A Balanced Foreign Policy

Chapter profile

1. Executive summary

Iraq Vision 2045 begins with a political fact: extensive relationships and international memberships do not by themselves establish independent decision-making. Embassies, meetings and memoranda may multiply while vital functions remain hostage to one supplier, crossing or technology provider. A government may possess legal decision-making authority yet face internal or external pressures exceeding its implementation capacity. The test is whether institutions can choose, negotiate, implement, review and retain alternatives when conditions change.

Constitutionally, Article (8) ties foreign policy to good-neighbourliness, non-interference, peaceful dispute settlement, relations based on shared interests and reciprocity, and respect for international obligations. Article (110/First) places foreign-policy formulation, diplomatic representation, negotiation and signature within exclusive federal powers. Provisions concerning the Council of Representatives, President and Council of Ministers frame the institutional procedures needed for state agreements. These are binding rules, not optional political ideas.¹

Practice reveals tangible diplomatic instruments. Baghdad hosted the Arab Summit in May 2025, participated in the quadrilateral Development Road understanding in April 2024, and continued cooperation mechanisms with Türkiye on water and trade. On 30 September 2026, the conclusion of the coalition’s military mission against ISIS in Iraq and the transition to bilateral cooperation arrangements were announced. None of these events alone constitutes a numerical indicator of decision-making independence or foreign-policy success: each file differs in nature, implementation scope and outcomes.²

The chapter adopts four interconnected standards. First, “Iraqi interests first”: rank interests according to sovereignty, people’s lives, economic sustainability, rights and obligations, rather than the intensity of relations with any capital. Second, “diversity without dependence”: relationships balanced by function, risk and alternatives, not equal arithmetic distributions of contracts and visits. Third, “cooperation without surrendering decisions”: every agreement is tested for competence, legality, financing, critical dependence, reviewability and exit. Fourth, “realism”: understand limits of power and resources, assess crisis probabilities and develop implementable options before announcing a position.

By 2030, the vision aims to establish a unified inventory of high-impact external commitments; an interests and dependencies analysis system; a joint crisis-position file prepared before contradictory statements proliferate; a pre-approval review model for strategic agreements; and a public monitoring report that protects information while disclosing what may lawfully be published. Between 2031 and 2045, it moves from establishing mechanisms to mature foreign-policy decisions capable of continuing across governments, absorbing shocks and generating partnerships that benefit the domestic economy and society. These are proposed policy targets, not verified government achievements.

The five strongest actions in the first hundred working days are to adopt a national-interest matrix; inventory highly sensitive agreements jointly through Foreign Affairs and the relevant bodies; create a crisis protocol for coordinating external positions; map critical dependencies in energy, water, trade, payments and security; and approve an assessment template preceding negotiation or signature of any strategic commitment. None requires a new ministry or rewriting the Constitution. Each requires a clear mandate, a single coordinating responsibility and records subject to oversight.

The principal research constraint is the absence of a unified published baseline measuring the quality and implementation rates of external agreements, joint-position preparation times, actual alternatives to dependencies, and external outcomes to which missions contribute. The programme therefore begins by measuring what can be established in 2027 and prohibits manufacturing an unauditable composite “independence index”. The value of Iraq’s position cannot be reduced to a score; it is tested through sound decisions and specific outcomes under real pressure.

Figure (1): The external decision chain that creates value. Every link is an operating condition; signature is not assumed to equal an outcome.

2. Concepts: what is balance, and what is not?

Table (2): The chapter’s operational glossary | Working definitions for this chapter.

Three often-confused levels must be separated: the state’s “right” to adopt a position, its “capacity” to turn it into conduct, and its “impact” on citizens’ lives and interests. A state that asserts its right but cannot stop an uncalculated commitment needs institutional capacity. A state implementing a costly agreement without evaluation may be procedurally efficient but strategically ineffective. This chapter therefore takes the capacity standard from “The State First”, the source-of-authority standard from “Sovereignty and the Monopoly of Decision”, and the outcome standard from “Effective Government”.

3. Constitutional and legal foundations and the limits of authority

3.1 Distribution of powers and position formulation

The constitutional framework for foreign policy rests on more than one provision. Article (8) sets the principles; Article (109) requires protection of the state’s independence and sovereignty; and Article (110) makes sovereign foreign affairs a federal function. Article (80) assigns the Council of Ministers responsibility for formulating and implementing general state policy and negotiating and signing treaties and agreements or authorising others to do so. Articles (61) and (73) regulate the legislative and presidential aspects of ratification under constitutional and legal conditions. The whole chain cannot be reduced to a minister’s signature or a council statement.³

Treaty-Making Law No. (35) of 2015, published in the Iraqi Gazette, issue (4383), governs treaty-making procedures. Foreign Service Law No. (45) of 2008 provides the professional framework for the diplomatic service and missions. The applicable text, amendments and implementing instructions must be checked before authority is fixed in a particular agreement. In particular, a memorandum of understanding does not become a sovereign commitment merely because of its title, nor may non-binding status be inferred simply from the word “memorandum”.⁴

3.2 Federal policy and local plurality

Exclusive federal competence does not eliminate coordination with regions, governorates and sectoral ministries on matters affecting them. Agreements on truck transit, receiving technical delegations or managing a border crossing may require local participation, while negotiation of sovereign foreign policy and conclusion of international obligations remain with the competent federal authority. The vision establishes a written representation and delegation protocol preventing duplicate messages and commitments and ensuring relevant bodies participate in information and decisions within constitutional limits, not outside them.

