Non-Oil Exports

Executive Summary

Statistics and Geographic Information Systems Authority data show total Iraqi exports of approximately USD 105.079 billion in 2024: USD 95.025 billion in crude oil, USD 5.579 billion in petroleum products and USD 4.475 billion in other ‘merchandise exports’ under the official classification. Crude oil alone thus remained approximately nine-tenths of total value, while the basket outside crude and petroleum products remained narrow relative to the economy, market and resource base.

The USD 4.475 billion figure cannot, however, be presented directly as ‘diversified exports’. The same official report shows that 77.2% of merchandise exports were classified as mineral fuels, mineral oils and their distillation products, bituminous substances and mineral waxes. The United Arab Emirates accounted for 84.8% of merchandise exports, followed by India at 11.3%. The report explicitly excludes Kurdistan Region exports. The 2045 project must therefore begin with a reconciled national baseline separating crude, petroleum products, other hydrocarbons, non-hydrocarbon goods, services and re-exports.

Iraq does not start from an institutional vacuum. The Export Support Fund exists under Law No. 6 of 1969, as amended; the Iraq International Trade Point operates within the Ministry of Trade to provide information, promotion and market opening; and commercial attachés are in place. In 2025, the Council of Ministers approved an export-support levy of five per thousand on imported goods through ASYCUDA for the Fund. The Ministry of Trade also announced a mechanism for registering Iraqi exporting companies in importing countries and Arab agreements facilitating entry of Iraqi products.

The most important ongoing border reform is customs automation. The Ministry of Finance documents the shift from paper to electronic declarations from 1 January 2025 and activation of exports through ASYCUDA at the export complex and all customs centres, with electronic payment, interagency connectivity and intelligent selectivity. A UNCTAD report for 2025 states that ASYCUDA covered more than 90% of Iraqi foreign trade by the end of 2024 and customs revenue increased 128% compared with 2023. These are real governance and revenue-collection gains, but do not automatically mean export time, cost and uncertainty have become competitive. Time, cost, rejection and reprocessing indicators must be published.

The central argument is that Iraq will not reduce its oil vulnerability simply by selling more materials abroad, but by building repeatable ‘export capability’: companies producing to demonstrable standards; accreditation, testing and traceability; market intelligence and contracts; finance and guarantees; predictable digital border procedures; regular logistics; and market access. Success is measured by exporters that survive and expand, markets and products with meaningful weight, and domestic value added, not exhibitions or first shipments.

The central question and chapter boundaries

The central question is: what trade, regulatory, financial and logistical infrastructure does Iraq need to turn non-oil exports from limited shipments concentrated in a few goods and markets into a sustainable portfolio of value-added goods and services, without creating open-ended subsidies, permanent protection or new distortions?

What the chapter addresses

• Increasing Iraqi companies' ability to export repeatedly, not merely complete one transaction.
• Standards, accreditation, certificates of origin, traceability and trade intelligence.
• Customs and border procedures and logistics as a competitiveness cost.
• Trade finance, guarantees and insurance against buyer and volatility risks.
• Opening markets, commercial attachés, trade negotiation and the World Trade Organization accession process.
• Measuring diversification in products, markets, exporters and value added.

What is left to other chapters

• Detailed manufacturing design; addressed in V2-D04-C03.
• Agriculture, water and food-security policy; addressed in V2-D04-C04.
• Investment, the private sector and general corporate financing; addressed in V2-D04-C05.
• Exchange rates, reserves, monetary policy, debt and the budget; left to the next chapter, V2-D04-C07.
• Major port, railway and road infrastructure; addressed in detail in the part on infrastructure, energy and services.

Definitions and measurement rules

First measurement rule: figures with different definitions are not combined into one political number. The Statistics Authority's merchandise-export data, the Central Bank's balance-of-payments data and World Trade Organization or World Bank service data may differ in timing, methodology and coverage. Each series serves its purpose and differences are explained. Second: re-exports or products with a high imported-input share are not treated as wholly Iraqi value added. Third: ‘export opportunity’ values or memoranda of understanding are not treated as completed exports.

