Internal Security and Intelligence

1. Executive Summary

This chapter begins at the boundary established by “Internal Security and Intelligence”: protecting the state does not mean making the army an instrument of everyday life. Military defence addresses aggression and high-intensity threats; citizens, cities, border crossings and streets need law-enforcement and preventive-intelligence institutions that understand their missions and jurisdictions, respond according to risk, and produce cases that can be tested before the courts. The chapter's equation is therefore: threat → lawfully obtained information → analysis → prevention or response → investigation → legal evidence → justice → correction and learning. This chain moves internal security from “suspicion–arrest–declaration of success” towards a measurable outcome.

Iraq is not starting from zero. The Ministry of Interior Law includes maintaining internal security and public order, protecting lives, freedoms and property, preventing crime and combating terrorism among the Ministry's objectives. In 2025, the unified emergency number 911 entered nationwide service; its announced connection phases linked dozens of stations and hundreds of security areas, while police-station automation reached 93%, according to an official announcement in early 2026. The Ministry also announced positive trends in several crime categories, case completion and execution of arrest warrants. These are important facts, but alone cannot establish a definitive national baseline, because definitions, denominators, coverage and methodology are not always published in detail. The chapter therefore treats them as a positive official trend requiring consolidation within a unified statistical system, not conclusive proof of every governorate's and agency's performance.¹

The measurement gap is evident in the absence, in the public domain, of a single Iraqi dashboard combining reported and unreported crime, field response times, investigation quality, use of force, complaints, drugs, human trafficking, terrorism, borders and trust under stable, comparable definitions. Non-publication does not mean non-measurement, and some data must remain internal; what can be published, however, should become regular and intelligible. The chapter therefore proposes a national crime and internal-security statistics system beginning with a dictionary of definitions, not an aimless “massive database”.

In cities, priority shifts from police presence as an end in itself to measurable service: a report classified, the appropriate resource dispatched, a response arriving, a crime scene preserved, an investigation built, and a recurring hotspot addressed. In investigation, the institution moves from excessive reliance on suspicion or confession to crime-scene work, chain of custody, forensic examination, alternative hypotheses, referral and follow-up. In organised crime, it moves from arresting the lowest link to dismantling networks, finance, logistics, protection and markets. In drugs policy, the state distinguishes supply, demand, treatment and enforcement, because seizures do not equal prevalence. In human trafficking, it distinguishes victims from possible immigration offenders and builds a chain of protection, investigation and conviction. In terrorism, it moves from a war over territorial control to preventing resurgence without entrenching a permanent state of emergency.

Rights are not an external constraint on security; they are part of its quality. The Constitution protects liberty, privacy, confidentiality of communications and peaceful demonstration, prohibits torture, and subjects agencies to civilian leadership and oversight. Internal security is therefore not professional if it reduces crime while expanding purposeless surveillance of society, increases arrests while lowering evidentiary quality, or makes secrecy a barrier to accountability. The 2045 standard is dependable everyday security without citizens feeling they live under permanent suspicion.²

2. From Military Defence to Protecting Everyday Life

The preceding chapter established that the army carries the military component of national security: defending Iraq and its sovereignty against threats exceeding law-enforcement instruments, with exceptional, limited and temporary domestic support where the law permits. This chapter therefore starts with a different question: who protects citizens, cities, border crossings and everyday life against crime, terrorism, drugs, organised networks and violence? The answer is not a “smaller army”, but a system of policing, intelligence, border security, investigation and justice performing distinct and complementary functions.

The police are a service and law-enforcement institution. Preventive intelligence examines threats and produces warnings and assessments to support decisions. The judiciary determines criminal responsibility and tests evidence. Counterterrorism agencies perform a specialised function that must not become an umbrella for every crime. Border security manages unlawful movement, crime, smuggling and border crossings, while military border defence remains an armed-forces function. Clear boundaries do not weaken coordination; they prevent responsibility disappearing between multiple institutions or exceptional instruments becoming normal practice.

Source: Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005.

3. What Is Professional Internal Security?

This chapter adopts an operational definition of internal security as the capacity of constitutionally and legally competent institutions to prevent, detect and respond to criminal, terrorist and violent threats within the state, and to protect public order and rights. The definition places “protection” and “rights” in the same sentence because security does not succeed if it reduces one danger while creating another through arbitrariness or lack of legitimacy.