3.3 Legal safeguards for realistic policy

National interest does not justify disregarding international law. The United Nations Charter prohibits threats or use of force against states’ territorial integrity or political independence and requires peaceful dispute settlement and good-faith fulfilment of obligations. “Balance” must therefore not be used to assert moral equivalence between every event, nor “sovereignty” to justify using Iraqi territory to harm neighbours unlawfully. Iraq has the right to state a rule-based position even when some partners disapprove.⁵

Figure (2): Decision gates for international agreements. Movement to each gate depends on completing the preceding one.

4. Iraq’s baseline: facts and limits of knowledge

Within the sources verified for this edition, Iraq’s public domain contains no unified annual series for high-impact agreements in force, implementation rates of their commitments, strategic dependency shares or response times to external crises. Failure to locate an indicator does not mean the government holds no internal records, but it prevents zero from being treated as the baseline. The vision adopts a register of “what we know” alongside “what we need to measure” before national outcome indicators are set.

Table (3): Documented external baselines and limits on inference | Sources R01 and R04–R12; each value must be read with its year, coverage and definition.

Source-conflict decision (D09-01): use the Iraqi statistical authority’s 2024 figure when the question concerns national exports as defined in its report; present UNCTAD’s estimate separately for international comparison. The chapter does not produce an arithmetic discrepancy “requiring correction”, because classification coverage and estimation methods may differ. The same methodological decision applies to bilateral trade, merchandise exports, services and security commitments.⁶

4.1 Strategic implications of the data without causal leaps

The heavy concentration of exports in oil indicates revenue sensitivity to relationships, markets, maritime passage and energy prices, but does not alone identify “dependence” on a particular state. Oil may reach multiple markets while budget finance remains tied to a single global demand cycle. The chapter therefore links external independence to diverse energy, trade, finance, gateway and information instruments, leaving their economic design to Door Four and subsequent chapters. It does not turn Foreign Affairs into an economic management apparatus replacing competent ministries.⁷

The state can convene many parties in Baghdad, as the May 2025 Arab Summit and the attendance of the UN Secretary-General demonstrated. Mediation, however, faces a stricter test than hosting: did the parties accept Baghdad’s role, did documented de-escalation steps occur, did the process continue after the meeting, and was its political cost acceptable? A summit photograph cannot support a general claim that Iraq has become the region’s mediator.⁸

5. Causal diagnosis: why do multiple relationships not necessarily produce independence?

The first bottleneck is fragmentation in defining interests within the state. A security body may view a file through threats, an economic body through a deal, a water ministry through allocations or projects, and a political authority through public messaging. Unless overall outcome ownership and permissible boundaries are settled, the Iraqi delegation negotiates with lists of demands rather than a unified strategy. This is a decision-chain failure, not automatic evidence of bad faith.

The second bottleneck is concentrated external exposure. The problem is not importing electricity, medicine or technology; it is a single party’s failure disabling a broad sector without remedy within an acceptable period. Diagnosis must reveal the entire dependency chain: supplier, intermediary, crossing, payment system, maintenance and knowledge. Multiple political relationships can coexist with hidden single-source technological or financial dependence.

The third bottleneck is weak conversion of agreements into outcomes. Iraq may sign a sound strategic framework and manage relationships successfully, yet implementation stalls through complicated authorisations, funding, contracts and changes of officials. This is not solely a “diplomatic failure”. Foreign Affairs should preserve commitments, coordinate and escalate stalled outputs, while the competent implementing ministry remains accountable for indicators under its control.

The fourth bottleneck is inadequate control over actors. A position issued by an unauthorised body, or the use of force, aviation or borders outside the lawful decision chain, can create a commitment or political incident beyond Foreign Affairs’ ability to contain. Balance therefore connects to the sovereignty, armed forces and internal-security chapters: one external decision, agencies acting under their mandates, and disciplined, accountable government communication.

The fifth bottleneck is weak institutional knowledge across governments. If assessments of partners, negotiations and commitments depend on individuals and personal relationships, the state loses accumulated advantage and repeats mistakes. The remedy is not merely an “electronic archive” for storage, but a living agreement register, owned position briefs, post-negotiation evaluation and staff rotation that preserves specialisation without allowing memory to leave when an employee moves.

Figure (3): The chain of foreign-policy decision failure. This is a possible organisational explanation; each file requires separate verification.

6. Iraq’s interests first: a method for ranking choices

“Iraq’s interests first” becomes a slogan unless it specifies how conflicts are resolved. The chapter establishes four levels of testing, not four competing slogans. The governing level covers territorial integrity, constitutional independence, people’s lives and preventing the state from becoming a platform for unlawful aggression; these cannot be traded for a short-term advantage. The vital level covers water, energy, food, passage, financial exchange and protection of citizens abroad. The developmental level covers investment, knowledge transfer, exports and education. The fourth covers reputation, mediation and cultural influence, judged by their ability to serve the preceding levels without overriding them.

