Iraq’s Strategic Position

Chapter profile

Door Eight ends with a simple idea: a state’s external strength begins with the ability to live and work within it. Iraq’s geography cannot become a trade and investment platform if cities are congested, ports disconnected from the interior, railways fragmented, roads unreliable and borders slow. This door therefore starts not with diplomatic rhetoric, but with place and the ability to use it.

The introductory chapter, “Why Great Iraq?”, established that Iraq covers approximately 438 thousand km² and that its location between the Gulf, Türkiye, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is a potential source of strength. It also warned against equating possession of an asset with converting it into an outcome. This chapter applies the same principle to geography: a route drawn on a map becomes a strategic corridor only when the entire chain works, from the port to the road, railway, border crossing, customs, logistics service and market. ¹²

1. Executive summary

Iraq is not geographically peripheral. It is a West Asian state with a limited Gulf coastline, land borders with six countries, and a population and economic centre situated between the Gulf, Türkiye, Iran, the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula. This map gives it four simultaneous directions of connection, but does not automatically make it a logistics hub. The World Bank’s latest diagnosis places Iraq 115th among 139 countries in the 2023 Logistics Performance Index, with a score of 2.4 out of 5. It reports that a truck journey of approximately 580 km between Baghdad and Umm Qasr may take around 24 hours. The obstacle is therefore not geographical distance alone, but the quality of roads, borders, operations and institutions. ³⁴

In 2025 and 2026, Iraq began building physical and procedural elements that could change this equation. The World Bank financed the railway extension and modernisation project with USD 930 million to rehabilitate 1,047 km from Umm Qasr to Mosul via Baghdad, and the economic transport corridors project with USD 900 million to develop the north–south and east–west axes. As designed, the railway project targets 6.3 million tonnes of domestic freight, 1.1 million tonnes of foreign-trade freight and 2.85 million passengers by 2037. These are targets for a specific project, not forecasts for the entire vision, but they indicate what converting the domestic backbone into capability means. ⁵⁶

In the south, Grand Al-Faw Port has become a tangible focal point rather than merely an idea on paper. The port’s official website presents five new berths, an initial container terminal with a design capacity of 3.5 million twenty-foot equivalent units annually, a 2.4 km immersed tunnel, a 62 km connecting road and a 23 km navigation channel. Yet a port alone does not create a regional hub. Its value depends on domestic connectivity, regular commercial operation, handling times, customs, and rail and road connections to the north and west. ⁷

This is where the Development Road enters. A 2024 memorandum between Iraq, Türkiye, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates described a road and rail route approximately 1,200 km long within Iraq, involving an estimated USD 17 billion investment and linking the Gulf to Türkiye and onward to Europe. In 2026, work continued on completing the project’s legal framework, while the Prime Minister’s Office reaffirmed in October its role as a route for trade, energy and investment and a bridge between East and West. Vision 2045 treats it as a central instrument, but rejects two errors: presenting it as a guaranteed substitute for the Suez Canal and treating transit fees alone as a development objective. ⁸⁹¹⁰

Institutional improvements at borders matter just as much. ASYCUDA covered more than 90% of Iraqi foreign trade by the end of 2024, and paper customs declarations were discontinued on 1 January 2025. The Uboor platform connects TIR international road-transport procedures to other systems; by 19 August 2026 it recorded 1,027 cross-border TIR transport requests. In September 2026, the General Company for Land Transport announced 1,120 transit freight journeys in one month from Türkiye and Europe towards the Gulf and Jordan. These figures are not a definitive measure of competitiveness, but they show that the “corridor” began to appear as actual traffic before completion of the megaproject. ¹¹[13][14]

The strategic conclusion is that Iraq needs a network rather than one line: a maritime south through Al-Faw and Umm Qasr; a north through Türkiye; a west through Jordan and Syria; an east through Iran; and a domestic axis connecting Basra, Baghdad, Mosul and other production centres. Each direction adds markets and resilience; each single-route dependence creates a point of failure. The strength of location is therefore measured not by agreements or maps, but by the time, cost and reliability of moving goods, people, energy and data, and by the Iraqi economy’s ability to retain value from those flows.

By 2045, Iraq should become a “multidirectional connectivity state”: ports, railways, roads and crossings operate as one system; customs are digital and traceable; corridors serve the domestic economy before transit; logistics nodes connect to industry, agriculture and services; and traffic can be diverted to alternative routes during shocks. The balanced foreign policy addressed in the next chapter provides this network’s political framework; this chapter builds its geographical and operational logic.

