Ali Zuweid's Political Programme
Proposed framework legislation · State, Constitution, Justice, Rights and Governance
Federal Administrative Organisation, Ministries and Independent Bodies Bill
A general framework defining the legal structure of the federal administration, regulating the establishment of ministries, executive entities not attached to a ministry and independent bodies, and governing powers, affiliation, independence, accountability and restructuring.
Executive Summary
The Bill addresses a structural gap in federal administration. The Constitution requires the formation, functions and powers of ministries and ministerial powers to be regulated by law, while the state's structure has evolved over decades through separate sectoral laws, orders, regulations and establishment decisions, alongside numerous entities not attached to a ministry and independent bodies. The Bill establishes a framework law that does not automatically repeal sectoral legislation, but provides a common rule preventing changes to the administrative structure through instruments below the level required by law.
The Bill distinguishes four categories often confused in practice: ministries; executive entities not attached to a ministry; constitutionally independent bodies; and independent bodies established by law. It confirms that “not attached to a ministry” is not equivalent to independence and that the label “body” does not itself create independence. It also balances independence and accountability: an independent body is protected from direction in individual technical decisions but remains subject to parliamentary, judicial, financial and integrity oversight.
The Bill also reorganises the rules governing establishment, merger and changes of affiliation of administrative formations. After a transitional period, it replaces Law No. (12) of 2011, establishes a federal administrative register and powers matrix, and requires periodic reviews to identify overlapping structures and entities that have continued without a clear need. It envisages no new government agency: central functions are assigned to the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers using existing resources.
Constitutional and legal context
The Constitution establishes two complementary foundations for this area. First, the Council of Ministers plans and implements general policy and oversees ministries and entities not attached to a ministry. Second, Article (86) requires that legislation regulate the formation, functions and powers of ministries and ministerial powers. The Constitution also devotes a chapter to independent bodies, specifies financial and administrative independence, oversight or affiliation for some, and permits other independent bodies to be established by law according to need and necessity. [1]
Iraqi legislative practice has remained largely sectoral. Ministries have different governing laws, some longstanding and repeatedly amended through later regulations and laws. For example, Ministry of Finance Law No. (92) of 1981 remains the basis for its internal rules and amendments through 2026, while the Ministry of Education Law was amended in 2025. This shows that general organisational reform cannot be achieved simply by issuing uniform regulations: a general framework and alignment of special laws are needed. [4] [5]
The Establishment, Merger and Change of Affiliation of Administrative Formations Law No. (12) of 2011 regulated, in only four articles, the establishment of departments below directorate-general level by Prime Ministerial decision and sections and divisions by decision of the minister or entity head. It is useful for organisational detail but does not address the higher institutional structure, independence of bodies, transfers of functions or a unified administrative register. [3]
In interpreting the position of independent bodies, Federal Supreme Court Decision 88/Federal/2010 held that some bodies' affiliation with the Council of Representatives does not prevent executive oversight within Article (80/First), and that bodies exercising executive functions whose affiliation is unspecified in the Constitution answer to the Council of Ministers. Decision 233/Federal/2023 again highlighted the distinction between setting general policy and an independent body's telecommunications-sector powers. The Bill adopts this distinction without making it a rule permitting interference in individual technical decisions. [6] [7]
The Council of Representatives also exercises actual oversight of independent-body officials. In 2026 it relied on constitutional jurisprudence in formally questioning and dismissing the head of a national body, confirming that independence does not abolish constitutionally prescribed political accountability. [8]
Legislative Gap
| Problem | Effect | Legislative Response |
|---|---|---|
| Numerous ministry laws of different ages and structures | No uniform federal standard for ministry formation and ministerial powers | A framework law plus a programme aligning sectoral legislation. |
| Confusion between “not attached to a ministry” and “independent” | Disputes over affiliation, oversight and direction | Clear legal classification based on the Constitution and law rather than names. |
| Units and entities established by instruments of differing levels | Expansion and an actual structure inconsistent with law or budget | Match the establishment instrument to the formation's level and impact on powers. |
| Overlap between a ministry and the regulatory body | Duplication in policy, regulation and licensing | Separate general policy from individual regulatory decisions and identify the lead authority. |
| Temporary councils and committees continuing for lengthy periods | De facto entities without a clear institutional framework | Maximum terms for temporary formations and prevention of their becoming permanent agencies in practice. |
| Limited overall visibility of the government structure | Difficulty identifying who decides, funds and holds others accountable | A federal administrative register, powers matrix and unified institutional identifier. |
Proposed legislative policy
The Bill establishes neither a “Ministry of Administration” nor a new “High Authority”. The problem is not the absence of another institution but the absence of clear common rules. Responsibility for the register, matrix and periodic evaluation is therefore assigned to the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers in coordination with existing bodies.