Institutional and legal framework

Existing institutions before any new body is proposed

The Ministry of Trade has existing instruments that can be developed instead of a parallel institution: the Private Sector Development Department and Iraq International Trade Point, commercial attachés, the State Company for Iraqi Fairs and Commercial Services, and the Export Support Fund. Export Support Fund Law No. 6 of 1969, as amended, established the Fund to assist competitive Iraqi export products, giving it legal personality and financing mechanisms. The Vision therefore does not automatically propose an export bank or agency before assessing the Fund's and existing bodies' functions and financing, guarantee and information capacities.

In 2025, the Council of Ministers approved collection by the Ministry of Finance/General Commission of Customs of a levy for the Export Support Fund equal to five per thousand of imported goods' value through ASYCUDA. Government statements that year also referred to support of up to 15% for some exporters. This latter figure is treated as an announced operating instrument requiring published eligibility, disbursement and impact rules, not a fixed entitlement for all exports.

Customs and standards

The General Commission of Customs leads border procedures, while the Border Ports Commission, sectoral bodies and standardisation and quality-control authorities have different roles. The ASYCUDA project with UNCTAD redesigned procedures, connected payments, data and agencies, and activated electronic exports. The Central Organization for Standardization and Quality Control is the pivotal link for product conformity, laboratories and standards. Export policy must therefore engage it from product design, not when the truck reaches the border.

World Trade Organization

Iraq is not a full World Trade Organization member as of this chapter's data freeze; the official accession page still lists it among ongoing accessions. The Working Party reconvened in July 2024 after a long pause, and Iraq submitted initial goods and services offers and documents on its trade regime. Accession's purpose is not diplomatic symbolism, but using negotiations to reform trade rules, increase transparency, establish predictable procedures and secure more regular market access while managing industrial and agricultural policy space within the rules.

Baseline: what does Iraq actually export?

The key analytical decision is not to present USD 4.475 billion as a homogeneous block of diversified industrial and agricultural goods. The official classification places the largest share within mineral fuels, oils and distillation products. The state therefore needs an export dashboard separating at least crude oil, petroleum products, gas, condensates and other hydrocarbons, petrochemicals, metals and construction materials, food and agriculture, pharmaceutical and chemical industries, light industries, and services.

The federal report's exclusion of Kurdistan Region exports also leaves the national baseline incomplete. The Vision does not fill this gap by estimation. It makes a reconciled national foreign-trade series a first-phase task for 2027–2028, with a unified protocol for classification, duplication, re-exports and services.

The concentration problem: a non-oil figure does not equal diversification

Concentration has three dimensions: product, market and exporter. Non-oil exports can rise because one commodity's price increases. A commodity can expand into one market yet remain exposed to a regulatory decision or border closure. A sector can be concentrated in one or two companies, with capability disappearing if they stop. Vision 2045 therefore adopts a separate concentration dashboard rather than relying solely on the ‘non-oil to oil’ ratio.

From product to buyer: the exporter journey

Export policy is often managed from the end: an exhibition, delegation or support request after the product is complete. The correct approach starts with the ‘exporter journey’, measuring time and failure at every point. The journey comprises market selection, requirements verification, contracting, finance, registration and certification, packaging and labelling, certificate of origin, inland clearance, transport to the crossing, border procedures, transit, destination clearance, collection and after-sales service.

A time baseline is established in 2027 for at least three actual export baskets, from factory to release at the crossing. The state does not use only one national average: chilled food products differ in timing from building materials or software.

Competitiveness: cost, quality and reliability

A competitive product is not always the cheapest. External buyers purchase a package of price, quality, timing, consistency, supply capability and documentation. A company that sells once at a low price, then delivers late or changes specifications, does not build a market. Support must therefore move from merely compensating for price differences towards reducing cost drivers and improving reliability.

The ‘factory-gate price’ is measured separately from the ‘delivered price’ to avoid confusing factory problems with logistics problems. Rejections, returns and contractual claims are also measured: more shipments with more rejections are not success. Nor should support encourage exports sold below their economic cost because of unsustainable energy or material subsidies, unless support is temporary, disclosed and compatible with Iraq's trade obligations.

Competitiveness also means policy stability. An exporter building a two-year contract needs reasonable predictability in fees, restrictions and procedures. Sudden export bans or permissions may be necessary for food security or crises, but if repeated they destroy Iraqi suppliers' reputation. Any emergency export restriction must therefore have a published criterion, duration and review.