2. The central question and the chapter's limits

The central question is: how can Iraq, between 2027 and 2045, turn its position between the Gulf, Türkiye, Iran and the Levant, and between Asia and Europe, from a source of exposure, conflict and incomplete corridors into a reliable economic and sovereign network that serves Iraq’s market first and widens its regional and international options without dependence on a single route, state or project?

The chapter treats geography as a platform for connectivity. It does not formulate alliance policy or balance relations among powers; that is the next chapter’s function. Nor does it redesign Al-Faw Port, railways or roads, which were addressed in the infrastructure door. It does not set export or investment policy, addressed in the economic door and revisited under economic diplomacy. Its role is to determine how these assets connect to become “locational capability”. [15]

3. Definitions and measurement rules

Measurement rule: the vision does not treat “how many kilometres were built?” or “how many agreements were signed?” as final outcomes. It measures time, cost, reliability, actual volume, the share of traffic using digital procedures and the share of value retained in Iraqi services, companies and employment. It also distinguishes port or rail design capacity from actual utilisation.

4. The geographical and logistics baseline

The baseline supports a twofold conclusion. First, Iraq has a strong spatial asset, existing networks and large projects under development. Second, current performance remains below the ambition of a “connectivity hub”. Location must therefore not be used to justify bypassing road, railway, customs and institutional reforms. On the contrary, it increases their value by multiplying their domestic and regional returns. ³⁴⁵⁷¹¹

5. Four directions, not a single axis

A multidirectional network does not mean every direction has equal importance at all times. Planning builds a “connectivity portfolio”: a faster or cheaper route is used when available, and an alternative exists when it is shocked. This is the same logic the vision applies to energy, finance and cybersecurity. Dependence is not risky merely because it exists; it becomes risky when replacement or diversion is difficult.

6. Iraq and the Gulf: a limited but high-value maritime gateway

Iraq’s coastline is relatively limited, increasing the strategic value of every metre of maritime infrastructure. Umm Qasr is the principal operating gateway, while Al-Faw is an expansion and transformation project. The risk is to view a port as land and berths alone. A port forms part of a chain beginning at sea and ending in a warehouse, factory or inland city.

Al-Faw’s development expands maritime capacity, but Vision 2045 sets three conditions: it must operate with Umm Qasr as part of a national port system rather than in isolation; success must be measured through actual containers, vessel and handling times, and road/rail connectivity rather than design capacity; and the coast must not become a new bottleneck because roads, tunnels, customs or railways have less capacity than the berths. ⁷

7. Iraq and Türkiye: the northern gateway to Europe

Türkiye is more than the “end of the road”: it is a domestic network connecting eastern Anatolia to ports, Istanbul, the European Union and the Caucasus. Iraq’s European connection therefore depends on the two networks’ ability to operate together: rail standards, timetables, clearance, crossings, fees and bottleneck capacity. In 2026, the World Bank approved substantial financing for a new rail crossing north of Istanbul, explicitly noting that it strengthens corridors including Iraq’s Development Road. This confirms that corridor competitiveness is not created within one country alone. [16]

Iraq must reach the border with a load and timetable that can be handed over to another network without costly reorganisation. Harmonised standards, digital data exchange and advance permits thus become as much a part of “location” as the road itself.

8. Iraq and Iran: a long frontier, a market and human mobility

Eastern Iraq is not empty space between Baghdad and the border. It is a chain of governorates, markets, trade flows, religious visits, and energy and water connections. The length of the connection with Iran makes the geographical relationship permanent, regardless of political change. Eastern gateways should therefore be managed as part of the national connectivity portfolio, neither as an exception nor as a substitute for other directions.

The vision does not settle the level of political openness or trade arrangements here. It establishes two operational principles: every major crossing needs customs and digital standards harmonised with the rest of Iraq, and every new connection must justify its function within the national network rather than create an isolated logistics island. Political and commercial details are left to Chapters Two and Three.

9. Iraq, the Levant and Jordan: the western gateway

The western gateway gives Iraq an important option: access to Jordan and then the Red Sea, and to Syria and then the Mediterranean and Levantine markets when conditions permit. ITREC itself makes the E1 axis between Baghdad, Syria and Jordan one of its two strategic investment axes, alongside E2 towards the north. This is practical recognition that Iraq’s geography cannot be reduced to the Al-Faw–Türkiye axis alone. ⁴

Multiple western gateways also matter for resilience. If the maritime or northern route is disrupted, the west can carry part of the trade or passenger traffic. But the “existence of a road” is insufficient: problems recur at borders, in processing times, truck yards and services. That makes Uboor and ASYCUDA part of geographical policy.

