Water and Water Security

Chapter Overview

1. Executive Summary

Iraq enters this chapter with a stark water paradox: the Tigris and Euphrates are part of its identity and economy, yet water has become a strategic constraint on agriculture, cities, energy and health. In November 2025, UNICEF warned that national reserves had fallen to approximately 4 billion cubic metres, the lowest in eighty years according to its statement. Rainfall and inflows then improved in 2026, with winter and spring episodes raising reserves and allowing the summer agricultural plan to expand. The lesson is not that the crisis ended, but that Iraqi water availability is volatile and requires management that preserves abundance for difficult years.¹

The structural pressure runs deeper than one season. The World Bank’s 2026 Tigris Adaptation and Healthy River project document places the projected supply–demand gap at approximately 10.9 billion cubic metres by 2035, more than 15% of total demand. It reiterates that declining water availability could reduce real output by up to 4% and employment in water-dependent sectors by approximately 12% by 2040. These are not “inevitable forecasts”; they constitute a scenario warning of the cost of failing to reform.²

Source: UNICEF 2025; World Bank TAHR/CCDR 2026. The two values have different definitions and do not form a time series.

The National Development Plan 2024–2028 establishes a sound basis for change: meet annual demand and balance agricultural, industrial and municipal uses under scarcity; increase overall irrigation efficiency from 39% in 2022 to 46% in 2024 and a target of 53% in 2028; and raise irrigation-water conveyance and distribution efficiency from 70% to 81%. Iraq Vision 2045 does not replace this plan; it extends its logic from irrigation efficiency to “national water accounting”, linking resources to services, value and the environment.³

Household service reveals that Iraq’s problem is not raw supply alone. The World Bank’s 2023 estimate indicates that 83% of the population have access to an improved drinking-water source, but only 60% of households report safe and continuously available water. Non-revenue water exceeds 60% under the same estimate, sewerage-network coverage is below 30%, and more than 70% of urban wastewater is discharged untreated. The state may therefore pump more water into a system that loses a large quantity and returns some of it to the river contaminated.⁴

Source: World Bank, TAHR Project Concept Note, 2026.

In Baghdad alone, TAHR estimates that more than 600 thousand cubic metres of untreated wastewater are currently discharged daily into the Tigris system, while the Rustamiya plants require rehabilitation and expansion. In April 2026, the Baghdad Mayoralty announced the imminent operation of seven new units with a capacity of 105 thousand cubic metres per day, enabling better treatment and agricultural reuse. These facts show that the cheapest “new water” is sometimes the water we stop polluting and recover for a second cycle.⁵

In agriculture, productivity remains the largest issue. In May 2026, FAO handed the Ministry of Water Resources the WaPOR tool for monitoring water use and productivity in the West Gharraf project through remote sensing, and inaugurated demonstration projects with the Ministry to improve irrigation efficiency in Najaf and Muthanna. In February 2026, the Ministry also announced plans to line canals and shift to pipes and modern irrigation. The direction is right, but the Vision rejects measuring success by sprinkler counts or kilometres lined; measurement concerns actual water use, crop output and value, salinity, energy and return flows to the system.⁶

Source: Ministry of Planning, Summary of the National Development Plan 2024–2028, Table 8.

The south faces a problem of both quality and source. Salinity in the Shatt al-Arab increases as releases fall, sea tides intrude and pollution rises. In 2025–2026, pumping routes and canals were used to improve water delivery to Basra’s districts, while the government awarded a seawater desalination project with a capacity of 1.2 million cubic metres per day, alongside smaller projects. Desalination may be necessary for Basra’s urban water security, but it does not replace river protection, network repair, Al-Bidaa water and wastewater treatment; otherwise, the state produces expensive water only to lose it or mix it into a polluted system.⁷

Regionally, cooperation with Türkiye has advanced institutionally: a 2014 memorandum entered into force in 2021, followed by a framework agreement in April 2024, an implementation mechanism in November 2025 for water quality, irrigation, reclamation and governance projects, and a Council of Ministers vote in July 2026 to activate the framework agreement. However, in January 2026 the Minister of Water Resources stated that no binding agreement set fixed quantitative allocations. Iraq must therefore combine water diplomacy with building domestic resilience, rather than make one a substitute for the other.⁸

Source: Official Iraqi sources and INA; this is not a timeline of binding quantitative allocations.