Internal security does not mean securitising the economy, politics, education and social life, turning opposition into an intelligence subject, using the army to solve every crisis, or promising zero crime or zero risk as realistic outcomes. A modern state does not eliminate crime; it makes crime harder to commit, faster to detect, less harmful, more effectively investigated and less likely to recur. This is why measuring harm and outcomes matters more than measuring activity alone.

This chain yields interpretive rules that must not be violated: reported crime does not equal total crime; seizures do not equal prevalence; arrest does not equal conviction; trust does not equal performance; and more data does not mean better intelligence. These rules turn intellectual honesty into a governance instrument: the state does not inflate success through an indicator that fails to measure its claim, or fill a data gap with an undocumented estimate.

4. Iraq's Baseline and the Measurement Gap

The baseline presents a mixed but not bleak picture. Trust in the police reached 71% in the Arab Barometer 2024 survey, based on a probability sample of 2,408 Iraqis interviewed face to face between May and July 2024, excluding Duhok according to the methodology document. This matters for legitimacy and cooperation, but is not a “performance score” and does not replace indicators of crime, response, investigation and rights.³

Operationally, 911 was launched and its connections expanded. The Ministry announced that information from a report takes approximately 30 seconds to reach the command or patrol after the call ends. This figure must be named precisely: it measures information-transfer time, not arrival at the citizen's location. The distinction illustrates the need for an indicator dictionary: a single expression such as “response time” can conceal radically different stages.

Regarding crime, the Ministry of Interior announced in late 2025 a 14% decline in general criminal offences over three years, an 88% decline in terrorist crimes and a 92% decline in tribal incidents, alongside arrest-warrant execution of 86% and investigative-case completion of 78%. The announced direction is positive, but the published official report does not present denominators, classifications, comparison years and calculation methods in sufficient detail to establish a complete national baseline. The vision therefore records the “official trend” and calls for methodological standardisation before setting subsequent numerical targets.⁴

The measurement gap does not mean agencies lack internal data. Some information is legitimately sensitive, some exists but is not standardised, and some is insufficiently measured. The first phase must distinguish these three categories. The public needs aggregate performance and clear methodology; leadership needs deeper detail; no institution needs purposeless data collection.

5. The National Crime and Internal-Security Statistics System

The first institutional reform between 2027 and 2030 is a national data standard answering a simple question: what do we mean by “crime”, “report”, “case”, “suspect”, “accused person” or “convicted person”? If definitions differ between directorates or change between years, figures may appear precise while being incomparable.

The proposed system does not begin by assembling every record in a central repository. It begins with a dictionary of definitions, a unique incident or case identifier, quality and correction rules, consistent geographic codes, metadata explaining methodology, and aggregate public outputs. It adds a periodic victimisation survey because reports alone do not reveal unreported crime. Statistics can be linked to health, justice and population data at an aggregate level, while access to personal data remains restricted by purpose and authority.

Publishing a percentage without a definition should become institutionally unacceptable. Every important figure must carry its measurement year, denominator, counting unit, geographic coverage and update date. This is not statistical luxury: it prevents an institution being rewarded for reducing reports rather than crime, or increased drug treatment being interpreted as an inevitable rise in prevalence rather than improved service access.

6. Security in Cities and Communities: From Presence to Service

Modern urban security exceeds the number of patrols and checkpoints. Service begins when citizens can report easily, risk is classified, the most appropriate resource is dispatched, a response arrives, evidence is preserved, the case is properly closed, and recurrence is analysed. The 911 service should therefore evolve from a successful communications project into a platform measuring the full journey: waiting, classification, dispatch, agency acceptance, mobilisation, arrival, initial control and incident closure.

No single international response-time benchmark fits Baghdad, Mosul, a small town and a rural village. The state needs incident categories and local standards derived from severity, distance, congestion and resources, publishing the median and P90 so averages do not conceal the worst cases. The goal is not a numerical race, but equitable service so that more distant neighbourhoods do not fall outside the state's standard.

Data-directed patrols can focus resources on recurring spatial and temporal hotspots. International empirical reviews have shown this approach to be effective when applied in a defined and measured manner. A “hotspot”, however, does not become an exception zone. Place and incident guide intervention, not residents' social identity; the concentration period must be limited, and effects and recurrence measured.⁵

Place-based prevention extends responsibility beyond policing: lighting, spatial management, upkeep, sightlines and access arrangements may reduce crime opportunities. Police provide harm analysis, while design ownership remains with municipalities, transport and services. The city thus does not become a security project; safety becomes part of the quality of urban management.

