Internet and digital infrastructure

Chapter Overview

1. Executive Summary

Iraq entered the middle of this decade with a much larger connectivity base than a few years earlier. The latest directly available ITU DataHub value places individual internet use at 81.5% in 2024 and households with internet access at home at 87.3%. ITU also records 17.6 fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people in 2024.¹²³These figures establish that the national problem is no longer “bringing internet to Iraq” from zero, but moving connectivity from mere possible access to a dependable everyday capability.

In fixed infrastructure, the Ministry of Communications announced in 2025 that marketable FTTH lines had exceeded four million, within a policy of gradual transition from traditional Wi-Fi provider networks to fibre.⁵This figure requires careful interpretation: a “marketable line” measures potential supply capacity, not whether a line is active, paid for or operating at a particular speed. The Vision therefore measures fibre achievement not only by installed ports, but by activation rates, service quality, cost and repair time.

In mobile communications, Iraq in 2026 remains before widespread commercial fifth-generation deployment. The Communications and Media Commission announced a strategic objective to launch 5G during 2027, following a regulatory direction against confining the technology to a single exclusive licence.⁷The 2024 agreement with Vodafone had laid the foundation for a new national fifth-generation operator.⁸The Vision’s decision is that 5G adds a layer of capacity, latency performance and industrial services, but does not replace fibre: every dense wireless network requires strong backhaul, while homes, schools and businesses need a mix of fibre, mobile and fixed wireless according to location and cost.

In 2026, Iraq’s geography itself became a digital asset. The Ministry of Communications announced the marketing of transit capacity through the “Civilisations Road” project from Al-Faw to Rabia under an IRU model, connecting Asia and the Gulf towards Europe through Türkiye. Three submarine cable routes with STC, Ooredoo and E& were also at different stages of completion, and the STC project had reached approximately 50% in July 2026.¹¹¹²This offers revenue, route diversification and international connectivity, but does not automatically become an achievement for citizens; it must translate into domestic capacity, competition, reliability and prices.

Satellite communications were also brought into the official framework. On 17 July 2026, the Commission announced the signing of Starlink’s licence in Iraq; in September 2026, it released a broader draft regulation for non-terrestrial network services for public consultation.⁹¹⁰This technology’s role in the Vision is not to compete with fibre in every neighbourhood, but to cover high-cost areas, provide critical institutions with a backup route, and enable connectivity during disasters and at mobile or remote locations.

The largest gap is invisible in the national average. Preliminary Household Socio-Economic Survey 2023-2024 data presented by the World Bank show internet access among men aged 18-65 at 82%, compared with 65% for women; in urban areas, 88% for men versus 75% for women, and in rural areas, 71% versus 44%.⁴A rising national average is therefore insufficient. Success in 2045 means eliminating geographic, gender and income gaps in meaningful connectivity, not merely improving speeds for those already connected.

The Vision draws on ITU’s concept of universal and meaningful connectivity: quality, availability, affordability, security, devices and skills.¹⁶¹⁷This chapter, however, deals primarily with infrastructure, access, quality and cost; skills, security and data governance are addressed in detail in their own parts. The practical result is a “Connected Iraq” programme that builds the backbone and international transit, expands FTTH, launches 5G on a basis of competition and quality, uses universal service for high-cost areas, connects schools, health centres and public facilities, and makes quality, price and outage data public and comparable.

2. The Central Question and the Chapter’s Scope

4.1 Central Question

What regulatory, investment and technical structure does Iraq need between 2027 and 2045 to make internet connectivity a functional right of access to the economy, services and knowledge, with suitable speed, reliability and cost in urban and rural areas, multiple routes, operators and technologies, and without turning digital infrastructure into a monopoly, critical dependency or equipment project disconnected from use?

4.2 What the Chapter Addresses

• The national backbone, international gateways, submarine cables and transit routes insofar as they relate to network resilience and domestic capacity.