The chapter’s operational argument is simple: Iraq cannot control rainfall or every upstream country’s decisions, but it can reduce wasted water per service, protect groundwater reserves, treat and reuse wastewater, reduce pollution, improve storage and operations, diversify southern cities’ water sources and acquire data that strengthen its negotiating position. Water security is therefore the management of vulnerability, not a promise of absolute abundance.

2. From Energy to Water: A Nexus That Cannot Be Planned Separately

The electricity and energy chapter concluded that water and energy are interdependent. A water or sewage plant without stable electricity becomes a service interruption and a source of pollution; a desalination plant needs substantial electricity; and modern irrigation requires pumping and control. In the other direction, thermal power plants use water for cooling, oil and gas require water in some processes, and reservoir levels affect hydropower capacity. The Ministry of Electricity must therefore not plan a power plant at a site without a sustainable water balance, nor may a water authority plan desalination without an energy contract and lifecycle cost assessment.

This nexus changes the project criterion. A desalination plant is not only a “water project”; it is water + electricity + membranes + chemicals + brine discharge + transmission pipeline + network. Sprinkler irrigation is not only a “water-saving technology”; it is pressure, energy, maintenance, a farmer, a farm and a crop. A 2045 project measures the complete resource cycle.

Source: Based on the logic of the sectoral chapters and reference sources.

3. The Central Question and the Chapter’s Scope

Central question: how does Iraq move between 2027 and 2045 from seasonal management of the water crisis to a water security system that ensures human, economic and environmental priorities, raises water productivity, reduces losses and pollution, and uses storage, groundwater, desalination, reuse and diplomacy within a single measurable portfolio?

3.1 What This Chapter Establishes

• The concept of water security and the difference between water availability and the ability to manage it.
• Water accounting and allocation among drinking water, agriculture, industry and the environment.
• Water productivity, irrigation efficiency and the conditions for selecting technology.
• Drinking-water reliability, losses, sewerage, treatment and reuse.
• Groundwater, storage, desalination, salinity and quality.
• Governance, diplomacy, data, financing and the stages to 2045.

3.2 What Is Left to Other Chapters

• Agriculture, crops and food security were addressed in V2-D04-C04; this chapter treats water as a constraint and an allocation issue.
• Municipal sanitation as a detailed service returns in the basic services chapter; here it is addressed as an element of resource security and river quality.
• Urban planning and transport are passed to the next chapter, “Transport and Cities”.
• Comprehensive water foreign policy intersects with the part on Iraq in the world; here it is addressed only as a water security instrument.

4. Operational Glossary and Measurement Rules

5. Iraq’s 2024–2026 Baseline: Historical Abundance Becomes Volatile Scarcity

No single year represents “normal water” for Iraq. The year 2025 was among the most severe recent years of scarcity, while spring 2026 brought rainfall episodes and releases that increased reserves and allowed a broader summer plan. This chapter therefore uses a multi-year baseline: 2024 for efficiency plans and institutions; 2025 as a stress test; and 2026 as a test of the state’s ability to capture and manage temporary abundance.

In June 2026, the Ministry of Agriculture stated that improved water conditions had added more than 3 billion cubic metres to reserves, allowing the summer plan to rise to approximately 1.8 million dunums. This increase must not be turned into a “final national reserve figure”, because it describes an addition/improvement in a particular time context. It nevertheless demonstrates the importance of seasonal operations and the ability to store rainfall episodes rather than let them pass without benefit.⁹

At the same time, Babil, Diwaniyah, Muthanna and Dhi Qar governorates continued reporting shortages of raw water for drinking supply in June 2026, confirming that national storage does not automatically become local service. Networks, water levels, encroachments, canals, pumping stations and treatment plants determine who receives water and when.¹⁰

6. The Water Crisis as a Strategic Risk

Water becomes a strategic risk when its shortage can disrupt several sectors simultaneously: food, health, internal migration, rural income, hydropower, industry, the environment and cities. The World Bank links lower water availability to potential output contraction and losses of water-dependent jobs; UNICEF documents scarcity’s direct effects on children and families in governorates such as Diwaniyah in 2026.