7. Police Reform: Professionalism Before Restructuring

The vision does not assume that “police reform” means dismantling and rebuilding the police. The right questions are: what works? Where is the bottleneck? Does the problem concern the mission, leadership, resources, training, data or authority? The rule is to repair the function before creating a new body. Institutional proliferation may multiply coordination interfaces rather than resolve them.

The required transformation involves six shifts: from measuring activity to measuring harm and service; from pure reaction to prevention while retaining strong response; from training as courses to competence, testing and recertification; from each directorate keeping its own data to a national standard with restricted access; from post-crisis accountability to routine recording and review; and from digitising paper to redesigning the report and case pathway.

Staffing is built around demand, not an abstract numerical ratio: call volumes, investigative workloads, temporal and spatial distribution, evidence, analysis, drugs, trafficking, border and financial-crime functions, and the ratio of administrative to field work. Any recommendation for additional recruitment must follow this analysis. Women's representation is a capability asset because it expands access to victims, women and children, not because it supplies a cosmetic number.

Career development requires continuous training, specialisation and skills retention. Financial investigators, laboratory staff and crime analysts cannot easily be replaced through general appointments. High-pressure occupations also require confidential physical and mental-health support that protects personnel capacity rather than turning requests for help into stigma or punishment.

8. Community Policing and Procedural Legitimacy

Community policing is an official police function intended to build trust and reporting channels, resolve minor problems before escalation, and refer cases to competent authorities. It does not mean delegating security to tribes or armed groups or creating a parallel force. The state retains law enforcement, but cannot produce security alone without community information, trust and cooperation.

Procedural-justice literature shows that citizens assess the police not only by case outcomes but by treatment: respect, neutrality, an opportunity to present their position, explanations of decisions, and an apparent legitimate purpose for authority. Iraq can use this mechanism to consolidate its relatively high trust base without claiming a quantified Iraqi causal relationship before local studies establish one.⁶

Trust is not an unrestricted mandate. It may be high while investigative gaps or spatial inequalities persist; it may fall because of a negative experience despite improvement in some indicators. It is therefore measured alongside ease of reporting, perceived safety, complaints, use of force, crime and investigation. A strong system does not select the indicator that flatters it; it reads conflicting indicators and explains them.

9. Criminal Investigation: From Suspicion to a Testable Case

Arrest is not the end of police work. Investigation's value lies in turning an event into a case the judiciary can test. The Criminal Procedure Law provides the general procedural framework and prohibits coercion, while the Constitution guarantees liberty, dignity and judicial decision-making. Reliance on confession alone therefore signals weakness in the evidence system, not speed.⁷

The quality chain is: report → crime scene → documented collection → chain of custody → forensic or medical examination → alternative hypotheses → lawful interviews → supervisory review → referral to prosecution → follow-up on deficiencies. This requires genuine case management connecting documents, time and evidence, not merely digital archiving of paper.

Quality can be measured through the proportion of files returned by the prosecution for substantive deficiencies, examination times by evidence type, chain-of-custody errors, and the crime clearance rate after national definition. The “returned files” indicator may initially rise because scrutiny has improved. Every increase must therefore not be interpreted as failure without understanding the system-building stage.

10. Use of Force, Complaints and Accountability

Police are not prohibited from using force, but it is a legal function that must be necessary, proportionate and accountable. United Nations principles require non-violent means first where effective, restraint, minimisation of harm and protection of life; political disturbances do not justify suspending these principles.⁸

Iraq needs a unified register of serious use-of-force incidents: mission type, legal basis, level of force and outcome, medical assistance, command review, referral for investigation when the defined threshold is met, and aggregate administrative or judicial outcomes. The register does not publish operational details or names, but reveals patterns: do incidents recur in a unit? Are they associated with inadequate training? Did they decline after corrective intervention?

The complementary question is: what can citizens do if they believe a security authority has abused its powers? A good system provides a clear channel, tracking number, severity-based deadlines, protection against retaliation and access to the courts, with serious-complaint investigation relatively separated from the direct reporting chain of the employee concerned. This does not presume a new authority: review begins with existing mechanisms and tests their adequacy.⁹

Fewer complaints do not automatically mean success. They may indicate better performance, or difficulty reporting or fear. Complaints must therefore be read alongside trust, injuries, investigations and outcomes, while the accessibility of the complaint channel itself is reviewed.