• Fibre optics and fixed-access networks, distinguishing marketable capacity from actual subscriptions and service quality.

• Mobile internet, 4G and the transition to 5G, linking licensing to coverage, quality, competition and investment.

• Satellite communications and non-terrestrial networks as tools for high-cost areas and backup, not a sole alternative.

• Universal service, rural and gender divides, affordability and connecting schools, healthcare and public institutions.

• Shared infrastructure, rights of way and access to ducts, conduits, towers and facilities to reduce deployment costs and time.

• Speed, latency, availability, outage, repair and price indicators, user protection and performance transparency.

4.3 What Is Not Addressed in Detail

Digital identity, payments, government platforms and interoperability are not this chapter’s subject; they are “what runs over the network” and are addressed in Public Digital Infrastructure. Data protection, cyber sovereignty, encryption and digital national security are addressed in Data Sovereignty and Cybersecurity. Start-ups, e-commerce and artificial intelligence appear here only as demand for connectivity; their policies are detailed in the economy, science and technology parts.

3. Definitions and Measurement Rules

4. The institutional and regulatory framework

Iraq regulates telecommunications through a structure involving several institutions. Article 103 of the Constitution places the Communications and Media Commission among the independent bodies, while Order 65 of 2004 remains a regulatory basis used by the Commission for licensing, spectrum management, subscriber protection and service quality.¹⁵The Ministry of Communications and the General Company for Telecommunications and Informatics, meanwhile, manage national assets, networks and projects, while mobile operators, internet service providers and private investment participate in access and operation. This plurality can create competition and specialisation, but it requires a clear separation between the roles of regulator, owner and operator.

In April 2026, the Commission's Board of Commissioners approved a project to study Fixed Broadband licences, indicating that regulation of the fixed market remains under development.⁶The Commission also approved rules for establishing, operating and leasing in-building wireless infrastructure in March 2026.²⁰Its Quality of Service Department has Drive Test tools, the toll-free complaints number 177, reports and performance indicators.¹³These are sound elements, but Vision 2045 calls for them to be brought together into a predictable market system: who owns the right of way and ducts? Who leases the fibre? What are the wholesale access terms? What is the minimum quality standard? How are prices or offers changed? And how can consumers appeal?

The institutional decision is not to create a new authority merely to coordinate networks. What is needed is a national digital infrastructure coordination council/mechanism, jointly led by the Ministry of Communications, the Communications and Media Commission, the Ministry of Planning, local governments and corridor-owning entities. Licensing and oversight should remain with the regulator, ownership and operation with their respective owners, and decisions should be linked to a shared infrastructure map and published indicators.

5. Iraq's digital baseline, 2024–2026

There is a significant gap in the quality of the baseline. The chapter did not find a published national dashboard bringing together, for each governorate, provider and technology: actual peak-hour speeds, availability, repair time, packet loss, prices after taxes and fees, rural coverage, the proportion of activated FTTH lines, and the number of schools and health centres with connections meeting a specified minimum standard. The Commission's possession of measurement tools does not imply the existence of a unified public data series. The Vision's first phase therefore starts with auditable measurement rather than filling in fields with estimates.

The Speedtest Global Index can be used as an independent view of the market, rather than as government statistics. In August 2026, the index reported measured median speeds for Iraq of approximately 81 Mbps for mobile and 61 Mbps for fixed connections.²¹This sample is based on user tests, not a national probability survey. The Vision therefore does not adopt the figure as an official target; its value lies in showing that speed can be measured regularly and that the gap between advertised and measured performance should become part of oversight.

6. From connectivity to meaningful connectivity

The ITU clearly sets out the concept of universal and meaningful connectivity: a connection cannot support development if it exists but is slow, intermittent or expensive, or requires a device the user does not own or a skill they do not possess.¹⁶¹⁷For Iraq, this means that the next phase is not merely a race for coverage. A country can record high usage while a rural school remains on a weak connection, a small business experiences repeated outages, or a household connects its phones through a package that cannot support video-based learning and remote work.