Interests are not ranked by one minister alone. The vision proposes an “interest and risk assessment” for every high-impact file, covering constitutional rights, benefits across the agreement’s life cycle, beneficiaries and adversely affected groups, legal commitments, the no-agreement alternative, supplier and financing availability, the likelihood of external pressure being transmitted internally, and corrective options. The decision distinguishes evidence-based knowledge, probabilistic judgements and policy choices. Water, border or trade files also include an assessment of effects on relevant governorates.

“We balance” is not an adequate answer to conflicting interests. If a foreign partner conditions financing for an essential project on a restriction affecting freedom of decision, the value and durability of funding, alternatives, the condition’s cost and legal constraint must be assessed. A third option or a negotiated safeguard and review clause then follows. If rapid regional messaging conflicts with citizens’ security or mission safety, speed must not become a measure of strength. Delaying an announcement pending verification can be a reasoned professional decision. This does not justify silence about an established event requiring a legal or humanitarian position.

Figure (4): Levels of national interest in decision testing. The order sets testing priorities, not a denial that issues overlap.

7. Multiple relationships without dependence: partnership structure, not visit counts

7.1 A relationship portfolio based on function

The chapter proposes an external portfolio of overlapping circles rather than a fixed map of allies and enemies. The neighbourhood circle addresses water, borders, trade, energy and population movements; the Arab and Gulf circle covers regional security, integration and connectivity; international partners cover training, technology, finance, markets and the international system; and multilateral institutions protect legal rules and support commitments, financing and dialogue. A partner may appear in more than one circle, and economic partnership gives no automatic authority over security or politics.

With Iran, Türkiye, the Gulf states, Jordan, Syria and Kuwait, Iraq needs clear interest files, deconfliction channels and testable technical mechanisms, not a choice between opposing slogans. Relations with the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia and others must not be reduced to “joining a bloc” because of a deal or visit. Partnerships are measured by independent lawful decisions, knowledge transfer, returns and alternatives. Methodologically, the vision labels no particular country a source of dependence or danger without a specific evidence file and institutional review.

Balanced partnerships do not mean equal financial, trade or training volumes. Iraq will deal more extensively with those whose markets, borders, technology or water resources connect to it. The vision’s condition is that relationship size must not become a right to obstruct sovereignty, and irreversible commitments must not be built without scrutiny. Priority goes to partnerships that reduce cross-border risks, widen choices and leave Iraqi institutions able to use what they learned in the partner’s absence.

Table (4): A matrix organising partnerships by function

7.2 Multiple alternatives at the functional level

A ministry contracting three suppliers is insufficient if all three shipments use one crossing or payment system. The vision proposes a “dependency chain” for each critical function: supplier, replacement capacity, potential outage duration, transition cost, actors able to obstruct it, and the legal instrument governing the response. A chain is classified as critical when it cannot sustain an essential function under a foreseeable shock within the required period, not merely because the supplier is foreign.

Work begins with functions most closely connected to national decisions: electricity and fuel, essential medicines, transboundary water, import and export routes, external transfers, digital platforms and authorised security infrastructure. Foreign Affairs does not specify power stations or import contracts. It manages political and legal dimensions, supports alternatives with the sector owner and records how each dependence affects sovereign choice.

Figure (5): Testing critical dependence in an external relationship. Dependence is classed as critical only after testing the absence of an alternative within the necessary time.

8. Cooperation with everyone without surrendering decision-making

8.1 An agreement is an instrument of benefit, not a certificate of friendship

The chapter treats every high-impact agreement as a chain of measurable commitments rather than a public-relations document. Before negotiation, the verifiable objective, minimum acceptable outcome, best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), cost of delay, and fiscal and sovereign effects must be defined. Where possible, the government compares at least three options: the proposed agreement, a revised agreement with safeguards, and an alternative or temporary domestic solution. Assessment includes sensitivity testing for security and fiscal changes, technology access and commitment duration.

Agreements involving land, oil, data or long-term concessions require stricter legal and fiscal review, making potential effects on future generations visible. A contract being “profitable” in its signing year is insufficient. It must withstand declining revenues, a change of government abroad or at home, and payment or transport-chain disruption. Shifting a decision’s cost onto a future budget without institutional disclosure and lawful approval must be prohibited in practice.

Security cooperation is legitimate when it respects the Constitution, authorisation, civilian control, mission records and oversight. Sovereignty is not measured by the departure of the last foreign adviser or by purchasing every technology domestically. The test is whether decisions on operations, assignments, financing, use of force and jurisdiction remain Iraqi, and whether arrangements, support, termination, restrictions and both parties’ accountability are documented. Competent constitutional bodies should be informed of commitments’ scope without disclosing sensitive operational information that need not be public.

8.2 Four tests for a beneficial relationship

The first test is legal: competent authority, ratification procedures, contracting parties’ rights, state responsibility and arbitration limits. The second is fiscal: total life-cycle cost, contingent liabilities and an oil-revenue decline scenario, not the value of a media-announced pledge. The third is sovereign: operability, substitution, termination, knowledge transfer and data protection. The fourth concerns delivery: who owns the outcome, when measurement starts, and the conditions for transition or termination if agreement outputs are not achieved.