Nor does the Bill seek to fit every independent body into one model: a central bank differs from an audit body, electoral commission or economic regulator. The rule is independence proportionate to function, with a common minimum covering transparency, conflicts of interest, annual reporting, auditing and judicial challenge. This accords with regulatory governance principles emphasising role clarity, prevention of undue influence, accountability and transparency, funding and performance evaluation. [10]
For ministries, the Bill confirms that Article (86) requires legislation, rather than a decision, to create a ministry or alter its fundamental powers. It leaves reasonable organisational latitude to the Council of Ministers and minister at lower levels, rather than freezing every organisational detail in statute.
The bill
Chapter One — Definitions, Objectives and General Principles
Article (1) — Definitions
For the purposes of this Law, the following terms have the meanings specified:
- Ministry: A federal executive institution established by law, responsible for a sphere of public policy and public service, and headed by a minister who is a member of the Council of Ministers.
- Entity not attached to a ministry: A federal public legal person or executive agency not administratively attached to a ministry. This designation does not itself confer constitutional or technical independence from the Council of Ministers.
- Independent body: A federal body granted functional or financial and administrative independence within a specified remit by the Constitution or legislation enacted pursuant to it.
- Constitutionally independent body: A body whose establishment, independence, oversight authority or affiliation is specified in the Constitution.
- Independent body established by law: A body established by legislation where need and necessity arise under Article (108) of the Constitution or a specific constitutional provision.
- Head of the authority: The minister or head of the entity or body, as applicable.
- General department: An administrative formation at directorate-general level or its statutory equivalent.
- Federal administrative register: The official electronic register recording the legal basis, powers, affiliation, structure, leadership and core budget of every federal entity covered by this Law.
Article (2) — Objectives of the Law
This Law aims to implement Article (86) of the Constitution within a general federal framework; establish rules for creating ministries, organising their functions and defining ministerial powers; clearly classify entities not attached to a ministry and independent bodies; prevent duplicate powers and administrative expansion; balance institutional independence with democratic accountability; and establish transparent rules for restructuring and transferring or abolishing functions.
Article (3) — Principle of Legality
Entities covered by this Law shall act within the Constitution and applicable laws. They may not expand their powers or transfer substantive powers to or from themselves by administrative order, instructions or a decision lacking statutory authority. A statutory power both limits the entity and grounds its responsibility. Powers affecting rights, imposing obligations or conferring regulatory or punitive authority shall not be inferred by analogy.
Article (4) — Separation of Powers
This Law shall not be interpreted to permit executive administration of the legislature, judiciary or constitutionally independent bodies, or permit an oversight or legislative body to manage an executive body's daily affairs. Cooperation and oversight shall remain within constitutional limits, preserving judicial review of the legality of acts and decisions.
Article (5) — Unity of General Policy
The Council of Ministers shall plan and implement state general policy and oversee ministries and executive entities not attached to a ministry within constitutional and statutory limits. Unity of general policy shall not extend to instructions concerning an individual or technical decision exclusively assigned to an independent body where its law prohibits this or intervention would defeat its intended statutory independence.
Article (6) — Clarity of Powers
Every public body shall have a defined purpose and identifiable functions. Its governing law or organisational regulations shall identify the decision-maker, implementing body and oversight body. Two bodies may not perform the same regulatory function for the same group and sector unless the law defines shared responsibilities and a mechanism to resolve conflicts.
