchases, and neutrality and oversight are maintained. This is more demanding than any international ranking because it links force to mission.

18.1 Transformation Phases, 2027–2045

19. Indicators and Targets: Measuring Capability Without Exposing It

The dashboard should be limited and dual-layered. Internally, mission-specific indicators are needed for Ready Capability, availability, repair time, stocks, training and dependencies; these data are not published in detail. The public and Parliament need aggregate indicators on completion of the doctrine cycle, programme links to capability gaps, training-plan implementation, closure rates for exercise findings, sustainment-plan coverage, NCO/PME pathways, reserve readiness in aggregate, reduction of critical dependencies and life-cycle financing.

Readiness percentages and platform numbers are not set before the defence review. Targets that can be established now are structural: completing a defence review, doctrine cycle and multiyear plan; requiring sustainment plans for new programmes; creating a unified classified measurement system; and determining a reserve model after study. Quantitative readiness, vacancy, retention and repair-time targets are established after the 2027–2028 baseline and kept at the appropriate classification level.

Methodological note: operational-readiness percentages and classified targets are not published in the public document.

20. Implementation Programmes: An Integrated Capability-Building Package

Reform does not require dozens of fragmented initiatives. It is better to consolidate interventions into a programme package that moves the institution from asset-based to capability-based planning. The institutional rule is to repair an existing function before creating a new institution: doctrine within the existing professional structure, C2 within joint command, industry within the Military Industrialisation Commission, education within military institutions, and data within the Ministry of Defence.

All programmes must be linked to the defence review. A programme unable to identify the gap it closes, the mission it serves, its life-cycle cost and outcome indicator does not become a priority merely because financial or political support is available. This is the practical meaning of “mission before platform” at the level of state administration.

Note: develop functions within existing institutions before creating new ones.

21. Implementation and Cost Matrix: From Review to a Funded Capability Portfolio

Implementation starts with a clear first action for every programme, not a general title. The defence review begins with a mandate, scope, questions and deliverables; doctrine with a unified chain of documents and lessons; C2 with a joint audit and measurement exercise; training with standards, assessment and retesting; sustainment with a Life-Cycle/Sustainment audit of principal assets and programmes; and reserves with an alternatives study before any expansion. These “first actions” prevent programmes becoming slogans.

Costs are not presented as an “Army 2045” bill, because that would imply false precision before a force review. They fall into four baskets: institutional reform—reviews, doctrine, data and education; readiness and sustainment—maintenance, ammunition, training, fuel and technical contracts; capability building—systems, infrastructure and initial training; and industry and reserves—model-dependent investments, trials, stocks and mobilisation. Every major project requires Should Cost, Life-Cycle Cost and sensitivity analysis. Acquisition is not funded unless operation and maintenance can be financed under a low-revenue scenario.

The chapter does not set a fixed percentage of GDP as a spending target. A financial figure becomes meaningful only when linked to a portfolio of capabilities and risks. A minimum level of training and maintenance must be protected from becoming “what remains” after salaries and deals, because that pattern produces an army with more assets and less capability.

Note: the implementation matrix does not include equipment costs unsupported by a scope and cost study.

21.1 Multiyear Defence Planning: The Budget Follows the Capability Portfolio

Most defence programmes operate beyond a single budget year: training a pilot or technician, building maintenance capacity, contracting support, introducing a system, upgrading software or creating reserves all entail commitments lasting years. When these commitments are managed through disconnected annual cycles, it becomes easy to fund acquisition while postponing operation, or to protect salaries while leaving maintenance and training to whatever remains. The vision therefore proposes a medium-term defence plan covering four or five years, renewed annually and linked to a capability portfolio rather than a shopping list.

For every programme, the plan includes the capability gap addressed, phases, acquisition, operating, maintenance and personnel costs, risks and dependencies, and readiness indicators. It tests a more conservative financial scenario—such as lower revenues—to ensure the state can sustain capability after purchase. If a programme fails this test, redesign, postponement or a cheaper alternative is more professional than introducing a capability that will later deteriorate through inadequate funding.

The objective is not to “lock in the military budget” beyond scrutiny, but to make commitments visible to decision-makers. Civilian authorities can then see today's decision cost and tomorrow's sustainment cost, and compare a new programme with funding training and maintenance or closing a C2 gap. They can also establish a stop or modification gate if threats, costs or performance change. The budget thereby becomes a force-building instrument, not a record of what could be funded in one year.

The vision does not require a fixed benchmark such as a percentage of GDP. Needs may rise in one phase and fall in another, while oil prices or economic growth can alter the meaning of the same percentage. More relevant criteria are these: do the threat and mission justify the capability? Can the state afford its lifetime cost? Do maintenance and training remain funded? Does the review show that every additional dinar closes a priority gap rather than duplicates an existing asset?

Note: the chapter sets no fixed military-spending share of GDP; the budget follows the mission, capability portfolio and sustainment costs.

22. Risks: How Can Reform Fail Even as Spending Rises?

The greatest risks are not all military. Reform may fail if appointments become extensions of political competition, politically driven procurement demands arise outside the capability portfolio, the state purchases platforms without sustainment, supplier diversification produces incompatible systems, or maintenance becomes the first casualty of fiscal pressure. It may also produce personnel expansion without skills or readiness, paper reserves, costly symbolic industry, or Vendor Lock-In that makes software and support a point of failure.