11. Organised Crime: Targeting the Network, Not Its Lowest Link

Organised crime is not every offence involving more than one person. The international framework identifies an enduring, structured group acting in concert to commit serious crimes for material benefit. This definition prevents exaggeration while shifting the unit of analysis from “the arrested individual” to “the network's capacity”.¹⁰

The proposed model is: direct actor → network node → logistics → money → protection or corruption → market. Arresting a transporter or intermediary may not reduce network capacity if they are quickly replaced. Priority cases therefore require parallel criminal, financial, border and legal investigation where appropriate, with every coercive measure remaining subject to a lawful basis, evidence and authorisation.

Financial investigation does not replace the chapters on corruption or the financial system. Its function here is to trace criminal proceeds, companies, accounts and assets within the law, referring matters to financial and judicial authorities where necessary. Recent FATF guidance makes depriving serious crime of proceeds central to strategy, while requiring distinctions between freezing, seizure, final confiscation and recovery.¹¹

12. Drugs: Security, Health and Networks on One Dashboard

In 2025, Iraq launched a national drug-situation analysis with UNODC and WHO covering five years, described as the most comprehensive in more than a decade, with attention to changing markets, synthetic substances, prevention, treatment and rehabilitation. This is important because it reframes the problem from “seizures” to a multidimensional phenomenon.¹²

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law No. 50 of 2017 itself does not place all categories in one basket. Article 40 permits a confidential treatment pathway for users who come forward voluntarily under the legal conditions. Policy should therefore not equate users, dependent persons, dealers, transporters, traffickers and network leaders, or reduce success to more arrests.¹³

The government announced a national strategy for 2025–2030. Iraq Vision 2045 therefore does not immediately need a parallel strategy; it needs access to the full text, established indicators and funding, and evaluation of implementation. The rule is to build on existing institutions and improve measurement, not replace every plan with a new name.

13. Human Trafficking: Victims First and Networks Before the Courts

Human trafficking is a crime of exploitation, whereas migrant smuggling concerns facilitating unlawful entry for benefit. A case may begin with smuggling and end in exploitation, but the terms are not interchangeable. Confusing them can turn a victim into an immigration offender and break the protection and investigation chain.¹⁴

The correct chain is: detection or referral → screening → victim identification → protection, shelter, health and legal assistance → network investigation → prosecution → judgment → compensation or restoration of rights → prevention of renewed exploitation. Investigation, prosecution, conviction and victim counts remain distinct units and must not be combined into one figure. The 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report recorded 1,698 persons investigated in Iraq, 1,270 prosecutions, 295 convictions and 335 identified victims. These figures do not represent the same “case count” or a complete national baseline.¹⁵

The effective legal basis remains Anti-Human Trafficking Law No. 28 of 2012. Limited verification through 27 August 2026 found the proposed first amendment within legislative proceedings and Legal Committee discussions in July 2026 in preparation for its first reading. The official source that could be checked did not establish that it had been enacted and published as an effective law. The chapter therefore treats the amendment as a legislative process, not a law in force.¹⁶

14. Preventive Intelligence: Warning, Not Political Surveillance

Preventive intelligence is lawful, purpose-specific collection and analysis of information on legally defined threats to provide warning, prevention and decision support. It does not mean collecting the largest possible volume of information about society, monitoring opposition, or maintaining a permanent file on everyone who has passed through a stage of suspicion. Intelligence quality lies in questions, analysis and decisions, not repository size.

The general cycle safe for publication is: define the need → lawful collection → processing and source evaluation → analysis → assessment and confidence level → limited distribution to the authority that needs it → decision → outcome review. The chapter does not address covert collection methods. It establishes an important standard: every information priority must be linked to a threat, purpose, duration and responsible owner, and closed when its purpose ends.

Analytical quality requires assessments to distinguish what is known from what is estimated, state confidence levels and alternative hypotheses, and identify what could make the analysis wrong. Alternative review and Red Teaming help strategic assessments resist confirmation bias or leadership pressure. Analysts are not political authorities: their task is to provide their best professional assessment. Leaders may request alternatives and scenarios, not change facts to fit a decision.