Article (7) — Names Do Not Create Public Authority
The names “authority”, “council”, “centre”, “office” or “agency” confer no independence, immunity or regulatory power by themselves. Legal status shall depend solely on the Constitution, establishing law and nature of the powers. Names may not circumvent restrictions on creating a ministry, independent body or directorate-general.
Article (8) — Institutional Proportionality
A permanent federal entity shall be created only where an existing body cannot perform the function efficiently and establishment costs and overlap risks are justified. Independence, resources and powers shall be proportionate to the function, risks of political influence or conflicts of interest, and need for technical expertise.
Article (9) — Accountability alongside Independence
Independence does not exempt a body from accountability. Independent bodies remain subject to judicial oversight, financial auditing and parliamentary scrutiny within constitutional and statutory limits, and shall comply with publication, transparency and annual reporting duties. An oversight body may not use accountability to dictate the outcome of a particular regulatory or professional decision outside lawful appeal procedures.
Article (10) — Continuity of Public Services
Restructuring, changes of affiliation and transfers of functions shall preserve uninterrupted public services, individual rights, pending transactions, valid contracts, data, records and assets. The law or transfer decision shall identify the body assuming existing obligations and service responsibility during transition.
Article (11) — Efficiency and Restraint in Expansion
Covered entities shall maintain the minimum structure required for their powers and prevent unnecessary duplicate offices, advisory units and similar formations. Upgrading an administrative formation is not an end in itself and must reflect workload, decision-making responsibility, staff numbers, risks and geographical reach.
Article (12) — Impartiality and Professional Continuity
Administrative and technical functions shall be managed professionally, impartially and with equal opportunity. Structures or restructuring may not be used to eliminate particular employees' positions or create offices tailored to individuals. Service, selection, promotion and discipline shall be governed by their respective public service laws without prejudice to statutory ministerial or board powers.
Article (13) — Institutional Transparency
Each covered body's legal basis, organisational structure, powers, leadership, contact channels and core budget shall be publicly available, subject to statutory security, privacy and investigative exceptions. The federal administrative register shall identify bodies, not replace texts published in the Iraqi Official Gazette.
Article (14) — No Immunity from Administrative Review
Regulations, instructions or organisational decisions may not prohibit judicial challenge to administrative decisions before the competent court. Any exception to judicial remedies must rest on the Constitution or clear legislation and be narrowly interpreted.
Chapter Two — Legal Structure of the Federal Administration
Article (15) — Categories of Federal Entities
For this Law, federal public entities are classified as: (a) ministries; (b) executive entities not attached to a ministry; (c) constitutionally independent bodies; (d) independent bodies established by law; and (e) public institutions or companies governed by their special laws. No entity may belong to more than one category except as the Constitution or a special law provides.
Article (16) — Priority of the Constitution and Special Law
In an express conflict, the Constitution and an entity's special law prevail over this Law's general provisions. This Law supplements matters unregulated by the special law. It shall not weaken constitutional independence, alter constitutionally specified affiliation or reduce an exclusive statutory power.
Article (17) — Federal Administrative Register
Using existing resources, the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers shall establish and continuously update the federal administrative register. For every entity it shall record the establishing law and amendments, legal category, affiliation or oversight body, head and appointment method, senior structure, core functions, branches, budget, official websites, and links to applicable regulations and instructions.
Article (18) — Effect of Registration
Registration does not create legal personality or powers or cure a defect in establishment. A conflict between register and law shall be corrected immediately, with the Iraqi Official Gazette text prevailing. Entities shall notify the General Secretariat within fifteen days of any effective legal or organisational change.
Article (19) — Unified Institutional Identifier
Each entity and principal formation shall receive a unified institutional identifier for use in budgets, staffing, contracts, digital systems and government reports. No identifier may be created for an entity lacking a legal basis or valid establishment decision.