The Vision applies six tests to any connectivity project: does it increase the number of people able to subscribe? Does it improve peak-hour quality? Does it reduce total cost or prevent it from rising? Does it add an alternative route or reduce a point of failure? Does it serve an institution or productive activity? And can the regulator measure the outcome? If the answer to most is no, the project may represent a technical upgrade, but it is not a national priority.

7. The national backbone and international gateways

The backbone is the part users do not see, yet it determines whether millions of subscriptions share a single bottleneck. Iraq has a twofold opportunity here: first, an internal network linking governorates, cities and access routes; second, its geographical position between the Gulf, Asia, Türkiye and Europe. The 2026 GBI agreement on the Al-Faw–Rabia route under an IRU model is a practical step towards turning this location into a data corridor.¹¹The planned submarine cable landings also provide additional gateways and capacity if completed and connected to multiple terrestrial routes.¹²

A digital corridor, however, must not be managed as a single road. The fastest route can become the greatest point of failure if everything passes through it. Iraq 2045 therefore requires diverse submarine and terrestrial gateways, physically separate routes within the country and the ability to reroute traffic automatically after a cut. Long-term commercial contracts must include service-level agreements, maintenance rights and alternative routes, and must not prevent Iraq from adding a new supplier.

The national backbone map is built at corridor level, rather than around company ownership. Every major road, rail, pipeline or electricity project in this Part should assess the possibility of adding spare ducts/fibre. In this way, major infrastructure works become a shared platform that reduces network costs, rather than leaving each entity to excavate the same route in different years.

8. Fibre to the home: from marketable lines to actual service

The decision to move towards FTTH is sound where density and demand support it, because fibre increases potential capacity and extends the asset's life. The announcement of more than four million marketable lines shows that Iraq has moved beyond pilot projects.⁵It nevertheless creates a measurement risk: the number of lines built may become the goal of the Ministry and companies, while activation remains low, prices high or service unstable.

The Vision therefore divides FTTH indicators into four layers: homes passed, or serviceable premises; homes connected, or activated lines; actual speed/availability; and subscriber retention and fault repair. It is not enough for a cable to pass a house. The final connection cost must be clear, activation time limited, equipment compatible and users able to change providers where the infrastructure permits.

Official discussion of switching off Wi-Fi must also be understood precisely. It refers to the transition from older local/commercial wireless access networks to FTTH, not a ban on Wi-Fi technology within homes or institutions; Wi-Fi will remain the final few metres of many fibre connections. The Vision therefore describes this as gradually phasing out unregulated or poor-quality access networks where a better alternative is available, without disconnecting service before an affordable alternative exists.

9. Mobile internet and the transition to fifth-generation networks

Mobile phones are the main means of connectivity for millions of Iraqis, so Vision 2045 cannot build digital equity on FTTH alone. Fifth-generation networks matter because they add capacity, spectrum, better network allocation and uses for industry, logistics and health. Yet value does not begin with a technology's name. If a 5G base station is installed with weak backhaul, limited spectrum or unstable power, it will not deliver the required outcome.

In 2026, the Commission announced a target of launching 5G during 2027 and said the national licence would not confer exclusivity over the technology, a direction that supports competition.⁷The Vision builds on this through three rules: no prolonged technological exclusivity without justification; measurable coverage and quality obligations in exchange for spectrum; and encouragement of tower and passive infrastructure sharing and neutral site access to reduce unproductive duplication.

5G is deployed in stages, beginning with high-demand areas, industrial zones, ports, airports and major urban centres, then expanding according to demand and coverage cost. Low-density areas may be served more efficiently through improved 4G, FWA or satellites. Technology follows function, not the reverse.