“Water security”, however, does not justify militarising management or removing users’ rights. Priorities must be public, and restrictions proportionate, temporary and reviewable. In a drought year, the area of a water-intensive crop or some non-essential uses may be reduced, but drinking water, health and minimum environmental requirements must not become allocations renegotiated daily.

7. The National Water Balance: Supply, Demand and the Gap

Iraq needs national water accounts updated annually and seasonally, combining cross-border inflows, rainfall and flash floods, storage, renewable and non-renewable groundwater, withdrawals by sector, return flows, evaporation, water quality and reuse. Without this balance, two entities may announce different “use” figures for the same quantity because one measures withdrawals and the other measures net consumption.

The World Bank’s reference projection of a gap approaching 10.9 billion cubic metres in 2035 should be used as a policy stress scenario rather than an inevitable figure: how much does efficiency reduce demand? What is the population effect? How do plans change if inflows fall or regional cooperation improves?

Source: .

8. Transboundary Water: Negotiation, Reliance and Alternatives

Ministry of Water Resources Law No. 50 of 2008 includes among the Ministry’s objectives safeguarding Iraq’s rights in shared international waters and engaging neighbouring countries to reach fair agreements on water quantity and quality. This establishes that negotiation is not solely a foreign affairs issue; it is an inherent water function linked to technical measurement and operations.¹¹

The Iraqi–Turkish process in 2024–2026 moved from a general memorandum to a cooperation framework and a project and financing mechanism covering water quality, irrigation, reclamation and governance. This is a useful addition, but the Minister confirmed in January 2026 that there was no binding agreement on fixed quantitative allocations. The Vision therefore adopts “data-based diplomacy”: agreed measuring stations, exchange of storage and rainfall forecasts, drought rules, joint projects and a dispute mechanism, rather than political demands that cannot be verified.¹²

In July 2026, the Council of Ministers voted to activate the framework agreement. This implementation step must be measured by completed projects, improved quality and efficiency, and published flow indicators where diplomacy permits, rather than by meeting counts alone.¹³

9. Storage, Dams and Drought and Flood Management

Storage is not an engineering end in itself. Dams and reservoirs move water across time, place and demand while managing structural safety, floods, sedimentation, the environment and energy. Rainfall episodes in 2026 demonstrated the importance of directing floodwaters to reservoirs, Tharthar, the marshes and the Shatt al-Arab. The 2045 state needs operating rules linked to weather and demand forecasts, rather than fixed schedules that do not change with the climate.

Before building a new large reservoir, Iraq must compare four alternatives: restore capacity lost to sedimentation and maintenance deficiencies; reduce canal and network losses; reuse treated water; and add new storage capacity. The best project has the lowest cost per reliable cubic metre after accounting for the environment, evaporation and conveyance, rather than the greatest size.

10. Groundwater: A Strategic Reserve, Not a Free Balance

In 2025, the Ministry of Water Resources described groundwater as a strategic reserve for future generations, to be used in extreme circumstances such as drinking supply or meeting part of the agricultural shortfall in specific areas, while reporting infringements and unlicensed wells. This is the right direction because some aquifers recharge slowly, and withdrawals may be irreversible within the Vision’s horizon.¹⁴

The Vision proposes a digital well register linked to water-level and quality measurements, basin-based licensing, flexible abstraction limits, prevention of random deep-well drilling, and groundwater use primarily as a drought reserve and local resource where sustainable. Groundwater is not treated as an “alternative solution” that permits postponing surface-water reform.

11. Allocation Among Drinking Water, Agriculture, Industry and the Environment

Allocation is the heart of water policy. The proposed priority order is not based on economic value alone: first, the health-related minimum for drinking water and basic services; second, the environmental minimum that prevents the collapse of rivers, marshes and water quality; then agriculture, food, industry and energy according to their water productivity, social effects and location. Severe crises require declared emergency rules rather than informal bargaining among governorates and users.

Agricultural allocations must also move from a “share per dunum” alone to seasonal water budgets at basin and project levels, compared with actual demand, crops and weather. Allocation that does not measure withdrawals, return flows and evaporation creates incentives to inflate demand.