Article (20) — Ministry
A ministry may be established, merged, abolished or have its fundamental powers changed only by law. Its law shall specify its functional sphere, principal powers, ministerial powers, senior formations and affiliated entities, leaving operational details that do not affect the substance of its powers to internal rules.
Article (21) — Entity Not Attached to a Ministry
An executive entity not attached to a ministry may be established by law where its function requires affiliation with the Council of Ministers or Prime Minister or cross-ministry organisation. It is not independent merely because it is outside a ministry and remains subject to general executive oversight unless broader independence is constitutionally or statutorily granted.
Article (22) — Constitutionally Independent Body
A constitutional body's status, independence, oversight and affiliation remain governed by its constitutional provision. This Law supplies only general rules compatible with its nature, such as institutional integrity, structure publication, auditing, conflict management and inter-agency coordination.
Article (23) — Independent Body Established by Law
A new independent body may be created only by law specifying need and necessity, the function unsuitable for direct ministerial administration, required independence, and appointment, accountability, financing and appeal mechanisms. The bill shall include an alternatives study demonstrating that institutional independence is proportionate.
Article (24) — Public Institution
A public institution may be established by law to deliver a service or manage a public facility or asset where its function is operational or economic and does not warrant a ministry or independent regulator. The law shall define its relationship with the relevant ministry or body, governance, resources and accountability.
Article (25) — Public Company
Public companies shall comply with public company, sectoral, competition and financial laws. State ownership shall confer no regulatory authority over competitors without an express statutory provision. The state's ownership and market-regulation functions shall be separated wherever possible.
Article (26) — Permanent Councils and Committees
A permanent council or committee exercising independent inherent powers or possessing a budget, staffing establishment or authority to bind other bodies may not be created by administrative decision. Temporary coordinating committees may be created by a decision specifying the task, members, duration and record-keeping body, without becoming permanent entities through practice.
Article (27) — Offices and Centres
An office or centre may be established within an existing body at the organisational level permitted by law, without separate legal personality or powers beyond those of its parent. Internal rules shall specify its position, functions, responsibilities and indicators of need.
Article (28) — Administrative Affiliation
Administrative affiliation identifies the higher body responsible for administrative oversight or coordination under law. A constitutional body's affiliation with the Council of Representatives does not imply daily management or power to direct technical decisions. Affiliation with the Council of Ministers likewise does not confer a right to interfere in a statutorily independent technical function.
Article (29) — Accountability to a Body
Accountability to the Council of Representatives or an oversight body entails attendance, reporting, answering questions and accountability within constitutional and statutory limits. It does not itself create an administrative hierarchy. Special laws shall determine the effects of accountability or removal.
Article (30) — Changes of Name
The name of a ministry, independent body or statutorily established entity may be changed only by law where powers or legal status are affected. The competent authority may rename an internal formation by decision if its level and substantive powers remain unchanged and its establishing law is respected.
Article (31) — Prohibition of Parallel Entities
No permanent formation may be established within the Prime Minister's Office, General Secretariat or a ministry continuously to exercise an inherent power of an existing ministry or independent body. A coordination team or monitoring unit may be established if it does not remove decision-making authority from the competent body.
Chapter Three — Ministries: Formation and Powers
Article (32) — Each Ministry's Special Law
Every ministry shall have an applicable law specifying its general function, fundamental powers, ministerial powers and senior formations. If its law predates the Constitution or no longer matches its actual structure, the Government shall submit an updating bill within the transitional timetable.
Article (33) — Contents of a Ministry Law
A ministry law shall contain at least its name, purpose, powers, ministerial duties, senior formations, affiliated entities, delegation rules, relations with governorates and regions where relevant, authority to issue regulations or instructions where constitutionally and statutorily permitted, and transitional provisions.
Article (34) — Limits of Ministerial Competence
A ministry shall remain within its statutory field. Where public policy requires several ministries to participate, none may unilaterally exercise another's powers. The Council of Ministers shall adopt coordination arrangements identifying the lead body and executive roles without changing statutory competence.
