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POL-05

This is a proposal for discussion, not an enacted law.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme

Proposed legislation · State, Constitution, Justice, Rights and Governance

Governorates, Decentralisation and Allocation of Powers among Levels of Government Bill

A repeal-and-replacement bill re-establishing governorate law on the basis of administrative and fiscal, rather than political, decentralisation. It sets clear boundaries between federal and local powers, links transfers of powers to financing, staff, assets and accountability, and prevents overlapping decisions by ministries and governorates.

Document number
POL-05
Version
1.0
Publication / last updated
5 October 2026
Scope
Republic of Iraq

Executive Summary

The Iraqi Constitution organises governorates not incorporated into a region as decentralised units with broad administrative and financial powers, and makes the governorate council and governor part of the state's constitutional structure. The Federal Supreme Court has, however, established an important distinction: decentralisation in governorates is administrative rather than political, and governorate councils are elected local administrative bodies, not legislative authorities parallel to the Council of Representatives. The Court has also confirmed that these councils' existence is a constitutional fact that cannot be abolished, and that an elected council continuing beyond its term without a renewed electoral mandate conflicts with the principle of peaceful transfer of power. [1] [2]

The applicable Law No. (21) of 2008 has been amended repeatedly. Functions, departments and staffing establishments have been transferred between the centre and governorates, with some later returned to ministries. The resulting layers of provisions, decisions and agreements make it difficult for citizens, employees and oversight bodies to identify responsibility for services and financing. The Council of Representatives itself acknowledged the need to address these gaps: on 8 April 2026 it completed the first reading of a new proposed Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region Law. During August 2026, the competent committee continued reviewing definitions, allocation of powers, ministry–governorate relations, oversight, administrative units and the High Commission for Governorate Affairs. [3] [4] [5]

This Bill therefore adopts repeal and replacement rather than a fourth or fifth amendment to the old Law. It redefines the council as an elected local administrative body and preserves its constitutionally prescribed administrative and financial independence, while limiting “local regulations” to instruments of administrative regulation grounded in federal law. They must not become local legislation independently creating crimes or taxes or restricting rights.

Powers are allocated in four layers: exclusive federal powers in which governorates may not encroach; shared or cooperative areas identifying who sets policy and who delivers services; inherent local powers administered at governorate or district level; and delegated powers transferred under Article (123) of the Constitution by written agreement linking the function to funding, staff, assets and data. A “no unfunded mandates” principle is added so that responsibility is not transferred to a governorate while funding, staffing or decisions remain with the ministry.

The Bill treats local finance as a condition of decentralisation, not a political privilege. A published federal transfer formula reflects population, need, poverty, infrastructure gaps, revenue capacity and service costs, while taxes and fees remain subject to federal law. It also prohibits off-budget accounts and unregulated local borrowing and subjects contracts and assets to audit and publication.

The Bill establishes the High Commission for Coordination among Governorates as a coordination mechanism, not a ministry above governorates. It makes the Federal Supreme Court the final arbiter of jurisdictional disputes between the Federal Government and governorates under Article (93) of the Constitution. In Baghdad Governorate, the Law applies provisionally insofar as consistent with the capital's special constitutional status, pending the Capital Law prescribed by Article (124). [6] [7]

Legislative Gap

Issues the New Law Must Resolve
AreaProblemResponse in the Bill
Council's Legal NatureThe old text describes the council in legislative terms, while the Federal Supreme Court has held that its role is administrative and financial within administrative decentralisation.Define the council as an elected local administrative body with law-based local regulatory authority.
Allocation of PowersOverlap between ministry and governorate, and successive decisions transferring departments and restoring their former affiliations.Classify functions and require a national matrix and written transfer agreements.
FinancingResponsibility may be transferred without adequate resources.“No unfunded mandates”: link every transfer to appropriations, staffing, assets and data.
OversightConfusion between parliamentary and administrative oversight and direct management of local services.Define oversight tools and prohibit substitution for the local executive authority.
DistrictsLack of a stable framework following changes to election and local council laws.Elected district councils and a district commissioner accountable to them within the governorate hierarchy.
BaghdadOverlap between the governorate and Baghdad Municipality, with the constitutionally required Capital Law still absent.A transitional rule preventing service duplication pending the Capital Law.
Data and BoundariesHistorical reliance on non-unified population and administrative datasets.A national digital register of units and boundaries, using current official statistical data.
Dispute ResolutionJurisdictional disagreements quickly become service disruptions or conflicting administrative correspondence.A coordinated settlement process followed by the Federal Supreme Court within its constitutional jurisdiction.

Proposed legislative policy

The Bill separates three questions often confused in practice: Who sets national policy? Who manages day-to-day services? And who pays the cost and is accountable for results? Transferring a directorate to a governorate is insufficient if financing, appointments, data and technical decisions remain with the ministry. Equally, a ministry should not remain accountable to Parliament for service outcomes when it lacks the means to deliver them.

