Parallel institutions and the problem of competing decisions
Imagine a government decision bearing all legally required signatures yet remaining unimplemented until approval arrives from a body absent from its official route. Now imagine an independent authority rejecting an instruction because the law gives its issuer no power to issue it. Both may look like institutional conflict. The first could reveal a parallel decision-making centre; the second could represent proper independence. Treating them alike might preserve unlawful duplication or dismantle a necessary legal safeguard.
Examining parallel institutions in Iraq should therefore begin with actual authority, not the number of offices and agencies. Who can permit or prevent action, who finances it, and who answers for resulting harm? What distinguishes institutional plurality serving a public function from competing authority dispersing responsibility? This article assumes no violation by a particular Iraqi body. It proposes a test, because diagnoses equating independence with disorder may create more centralisation without clearer decisions.
Legal independence does not create a second government
Iraq’s Constitution establishes independent bodies and their relationships with oversight or accountability alongside executive responsibilities. Articles 102–108 describe different legal arrangements within the state, not a space outside it. Independence of the central bank or an oversight body, for example, does not confer a general mandate to rival the Council of Ministers across all policies. Nor may government cancel its competence whenever disagreement arises. Each body’s functions and governing law must be examined rather than inferring its boundaries from the word “independent”. Constitution of the Republic of Iraq.
Here, “parallel institution” is an analytical description of an arrangement exercising actual power beyond its declared competence or competing with lawful procedures without equivalent accountability. It may have premises and employees, or exist as a network of relationships and instructions without an administrative name. Removing a box from an organisational chart therefore does not necessarily remove competing authority; undeclared powers may move inside an existing ministry. Conversely, several institutions can legitimately share a file if their responsibilities and means of resolving disagreements are clear.
The crucial distinction is between a legally established right of review and a concealed power to obstruct. Financial scrutiny or judicial review slows some decisions to protect rights and public interests; not every delay signifies a parallel institution. But when implementation depends on approval whose basis cannot be identified or challenged, people cannot know the rule. Obtaining an exception may become more worthwhile than satisfying requirements. This is a possible analytical consequence of unclear authority; its existence and scale must be demonstrated case by case through records and facts.
The problem grows when three routes diverge: formal decision, funding and information. An official may authorise something without possessing the data required to assess it, or bear responsibility for implementation while resources are determined elsewhere. Separation is not inherently defective: separating payment from approval may be a safeguard. The defect begins when no known mechanism connects the routes and allocates responsibility, enabling each party to block an outcome without bearing full responsibility for it.
Why competing authority persists despite clear organisational charts
The World Development Report 2017 helps explain the difference between institutional form and effectiveness: power asymmetries, capture and clientelism can obstruct policy, while performance requires commitment, coordination and cooperation. This is a general framework for incentives, not evidence against an Iraqi individual or body. Its value is to ask who benefits from ambiguity and how reform costs are distributed, instead of assuming a better organisational chart will automatically change behaviour. World Bank: Governance and the Law.
An informal centre may benefit from controlling exceptions, while an official administration may benefit from passing difficult decisions elsewhere to avoid accountability. Duplication would then be reproduced within the apparatus, not imposed solely from outside, because it offers short-term protection to the signatory. This institutional hypothesis requires testing. It nonetheless explains why a circular asking everyone to “respect their powers” can fail: if avoiding responsibility remains more rewarding than making a sound decision, actors will seek another form for the same practice.
Information shapes authority as much as office does. The body monopolising project data can narrow the alternatives presented even without holding final decision-making power. If sources and limitations are unknown, the formal authority may approve a conclusion it cannot examine. The answer is neither to publish every piece of information nor to concentrate it all in one office. Competent authorities need lawful access to necessary data, records of what was supplied or withheld and why, and protection of privacy and sensitive information.
On finance, the IMF’s 2025 Iraq report recommends stronger financial management and oversight of commitments and restates a recommendation to control and monitor access to extrabudgetary funds. The relevant point is oversight, not treating an older report as a verified account of 2026 outcomes. Creating obligations that budget decision-makers cannot clearly see can generate a parallel financial decision even when paperwork appears complete. An extrabudgetary fund is not unlawful merely because it exists; the questions concern its basis, limits, information and accountability. Iraq 2025 Article IV report and Annex I.
The coordination lesson: changing organisational boxes is insufficient
US discussions following the 9/11 Commission report offer a different example of coordination problems. In testimony on 3 August 2004, the Government Accountability Office addressed executive reorganisation and information sharing and analysis. The comparison concerns cooperation among lawful agencies, not equivalence with any force operating outside the law. It illustrates why combining functions or changing administrative leadership does not alone guarantee that knowledge reaches those needing it at the appropriate time. GAO testimony on reorganisation and information sharing.
If an institution is rewarded more for protecting its remit than for achieving a shared outcome, information hoarding may continue after a merger. Conflict may move from two ministries to two directorates within one ministry. Reorganisation therefore needs a defined shared outcome, a route to resolve conflict and a standard establishing each party’s contribution. Merger is a possible instrument, not an objective in itself. Organised cooperation between two bodies may be more effective than a large apparatus whose components compete invisibly.
Excessive coordination presents the opposite risk. Adding senior approval to every decision in the name of unified authority may create a bottleneck and weaken professional competence. A coordination committee may also become a new executive authority with legally unclear boundaries. The alternative is to identify matters genuinely requiring joint resolution, leave routine decisions with the competent authority and send defined disputes to a known adjudicating body. A clear route reduces reliance on personal intervention without preventing necessary cooperation.
Reform that makes decisions traceable
I propose starting with a defined public-policy file and mapping its actual route: who requested the decision, supplied information, authorised the commitment, could stop it and reviewed the outcome? That route can then be compared with published responsibilities. This does not presume bad faith. It may reveal delay arising from conflicting rules or missing delegation, or it may expose a practice lacking legal basis. The distinction matters: the former requires organisational or legal correction, while violations require appropriate remedies and accountability.
The next step is to reduce unexplained exceptions without abolishing necessary flexibility. Each exception should record its reason, duration, authorising official and financial consequences, with patterns reviewed periodically. If the exception becomes routine, either the rule needs openly declared revision or a breach needs correction. Maintaining an inoperative rule alongside a permanent exception creates opportunities for intermediation and weakens equal treatment. This is an anticipated consequence to test, not an established numerical claim about corruption in Iraq.
Reform should be measured by what happens to responsibility, not the number of abolished bodies. Is the decision-maker identifiable? Are contradictory approvals less frequent? Can refusals be challenged under law? Are commitments visible to authorised overseers? Answers may justify retaining an independent body while clarifying relationships, changing a delegation or ending an unlawful practice. The solution should not be chosen beforehand and evidence collected only to support it.
Unified Iraqi decision-making therefore does not require one institution to say everything. It requires known limits for each authority and a connection between binding power and reviewable responsibility. Independent institutions can strengthen that system; unaccountable centres can weaken it even inside an apparently unified structure. Addressing duplication begins when the actual route becomes visible to competent oversight and concealed approvals cease to be necessary. Institutional diversity can then serve the state instead of ambiguity becoming a resource contested by decision-making centres.
Cite this article
Ali Zuweid. Parallel institutions and the problem of competing decisions. 25 October 2026. https://alizuweid.com/articles/iraq-parallel-institutions-dual-decision/?lang=en