Article (35) — Policy, Delivery and Regulation
A ministry law shall separate, wherever possible, sectoral policymaking, service delivery or facility operation, and market regulation and oversight. Where functions are combined, institutional safeguards shall prevent conflicts of interest and separate regulatory decisions from operational interests.
Article (36) — Ministerial Powers
The minister is the ministry's head and is politically and administratively responsible for implementing its law and Council of Ministers policy within its remit. Powers shall be exercised personally or by delegation where permitted. The minister shall issue necessary administrative and organisational orders within their competence and ensure the legality of ministry actions and efficient use of resources.
Article (37) — Non-Delegable Powers
A minister may not delegate powers required by the Constitution or law to be exercised personally, propose a bill, approve the ministry's final draft budget, appoint an official whose appointment requires the minister's personal decision, or impose a penalty required to be issued personally, unless delegation is expressly permitted by law.
Article (38) — Administrative Delegation
Delegation shall be written and specify its subject, duration and recipient, be published within the ministry and entered in the delegation register. It does not relieve the minister of political or general oversight responsibility. The recipient may not subdelegate without an enabling provision.
Article (39) — Undersecretary
The undersecretary shall manage delegated portfolios, ensure continuity of the administrative apparatus and monitor policy and programme implementation. The office creates no powers independent of the minister; service, appointment and staffing laws determine its qualifications and grade.
Article (40) — Number of Undersecretaries
The ministry law or approved staffing establishment shall determine undersecretary numbers according to functions and sectors. Unnecessary posts are prohibited. Any increase shall have organisational and financial justifications published with the proposed statutory or staffing amendment.
Article (41) — Director-General
A director-general heads a general department established by law or the ministry law and exercises assigned powers within the hierarchy. A new directorate-general may not be created by administrative decision without statutory authority. Its functions may be merged or redistributed only through the legal instrument required for that organisational level.
Article (42) — Advisers
An adviser's duties shall concern a defined professional or policy subject and confer no executive authority over ministry departments without a provision or valid delegation. Adviser numbers, job titles and funding sources shall be published. Advisory offices may not replace general departments or circumvent appointment and staffing rules.
Article (43) — Minister's Office
The minister's office shall be confined to direct support, coordination, follow-up and communications, without becoming a parallel management channel for general departments. Its powers shall be specified in internal rules. Executive correspondence with departments shall follow the hierarchy except in cases designated by the minister in writing.
Article (44) — Legal Department
Every ministry shall have an appropriate legal formation reviewing proposals, contracts and decisions and coordinating with the State Council and judicial bodies under law. Its opinion shall not replace the powers of the State Council, judiciary or oversight authorities.
Article (45) — Planning and Policy
The ministry shall maintain a planning and policy function proportionate to its remit, linking the government programme to the budget and sectoral objectives. Scattered planning units shall not be duplicated where consolidation is possible. Evaluation shall be separated from implementation where necessary for integrity.
Article (46) — Internal Control and Audit
Every ministry shall maintain an internal control and audit system with the functional independence necessary for its duties, reporting to the minister or statutory authority and following applicable financial and audit standards and instructions. Internal audit does not replace the Federal Board of Supreme Audit, Commission of Integrity or judiciary.
Article (47) — Citizen Affairs
The ministry shall provide a single channel for complaints, requests and enquiries, registered digitally, with grievances referred to the competent authority under administrative procedure law. The citizen affairs unit shall not replace statutory review and appeal procedures.
Article (48) — Data and Records
The ministry is responsible for the integrity, classification, preservation and lawful accessibility of its records and data. It shall use national interoperability, digital identity and archiving standards when their governing laws enter into force.
Article (49) — Local Ministry Formations
Governorate directorates or branches may be created only where functionally needed and the power has not transferred to local administration. The structure shall define each branch's relationship with ministry headquarters and the governorate and prevent duplicate command and funding chains.
Article (50) — Relations with Governorates
The ministry shall allocate functions between itself and governorates according to the Constitution and applicable laws. A function transferred by law to a governorate may not be recentralised except by law or a lawful transfer mechanism. Technical coordination and national standard-setting shall remain distinct from day-to-day local service management.