The Bill therefore adopts neither “absolute decentralisation” nor “comprehensive recentralisation”. It applies subsidiarity: sovereign, national and cross-governorate functions remain federal; local services move towards governorates and districts; and mixed areas are governed by agreements and auditable accountability arrangements.

The Bill repeals and replaces Law No. (21) of 2008 because successive amendments and institutional changes have made reliance on the original Law as amended less clear than rebuilding the framework around the Constitution, Federal Supreme Court decisions and practical experience. This direction intersects with the legislative process begun by the Council of Representatives' reading of a comprehensive proposed law in 2026. [3]

Text of the bill

Proposed legislation

In the name of the people
Presidency of the Republic

Pursuant to the enactment of the Council of Representatives and the provisions of the Constitution, the following Law is promulgated:

Governorates, Decentralisation and Allocation of Powers among Levels of Government Law

Statement of reasons

To implement constitutional provisions on the federal system, administrative decentralisation and the administrative and financial powers of governorates not incorporated into a region; define federal–local relations to prevent overlap and duplication; ensure that powers transfer together with resources, staffing, assets and data; strengthen elected councils' planning and oversight role within their administrative nature; secure periodic elections and continuity of public services; regulate local finance, transparency, oversight and jurisdictional dispute resolution; and replace Law No. (21) of 2008, as amended, with a unified legislative framework, this Law is enacted.

Explanatory memorandum

1. Why a New Law Rather than a Fourth Amendment?

The current Law has passed through distinct political and administrative phases: expanded transfers of powers, reattachment of sectors, changes to local councils, suspension of councils and their subsequent re-election. In 2026, the Council of Representatives itself turned to a comprehensive proposed law rather than amendment of an article or chapter, making repeal and replacement clearer and safer in application. [3] [4]

2. Correcting the Concept of “Local Legislation”

Governorates possess broad powers, but the Federal Supreme Court has held that a governorate council is a local administrative body and that the Constitution did not entrust it with legislative powers. The Bill therefore permits local regulations, instructions and decisions where authorised by law, while preventing them from becoming an independent source of crimes, taxes or restrictions on rights. [2]

3. Oversight without Tutelage

Article (122/Fifth) prevents a governorate council from being subject to ministerial control, while the Court confirms that administrative decentralisation does not mean political independence from the state and that the governor works within general policy under administrative, parliamentary and judicial oversight. The Bill separates oversight of legality and performance from day-to-day administration: the ministry does not replace the council, and the council does not directly command federal departments. [1] [2]

4. Powers and Funding in One Document

One reason for weak decentralisation is that a transfer was sometimes understood merely as transferring an administrative signature. The Bill requires one package: function + appropriation + staffing + asset + contract + data + service standard + accountable body. A year after transfer, the audit body or citizen can thus ask one entity to account for the result.

5. Districts as a Nearby Implementation Level

The Bill reorganises the district council and commissioner while retaining the subdistrict as an executive unit, consistent with the current electoral approach covering district councils. It avoids recreating layers of small councils that could increase costs without real powers. [9]

6. Baghdad

The Constitution requires a special Capital Law, which remained incomplete through 2026. Local authorities continue to emphasise the need for legislation defining the relationship between Baghdad Governorate and Baghdad Municipality. This Bill therefore does not attempt to subsume the Capital Law; it establishes an interim rule preventing duplicate services and contracts until that Law is enacted. [6] [7]

7. Transfers of Powers: Text and Implementation

Disputes over transferring agricultural powers show that the issue is not merely declaring competence, but the timing of transfer and its connection to staffing, financing, assets, general policy and national service standards. The Bill therefore makes transfer a fully specified legal process, preventing responsibility from remaining divided between a body controlling decisions and another bearing service outcomes. [12] [13]

Alignment with Existing Legislation

Principal Affected Legislation and Regulations
Legislation or FrameworkRelationship to the BillAction
Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region Law No. 21 of 2008, as amendedExisting frameworkRepeal and replacement while preserving valid legal effects.
Council of Representatives, Governorate and District Council Elections Law No. 12 of 2018, as amendedSeat numbers, elections, ratification and vacancy fillingRemains the specific election law; the Bill refers to it rather than repeating polling details.
Federal Financial Management LawBudget, Treasury and accountsApplies to local finance, with transfers and local resources established in this Bill.
General Commission for Monitoring the Allocation of Federal Revenues Law No. 55 of 2017Equitable resource allocationThe Bill retains the existing Commission and prevents parallel financial oversight.
High Commission for Coordination among Governorates Internal Rules No. 1 of 2022 and their 2023 AmendmentFederal–local coordinationReorganised within 120 days on an explicit statutory basis and confined to coordination.
Public Service, Procurement, Integrity and Federal Board of Supreme Audit LawsStaffing, contracts and oversightGeneral rules remain effective and apply to the governorate as a public body.
Sectoral Laws on Health, Education, Water, Environment, Transport and Other AreasDefine policy, standards and specific powersSpecific sectoral provisions prevail in an express conflict, with functional allocation reviewed through a national matrix.