Standards, accreditation and traceability

A standard is a market gateway, not an administrative paper. Each export basket needs a map of destination standards, conformity body, accepted laboratory, packaging and labelling requirements, food or drug safety where applicable, and product traceability. A laboratory's existence is insufficient; buyers or regulators must recognise its test results.

The Vision moves towards ‘test once, wider acceptance’ by strengthening Iraqi laboratory accreditation and mutual-recognition agreements where possible, with digital certificates linked to customs declarations. For food and sensitive products, export support is tied to a verifiable establishment/batch traceability system, not a certificate of origin alone.

• Publish a national laboratory list with each laboratory's accreditation scope, not names without scope.
• Record foreign shipment rejections and reasons, and turn them into compliance lessons.
• Review Iraqi standards that create unnecessary barriers or differ without justification from the target market.
• Distinguish certificates of origin establishing source from quality certificates establishing conformity; neither replaces the other.

Customs, borders and logistics

Customs automation is the strongest ongoing reform to build upon. The Ministry of Finance documents activation of exports through ASYCUDA at the export complex and all customs centres, and replacement of paper declarations with electronic declarations from 1 January 2025, alongside electronic payment, government-agency connectivity and intelligent selectivity. This infrastructure reduces friction and generates measurable data.

Digitalisation is not measured by connected centres alone. The export dashboard must publish declaration-acceptance time, inspection time, share selected for inspection, release time, share returned for missing documents, system outages and transaction cost. Moving papers onto screens without re-engineering requirements leaves the burden intact.

On routes with recurring exports, use risk management rather than full inspection, and an authorised economic operator programme once integrity and compliance criteria are established. The priority is to distinguish compliant low-risk exporters from flows of unknown risk, with effective post-clearance auditing.

Logistics outside the gate matter just as much. Exporters need regular shipping schedules and costs that can be incorporated into contracts. Factory-to-crossing travel time, waiting time, service frequency and congestion impacts are therefore measured. Port, railway and road investment details remain in the infrastructure part; this chapter defines their export-service requirements.

Finance and export-risk guarantees

Exporters need working capital before receiving payment and may require a performance guarantee, letter of credit or insurance against buyer non-payment. These differ from the long-term factory loan addressed previously. Export instruments are therefore built around the contract cycle: verified purchase order, production, shipment, collection.

The Export Support Fund already exists, with funding linked to imports. The proposed reform does not automatically increase cash support; it publishes a portfolio of instruments and outcomes: who received support, for which market, what additional exports resulted, whether the exporter continued and whether support was necessary. Incentives gradually shift from a percentage of shipment value towards services with shared benefits, such as accreditation, testing, market entry, credit insurance and information.

Governance rules

• No support for a shipment whose origin, value and payment collection cannot be verified.
• No uniform support rate across all goods and markets; choose the instrument according to the market failure.
• Avoid open-ended support becoming a permanent entitlement and weakening productivity incentives.
• Tie support to exporter survival, market opening or standard accreditation, not shipment value alone.
• Review instrument compatibility with World Trade Organization obligations as accession progresses.

Commercial banks can provide trade finance under regulatory oversight, while the Fund or an existing guarantee mechanism shares defined risks. The treasury does not bear the exporter's entire loss. Every sovereign or quasi-sovereign guarantee must have a ceiling, fee, reserve and loss report.

Market intelligence and commercial diplomacy

An exhibition is not a market. Commercial attachés and the Trade Point must turn information into an actionable opportunity: who buys, to what specification, at what reference price, through which distribution channels, with what fees and restrictions, against which competitors, and with what seasonal demand? In 2025, the Ministry of Trade announced a mechanism for registering Iraqi exporters in importing countries and agreements with Arab countries supporting their market entry. This must become a measurable service.

Each trade mission is assessed after 6 and 12 months by actual contracts and continuing exporters, not meeting counts. An ‘opportunity list’ is built from target-market import data matched with Iraqi capabilities, not ministries' wishes. The Iraqi diaspora can also provide access and connections where real commercial value exists, rather than serving as a courtesy channel.