Article (51) — Relations with the Kurdistan Region and Other Regions
Ministry organisation shall respect exclusive and shared powers and coordination with regional authorities under the Constitution and applicable laws. This Law shall not expand a federal ministry's non-exclusive powers at the expense of a region's constitutional powers.
Article (52) — Sectoral Councils
Under its internal rules, the Council of Ministers may establish a ministerial or coordinating council for a sector involving several ministries. It shall create no new powers or replace the legally responsible minister. Its recommendations and decisions shall remain within Council of Ministers powers.
Article (53) — Inter-Ministry Agreements
Ministries may conclude organisational memoranda on data exchange or joint procedures. Such memoranda may not transfer statutory powers or create a fee or obligation for individuals or companies without a legal basis.
Article (54) — Shared Services
The Council of Ministers may establish shared government services for procurement, human resources, digital infrastructure, archiving or property management where no substantive ministerial power is transferred. The decision shall specify service level, funding, responsibility, data protection and business continuity.
Article (55) — Asset Management
Every ministry shall inventory its real estate, movable and digital assets and link them to financial and government registers. A significant asset may not be transferred between ministries because of administrative change without a legal and financial record specifying ownership, liabilities, contracts and affected employees.
Article (56) — Existing Contracts upon Restructuring
Merging a ministry or changing its remit shall not automatically terminate valid contracts. Rights and obligations shall pass to the legal successor designated by the restructuring law. Contractors and oversight bodies shall be formally notified, and state guarantees shall remain according to contract and law.
Article (57) — Budget and Structure
Budget classifications shall reflect the ministry's actual legal structure. An unlawful permanent formation may not be financed through a separate budget heading or programme. The Ministry of Finance shall notify the Council of Ministers and oversight bodies of material discrepancies between legal structures and spending-unit structures.
Article (58) — Staffing and Structure
Creating a formation shall not automatically create posts. Posts and staffing remain subject to service, staffing and budget laws. Every restructuring shall include its employment effects and ways to redeploy surplus staff before requesting new appointments.
Article (59) — Ministry Internal Rules
Ministry internal rules shall be issued under authority granted by its law, specifying divisions of senior formations, their duties, reporting lines and delegations. They may not amend the ministry law or create external regulatory powers absent from statute.
Article (60) — Publication of Ministry Structure
The ministry shall publish an updated organisational chart showing the minister, undersecretaries, general departments, branches and affiliated bodies, with links to legal bases. It shall be updated within thirty days of any effective change.
Article (61) — Ministry Annual Report
Every ministry shall submit a concise annual report to the Council of Ministers and Council of Representatives on performance of its duties, expenditure, results and challenges. A public version shall be published under access-to-information law when in force, excluding legally protected material.
Article (62) — Handover of Responsibility
When a minister, undersecretary or director-general changes, records, files, contracts, pending decisions, assets and delegations shall undergo documented handover. Political leadership changes shall not suspend pending transactions or revoke valid decisions except according to law.
Chapter Four — Establishment, Merger and Changes of Affiliation of Formations
Article (63) — Required Legislative Level
The instrument required to establish, merge or change affiliation depends on the formation's level and impact on powers. A ministry, independent body or directorate-general or equivalent established by law may be changed only by law. Lower formations may be changed through instruments permitted by this Chapter and the entity's law.
Article (64) — Departments below Directorate-General Level
On recommendation of the competent minister or head of an executive entity not attached to a ministry, the Prime Minister may establish, merge or change the affiliation of a department below directorate-general level, provided this neither alters statutory powers nor creates an unfunded staffing increase.
Article (65) — Sections and Divisions
Within the entity's law and internal rules, its minister or head may establish, merge or change the affiliation of sections and divisions. The decision shall be entered in the federal administrative register if it affects the published structure. One function shall not be split among multiple formations without justification.
Article (66) — Units below Division Level
Units below division level may be organised by internal administrative order when needed. They shall have no financial independence or external signing authority except within delegations. Their necessity shall be reviewed periodically in structural assessments.