Transitional Provisions and Implementation Requirements

First priority: Within 120 days, align the High Commission for Coordination among Governorates rules and approve a standard transfer-of-powers agreement.

Second priority: Within 180 days, issue a national matrix allocating administrative and service functions, linking each to decision-making, financing and accountability.

Third priority: Within 24 months, review all previous transfers of powers, particularly sectors whose departments shifted between ministries and governorates.

Fourth priority: Complete district councils under election law within the transitional period, without extending expired elected councils.

Fifth priority: Build a unified digital register of administrative units and boundaries and local assets, linked to official statistics, budgets and projects.

Financial and Implementation Implications

The Bill does not envisage an extensive new government apparatus. The High Commission for Coordination already exists with established internal rules. Its principal institutional effect is therefore to redefine that body's powers and secretariat rather than establish an institution from scratch. [10]

The principal transition costs will arise from digitising boundary and asset registers, standardising budget and contract publication platforms, preparing the functional allocation matrix, reviewing staff and asset transfers, and completing district council elections if not already held. Published public sources lack sufficient detailed data for a reliable cost estimate without false precision. The Bill therefore requires the Ministries of Finance and Planning to prepare a detailed implementation cost estimate before each transfer of powers or establishment of an administrative unit.

The most important medium-term fiscal effect is not necessarily higher spending but restructuring expenditure: reducing duplicate functions between ministries and governorates, linking funding to accountability, and improving appropriation distribution among governorates and districts through a published formula. No “saving” may be recorded in advance of measuring the actual effects of eliminating duplication.

Relevant Principles of Decentralised Administration

Iraq need not copy another country's model: its constitutional framework is distinctive and constrained by Federal Supreme Court decisions. Nevertheless, effective decentralisation systems share practical principles adoptable without importing a different political structure: clear responsibilities at each level, subsidiarity, funding proportionate to functions, prevention of unfunded mandates, publication of performance data, and formal channels for resolving jurisdictional disputes before litigation.

The Bill uses these principles as administrative tools while retaining Iraq's constitutional boundaries: governorates are not regions, possess no regional legislative authority, sovereign powers remain federal, and the Federal Supreme Court remains responsible for resolving disputes among levels of government.

Sources and references

  1. Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, particularly Articles 93, 110–116 and 121–125. Iraqi Council of Representatives. Official text.
  2. Federal Supreme Court, Decision 155/Federal/2019 and Consolidated Cases and 5/Federal/2021, principles of administrative decentralisation, administrative nature of governorate councils, periodic elections and oversight. Court decisions database.
  3. Iraqi Council of Representatives, Session of 8 April 2026, completion of the first reading of the proposed Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region Law. Source.
  4. Iraqi Council of Representatives, Regions Committee, 10 August 2026, discussion of definitions, shared powers, federal–governorate relations and council mechanisms. Source.
  5. Iraqi Council of Representatives, Regions Committee, 13 August 2026, review of oversight of federal departments, administrative units, land and the High Commission for Governorate Affairs. Source.
  6. Constitution, Article 124, Baghdad's special status and the requirement to regulate the capital by law. Official text.
  7. Baghdad Governorate, 28 January and 17 February 2026, continuing need for a Capital Law regulating powers and relations with Baghdad Municipality. First source, Second source.
  8. Ministry of Justice, Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 4487 of 2018, Third Amendment to Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region Law No. 21 of 2008. Official issue announcement.
  9. Ministry of Justice, Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 4718, 8 May 2023, Law No. 4 of 2023, Third Amendment to the Council of Representatives, Governorate and District Council Elections Law No. 12 of 2018. Iraqi Official Gazette PDF.
  10. Ministry of Justice, Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 4722, 29 May 2023, First Amendment to High Commission for Coordination among Governorates Internal Rules No. 1 of 2022. Iraqi Official Gazette PDF.
  11. Iraqi Council of Representatives, 17 August 2026, meeting of the Speaker and governors discussing transfers of powers, revenues and amendments to the Governorates Law. Source.
  12. Federal Supreme Court, Decision 132/Federal/2023, compelling transfer of certain Ministry of Agriculture powers to governorates under Article (45/First/1 and 5) of the Governorates Law. Court decisions database.
  13. Iraqi Council of Representatives, Regions Committee, 10 September 2026, discussion of transferring agriculture directorates, the administrative, legal and financial effects of detachment, and the need to address overlap in the Governorates Law. Source.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · POL-05 · Version 1.0

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