Market access and the World Trade Organization pathway

Market access has four levels: tariffs, non-tariff restrictions, rules of origin, and technical and sanitary requirements. An agreement reducing tariffs without resolving product registration or laboratory recognition may change nothing for exporters. Every trade negotiation is therefore guided by a matrix of actual barriers reported by exporters, with assessment of benefiting sectors and corresponding costs.

Iraq's World Trade Organization accession process offers an opportunity to reform the trade system under published rules. The Working Party's July 2024 meeting discussed the trade-regime memorandum, initial goods and services offers, and legislative plan. The Vision supports continued accession, provided negotiations follow a development strategy rather than speed alone: what transitional tariffs are needed, what service commitments apply, what is the effect of domestic support, and what intellectual-property, procurement and standards laws are required?

Until accession is complete, existing bilateral and Arab agreements are reviewed for actual use. An agreement unused because of origin rules, logistics or lack of information does not count as a trade achievement. Concise origin guides for each agreement are published for exporters to reduce rejections and violations.

Export baskets: selection logic, not wish lists

This chapter does not repeat industrial or agricultural plans, but needs criteria for baskets deserving focused export services. The Vision uses six questions: is there actual scalable production? Does Iraq have an input, skill or location providing an advantage? Is the external market large or nearby? Can standards be met? Is domestic value added significant? Can the company repeat supply?

The Vision does not target exports of raw materials that can be processed locally unless raw export is the highest-value use or no economically viable processing capacity exists. The principle is to maximise Iraq's net value, not prohibit raw exports by administrative decree.

Service exports and the digital economy

Export diversification is not confined to containers. Software, design, engineering, consulting, education, tourism, transport and professional services can generate foreign exchange without comparable material intensity. Their measurement is weaker than goods, however, because some pass through individual transfers, platforms or external contracts.

The first phase establishes a statistical register of export services through cooperation among the Central Bank, Statistics Authority, tax bodies and payment platforms, protecting privacy. Three barriers are addressed: receiving international payments, acceptable contracting and invoicing, and recognition of qualifications or licensing in target markets. No ‘digital export programme’ is created separately from digital-economy policy; this chapter defines only the external-market gateway.

Statistics distinguish a service performed by an Iraqi inside Iraq for an external buyer, a service provided through an overseas branch, inbound tourism and international transport. This avoids a single figure whose components policymakers do not understand.

The Iraqi exporter: survival and expansion, not the first deal

The most important statistic Iraq publicly lacks is exporter survival. The number of companies exporting once may rise through a campaign or price conditions, while development comes from companies returning the next year and expanding markets and products. An exporter database is therefore built from ASYCUDA data after deduplication and confidentiality protection, producing cohort survival indicators by entry year.

Government statements in September 2025 referred to 54 Iraqi factories beginning exports of products including iron and steel, batteries, food and carpets. This is a directional signal, not a national baseline, because the definition of ‘began exporting’, period and value were unpublished. These cases must become a learning database: how many continued, to which markets, what was the first barrier, and which government intervention was decisive?

‘Exporter’ must also be distinguished from ‘trade intermediary’. Intermediaries are not inherently negative: they may aggregate several companies' products and provide market knowledge. The database must nevertheless identify the original producer and value added, so export capability is not attributed to an entity producing nothing and producers are not denied knowledge of the final market.

International comparisons: transferring the mechanism, not the country

Comparative experience is useful only when it identifies a transferable mechanism. Türkiye developed an exporter base through associations, councils, financing services, standards and logistics, but its economic scale and customs union with Europe cannot be copied. Morocco connected industrial investment to ports, logistics, agreements and automotive and aerospace chains; the lesson is to link factory, port, buyer and standard from the investment's beginning. Vietnam attracted extensive export investment, but foreign companies' high export share reminds us that export growth alone does not ensure deeper domestic suppliers.

For Iraq, the better comparison is not ‘Who do we become?’ but ‘Which link is missing?’ If the problem is standards, study accreditation; if finance, credit guarantees; if markets, promotion agencies; if borders, risk management and a single window. Neither a subsidy percentage nor an institution's name is transplanted from another country.

Jordan offers a nearby lesson in access to multiple markets and standards compliance, but has a different economic structure and resources. The Gulf offers a nearby high-income market with strict quality and registration requirements. Iraq therefore uses nearby markets as a product-testing gateway, not a substitute for broader competitiveness.