10. Between Asia and Europe: what does that actually mean?

“Iraq lies between Asia and Europe” is geographically true, but can become propaganda unless unpacked. Asian goods do not choose Iraq because of a map. They take the route offering the best combination of price, time, reliability, capacity, insurance and risk. Some container cargo will remain maritime through Suez even after the Development Road is complete, because sea transport is often cheaper for large, time-insensitive loads.

World Bank railway-project reports indicate that the Development Road concept relies on a potential time advantage for sensitive goods, but this advantage depends on every link performing. Vision 2045 therefore adopts no fixed promotional figure for days saved. It adopts an annual test: how long does shipment take from a selected Asian port to a European destination through Iraq compared with alternatives, and what are its cost, variability and delay rate? If the route is uncompetitive in a particular segment, the state must not subsidise it to vindicate a political narrative. [17]

11. The national corridor first: the domestic economy before transit

The most dangerous mistake is to build a rapid freight corridor while Iraq’s cities and markets remain disconnected from it. A corridor shortening the route from Al-Faw to Türkiye but failing to reduce the cost of transporting wheat, cement or industrial products between Basra, Baghdad and Mosul fails a substantial part of its development purpose.

The chapter therefore makes “domestic freight” a primary, not secondary, indicator. IREM itself expects domestic freight by 2037 to far exceed rail export/import volumes. This makes economic sense: the national market provides the underlying demand that justifies part of the investment even before international transit matures. ⁵

12. Grand Al-Faw Port: a gateway, not an island

A port becomes a gateway when four conditions coincide: vessel arrival, rapid unloading, direct transfer to rail or road, and customs procedures that do not recreate paperwork manually. Al-Faw’s official website shows physical infrastructure being built around this approach: berths, a navigation channel, an immersed tunnel, a connecting road and a container terminal. These are links in a chain, not separate projects. ⁷

The vision’s decision is to integrate Umm Qasr, Al-Faw and the southern logistics area into a “Gulf Gateway System”. Port functions are allocated according to efficiency and demand, linking tariffs and incentives to performance indicators: vessel waiting time, container time from berth to port gate, rail-transport share, release time and chain safety. Concession contract value and crane counts are insufficient.

13. The Development Road: from megaproject to corridor system

The Development Road is the clearest recent attempt to turn Iraq’s geography into economic infrastructure. The 2024 quadrilateral cooperation memorandum linked the project to economic integration and East–West connectivity through a phased road and rail route approximately 1,200 km long within Iraq. In April 2026, the Ministry of Transport discussed a dedicated draft law to provide a stable investment and operating environment. ⁸⁹

The project must not become a “state within the state”. It needs a law defining ownership, access and tariffs, contract standards, community and land rights, competition rules, safety, links to existing railways and roads, and scrutiny of financial commitments. Each construction phase must pass demand, financing and connectivity gates. Long-term capacity should not be built while a cheaper, short bottleneck prevents its use.

14. Existing railways: the backbone that must not wait for the new project

The chapter’s strongest methodological decision is not to wait for a new network to be complete before Iraq begins its logistics transformation. IREM focuses on 1,047 km of existing railway between Umm Qasr and Mosul via Baghdad, covering track, trains, the Baiji workshop, safety, management and private-sector participation in dry ports and logistics nodes. This network can become the Development Road’s “transitional backbone”. ⁵

This also prevents duplicate investment. Before creating a parallel line or new node, the state tests whether upgrading an existing asset would be cheaper and faster, whether it connects to factories and warehouses, and whether block trains can carry grain, cement and containers. The 2045 standard is reliable tonne-kilometres and life-cycle cost, not merely the novelty of an asset.

15. Eastern, western and northern roads

Roads will remain essential even as rail expands. They currently carry more than 90% of transport activity, and the World Bank describes extensive sections as being in fair to poor condition. ITREC tests a corridor approach: E2 northwards to the Turkish border and E1 westwards towards Syria and Jordan, with performance-based maintenance, climate resilience and institutional reform. ⁴

The vision adds an integration condition. Strategic roads are assessed not only by their physical condition, but by truck yards, weighing and inspection stations, emergency care and safety, fuel and future charging facilities, communications and rail transfer areas. Heavy transit traffic should also be separated from city centres wherever possible so citizens do not pay for the corridor through congestion and accidents.