Preventing intelligence politicisation requires a lawful purpose, prohibition of collection for partisan or electoral objectives, data-access logs, penalties for leaks or blackmail, oversight of intrusive powers, and protection of analysts against pressure to change conclusions. Secrecy belongs to information that warrants it, not to the entire institution.

15. Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Preventing Resurgence Without Permanent Emergency

Today's Iraq is not the Iraq of 2014. Official indicators show a substantial decline in terrorist crimes, while the United Nations Secretary-General's July 2026 report confirms that ISIS and its affiliates remain capable of adapting under pressure. These statements do not conflict: lower intensity within Iraq does not mean the possibility of resurgence has disappeared.¹⁷

The strategic transition is from recovering territory to preventing resurgence: risk-directed intelligence; investigations into cells, financing and support; target protection based on risk assessment; border and information coordination; and periodic review of what requires specialised instruments and what can return to ordinary policing. As conditions stabilise, emergency arrangements should diminish rather than become a permanent structure.

Violent extremism is not equivalent to different ideas, criticism, opposition or unpopular opinion. An issue becomes a security matter when a legal connection exists to violence, criminal incitement, financing, terrorist organisation or criminalised preparation. Broader prevention requires education, employment, religion, media and civil society acting within their mandates; agencies provide threat assessments, not management of society.

16. Border and Border-Port Security: Harder for Smuggling, Easier for Lawful Movement

This chapter distinguishes Border Defence from Border Security. The former is military defence of territory against high-intensity military threats, addressed in the preceding chapter. The latter is management of unlawful crossings, smuggling, crime, documents, people, goods and risks within a multi-agency civilian-security system.

Border Ports Commission Law No. 30 of 2016 already reflects multiple authorities: the Commission oversees and monitors the performance of agencies operating at crossings, while ministry and police personnel retain their own establishments and jurisdictions. The vision therefore does not propose merging customs, border ports, police, health and agriculture into one agency. It calls for integrated management: separate mandates, a common objective, disciplined data practices and risk-based coordination.¹⁸

The dual standard for smart borders is to make them harder for smugglers and easier for lawful trade and travellers. This requires risk management instead of equal inspection of every movement, coordinated inspection where it reduces duplication, separation of powers in the decision cycle, an audit trail for exceptions, and measurement of lawful crossing times alongside risk detection. The WCO standard for coordinated border management offers useful mechanisms, but another country's structure is not transferred literally.¹⁹

17. Protecting Society from Violence and Disorder, and Managing Assemblies

Public order does not mean protecting the government from criticism. Institutions must distinguish crime and armed violence, riots and collective violence, peaceful demonstrations, and political protest, strikes or peaceful civic action within legal limits. This prevents security responses becoming political classifications of people rather than responses to criminalised conduct.

Assembly management begins with communication, facilitation and de-escalation, followed by a graduated response if genuine danger emerges, governed by necessity, proportionality, documentation and accountability. The chapter provides no dispersal tactics. Success means protecting participants, bystanders and property while maintaining the peaceful right, reducing injuries and unnecessary arrests, and investigating serious incidents.

Armed community conflicts, vendettas and tribal disputes become security matters when they involve weapons, threats to life and obstruction of institutions. The state's role is neutral response, enforcement of the law, protection of victims and witnesses, and prevention of escalation, with lawful civilian mediation possible without surrendering the monopoly of law enforcement. The announced decline in tribal incidents is positive, but requires a stable definition before becoming a measurement series.

18. Coordination and Information Sharing: Disciplined Exchange

Information that does not reach the authority capable of acting in time is not a security capability. Conversely, information reaching everyone without purpose or restriction becomes a risk to security and rights. Iraq therefore needs a balance between Need-to-Share and Need-to-Know, not the victory of one over the other.

The proposed model is: owning authority → classification → use purpose → authority in need → role-based permission → access log → retention period → audit → purpose closure. Every record needs a data owner and quality officer; every access requires a reviewable reason. Personal relationships between officers may help, but cannot be the sole structure for information sharing.

There is insufficient justification for automatically creating a new Fusion Center. Iraq already has centres, commands, joint arrangements, 911 and border-port coordination. The problem may concern a protocol, definition, liaison officer, authority or incentive. Work in 2027 therefore starts with a map of institutions, functions and information flows. A new body is created only if review demonstrates that the function does not exist or that repairing existing arrangements is insufficient.