Agreements are classified by the sensitivity of their effects: routine and low-risk; medium-risk, requiring cross-ministerial input; and high-risk, involving security, resources, long commitments or critical infrastructure. This classification does not replace constitutional procedures. It is an internal tool for examining risks before the legal process. Any exemption from assessment must be written, reasoned and reviewed so diplomatic urgency does not become a routine route around scrutiny.

9. Realistic diplomacy: from statements to a decision cycle

The proposed realism means neither always choosing the lowest political cost nor abandoning principles. It assesses what Iraq can do with its resources, progressively builds what it cannot yet do, and offers negotiated solutions that secure gains or prevent assessable losses. In a changing environment, assessment must distinguish a temporary political signal from structural change, negotiable pressure from dependence requiring domestic reduction, and a direct threat from unsupported alarmism.

The position cycle begins with a “situation brief” prepared by a specialist Foreign Affairs team with sectoral ministries and relevant national bodies. It separates established and unestablished facts, affected parties, policy objectives, alternatives and each alternative’s risks, and an explicit recommendation signed by its owner. During an acute crisis, an urgent one- or two-page version is prepared within a defined timeframe and reviewed within 72 hours as information improves. The measure is not the number of briefs, but the share of decisions supported by a documented joint assessment before approval where events allow.

A formal public-communication coordination protocol prevents fragmented messaging on sensitive sovereign issues without cancelling parliamentary oversight, press freedom or access to information whose publication is lawful. State communications should distinguish legal positions, expressions of humanitarian concern and conditions for operational response. Mixing these layers can turn principles into practical commitments without readiness to deliver them.

Figure (6): The joint external-position cycle. The competent authority makes the final decision; the ministry coordinates analysis.

9.1 Negotiating strength is not loudness

Negotiating capacity is measured by the quality of the file, the alternative and discipline before the other party. Even in an unequal relationship, Iraq can improve its position through reliable data, intersecting interests, alternative partners and an agreed sequence across ministries. Conversely, a state can lose a clear right by negotiating through multiple delegations, signing an impracticable declaration or promising an unsupported appropriation.

This requires diplomatic specialisms in law and treaties, regional geopolitics, security arrangements, water and environment, economic and fiscal assessment, crises and consular affairs, data and foresight. Diplomats do not become water engineers or financial judges, but must know how to read evidence, question specialists and assess wording’s consequences. Foreign Affairs coordinates these skills in one delegation under one mandate and preserves negotiation records retrievable years later.

10. Four Iraqi cases for testing the proposed policy

10.1 Security transition and the international coalition: what ended and what remained?

On 27 September 2024, the coalition and its partners announced a timetable for ending the military mission in Iraq and transitioning to bilateral security partnerships. On 30 September 2026, the United Kingdom announced the conclusion of Operation Inherent Resolve’s mission in Iraq and the departure of its participating forces. US Central Command reported the same day that the orderly departure of American forces and equipment from Erbil Air Base was complete, while the Syria-related mission continued from another centre. These events represent an announced transition from a coalition mission within Iraq to other cooperation arrangements. The vision does not infer the end of all defence ties or of the terrorist threat.⁹

The implication is a test of “renewed cooperation decisions”: what remains within bilateral arrangements, for how long, with what scope and review rights, and how do Foreign Affairs, Defence, national security, the judiciary and oversight bodies connect the overall picture of commitments? Announcing a mission’s end does not replace a post-transition agreement register. Support, training, intelligence and legal-service arrangements must be checked against specialist Iraqi sources before a final judgement on actual independence. The vision’s standard is sustained Iraqi leadership and the ability to reassess needs against threats and capabilities, rather than treating either separation or continued foreign presence as success in itself.

10.2 Water with Türkiye: negotiating outcomes and financing

Türkiye’s visit to Iraq on 22 April 2024 produced a broader cooperation framework and several documents, including a water-cooperation framework. On 2 November 2025, a financing and implementation mechanism was signed, with provisions published by the Iraqi News Agency: Iraqi bodies identify projects; Turkish companies are selected under Iraqi award procedures with participation by qualified Iraqi firms; and a finance and planning committee with relevant bodies provides approval and follow-up. The financing mechanism also includes an account funded by sales of crude volumes determined by a Council of Ministers decision under existing marketing procedures. These are substantive contractual details requiring specialist analysis, not something reducible to a “water allocation agreement”.¹⁰

The implication is twofold. Diplomacy benefits from converting a dispute into projects and an institutional mechanism, but cannot promise increased water flows merely because infrastructure finance is agreed. Water-outcome indicators must be separated from project-contracting indicators: seasonal flows at defined measurement points, water quality, agricultural benefit, financing terms, contractual compliance and net opportunity cost. These data fall within Water Resources, Finance and Planning, working with Foreign Affairs. Attributing the entire outcome to one ministry would violate the responsibility principle methodologically.