16. Crossings and customs: borders are part of the infrastructure

In international trade, an hour at a crossing can cancel an hour saved on a motorway. This chapter therefore treats borders as a logistics asset. ASYCUDA brought an important transition: by the end of 2024 it covered more than 90% of foreign trade, and in 2025 paper customs declarations ceased and electronic payment was added. Customs revenue also rose 128% between 2023 and 2024 according to UNCTAD—a fiscal effect, but insufficient by itself to establish faster clearance. ¹¹

The next step is the “integrated crossing”: one declaration, risk-based inspection, advance data exchange, truck appointments, electronic payment, mutual recognition of certain documents and measurement of transit time from yard entry to exit. Both the median and the ninetieth percentile should be published, because a favourable average can conceal shipments delayed for days.

17. TIR and Uboor: from an agreement to actual movement

Iraq’s accession to the TIR international road transport system provided a framework for reducing repeated guarantees and inspections during transit. Full operation began on 1 April 2025 according to the National Digital Transformation Centre’s Uboor platform, which integrates TIR with other transport and freight systems. By 19 August 2026, the platform recorded 1,027 cross-border requests. [13]

In September 2026, the land-transport authority announced 1,120 transit freight journeys in one month from Türkiye and Europe towards the Gulf and Jordan. The two figures should not be compared directly because they come from different snapshots and time definitions. Their proper significance is accelerating use. The 2045 goal is not to “maximise truck numbers”, but to maximise safe, valuable traffic while shifting suitable freight to rail and reducing border time. [14]

18. From an arena of conflict to a connectivity platform

A central location increases opportunities for connection as well as exposure to neighbouring conflicts. Where interests, forces, markets, sanctions, water and energy intersect at Iraq’s borders, location can become a source of permanent pressure. Moving from an “arena” to a “platform” means neither passive neutrality nor denial of threats. It means Iraqi, publicly known rules governing territory, infrastructure and decisions, with the state’s interest in continued lawful movement becoming an incentive for stability rather than a justification for intervention.

This transformation begins internally: unified decision-making, corridor security, dependable courts and contracts, harmonised customs and no force able to block a road or crossing for private purposes. This chapter therefore relies on the conclusions of the state, sovereignty and security doors without reopening them. Geography does not become power when authority over a route is fragmented.

19. Operational neutrality of corridors

No Iraqi corridor should assume that success requires excluding other corridors or countries. The global economy works through portfolios of routes; companies redirect shipments according to price and risk. Iraq’s interest is to remain attractive even when Suez, the Middle Corridor, and Iranian and Gulf ports operate efficiently.

“Operational neutrality” means non-discriminatory access under law and contracts, avoiding exclusive attachment of civilian infrastructure to a political bloc, and enabling multiple connections without granting one partner the power to obstruct others. The next chapter defines the political doctrine of this balance; here the network logic is established.

20. Transit is not enough: where does the value remain?

A country crossed by a container in a few hours may earn fees without building a substantial economy. Greater value comes from storage, consolidation and deconsolidation, container and vehicle repair, finance and insurance, refrigeration, packaging, laboratories, brokerage, data, light manufacturing and inputs supplied to domestic industry.

Vision 2045 therefore does not target transit growth alone. Every corridor node must demonstrate a “value-capture plan”: which firms will it serve, which local chain, which skills, which land, and what water and energy? Below what threshold does the zone become merely a property holding? This links location to a productive economy rather than creating a new rent stream.

21. Logistics nodes and productive cities

Dry ports and logistics and industrial zones are where a corridor changes from a line into an economy. IREM itself opens space for private capital in dry ports and logistics nodes. Yet a label is not an outcome. Locations must be selected where industrial or agricultural demand intersects with rail, roads, land and services, not because every governorate wants a logistics zone. ⁵

A portfolio model is adopted: a southern node linked to the maritime gateway; central nodes serving Baghdad and production areas; northern nodes connecting to Türkiye; and eastern or western nodes where demand is demonstrated. The final number follows the freight model, not a predetermined political decision. Each node has an exit gate if traffic and investor volumes fail to reach defined thresholds during its establishment years.

22. Energy and data within the corridor logic

A modern corridor carries more than goods. Road and rail routes can benefit from coordinated energy lines, fibre and communications within planned rights of way, reducing excavation costs and increasing resilience. This chapter does not select specific pipelines or cables. It establishes the principle of a “multi-utility corridor” where feasibility, security and environmental conditions are clear.

This principle prevents later project conflicts: a newly opened road excavated for a cable, or a railway crossed by unplanned utility lines. It also allows logistics nodes to serve data centres, industry and energy, while data and energy sovereignty remain within their specialist doors.

23. Resilience: what happens if one direction closes?

Strategic resilience is tested on closure day, not opening day. Iraq must know in advance: if the maritime corridor fails, what can land routes carry? If a northern crossing closes, what can the west handle? If a railway fails, how much can roads absorb without collapse? If a customs system fails, is secure digital continuity available?