19. Data Governance, Surveillance and Privacy

Every large security register creates capability and risk simultaneously. Governance must therefore answer: who owns the record? Who reads or edits it? For what purpose? How are errors corrected? How long is information retained? What happens when a false match affects a person? How are preliminary intelligence data distinguished from judgments and criminal records? The fundamental rule is that suspicion is not a permanent identity.

The Constitution protects privacy and confidentiality of communications and imposes legal and judicial conditions on surveillance where its provisions require them. No expansion of surveillance is therefore recommended before a primary legal review of powers, duration, renewal, storage, destruction, access and remedies. The governing test is: legal basis + legitimate objective + necessity + proportionality + authorisation or oversight where legally required + time limit + disciplined retention + review and redress.²⁰

Good preventive intelligence is not mass surveillance. Technology or algorithms may assist analysis, but do not determine guilt and should not be a black box imposing punitive consequences. Any predictive model affecting rights needs a legal basis, explanation, bias testing and human review; the architecture of artificial intelligence and cybersecurity is left to the next chapter.

20. International Comparisons: Mechanisms, Not Templates

Iraq does not need a single “country model”. It needs mechanisms tested against similar problems that can be adapted. Intelligence-Led Policing helps turn analysis into priorities and resources, provided it does not become automatic suspicion. Hot Spots policing offers a limited, measured focus on harmful locations, provided it avoids profiling. Procedural Justice makes respect, neutrality, voice and explanation part of performance. Coordinated border management links security to trade facilitation. Financial investigation targets proceeds. Oversight of secret powers establishes the principle that secrecy does not remove the need for a review authority outside the operational chain.

Comparative sources: OSCE; NIJ; College of Policing; WCO; FATF; UNODC; British oversight materials.

21. The Vision for Internal Security in Iraq in 2045

Professional internal security in Iraq in 2045 is a system of policing, intelligence, border security and enforcement institutions operating under the law with clearly divided responsibilities. It detects danger as early as possible, responds according to severity, investigates through evidence, targets networks and proceeds rather than peripheral actors alone, shares information according to purpose, authority and audit, and protects cities and society while preserving liberty, privacy and trust. Security thereby becomes a normal institutional service rather than a permanent exception.

We know we have arrived when citizens can report and track their reports; when field response is measured by incident category; when police address recurring hotspots through data without unlawful discrimination; when cases withstand judicial scrutiny because evidence is sound; when disruption of a network is measured by its remaining capacity and proceeds; when the drugs dashboard distinguishes supply, demand and treatment; when trafficking victims reach protection; when intelligence assessments specify their question, confidence and collection duration; and when intrusive surveillance operates under authorisation, oversight and a recorded trail.

The most important outcome is political and institutional: security improves across changes of government without agencies becoming instruments of political competition. Citizens live in relatively safe cities, but security presence does not dominate civilian life. This is the distance between a strong state and a state that monitors its society.

22. Transition Stages, 2027–2045

23. Indicators and Targets

Targets are not built on cosmetic increases. Where no national baseline exists, the 2030 target is to establish it and standardise the definition before setting the subsequent figure. The vision does not use “zero crime”, “100% trust” or “zero terrorism forever”. The aim is to reduce harm, strengthen capability and improve legitimacy in a reviewable way.

24. Implementation Programmes

The programmes are consolidated into ten functional packages that can be implemented within existing institutions. Naming a programme does not mean creating an institution; it means defining an outcome, owner, interventions and indicator. Detailed costs are deferred to first-phase studies where no baseline exists for assets, systems and personnel.

1. Crime and internal-security statistics

Problem: inconsistent definitions and no unified baseline. Objective and intervention: a data dictionary, metadata, quality, victimisation survey and aggregate public output. Lead/partners: Ministry of Interior + statistics authority. Phase: 2027–2030. Governing indicator: dictionary completion and data quality. Cost: determined through an implementation and life-cycle study in the first phase, according to existing capacity and the gap; no new agency or parallel platform is presumed before existing arrangements are tested.

2. Service-based policing and 911

Problem: measuring report transfer rather than the complete service. Objective and intervention: report categories, end-to-end measurement, Median/P90 and audits for gaming. Lead/partners: Ministry of Interior/911. Phase: 2027–2035. Governing indicator: actual response time and spatial disparities. Cost: determined through an implementation and life-cycle study in the first phase, according to existing capacity and the gap; no new agency or parallel platform is presumed before existing arrangements are tested.