10.3 The Development Road: multiple partners do not eliminate project risks

Qatar’s Ministry of Transport announcement of 22 April 2024 documented a cooperation memorandum among Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Türkiye concerning the Development Road and Al-Faw Port. It shows the possibility of bringing partners with different economic positions together around regionally significant Iraqi infrastructure. Yet the project cost and phases cited in one memorandum partner’s announcement are estimates for a broader project, not a financing commitment approved by all parties on one date. A signed memorandum does not prove a road exists or sustainable revenues have begun.¹¹

Foreign policy protects sovereignty, passage, standards and dispute frameworks, and prevents political monopolisation of the project route. Technical feasibility, section financing, contracts and asset ownership remain with sectoral bodies. The next stage requires binding schedules for each party, commercial impact and alternative-corridor testing, enforceable transport agreements and transit procedures, and a dispute-resolution system. This is a diplomatic chapter on “partnership conditions”, not road engineering or a procurement plan.

10.4 Kuwait and maritime boundaries: legal negotiation, not media negotiation

A 2025 report by the UN Secretary-General documented meetings of the joint Iraqi–Kuwaiti technical and legal committee on maritime delimitation beyond marker 162, alongside continuing diplomatic contacts. This case demonstrates the importance of historical, legal and procedural records. An issue may carry sovereign, economic and public significance, yet require maps, coherent legal positions, a negotiation process and respect for established international commitments and rights still under discussion.¹²

This chapter has no authority to settle a specialised legal dispute or invent an interpretation of a boundary delimitation whose full documents have not been verified. It recommends a unified file of materials, maps, correspondence, legal interpretations and alternatives, and one negotiating position protecting Iraq’s legal interests while remaining open to peaceful settlement. Success is not a harsher statement, but documented progress through a recognised process consistent with the Constitution and international law.

11. Managing regional crises: four operating protocols

Major regional security events in 2025 and 2026 affected Iraqi debate on sovereignty and avoiding involvement in neighbouring conflicts. In a statement published on 8 March 2026, the Council of Representatives rejected use of Iraqi territory or airspace for hostile acts against neighbouring states and called for protection of missions, forces and facilities. The chapter treats this as a documentable official position, not sufficient evidence of enforceability in every incident. Making it real requires coordinated security and diplomatic procedures and appropriate confidential measurement.¹³

Table (5): A decision model for four shock types | Proposed operational policy scenarios; quantitative warning thresholds are established through national sectoral measurement.

11.1 A crisis is more than a moment for a statement

Each protocol requires a dated decision file: the body detecting the event, a verification source, confidence level, estimated effects on citizens, the competent action owner, a consistent external message and a review date. The Council of Ministers designates a coordinator for cross-ministerial crises, while Foreign Affairs manages political and legal aspects with competent agencies. This must create no parallel command over forces, fiscal policy or customs, but a data and decision pathway to existing authorities.

A “position within 24 hours” target must not encourage statements before verification. The proposed measure is a joint initial assessment within the deadline for highly classified incidents, with the ability either to issue a public position or temporarily withhold details for justified, reviewable reasons. Outcome evaluation examines reduced harm, restored functions and coordination efficiency—variables involving multiple actors, not automatically attributable to Foreign Affairs alone.

12. International comparisons: four adaptable mechanisms, not copied models

Four experiences were selected to compare different mechanisms: Oman as a stated example of preserving dialogue channels in a tense neighbourhood; Indonesia for linking independence to external initiative and regional institutions; Kazakhstan for documenting a “multi-vector” concept in a state sharing borders and interests with major powers; and Singapore for prioritising vital interests and international law amid great-power competition. The comparison concerns policy designs and institutional instruments as declared by those states, not a claim that diplomacy alone caused their economic or security outcomes.

Table (6): Selected institutional comparison | Foreign ministry documents of the four states, references R15–R18; mechanisms are presented, not causal evaluations of outcomes.

Oman’s Foreign Ministry explicitly emphasises good-neighbourliness, dialogue and pragmatism, explaining how it maintains communication between parties that may disagree. Iraq’s lesson is to institutionalise contact channels and avoid closing a channel needed for de-escalation because of one crisis, while retaining clear legal limits. This does not require Iraq to promise mediation in every dispute: a role’s costs or conditions may exceed the state’s ability to sustain it.¹⁴

Indonesia’s “free and active” model links resistance to dependence with participation in the regional and international system. Kazakhstan’s model identifies “practical and proactive multi-vector engagement” within an official 2020–2030 concept. Singapore’s official discourse stresses policy based on interests, law, routes and basic needs rather than allegiance or hostility to a major power. The transferable common elements are declared national priorities, effective diplomatic capacity and considered alternatives. Power centres, security arrangements and particular histories are not automatically transferable.¹⁵

13. The reference scenario to 2045: what if working methods do not change?

13.1 Baseline scenario: existing instruments continue without integration

The reference scenario assumes existing policies without major organisational reform. Relationships remain multiple, and agreements, summits and bilateral coordination continue, but commitment-quality standards do not become one register and an integrated system of alternatives to dependencies. During a regional shock, bodies vary in response speed and information-sharing capacity. Some sound projects proceed while others stall because financing, authority and measurement were unresolved at signature. This is a conditional structural scenario, not a prediction of a particular war or isolation for Iraq.