12. Water Productivity: From Withdrawal Volume to the Value of a Cubic Metre

The National Development Plan adopts higher irrigation efficiency, but Iraq Vision 2045 broadens the indicator to water productivity: kilograms of crop per cubic metre, dinars of value added per cubic metre, and jobs or services per cubic metre, taking food security and equity into account. A crop may have lower economic value yet be strategic for food supply; price alone therefore does not decide.

The WaPOR tool received by the Ministry of Water Resources in 2026 is important because it turns remote sensing into spatial measurement of consumption and productivity. The objective through 2030 is to extend this approach from a demonstration project to major basins and irrigation projects, linking it to agricultural and allocation plans.

13. Irrigation: Overall Efficiency Before Technology Purchases

Irrigation efficiency has three links: conveying water from the source, distributing it within the project, then using it in the field. If the main canal leaks or distribution is uncontrolled, the benefit of a sprinkler will not extend to the whole system. The National Development Plan itself separates conveyance and distribution efficiency from field and overall efficiency—a methodological distinction that must be retained.

Lining canals or replacing them with pipes can reduce seepage in some locations, but is not a universal prescription: some seepage recharges groundwater or generates useful return flows, and pipes require pressure, energy and maintenance. A “loss balance” therefore precedes the project: where does the water actually go, and what does recovering it cost?

14. Modern Irrigation: Where Does It Help and Where Is It Insufficient?

Drip, sprinkler and subsurface irrigation help when they suit the crop, soil, salinity, energy and holding size. But they may increase basin consumption if farmers use the savings to cultivate more land. The Vision therefore links technology support to a water ceiling and actual measurement, rather than simply an equipment grant.

The demonstration projects inaugurated by FAO and the Ministry of Water Resources in Najaf and Muthanna in 2026 provide a testing platform. Results must be published: water quantities before and after, yields, energy costs, failures, operating skills and farmer income. What succeeds can then be expanded according to the area.

15. The Crop Portfolio and Water Opportunity Cost

Water security does not mean an absolute ban on water-intensive crops. Decisions depend on season, location, food demand, crop value and alternatives. Relative abundance in 2026 allowed some paddy-rice cultivation to resume, while irrigated areas in the south had been reduced in earlier scarcity seasons. Seasonal flexibility is better than a fixed list.

The state must publish a “local water footprint” for every major crop rather than a generic global figure, because consumption in Najaf differs from the north. The footprint informs planning and support; it is not used to impose a direct water tariff on small farmers before measurement and service have been established.

16. Drinking Water: Access Is Not the Same as Safe Service

Access to an improved source is insufficient if service is intermittent, pressure is low or quality is unstable. TAHR places improved-source access at 83% in 2023, but only 60% of households report safe and continuously available water. The gap between these indicators is the core service issue.

Iraq Vision 2045 therefore measures drinking water through five indicators: hours of continuity, pressure, quality compliance, time to repair a break and service equity among neighbourhoods. A plant’s “production volume” remains an input indicator; what reaches the tap is the outcome.

17. Networks, Losses and Non-Revenue Water

The estimate of non-revenue water exceeding 60% reveals the largest virtual water plant that can be built: repairing the network, meters and data. Part of the proportion is physical, caused by leakage and ageing pipes; another part is commercial, arising from meters, irregular connections and billing. They cannot be addressed with a single instrument.

TAHR proposes water-network monitoring and management systems in 15 governorates to identify production, distribution, leakage, illegal consumption and pipe condition. The Vision makes this a national system: district metered areas (DMA), production and transmission meters, pressure management, leak detection and GIS maps, followed by pipe replacement according to risk rather than age alone.¹⁵

18. Wastewater: The Largest Wasted and Polluting Water Resource

When untreated wastewater is discharged into the Tigris and Euphrates, Iraq loses twice: it contaminates the raw resource and wastes water usable after appropriate treatment. The World Bank estimates sewerage coverage below 30%, with more than 70% of urban wastewater discharged untreated. In Baghdad alone, untreated flows to the river system exceed 600 thousand cubic metres daily, according to the 2026 project document.

The priority through 2030 is not only to build new plants, but to restore existing capacity to service, complete the networks feeding it, and manage operations, energy and sludge. A plant without a network, or a network without treatment, transfers the problem from a neighbourhood to a river.

Source: Based on the TAHR approach and Iraqi updates in 2026.