10. Satellite communications and non-terrestrial networks

The signing of the Starlink licence in July 2026 opens up a channel that previously existed in an unregulated form, allowing it to be brought under licensing and oversight.⁹The public consultation on non-terrestrial networks in September 2026 also indicates that Iraq is not merely regulating an individual company, but is building a broader regulatory category.¹⁰This is a positive step because the technology cycle moves faster than any particular company's name.

Satellite communications serve three principal functions in Vision 2045: cost-effective connectivity in extremely remote locations where fibre or towers cannot justify their cost; backup links for hospitals, security centres, airports, and water and power plants; and rapid connectivity during disasters or cuts to terrestrial routes. They must not be used to justify leaving villages without terrestrial investment once their density warrants a fixed or mobile network.

Government satellite contracts need to purchase a service, not merely equipment: minimum speed and availability, priority during emergencies, equipment replacement, local support, transparent costs and an exit or transfer plan when suppliers change. Data sovereignty, security and encryption are left to the relevant chapter, but this chapter requires that a critical service must not become dependent on a single provider without an alternative.

11. Quality, reliability and resilience

Network quality is not a matter of impressions. The Communications and Media Commission has a Quality of Service and Spectrum Monitoring Department, publishes information on Drive Test tools and the complaints number 177, and conducts fieldwork during periods of heavy demand.¹³In 2026, it announced measurements and field visits during major events, demonstrating an actual oversight capability.²²The requirement is to move this capability from particular seasons and events to a continuous annual dashboard covering every governorate, provider and technology.

Performance must be published in a comparable format, with minimum sample and methodology requirements. The Vision does not use zero outages as a target: complex networks fail. The goal is to reduce and contain outages, reroute traffic and repair the cause quickly, distinguishing planned from unplanned interruptions.

12. Universal service and the spatial divide

The Communications and Media Commission has universal service regulations and a mechanism, along with field projects for remote areas.¹⁴This tool should become the main driver for closing gaps in areas that cannot generate sufficient commercial returns. Rather than providing unconditional general subsidies, the Vision uses competitive reverse auctions: the state specifies an area, a quality outcome and a maximum price, and operators compete over the lowest subsidy needed to provide the service within a binding timeframe.

The map must be precise down to subdistrict, village, road and public facility level. A governorate may be covered while rural pockets lack capacity, electricity or backhaul. Gender and rural disparity data from IHSES 2023–2024 show that connectivity is not merely a geographical issue: preliminary access figures for rural women were 44%, compared with 71% for men.⁴Universal service programmes therefore incorporate institutional access points, training and affordable devices through the social Parts of the Vision, rather than stopping at a new tower.

13. Affordability: connectivity that citizens can use

Connectivity that citizens cannot afford is not meaningful connectivity. The UN meaningful connectivity target places a basic broadband subscription below 2% of monthly gross national income per capita, and also below 2% of the average income of the lowest-earning 40% of the population.¹⁶This chapter has no consistent published Iraqi baseline for these ratios, and therefore does not invent a figure. The year 2027 begins with an official price basket linking minimum data allowances, speed and price to household income by income group.

The cost of service is separated into activation fees, a device/router, the subscription, taxes and fees, and additional packages. Temporary discounts do not solve the problem if entry costs remain high. Competition is the first tool for affordability, followed by universal service and pooled institutional procurement, then targeted support for the most disadvantaged where necessary. The Vision does not recommend permanent administered pricing that stifles investment; it recommends transparency, comparison, an open wholesale market and prevention of monopolistic practices.

14. Schools, health facilities and public institutions

Connecting schools, health centres and public institutions is not a separate internet project; it is a condition for the education, health and effective government Parts to function. UNICEF reported that the electronic school management system had reached 16,675 schools by December 2025.¹⁹This is a fact about the spread of a digital system, not proof that every school has a fast, reliable connection. An indicator must therefore not confuse the existence of a platform with a site's ability to use it.