The scenario explains why doubling diplomatic activity is insufficient. More visits without a clear partnership strategy or dependency assessment may widen both opportunities and invisible risks. If institutional knowledge remains personal, each government risks rebuilding what its predecessor learned. The scenario does not assert that every relationship fails, but assumes continuing variation in outcomes and difficulty attributing and measuring them.

13.2 Realistic reform scenario

This assumes an inventory and assessment of high-impact agreements beginning in 2027, a joint position brief and identification of the first five critical dependency functions with sectoral bodies. By 2030, high-risk projects face legal, fiscal and sovereign testing, a non-sensitive annual performance report is published, and specific mediation efforts rest on expertise and interest. Reform effects grow gradually because Foreign Affairs’ effectiveness depends on domestic alternatives, a stable civil service and a predictable budget. This is the vision’s recommended working path.

13.3 Accelerated reform scenario and its conditions

Improvement may be faster if agreement, budget, risk and security data systems are integrated; energy, corridor and financing sources diversify; and national capacity for dispute resolution and project delivery improves. Reform speed, however, is not a diplomatic decision alone. It requires civil-service, procurement, economic and institutional reform and control over instruments of force. This scenario is therefore assigned no independent numerical probability and no binding target before delivery capacity is tested.

Figure (7): Three future branches. Conditional policy choices, not statistical probabilities or certain predictions.

14. Iraqi foreign policy in 2045 and the theory of change

In the Iraq of 2045 envisaged here, foreign policy is the natural extension of a state with one constitutional decision-making authority, a less fragile economy and institutions that preserve memory. Iraq can maintain deep relations with states that disagree with one another without surrendering its independent decisions or reducing its freedom to friendship with one party. Negotiation, approval, registration, implementation and warning rules become familiar across the state. Embassies serve as instruments of service, analysis and influence within their mandates, rather than fronts for personal relationships changing with governments.

The theory of change has five links: clarity of competence and interests; production of data and alternatives; better negotiation and cooperation terms; reduced exposure to external shocks through sectoral diversification; and stronger standing as a reliable, proactive partner. The fifth does not arise from statements alone, but from the interaction of domestic capability, reputation and repeated action. Outcomes are therefore reviewed every five years; the chapter does not assume that more relationships mean more power without indicators.

The pathway connects to preceding doors. Door Two provides decision-making authority, rule of law, effective government and integrity. Door Three provides defence and security institutions that do not create parallel foreign policy. Door Four provides stable fiscal policy and a more diversified economy. The chapter hands Door Nine’s Chapter Three a stable political and legal environment for economic diplomacy, and Chapter Four a framework for standing and cultural diplomacy kept distinct from security and deals.

Figure (8): The theory of change to 2045. Each link differs in measurability; the final impact cannot be reduced to a relationship count.

15. The objective ladder: 2027, 2030, 2035, 2040 and 2045

The vision follows its shared phases: the first hundred days establish authority and information; 2027–2030 restores the foundations; 2031–2035 consolidates decision instruments; 2036–2040 expands capabilities; and 2041–2045 establishes sustainability and maturity. It does not present international targets as “Iraqi results already achieved” or assign an unauditable number to balance. “A baseline to be established in 2027” means missing published data are not zero, and numerical targets begin after denominators and coverage are harmonised.

In the first hundred working days, the government approves a clear authority framework for position files and escalation; ministries inventory existing highly sensitive agreements; an initial list identifies functions that stop if an external supplier is interrupted; and a standard assessment template covers every new sovereign commitment. The outputs are specific decisions, data and assignments—not a redrawing of alliances or establishment of new embassies or institutes.

By 2030, the minimum functioning system should include a highly sensitive agreement register documenting parties, follow-up owners and deadlines; crisis-response indicators tested through simulation; an annual external-performance report protecting confidential information; and documented joint position files for high-impact negotiations. This enables a transition from scattered activity to accountable portfolio management.

By 2035, commitments should be linked to fiscal costs, due dates, amendment and exit conditions; alternative-dependency plans tested in at least the five most important sectors; and diplomatic knowledge transferable between staff and missions. By 2040, anticipatory capability should mature, allowing government to face shocks with previously tested alternatives. By 2045, preserving decision-making independence becomes a stable institutional practice despite changes of people and governments.

Table (7): Proposed, auditable practical targets | All percentages are policy-design targets. Denominators and definitions of sensitive cases are established in 2027 and are not presented as forecasts.

15.1 Calculation and correction rules

FP-01 = highly sensitive agreements with a complete legal and fiscal file, an implementation indicator and a review date ÷ all highly sensitive agreements established by the inventory, not all documents historically signed. FP-02 = new high-impact agreements passing every review gate before becoming binding ÷ all new agreements meeting the classification. FP-03 = high-impact decisions recorded with a signed joint position brief ÷ all decisions in the same category. Cases may be excluded from the denominator only where non-measurability and its reason are documented, not to improve the percentage cosmetically.