19. Reuse: A Second Cycle for Water

Treated water does not always need to return to drinking-water quality. The principle is fit-for-purpose: treatment suited to restricted irrigation, industry, green spaces or environmental flows, with microbial and chemical standards and monitoring. Each additional treatment level has an energy and materials cost and must therefore match the use.

The opening of new Rustamiya units with a capacity of 105 thousand cubic metres daily in 2026 illustrates the potential: better treatment reduces river pollution and makes water available for agriculture. TAHR itself bases expansion on reuse where feasible. By 2045, discharging recoverable water without a reuse assessment must become the exception rather than the rule.

20. Water Quality and River Pollution

Scarcity and quality compound each other: as flow declines, pollutant concentrations and salinity rise. The Environmental Protection and Improvement Strategy 2024–2030 calls for regional water cooperation and law enforcement to reduce pollution and salinity in southern Iraqi rivers, the Shatt al-Arab and the marshes. On 28 September 2026, UNICEF called for urgent action to stop river pollution, expand wastewater treatment and monitor quality.¹⁶

On 5 October 2026, the Higher National Water Committee discussed measures to protect the Tigris and Euphrates and reduce pollution, according to the Ministry of Environment. This matters for the data cutoff: the problem is no longer only an old environmental diagnosis, but an active government issue in late 2026.¹⁷

The Vision proposes a unified quality network whose data are published with an appropriate delay: salinity, turbidity, oxygen, bacterial indicators, nutrients and location-specific industrial pollutants. More important is linking every exceedance to a source, a responsible party and corrective action, rather than publishing figures without enforcement.

21. Basra, Salinity and Desalination: A Portfolio, Not a Single Project

Basra encapsulates Iraq’s water crisis: it lies at the end of the basin, is affected by salinity, tides, pollution and reduced releases, and needs reliable drinking water for its population, industry and port economy. The right solution is therefore a portfolio: protect freshwater routes and Al-Bidaa water, improve the Shatt al-Arab where possible, desalinate seawater for drinking supply, treat and reuse water for industry and agriculture, and reduce network losses.

In 2025, the government announced the award of a desalination project with a capacity of 1.2 million cubic metres per day within a wider southern water plan. In July 2026, the Finance Committee discussed financing treatment, desalination, wastewater treatment and completion of Al-Bidaa with the ministers responsible for water resources and construction. These are priority projects, but Iraq Vision 2045 requires an energy contract, lifecycle costs, brine management, a transmission pipeline, storage and NRW measurement before judging the resulting security.¹⁸

Source: Based on projects and measures announced in 2025–2026.

22. The Marshes and Minimum Environmental Water Requirements

Water reaching the marshes is not a “remainder” after agriculture and cities. The amended Ministry of Water Resources Law included the Centre for the Restoration of the Marshes and Wetlands among its organisational units, and the environmental strategy links the Shatt al-Arab and marshes to quality and salinity. The marshes have environmental, economic, cultural and climatic functions; their collapse increases migration, dust and biodiversity loss.

The Vision proposes a seasonal environmental minimum determined scientifically, linking marsh releases to salinity, biodiversity, cover and inundation rather than a fixed quantity alone. In years of extreme scarcity, trade-offs are managed openly while preserving a core water allocation that prevents irreversible collapse.

23. Cities, Rural Areas and Spatial Equity

The national average conceals local crises. In Diwaniyah in early October 2026, UNICEF documented villages receiving water only once every several days, with some families waiting longer. In the south, salinity compounds intermittency, while urban fringes experience development faster than network expansion. Continuity and quality indicators must therefore be published at service-area level, not only governorate level.¹⁹

Equity does not mean that every user receives the same quantity. It means a guaranteed minimum of safe water, followed by clear allocation rules for services and production, protection of poor households from commercial reform costs, and gradual accountability for high consumption and deliberate waste once meters and service are available.

24. Climate: Drought, Heat and Floods

Climate change does not mean “drought alone”. Iraq needs to manage both ends of variability: scarce years and episodes of heavy rain and flash floods. The year 2026 itself offered a lesson: rainfall improved reserves after the 2025 crisis. The 2045 system therefore develops seasonal forecasting, reservoir operating scenarios, drought plans and flood maps, and prevents construction in floodwater channels.