The Vision adopts a connected public institution standard: a primary link meeting a specified minimum according to user numbers, a functional internal network, appropriate backup power and a backup route for critical facilities. Iraqi schools adopt at least the ITU target for 2030: a connection for every school, with a minimum of 20 Mbps per site, 50 kbps per student and a minimum data allowance of 200 GB as an international minimum reference, then raise standards locally as use grows.¹⁶

Primary health centres and hospitals require a different scale: a small clinic may need a reliable connection for referrals and records, while a referral hospital needs multiple routes, higher capacity and continuity. The Vision therefore does not use a single speed for every institution. Service classes are defined according to critical function.

15. The digital economy and businesses: connectivity as a production input

Digital infrastructure is part of the economy because it reduces transaction costs and the cost of access to markets and information. A World Bank report on Iraq previously warned that weak capacity, quality and affordability constrain small businesses and prevent them from using platforms, e-commerce and operational management effectively.²³The older figures in that report are not used as this chapter's baseline, but the economic mechanism remains valid: connectivity is a production input, like electricity and transport.

Industrial and logistics zones, universities, incubators and major markets are therefore treated as sites of intensive demand that should not have to wait for individual complaints. Every new economic zone must have a multi-provider telecommunications plan and shared infrastructure ducts before occupation. Developers must be prevented from imposing a single provider within a complex where competition or wholesale access is technically feasible.

Iraq also connects its international digital corridor to a domestic economy, rather than relying solely on transit revenue. International cables and routes encourage content facilities, computing facilities and regional businesses when power, law, local connectivity and competition are stable. Data centre and data sovereignty policies are not detailed here; this chapter only ensures that the network can carry demand.

16. Shared infrastructure, rights of way and a dig-once policy

Much of the cost of fibre is not the glass itself, but excavation, permits, resurfacing and access to buildings and poles. Vision 2045 therefore adopts the dig-once principle: when a road, major pavement, sewerage, electricity or new-city project is implemented, telecommunications needs are assessed and standard leasable ducts are installed where viable. This reduces repeated excavation and street damage and accelerates network expansion.

A national and local rights-of-way framework is established: defined decision times, published fees, utility maps, reinstatement specifications and a duct reservation system. Towers and government sites can be shared on non-discriminatory terms where security and safety permit. The Commission's 2026 rules for in-building wireless infrastructure provide a foundation that can be extended from inside buildings to a broader shared infrastructure policy.²⁰

17. Competition, regulation and user protection

Competition does not mean having the greatest possible number of companies if the market is fragmented among weak providers without investment capacity. Nor does it mean consolidating the market until only an operator or two remain able to control price and quality. The goal is competition in service and investment, with clear entry, exit and merger rules. The 2026 Fixed Broadband licence study project is an opportunity to rebuild these rules on a transparent, technology-neutral basis.⁶

The Vision separates the wholesale and retail layers where state infrastructure or a natural monopoly dominates. If publicly funded fibre or ducts have spare capacity, access must be transparent and non-discriminatory, based on known costs and methodology. Where a provider is vertically integrated, the regulator needs tools to prevent it from favouring its commercial arm in ways that deny a competitor access to infrastructure that cannot be economically duplicated.

User protection includes a concise contract, expected peak-hour speed/capacity, usage policy, all fees, the right to complain, compensation or rules for major outages, and straightforward service transfer/cancellation. The 177 number and complaints platform provide a sound foundation, but the required outcome is publication of resolution rates and times, alongside provider comparisons.¹³

18. Local exchange and content: shortening routes, not isolating the internet

Not every byte needs to leave Iraq and return. When two operators exchange local traffic through an exchange point, or a cached copy of content exists within the country, routes, latency and international capacity costs fall, while resilience to external outages increases. The Vision therefore encourages neutral internet exchange points, open peering and the hosting of content network caches where viable.