Institutional risks also exist: permanent military policing that erodes training; excessive secrecy that prevents scrutiny; excessive disclosure that harms readiness; threats changing faster than procurement cycles; and programme cancellation after a change of government without assessment. Each risk is therefore linked to an early-warning indicator, an accountable owner and a mitigation measure, rather than presented as a generic list that could be copied into any chapter.

Methodological note: risks are grouped around capability, professionalism, sustainment and governance.

23. Constitutional and Rights Safeguards: Professionalism Includes How Force Is Used

These safeguards are not an ethical appendix; they form part of the definition of military professionalism. Strategic political decisions are civilian and constitutional, military execution is professional, and the institution is neutral. Obedience is lawful rather than blind; violations are subject to accountability within the relevant jurisdiction; and military education integrates international humanitarian law, civilian protection and human rights into training and doctrine, not into a lecture detached from the profession.

The armed forces are not used against peaceful political activity, and describing an issue as “national security” does not automatically justify exceeding jurisdiction or the law. Every domestic army-support mission must have a legal basis, defined objective, necessity, proportionality, duration, review and exit plan. This applies the preceding chapter's principle: a strong state can use force when necessary and can also prevent itself from using force when it is unnecessary.

Budget and procurement oversight form part of legitimacy, while legitimate secrecy is protected. The institution also needs protection for professional service members who reject partisan interference or unlawful orders through established procedures, and professional equality that makes merit, discipline and standards—not affiliation—the basis of careers. Rights thereby become not a constraint on readiness, but a condition for sustaining trust, the chain of command and legitimacy.

24. Conclusion: From Possessing Forces to Possessing Capability

The army Iraq needs is neither the largest by headcount nor the most varied in weaponry. It is an institution that knows its mission, connects that mission to strategy and doctrine, translates capability gaps into force design, then converts money and platforms into ready capability through personnel, training, command and control, logistics, maintenance, ammunition and financing. It is an army able to repeat this sequence whenever threats or technology change, rather than defend what exists merely because it exists.

This logic changes the order of priorities. The defence review precedes the number; doctrine precedes the platform; C2, training and logistics are not “support” but governing capabilities; non-commissioned officers and education produce continuity; reserves count only when trained and callable; industry is a means to reduce critical dependence, cost or maintenance time, not a prestige project; and external partnership succeeds when it leaves an Iraqi capability that can endure after the partner changes.

The political and constitutional boundary remains clear: the army serves the state, not the government; defence, not political competition; and remains under civilian leadership and the law however capable it becomes. Force outside the law adds no net capability to the state; it creates a new source of uncertainty. The 2045 model therefore combines dependable defence capability with an institution society need not fear becoming a political actor or an instrument of everyday administration.

At this point, the next question becomes more precise. If the professional national army protects Iraq against high-intensity military threats and defends its borders and sovereignty under the law, who protects everyday life within the state against organised crime, drugs, terrorism, cross-border networks and domestic violence? How can professional police and intelligence services be built to prevent, detect and respond under the law, without permanently militarising society?

References

1. Iraqi Council of Representatives, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, especially Articles 9, 78, 99 and 110 concerning defence, civilian leadership, military justice and federal competence.
2. Iraqi Council of Representatives, decisions and recommendations of Session (18), 19 April 2026, and official materials on the first reading of the proposed National Military Service Law.
3. Military Service and Retirement Law No. (3) of 2010, as amended, Iraqi Official Gazette, issue 4143, 8 February 2010.
4. Military Penal Code No. (19) of 2007, Iraqi Official Gazette, issue 4040, 9 May 2007; and Military Criminal Procedure Law No. (30) of 2007.
5. Iraqi News Agency, 8 May 2024, on approval of the National Security Strategy 2024–2028; and 30 June 2026, on mechanisms for activating the new/updated national-security strategy.
6. Iraqi Ministry of Defence, 25 November 2025, official materials concerning the “Military Doctrine for the Iraqi Army” conference.
7. World Bank Data / SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Iraq, military-expenditure data for 2024 and measurement methodology.
8. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Weapon System Sustainment, 2023–2026 reports on sustainment, operating and support costs, and the life cycle.
9. Iraqi News Agency, 12 September 2024, official information concerning the M-SAM contract, personnel training and phased delivery.
10. Iraqi Military Industrialisation Commission, the legal and institutional framework of the Commission established by Law No. (25) of 2019; and Iraqi News Agency, 30 March 2025, the institutional statement on savings.
11. NATO, NATO Mission Iraq and Relations with Iraq, May/June 2026 updates on capacity-building, military education, leadership and resource management.
12. U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement Announcing the Timeline for the End of the Military Mission of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Iraq, 2024.
13. Finnish Government / Ministry of Defence, official materials on the reserve system, refresher training and its 2025–2026 reforms.
14. Singapore Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), Ready SG 2026 and official materials on reserves and mobilisation tests.
15. Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, Secretariat of Defence Industries, official data on the institutional and sectoral defence-industry model.
16. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Publications, on the function of joint doctrine in coordinated planning, operations and training.
17. NATO Allied Command Transformation, Role in NATO Defence Planning Process, on the logic of moving from political guidance to capability requirements, implementation and review.