The World Bank estimates that Iraq’s water availability could decline by approximately 13–28% by 2050 in the comparative CCDR findings. This figure is not used as an exact local forecast for each basin, but as a design test: will the project operate if resources decrease and temperatures rise?²⁰

25. The Water–Energy–Food Nexus

The three chapters—agriculture, energy and water—must share one dashboard. Expanding agriculture through groundwater pumping raises electricity demand and depletes groundwater reserves. Expanding desalination raises electricity demand. If a power plant reduces water use through dry cooling, operating cost and efficiency rise. Optimal decisions do not emerge within a single sector.

The Vision proposes a “nexus assessment” for major projects: water, energy, land, carbon, food and resilience. Its purpose is not to delay projects with another study, but to prevent transferring the problem from one ministry to another.

26. The Legal and Institutional Framework

Ministry of Water Resources Law No. 50 of 2008 establishes responsibility for planning and developing surface water and groundwater, rights in international waters, protection against pollution, and dam and irrigation management. Meanwhile, drinking water and sewerage responsibilities are distributed among the Ministry of Construction, Housing and Municipalities, the Baghdad Mayoralty, regional authorities and governorates, while the Ministry of Environment monitors quality and the health sector contributes to safety. Multiple institutions are normal; the problem arises when no single party owns the outcome.

The 2026 TAHR document describes the institutional landscape as fragmented and proposes water and sewerage master plans for Baghdad, Basra and Nineveh, performance indicators and financial sustainability. Iraq Vision 2045 does not propose merging all ministries; it proposes a policy council, water balance, shared data and service agreements specifying who decides, implements and oversees.

27. The National Water Council: Unify Policy, Not Duplicate Institutions

On 20 April 2026, the Council of Representatives completed the first reading of a proposed National Water Council law, intended to adopt a unified strategy for shared waters, protect resources, and ensure their use and equitable distribution among the Region, governorates and sectors. Discussion of the draft continued in July. At this chapter’s cutoff, the proposal is not treated as an enacted law; it is, however, an institutional direction that must be designed well.²¹

If established, the Council should not become a parallel ministry. Its functions are to approve the national water balance, drought scenarios, allocation priorities and the transboundary negotiating position; resolve disputes among sectors and governorates; and adopt water security indicators. Implementation remains with the competent entities.

28. Data, Measurement and Digitisation

Water is among the sectors benefiting most from digitisation because the underlying problem is spatial and temporal. A flow meter, quality station, satellite image, well level, canal map and citizen complaint can feed a single decision system. WaPOR is an important beginning, but must be linked to ground measurements and calibration.

The proposed 2045 dashboard presents, daily within government and weekly/monthly to the public according to sensitivity: inflows, reserves, releases, levels, drinking-water demand, agricultural allocations, salinity, treatment-plant indicators, NRW, treated wastewater and marsh inundation. Transparency reduces rumours and supports negotiations among governorates.

29. Water Economics, Finance and Tariffs

Water is both a basic right and a service with a cost. Low unmetered tariffs do not protect the poor; they may protect large consumers more and leave the utility without maintenance. But raising tariffs before stable service and reliable meters creates legitimate opposition. The reform sequence is: measurement and leak repair + service and quality + a customer database + targeted support + gradual tariffs.

TAHR includes financial sustainability, ERP, CRM and billing among its reforms, with sequenced investments: 600 million dollars in the first phase, 2026–2034, for rehabilitation and foundations, and a proposed second project of approximately a billion dollars for expansion. It also identifies wider water and water-security investment needs reaching tens of billions through 2040. The Vision does not use one aggregate figure until Iraq’s portfolio has been reviewed and rehabilitation separated from expansion and major national projects.²²

30. International Comparisons: Transfer the Mechanism, Not the State

The shared lesson is that successful water-management countries do not rely on one instrument. They combine water accounting, basin institutions or coordination, pricing or allocation, infrastructure, reuse, data and drought rules. Iraq needs the combination appropriate to two international rivers, extensive agriculture, growing cities and an extremely hot climate.

31. Water Security in Iraq in 2045

In 2045, Iraq does not wait for the rainy season to know whether its agricultural plan is feasible. Before the season, it has forecasts, reserves, a demand balance and scenarios. Every irrigation project knows its consumption and productivity. Every city knows its produced, lost and billed water and its quality. Major wastewater flows are treated and reused where worthwhile. Groundwater is withdrawn within basin limits, and the marshes have a known environmental minimum.