FP-04 = high-risk crises with a documented initial assessment completed within 24 hours of the established crisis start ÷ all crises meeting the definition during the year. Time refers to delivery of the assessment to the competent authority, not a press statement. An event may be exempted only once through a reasoned review order disclosed statistically without sensitive information. FP-05 measures actual operational tests or simulations with scenarios, timing and decisions, not merely the existence of a plan. The number of sectors tested must be disclosed so the indicator does not conceal limited coverage.

FP-07 = failures of high-impact agreements receiving a reasoned corrective, escalation or termination decision within 90 days of diagnosis ÷ all documented stalled cases. It is not the “share of completed projects”, which belongs to sectoral bodies. FP-08 = high-impact negotiating teams including legal, sectoral and fiscal expertise where needed, whose members have demonstrably received simulation training and post-negotiation evaluation ÷ all teams meeting the test. The measurement unit reviews numerators, denominators and samples semi-annually.

16. Implementation programme package: decisions and instruments, not labels

FP-P01 — Framework for defining national interests and classifying files

Under a Council of Ministers mandate, Foreign Affairs leads preparation of a standard template assessing interests, rights, alternatives, risks and competence. It is first tested on three contrasting files: water, security and trade. After the judiciary or competent legal body reviews each model’s constitutional and fiscal aspects, the template becomes a required attachment to high-impact submissions. The first-year output is not a general strategy document, but ten complete decision files subject to sample audit and correction where needed. Decision authority is not transferred from government or constitutional institutions to a new technical unit.

FP-P02 — National Register of External Agreements and Commitments

Foreign Affairs begins a reference inventory within the ministry and relevant bodies of treaties, agreements, memoranda and contracts with sovereign effects, within a clear legal scope. The register records binding status, entry into force, implementing bodies, financial and contingent commitments, review and termination conditions, implementation status and supporting evidence. An oversight team samples files against signature, ratification, allocation and delivery documents. The system has two levels: an operational version with defined permissions and a public version containing non-sensitive data whose publication is lawful. The vision does not support giving a technical body power to amend a treaty through an information system.

FP-P03 — Unified mechanism for external positions and crises

The Council of Ministers adopts a protocol defining incidents requiring cross-ministerial coordination, the initiating body for each type, verification levels, notification deadlines, resolution of conflicting data and the authorised spokesperson. Two exercises are held in the first year: a border/security crisis and a trade/payments crisis. The Council receives a concise report on detection, assessment, decision and correction times, separating operational secrets from publishable administrative lessons.

FP-P04 — Atlas of Critical External Dependencies

The five priority sectors describe services dependent on foreign suppliers, crossings or settlement arrangements, then identify implementable alternatives, a transition plan and a testing period. This does not authorise Foreign Affairs to buy equipment, energy or medicines. It organises how risks affect freedom of decision and involves the ministry in negotiating safeguards. Sectoral ministries calculate costs and manage stocks and maintenance; Finance reviews financing effects; Foreign Affairs coordinates external aspects. Reduced dependence is not defined as “zero reliance on the outside world”, but as an alternative that sustains a function through a reasonable interruption.

FP-P05 — Agreements Delivering Net National Value

A pre-negotiation assessment gate covers high-impact agreements: competence, compliance, benefit, full cost, exposure, alternatives, exit terms, dispute settlement and outcome ownership. The document must explain the no-agreement option and its implications so signature does not become the default objective. After 12–24 months of implementation, the relevant ministry reviews the commitment’s impact and a joint team approves completion, modification or termination under applicable powers and contracts. Procedural exemptions apply only where the competent authority determines confidentiality on specific legal grounds, not to every highly sensitive file.

FP-P06 — Professional Diplomacy and Negotiating Memory

Under the Foreign Service Law, Foreign Affairs organises specialist pathways, simulation training and standard handover files between staff, ambassadors and delegations. Training is measured through solving a real negotiation case or documented simulation, handling a legal document and analysing risk, not course attendance hours. Excessive rotation that interrupts expertise is limited, as is concentrating knowledge of a critical file in one individual. This is gradual professional redesign, not abolition of career hierarchies or appointments outside the law.

FP-P07 — Multilateral Engagement and Disciplined Mediation

Foreign Affairs maintains engagement with the United Nations, Arab League and organisations affecting Iraq’s security, water and development. It selects a small number of mediation files satisfying four conditions: acceptance by the parties, a clear Iraqi benefit, capacity for procedural impartiality, and no exposure to penalties for failures beyond Iraq’s control. Each initiative is reviewed against indicators disclosed where possible: acceptance of communication channels, continued talks, agreement on an intermediate step and reduced specific obstruction. Hosting a meeting cannot count as successful mediation without evidence of an outcome reasonably attributable to Iraq’s role.

FP-P08 — Protecting Citizens and Interests Abroad

Foreign Affairs develops consular tools for cross-border risks, including case registration, acknowledgement deadlines, escalation, protection and privacy standards, and referral channels to legal and local bodies in the country of residence. An embassy replaces neither the host country’s courts nor individual responsibility, but provides a state response when citizens need services under known agreements and laws. Measurement begins with urgent case categories rather than every routine certification request, so numerical pressure does not undermine investigation and response quality.