3. Investigation and evidence

Problem: file completion does not equal quality. Objective and intervention: crime-scene work, Chain of Custody, laboratories, Case Management and training. Lead/partners: Interior + prosecution/justice authorities. Phase: 2027–2040. Governing indicator: returned files, time and quality. Cost: determined through an implementation and life-cycle study in the first phase, according to existing capacity and the gap; no new agency or parallel platform is presumed before existing arrangements are tested.

4. Legitimacy, use of force and accountability

Problem: no published national dashboard. Objective and intervention: use-of-force policy, de-escalation, incident register, complaints and Procedural Justice. Lead/partners: Interior + judiciary/oversight. Phase: 2027–2035. Governing indicator: recording completeness, investigation time and trust. Cost: determined through an implementation and life-cycle study in the first phase, according to existing capacity and the gap; no new agency or parallel platform is presumed before existing arrangements are tested.

5. Organised crime and financial investigation

Problem: targeting replaceable links. Objective and intervention: Threat Assessment, financial investigation, case teams where needed and asset recovery. Lead/partners: competent authority + AML + judiciary. Phase: 2028–2045. Governing indicator: disrupted networks, finally confiscated assets and recurrence of activity. Cost: determined through an implementation and life-cycle study in the first phase, according to existing capacity and the gap; no new agency or parallel platform is presumed before existing arrangements are tested.

6. A balanced drugs response

Problem: seizures do not measure prevalence. Objective and intervention: implement/evaluate the 2025–2030 strategy, treatment, prevention, networks, finance and borders. Lead/partners: Health + Interior and relevant authorities. Phase: 2027–2045. Governing indicator: separate supply/demand/treatment measures. Cost: determined through an implementation and life-cycle study in the first phase, according to existing capacity and the gap; no new agency or parallel platform is presumed before existing arrangements are tested.

7. Human trafficking and victim protection

Problem: victims risk falling between institutions. Objective and intervention: Screening, Referral, case management, protection, network investigation and legislative follow-up. Lead/partners: competent authorities under the law. Phase: 2027–2035. Governing indicator: access to protection, prosecution and conviction measured separately. Cost: determined through an implementation and life-cycle study in the first phase, according to existing capacity and the gap; no new agency or parallel platform is presumed before existing arrangements are tested.

8. Preventive-intelligence governance

Problem: more collection does not mean better analysis. Objective and intervention: PIR governance, confidence levels, Red Teaming, access logs and surveillance review. Lead/partners: each agency within its mandate + a lawful governmental framework. Phase: 2027–2040. Governing indicator: warning time, assessment quality and access violations. Cost: determined through an implementation and life-cycle study in the first phase, according to existing capacity and the gap; no new agency or parallel platform is presumed before existing arrangements are tested.

9. Preventing terrorist resurgence

Problem: cell activity remains a risk despite lower intensity. Objective and intervention: periodic assessment, financing, borders, target protection and transition to ordinary policing. Lead/partners: counterterrorism and security system. Phase: ongoing. Governing indicator: harm trends and review of emergency missions. Cost: determined through an implementation and life-cycle study in the first phase, according to existing capacity and the gap; no new agency or parallel platform is presumed before existing arrangements are tested.

10. Integrated border management and information sharing

Problem: duplication, gaps or information monopolies. Objective and intervention: risk-based borders, coordinated inspection, Process Maps, and inter-agency purposes, roles and access logs. Lead/partners: Border Ports Commission and relevant authorities + government. Phase: 2027–2040. Governing indicator: movement time, risks and warning-transfer time. Cost: determined through an implementation and life-cycle study in the first phase, according to existing capacity and the gap; no new agency or parallel platform is presumed before existing arrangements are tested.

25. Implementation Matrix

26. Costs and Financing

The chapter presents no “Internal Security 2045 bill”. Without a detailed inventory of systems, laboratories, personnel, licences and call workloads, an overall figure now would imply false precision. Every major programme must therefore undergo a 2027–2028 cost study covering investment, operation, maintenance, training, privacy safeguards and audit.

Costs comprise capital establishment of communications, laboratories and systems where needed; annual personnel, maintenance, licensing, materials and communications operations; training, accreditation and reaccreditation; change management and operating procedures; legal and privacy safeguards, audit logs and complaints; surveys and data; and victim-protection services. A digital project whose operation, security and updating are not funded for years is not a complete capability.