Cooperation with upstream countries becomes more institutionalised and data-based, but national stability does not depend on goodwill alone. Desalination in the south, reuse, storage, demand management and efficiency allow Iraq to absorb a bad year without the collapse of services, agriculture or the environment.

32. Transformation Stages, 2027–2045

Source: .

33. Indicators and Targets Dashboard

The following targets are proposed policy commitments, not forecasts. Where a unified national baseline is unavailable, the task for 2027 is to establish it before setting a final value.

34. Implementation Programme Package

Programme 1 — National Water Accounting

A unified platform for inflows, storage, withdrawals, return flows, quality and use by basin and sector, with a definitions dictionary and annual and seasonal balances.

Programme 2 — Drought and Flood Plan

Warning stages linked to reservoir operating rules, allocation and public communication, with annual exercises before summer.

Programme 3 — Drinking Water First

Identify risk areas, operational storage, source redundancy, critical generator/solar backup, laboratories and an urban emergency system.

Programme 4 — NRW: Recover Lost Water

DMAs, production and transmission meters, pressure management, leak detection, GIS, repairs prioritised by returns, a customer database and billing.

Programme 5 — Water and Sewerage Rehabilitation Before Expansion

Restore existing plants to design capacity, then expand according to demand, networks, energy and operations.

Programme 6 — Healthy Rivers and an End to Untreated Discharge

Inventory outfalls, environmental enforcement, industrial pretreatment, and plant connections to quality monitoring and corrective action.

Programme 7 — National Water Reuse

Fit-for-purpose standards, separate pipelines for industrial and agricultural users, and purchase contracts for treated water.

Programme 8 — Agricultural Water Productivity

Expand WaPOR and ground measurement, kg/m3 and value/m3 indicators, and link agricultural support to water plans.

Programme 9 — Basin-Based Irrigation Modernisation

Lining/pipes/sprinklers/drip where viable, with a water ceiling preventing the rebound effect.

Programme 10 — Groundwater Register

Digital licensing, level and quality monitoring, satellites to detect wells, closure of unauthorised wells and emergency drinking-water plans.

Programme 11 — Water Security for Basra and the South

Al-Bidaa water and supply routes, desalination of 1.2 million m3/day and other projects, reuse, salinity and network management.

Programme 12 — Environmental Minimum and Marshes

An indicator of inundation, quality, salinity and biodiversity; flexible allocation; and drought plans preventing irreversible ecological collapse.

Programme 13 — Technical Water Diplomacy

Measuring stations, data and forecast exchanges, joint projects and drought protocols with upstream countries.

Programme 14 — Water Council/Governance

A national water balance, resolution of sector/governorate conflicts, and approval of plans and risks without duplicating implementation.

Programme 15 — Water Lifecycle Financing

Separate CAPEX from OPEX, performance contracts, gradual tariffs after metering, targeted support and protected maintenance funds.

Programme 16 — Water Innovation

Lower-energy desalination, sensing, decentralised treatment, irrigation materials and systems, and links between universities and companies and actual water problems.

35. Implementation, Cost and Financing Matrix

The chapter does not set an aggregate investment figure through 2045, because the original SWLRI document and its investment provisions are being updated, and TAHR itself uses a series of projects extending over a decade. The rule is to sequence funding: first repair existing assets and losses, then expand where the project passes the tests of cost per reliable cubic metre and operating, energy and environmental costs.

36. Risks and Safeguards

37. Conclusion and the Bridge to Transport and Cities

This chapter establishes that Iraq’s water crisis is not solely an “upstream country problem”, “citizen waste” or “too few dams”. It is a system: a volatile transboundary resource, agriculture consuming the largest share, high-loss networks, untreated wastewater, pollution and salinity, incomplete data and institutions sharing responsibility. No single lever therefore saves Iraq; a sequenced portfolio is required.

The portfolio begins with drinking water and the river, then measuring every drop, reducing losses, increasing agricultural productivity, treating and reusing wastewater, protecting groundwater, diversifying southern water sources and establishing technical water diplomacy. These layers make Iraq less vulnerable even if it cannot control every external inflow.