FP-P09 — Public Reporting and Accountability Across Governments

Foreign Affairs, with Planning, Finance and sectoral bodies, issues an annual foreign-policy report covering yearly objectives, non-sensitive output and outcome indicators, selected causes of delay, agreement-review status, consular responses and improvement decisions for the following year. A restricted companion version for competent constitutional authorities addresses security risks and sensitive relationships. The intended institutional outcome is that Parliament, the public and the executive can know what was promised and achieved without lawful confidentiality becoming immunity from all accountability.

17. Implementation, cost and financing matrix

Costs are classified as “small/medium/relatively high” because unified data on staffing, systems, assets and detailed ministry and partner expenditure are absent. Stating specific dinar sums without specifications or procurement studies would be unprofessional. Before contracting, setup costs, annual operation and maintenance, training and integration, data security and any financial commitments or long-term contracts must be detailed. Funding comes primarily from reprioritised existing ministry budgets. No separate external fund is assumed, nor are monetary reserves expected to bear these costs.

Table (8): Institutional assignment and financing matrix | An initial ordinal estimate that does not authorise contracting. Finance and Planning establish life-cycle costs before allocating any new expenditure.

17.1 Fiscal and institutional sustainability test

This package creates no new ministry or independent authority with a permanent payroll. It assigns responsibilities within existing constitutional structures. Its financing gate follows the principle in V2-D04-C07: permanent expenditure requires permanent resources and capacity. Foreign Affairs instruments must not become an expanding capital-spending channel without an operational service. Before funding a records and coordination system, the cost of using or connecting existing government platforms must be compared with developing and maintaining a new one. Staff capacity to update data after the technology contract ends must also be tested.

18. Monitoring dashboard and operational definitions

Table (9): Operational indicator register | An initial definition for the central indicator register. Coverage, eligibility, exemptions and data sources are finalised in a 2027 measurement document.

“Numbers of agreements”, “numbers of visits” and “numbers of statements” must not serve as principal impact indicators. They may be reported as activities, but impact requires evidence of a transition to a service or outcome within Foreign Affairs’ authority. A sample of indicators is independently reviewed annually, including verification that terms have not changed meaning between governments. Improvement caused by a shrinking denominator rather than a better outcome must be disclosed as a methodological change, not an “achievement”.

19. Risks, alternatives and safeguards

Table (10): Foreign-policy reform risk register | An initial qualitative assessment; numerical probability and impact assessments follow establishment of a documented incident and decision register.

19.1 Constitutional and rights safeguards

Greater discipline in foreign policy must not become a secret monopoly without oversight. Law defines information-classification levels and parliamentary and judicial access procedures within their mandates. “National interest” must not be used to criminalise peaceful objection or prevent public discussion of economic and social matters. Mission applicants’ and negotiators’ privacy is protected through data minimisation and auditable access logs, and political profiling of citizens outside a legitimate consular purpose is prohibited.

The vision proposes two connected, not conflicting, reports: a public report disclosing non-sensitive indicators and outcomes, delays and reasons for correction; and a restricted institutional report for competent authorities covering files whose publication could harm safety or legitimate negotiation. Restrictions cannot remain permanent without review; they require temporal and legal justification. Oversight of expenditure, commitments and public services continues in a manner that protects the right to information where law permits.

20. Annual and five-year review system

The review cycle begins in each year’s first quarter by fixing the scope of agreements, indicators and the source of each value. The annual performance report follows on a government-set date, not one left to a changing official’s discretion. Review includes randomly selected high-impact files, seriously stalled files, dependency alternatives and crisis patterns. Every deviation is linked to a remedy with an owner, deadline and evidence method, not merely the phrase “following up the matter”.

A foundational review in 2030 checks that denominators established in 2027 remain comparable and institutions actually use the registers. Strategic reviews follow in 2035, 2040 and 2045, asking a counterfactual question: which decisions would the government have made differently without this programme? An absence of documented examples indicates a risk that the system has become an additional administrative activity, requiring modification, merger or termination. A weak measurement target may be raised or an exaggerated one reduced through a public decision with statistical explanation, not by rewriting historical figures.

21. Conclusion: what does a balanced foreign policy achieve?

In Iraq Vision 2045, a balanced foreign policy means the ability to cooperate deeply without becoming subordinate, defend legal rights without creating unnecessary hostility, and use Iraq’s location and diplomatic platforms to reduce risks and open opportunities without exposing citizens’ lives or resources to commitments the state cannot fulfil. It is a policy of interests, rules and alternatives, not equal distribution of diplomatic affection.

The chapter’s specific success is not more embassies, photographs or agreements. It is fewer uncalculated decisions, a higher share of agreements with known costs, functions and owners, greater readiness of alternatives during shocks, a coherent Iraqi position issued by competent authority, and annual evaluation permitting correction. Foreign Affairs guards external coherence and manages negotiation, while sectors remain responsible for their assets, services and outcomes under their control.

This closes the question of political balance and prepares for V4-D09-C03, “Economic Diplomacy”: how can missions, agreements and partnerships use institutional sovereign capacity to open markets, attract productive investment and provide trade services without repeating the competence and governance rules established here? It also prepares for V4-D09-C04, “Soft Power”, treating standing as an effect accumulated through reliable action, culture, education and international interaction, not a substitute for independence.