Shortening routes, however, is not equivalent to localising the internet or forcibly confining data. Global content needs a global network, and data and sovereignty policies have their own rules in the relevant chapter. The criterion here is technical and economic: keep local traffic local where this is more efficient, and retain diverse external routes.

The year 2027 begins with a public inventory: where exchange points are located, the volume of local traffic, the proportion of networks exchanging directly, and latency to the most popular content. The chapter does not set an artificial percentage target before this inventory; it sets a direction: as local demand grows, unnecessary journeys for local traffic should decline.

19. Power, continuity and green infrastructure

The digital network depends on electricity. A tower without power or a fibre facility without cooling is not reliable infrastructure. This chapter therefore connects with the electricity and energy plan: classification of critical telecommunications sites, appropriate battery/generator autonomy, dual supplies where possible, and fuel and energy monitoring. The Vision does not redesign the electricity grid here; it treats telecommunications as a critical customer with a continuity standard.

Expansion of towers and network facilities also increases energy consumption. Vision 2045 uses energy efficiency per unit of data, sleep/optimisation technologies and solar/hybrid power at remote sites where their lifecycle cost is better. No particular source is mandated; what is required is measurement of lifecycle cost, emissions and reliability.

20. Digital Iraq in 2045

This does not mean that every village is covered by the same technology. A home in Baghdad may connect through FTTH, a farm through FWA, a border site through 5G or satellite, and a business through dedicated fibre. Equality lies in the minimum outcome: a connection capable of supporting education, work, services and communication, rather than identical cables.

The national outcome is also for Iraq to become a regional data hub without tying its security or economy to a single route. Transit revenue matters, but greater value arises when Iraqi businesses, universities and factories use the same capacity to produce, sell, research and learn.

21. Transformation stages, 2027–2045

22. Indicator and Target Dashboard

The following targets are proposed policy commitments. Where there is no published Iraqi baseline using a unified definition, the baseline is established in 2027 rather than filled with an estimate. Values are reviewed every four years because the standard for sufficient speed will itself change by 2045.

23. Implementation Programme Package

24. Implementation, cost and financing matrix

The chapter does not set a single national cost, because connectivity costs depend on population density, excavation length, spectrum, equipment prices, power and technology choice. Each project moves from a programme to an investment only after a demand model, lifecycle costing, a financing source and a quality contract are in place. Public subsidies go to a proven market gap, not to an area that competition could serve commercially.

25. Risks and Safeguards

26. Governance, data and monitoring

The Vision needs an owner of the outcome, not an owner of every network. The Ministry of Communications leads policy for the backbone, assets and corridors within its remit; the Communications and Media Commission regulates the market, spectrum, quality and user protection; the Ministry of Planning sets standards for incorporating digital infrastructure into cities, roads and projects; and governorates and municipalities administer rights of way and excavation under national rules. Education, health and economic sectors own their demand and service requirements, rather than waiting for the Ministry of Communications to define their needs on their behalf.

The distinction between confidential operational data and public transparency is maintained. Citizens do not need a detailed map of network vulnerabilities or security details; they need to know the quality of the provider they buy from, the extent of outages, whether an area is served and how universal service funds are spent. Every published figure carries a definition, year and denominator.

27. Conclusion and the bridge to basic services

This chapter places the internet in its proper position within Iraq Vision 2045: essential infrastructure, neither a recreational add-on nor a synonym for the whole of digital transformation. Iraq today has relatively high usage, expanding FTTH, regulation moving towards 5G and satellite communications, and new international corridors. These are real gains. They become national capability, however, only when translated into active subscriptions with dependable quality and cost in every governorate and institution.

The path to 2045 is not a single technology for everyone. Fibre provides the backbone and a strong option for dense areas; mobile networks provide mobility and coverage; FWA closes gaps economically; satellites cover the hardest-to-reach locations and provide backup; and international corridors give Iraq capacity and a strategic position. The state's role is to make these layers compete and share where appropriate, and to measure outcomes rather than technology names.