An annual “corridor stress test” is established: 7-day and 30-day closure scenarios for each major gateway; loss of bridge or tunnel capacity; a sudden demand surge; a climate event; and a digital-system outage. Results are measured by rerouting time, lost capacity and alternative-route cost. This turns resilience from a slogan into engineering and operation.

24. Competition between corridors: no selling illusions

Iraq is entering a crowded corridor market: Suez, the Middle Corridor through Central Asia and the Caucasus, Gulf networks, Iranian routes, Levantine connections and improved maritime routes. No rule guarantees victory to the shortest geographical line. Corridors are compared by door-to-door time, cost, timetable reliability, capacity, insurance, political risk and the number of handling stages.

Vision reports must therefore avoid claims such as “Iraq will capture Asia–Europe trade” without a demand model. Three scenarios are permitted: conservative, reference and high, each with volumes, costs and phased investments. If demand falls short, new capacity slows while domestic-network reforms continue because they have an independent internal return.

25. Comparative lessons: transfer the mechanism, not the country

26. Iraq’s geo-economic position in 2045

In 2045, the vision does not define Iraq as “a corridor between others”. The intended definition is a market and producing state on an international route network, with a Gulf gateway, a domestic rail and road backbone, practical northern, western and eastern connections, and international transit that improves rather than crowds out domestic economic efficiency.

The final picture has five layers: multiple gateways; highly reliable domestic corridors; digital borders; logistics and production value nodes; and sovereign policy retaining freedom to choose partners and routes. If four layers are complete but the fifth is missing, location becomes vulnerable to dependence. If the fifth exists without infrastructure, sovereignty becomes rhetoric without capability.

27. Transformation phases, 2027-2045

28. Indicator and target dashboard

Proposed numerical targets are not forecasts and are recalibrated after the 2027 baseline and demand studies. Indicators depending on intermittent international rankings serve as external verification, while daily decisions use national data: journey time, border time, tonnes or containers, reliability and cost.

29. Implementation programme package

30. Implementation, cost and financing matrix

The vision uses no single national cost figure for corridors because some assets are funded or under design and others depend on private concessions. What is needed is a “commitment register” distinguishing construction costs, government guarantees, minimum commitments, maintenance, land and exemptions. This prevents a geo-economic project from becoming a hidden, deferred fiscal obligation.

31. Risks and safeguards

32. Governance, data and monitoring

Iraq’s location needs an “outcome owner”, not necessarily a new ministry. The vision proposes a corridor steering council within an existing government structure, including Planning, Transport, Construction, Finance, customs, border crossings, investment, the Region and relevant governorates. Its task is to approve the portfolio and gates and resolve conflicts, not manage daily operations.

The national dashboard is published at two levels: a monthly public dashboard for time, volume, reliability, tariffs and projects; and an internal dashboard for risk, security and resilience. Every number has a fixed definition: when does the “border time” clock start, what constitutes an actual TEU, a TIR journey or a tonne of freight? This prevents statistical success being manufactured by changing a denominator or definition.

Corridors are reviewed every four years before major investments are updated. The review covers demand, social and environmental costs, public-finance commitments, alternative-route competitiveness, effects on governorates, prices and land, and the share of value retained in Iraq. A project failing review is slowed or redesigned even if rhetoric describes it as “strategic”.

33. Chapter boundaries and conclusion

This chapter has not identified allies or adversaries, set trade tariffs or an investment agreement, designed an image campaign for Iraq, or declared it a fully developed “regional hub”. It has established only the structure making such policies realistic: multidirectional geography, gateways, a domestic network, digital borders, reroutable corridors and local value.

The governing conclusion is that Iraq does not need to change its location; it needs to change its location’s function. Geography becomes a network of options rather than a channel for pressure, conflict and dependence. Instead of the world passing near or over Iraq, Iraq gains the ability to choose where it connects, how it benefits and what remains under its control.

34. The bridge to a balanced foreign policy

Once the geography of interests is established, the question becomes political: how does Iraq manage relations with states that are simultaneously markets, crossings, water and energy sources, and security and political powers, without multiple connections becoming multiple dependencies? The next chapter begins here. A multidirectional location needs a foreign policy with multiple relationships, but one national decision and an Iraqi interest that can be defined and measured.

The central handover is: no isolation, because geography is interconnected; no dependence, because the network is diverse; no operational hostility towards a competing corridor; and no partnership granted the power to obstruct the others. This is not yet a complete foreign policy, but the geographical constraints on which it must be built.