Iraq's export economy in 2045

In 2045, Iraq's trade strength is measured not by the number of countries with which trade grows, but by an export portfolio working under different conditions. Trade data are unified between the federal centre and the Region, clearly separating hydrocarbons from other goods and services. Thousands of exporters are registered, but more important is a substantial body of continuing exporters returning annually.

Shipments move through a digital system from factory to border, with exporters knowing documents, time and fees in advance. More Iraqi laboratories' certificates are accepted abroad. The Export Support Fund operates transparent instruments with impact review, while credit guarantees cover qualified contract risks. Commercial attachés produce market profiles and contracts, not protocol alone.

Exports span baskets and markets, and digital and professional services become visible in external accounts. Oil remains important, but currency, jobs and budgets become less sensitive to barrel prices because multiple Iraqi companies sell abroad with rising value added.

Stages of transformation, 2027–2045

Indicator and Target Dashboard

The Vision sets no final figures for indicators lacking valid baselines. Exporter, survival, service, value-added and concentration baselines are established in 2027–2028. The following targets either rest on the 2024 baseline or are conditional on establishing one.

New numerical targets are adopted only after publishing the definition, year and denominator. The Vision does not adopt a cosmetic 20–40–60–80% ladder merely to fill a table.

Implementation programme package

Programme 1: the national export baseline

Unify data from the Statistics Authority, Central Bank, customs, the Region and services, remove duplication, and classify crude, derivatives, goods, services and re-exports. The first output is a national data dictionary, not a promotional report.

Programme 2: the digital exporter journey

One government service displays requirements by commodity and market, connects ASYCUDA with certificates of origin, standards and payments, and measures time and failure. No separate platform is built if integration into Ur and ASYCUDA is possible.

Programme 3: the Iraqi quality passport

Accelerate laboratory accreditation, certificates and traceability for priority baskets, linking shipment rejections to a corrective database. The programme starts with international recognition, not laboratory equipment purchases alone.

Programme 4: the continuing exporter

Support new exporters' early years through market, standards and financing services, reviewed after every cycle. The criterion is survival and expansion, not receipt of a grant.

Programme 5: the export-contract guarantee

Develop Export Support Fund and bank instruments to guarantee buyer credit and finance purchase orders and shipments within clear risk limits, fees and reserves.

Programme 6: a market for every basket

Commercial attachés and the Trade Point produce market profiles, buyer matching and contract follow-up. Each mission is measured by sales after 12 months, not visits.

Programme 7: market access and trade negotiation

A joint working group within existing institutions compiles exporters' barriers, supports WTO negotiations, agreements and standards recognition, and provides impact analysis before commitments.

Programme 8: service exports

Build measurement, payments and contracting for exportable digital, professional, tourism and transport services, integrated with the digital-economy and human-resources parts.

Implementation, Cost and Financing Matrix

No programme requires a new ministry or authority. If a functional review shows an existing body cannot perform a particular function because its legal basis is inadequate, the minimum institutional amendment is then proposed. Major port, railway and road infrastructure costs are not assigned to this chapter.

Risks and safeguards

There is also an environmental and water risk: promoting water- and energy-intensive agricultural or industrial exports solely for foreign exchange may transfer costs to national resources. Water, energy and emissions therefore enter export-basket assessment where material, and net value is calculated rather than shipment value alone.

Conclusion and the bridge to fiscal and monetary policy

Non-oil exports put everything built so far in the economic part to a practical test. If the productive economy is real, an increasing share of its companies must pass an external test of quality, cost, timing and contracting. If investment is productive, it must create companies able to reach markets beyond domestic spending. If customs are digital, this must show in time and costs exporters can measure.

The next chapter, V2-D04-C07 — Fiscal and Monetary Policy — does not rebuild the export system. It moves to the macroeconomic environment determining price stability, debt, reserves, exchange rates and budget composition. The bridge is that exports need monetary and fiscal stability and finance, but exchange rates or public spending alone cannot create a competitive product or external market.

Conclusion: Iraq does not escape oil vulnerability by shipping a non-oil commodity for the first time. It gradually escapes when increasing numbers of companies can sell into multiple markets, collect payment, return the following year and raise their value added.