The public budget is the primary source for continuing sovereign functions. International technical assistance is appropriate for standards, training, pilots and knowledge transfer, not permanent operational dependence. Confiscated funds are not treated as guaranteed recurring revenue, and an investigating authority's income is not linked to confiscation volume in a way that creates a perverse incentive.

27. Risk Register

28. Constitutional and Rights Safeguards

The governing principle is that internal security protects citizens against both crime and arbitrary force. Legality means no power of arrest, search, surveillance or use of force without a legal basis. Necessity and proportionality mean not using the more severe measure when a less intrusive one achieves the legitimate objective. The prohibition of torture is absolute, and the presumption of innocence prevents suspects or detainees being equated with convicted persons. Privacy means minimum necessary collection, a defined purpose, restricted retention and audited access. Expression and assembly mean that opposition, criticism and peaceful demonstration are not threat indicators in themselves.²¹

Accountability includes defence rights, judicial review, complaints and redress, recording use of force and investigating serious incidents, and oversight of intrusive powers. Non-discrimination prohibits profiling based solely on collective identity. Appropriate transparency publishes policy, aggregate figures and outcomes while protecting operations and sources that warrant secrecy.

In automated analysis, a score or algorithm should not produce a decisive punitive consequence without human and legal review. In data, preliminary information must not become a permanent label. In intelligence, secrecy must not become immunity. The rule is that secrecy protects sources, operations and legitimate capability; it does not protect mismanagement or established violations.

29. Conclusion: Stronger Security Through Greater Professionalism and Legality

Strong internal security is not a system making society more submissive. It makes crime, networks and violence harder, investigation more professional, response faster, victims better protected, information more useful, and force more subject to the law. The state need not choose between effectiveness and rights: professional institutions use rights to define mission boundaries, data to define outcomes, and accountability to correct errors.

In 2045, police success is not measured by checkpoint numbers, intelligence by file counts, borders by inspection numbers, or drug control by seizure weights. It is measured by whether harm fell, response improved, evidence withstood scrutiny, networks were disrupted, victims were protected, lawful movement became easier, and information reached those who needed it without the state becoming an unrestricted collector of citizens' data.

This completes the boundary between Chapters Two and Three: the army protects the state against high-intensity military threats; internal-security institutions protect everyday life through law, investigation, prevention and response. These institutions themselves, however, increasingly depend on data, platforms, communications and interconnected systems. The next layer of risk emerges from that dependence.

30. The Bridge to V1-D03-C04 — Cybersecurity and New Forms of Security

References

1. Iraqi Council of Representatives, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, especially Articles 9, 14, 15, 17, 37, 38, 40, 46 and 84 concerning civilian leadership, rights, privacy and oversight.
2. Iraqi Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Interior Law No. 20 of 2016, and official materials concerning the unified emergency number 911, police-station automation and performance trends during 2025–2026.
3. Counter Terrorism Service Law No. 31 of 2016; Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13 of 2005; Criminal Procedure Law No. 23 of 1971 and its amendments; Public Prosecution Law No. 49 of 2017.
4. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law No. 50 of 2017; and Supreme Judicial Council official materials concerning Article 40 and the voluntary-treatment pathway under legal conditions.
5. Anti-Human Trafficking Law No. 28 of 2012; Iraqi Council of Representatives, legislative proceedings and first-amendment discussions in July 2026.
6. Border Ports Commission Law No. 30 of 2016; Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Law No. 39 of 2015.
7. Arab Barometer, Iraq 2024 survey methodology and trust indicators.
8. United Nations Iraq / UNODC / WHO, national analysis of Iraq's drug situation, 2025, and materials on prevention, treatment and rehabilitation.
9. U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2024: Iraq.
10. United Nations Security Council, Secretary-General's report on the threat posed by ISIS, 31 July 2026.
11. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and Palermo Protocols.
12. OSCE, Intelligence-Led Policing guidance; U.S. National Institute of Justice, hot-spots policing materials; College of Policing, procedural-justice materials.
13. World Customs Organization, Coordinated Border Management guidance.
14. Financial Action Task Force (FATF), materials on financial investigation and asset recovery in serious and organised crime.
15. United Nations, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials; UNODC materials on police accountability, oversight and integrity.
16. UK Investigatory Powers oversight materials, on mechanisms for overseeing intrusive and secret powers.