The state, sovereignty and strategic decision-making

Civil–military relations: how can armed forces be strong and non-partisan?

By Ali Zuweid · Article date: 24 October 2026 · 8 min read

English translation published 31 October 2026. Read the Arabic original.

In the annual report covering 2025, submitted to the Bundestag on 3 March 2026, Germany’s Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces addressed the gap between providing resources and converting them into actual readiness, alongside personnel, equipment, administrative procedures and service members’ rights. The example illuminates the purpose of oversight: higher expenditure alone does not establish capability, and identifying institutional weaknesses can strengthen forces rather than undermine them. It does not offer Iraq a ready-made German formula or prove that an institution publishing a report has resolved all its problems. Parliamentary Commissioner’s Annual Report 2025.

Iraq’s debate on civil–military relations needs to move beyond a misleading choice between strong forces and effective civilian oversight. The more precise question is how to build forces capable of their mission, whose direction does not follow partisan competition, while keeping them subject to accountable constitutional authority. Who defines the political objective, who provides professional assessment, and how can officers be protected from politicisation without gaining a right to obstruct lawful decisions? Answering requires distinguishing civilian leadership, party loyalty and military professionalism.

Civilian leadership is not party ownership of the forces

Iraq’s Constitution places armed forces and security services under civilian leadership and bars their intervention in politics or the transfer of power. It distinguishes restrictions on military political activity from the retained right to vote. It also establishes the prime minister’s position as commander-in-chief and Parliament’s role in approving specified senior appointments. These rules allocate and constrain authority; they are not, by themselves, evidence that neutrality is fully achieved in practice. Articles 9, 61 and 78 of Iraq’s Constitution.

The essential distinction is that government has constitutional authority to lead the forces, not to turn them into an electoral or organisational extension of its constituent political groups. Civilian leadership concerns the source, limits and public accountability of a mandate. Partisan loyalty makes careers depend on a political actor’s interests. Both may look similar when instructions come from a civilian official, but their purposes, selection criteria and accountability differ. Asking whether the person issuing an order is civilian is therefore insufficient: under what authority, for which mission and subject to what oversight?

The forces also need clear limits on their professional role. They are entitled, and obliged, to explain the costs and risks of options and the limits of their implementation capacity. Specialised expertise does not confer the right to determine national objectives alone or decide the legitimacy of political competition. Acceptable risk and the allocation of resources between defence, services and foreign relations are public matters extending beyond any single profession. Military advice is strong when truthful and testable, not when it becomes an unreviewable political decision.

Consider a hypothetical situation in which an official demands a rapid result while professional assessment shows that available resources are insufficient. The institution could flatter political expectations, refuse dialogue entirely, or present documented alternatives explaining what is achievable and under which conditions. The third approach is closest to professionalism: it neither removes civilian leaders’ choice nor conceals its cost. Treating assessment as a loyalty test encourages reassuring reports and may reveal inadequacy only during implementation, when correction becomes more expensive.

Neutrality begins with careers and budgets

Neutrality cannot be created by a general instruction against political discussion while promotion, assignments and evaluation continue to depend on patronage. If personnel believe their future depends on a network outside the lawful chain of responsibility, they have an incentive to accommodate it without receiving written instructions. This is a possible causal relationship to investigate, not a blanket accusation against service members. Addressing it requires institutional criteria for competence, experience, discipline and integrity, with fair review of decisions affecting careers.

Criteria do not eliminate leadership discretion. Different roles require different experience, and competence cannot be reduced to seniority or one qualification. They do, however, require decision-makers to explain a candidate’s suitability and allow oversight to identify repeatedly unjustified exceptions. Appeal procedures must not become a means of blocking every appointment. Continuing work can be separated from reviewing a decision’s validity within defined times and responsibilities, so discipline does not close off complaints and complaints do not abolish discipline.

The same equation applies to budgets. A large budget may fund useful capability or distribute resources across items poorly aligned with priorities. Civilian debate should therefore examine the relationship between mission, resources and results, not just the total. Improving maintenance, training and personnel management may address a particular problem more directly than purchasing equipment, but each case requires professional evaluation; that possibility is not a universal procurement rule. Good oversight seeks evidence connecting expenditure to its purpose.

In this context, the OSCE’s 1994 Code of Conduct supplies a comparative benchmark linking democratic control to defined constitutional authorities, legislative oversight of expenditure, political neutrality and individual legal responsibility. These commitments apply within the participating-state framework; they do not establish automatic Iraqi obligations. Their analytical value lies in treating neutrality, financing and accountability as connected elements, rather than separate files manageable by one institution. Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, paragraphs 20–23 and 30.

Oversight that understands the institution and protects truthful information

Professionally weak civilian oversight risks two opposite responses: accepting everything presented to it or challenging every detail to demonstrate independence. Both reduce decision quality. Parliament and oversight bodies need sustained capacity to read budgets, evaluate programmes and understand indicators’ limitations, supported by specialised expertise subject to conflict-of-interest rules. That capacity becomes more useful when retained institutionally instead of disappearing with changes in committees or officials’ offices.

Information legitimately classified for protection must also be distinguished from secrecy preventing scrutiny of who decided or how resources were spent. The objective is not to publish details endangering people or operations, but to establish access levels enabling competent authorities to verify them while releasing appropriate general findings. Exceptions to disclosure should have reasons and review points. Indefinite secrecy can obstruct learning after the original need for protection has ended, turning a past mistake into a recurring risk.

The German parliamentary report mentioned earlier offers a way to understand complaints within the institution: a system’s ability to hear personnel problems does not contradict its ability to lead them. For Iraq, the adaptable institutional principle matters more than copying a foreign office under a new title. A complaint reaching a competent authority and receiving fair treatment can reveal administrative failure before it affects performance. An additional channel unable to protect complainants or follow through on decisions may instead create paperwork without trust.

Protecting professional objections must not exempt individuals from responsibility. Raising a reservation through lawful procedures differs from acting beyond one’s authority or excusing an evident violation simply because an order existed. This article does not adjudicate detailed legal cases. It argues that education and training should clarify limits of authority and routes for requesting review. Ambiguity harms both those issuing and those receiving instructions, making accountability after an incident a late substitute for institutional prevention.

Strength that can be relied upon across governments

I propose beginning Iraq’s institutional assessment with verifiable questions. Are positions tied to defined qualifications? Can reasons for professional decisions and exceptions be traced? Does military assessment offer real alternatives and their risks, or merely endorse leaders’ preferences? Do civilian oversight authorities receive sufficient information under appropriate safeguards? This is not an operational formula. It tests the relationship between those holding the mandate and those possessing expertise, identifying necessary reform before expanding structures.

Reform should proceed without interrupting service or punishing individuals for systemic problems. It can begin with evaluation, grievance and decision-recording procedures, then connect expenditure programmes to suitably independent outcome reviews. Each step needs a success criterion, an identifiable responsible party and a distinction between administrative changes and those requiring legislation. Replacing leaders or announcing professionalism alone does not change incentives that may reproduce the same problem under different names.

Strong, non-partisan forces are therefore neither forces without professional opinions nor forces determining public policy themselves. They provide constitutional leaders with truthful assessments, receive missions and resources that can be reconciled, and are judged by law and performance rather than partisan loyalty. Civilian leadership succeeds when it scrutinises the institution without degrading its expertise and protects it from politicisation without shielding its mistakes. Iraqi strength then rests on the institution and state, remaining dependable as governments change.

Ali Zuweid — Researcher in strategic affairs and national security