Article (67) — Establishment Application Requirements
A request for any permanent formation shall state its function, why the existing structure is insufficient, workload, required staff, cost, organisational position, alternatives considered, relationships with other bodies and performance indicators. Incomplete requests shall be rejected.
Article (68) — Non-Duplication Test
Before creating a formation, the entity shall search the federal administrative register for bodies performing similar functions. If overlap exists, the request shall include a consolidation proposal or explicit responsibility-sharing protocol.
Article (69) — Temporary Establishment
A temporary team or office for a defined project may be created for no more than two years by a decision specifying its end date. It shall have neither legal personality nor permanent staffing. Renewal is permitted once by reasoned decision; thereafter it shall be abolished or the appropriate legal instrument completed to make it permanent.
Article (70) — Expiry of a Temporary Formation
A temporary formation ends when its term expires or task is completed, whichever comes first. Its records and assets shall pass to the parent body. Remaining employees or an outstanding appropriation do not justify continuation without authority.
Article (71) — Upgrading a Formation
Upgrading a section to a department, or department to a directorate-general, shall be treated as establishment at the new level and subject to the same instrument and conditions. Renaming it or granting its head a higher grade does not legally effect an upgrade.
Article (72) — Downgrading a Formation
A formation may be downgraded if functions diminish or transfer elsewhere, with employment rights protected under service laws. Downgrading shall not be used as a penalty against the officeholder.
Article (73) — Merger of Formations
Merger shall be the first option where functions are similar or fragmented, provided responsibility remains clear. The merger decision shall identify the organisational successor, transferred functions, assets, employees, records and contracts, and the new structure's commencement date.
Article (74) — Change of Affiliation
Statutorily prescribed affiliation may be changed only by law. For lower formations whose affiliation may legally be changed, the decision shall be reasoned and shall not alter the entity's substantive remit or legal independence.
Article (75) — Regional and Local Branches
Branch creation shall consider service demand, population distribution, distance and digital delivery possibilities. Branches shall not proliferate merely to match administrative boundaries where a regional or electronic centre can provide services efficiently.
Article (76) — Branch Closure
A branch directly serving the public shall not close before an effective, publicised alternative protects beneficiaries' rights, taking account of persons with disabilities, remote areas and limited digital connectivity.
Article (77) — Standardisation of Internal Rules
The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers shall prepare a common advisory template for internal rules showing organisational levels and functional separation principles, without imposing one structure on sectors of different natures.
Article (78) — Regularisation of Non-Compliant Structures
If a permanent formation operates without sufficient legal authority, its entity shall submit a request during the transitional period to regularise, merge or abolish it. Regularisation shall not invalidate previous lawful acts performed in good faith within the parent's original remit, while individual appeal rights remain preserved.
Chapter Five — Executive Entities Not Attached to a Ministry
Article (79) — Establishment Conditions
An executive entity not attached to a ministry shall be established by law where its function spans ministries, requires direct proximity to the Council of Ministers or has an executive character unsuitable for a particular ministry. Its law shall explain why an existing ministry cannot undertake the task.
Article (80) — Executive Reporting Authority
The entity shall be affiliated with the Council of Ministers or Prime Minister according to its law and subject to general policy and constitutional executive oversight, unless specified technical independence is granted for certain decisions.
Article (81) — Distinction from Independent Bodies
An entity shall not be described as “independent” in official correspondence merely because it is outside a ministry unless the Constitution or its law grants that status. The administrative register shall reflect its actual status to prevent confusion about oversight and responsibility.
Article (82) — Entity Head
The entity's law shall specify its head's appointment method, term and qualifications. Where no term is specified, this Law creates none automatically; the Government shall propose an amendment resolving the ambiguity under the legislative alignment programme.
Article (83) — Head's Powers
The head shall exercise statutory administrative and executive powers and be responsible for the entity's budget, employees and decisions. Delegation may follow the rules applicable to ministers unless otherwise provided by law.
Article (84) — Budget
The entity's budget shall form part of the federal budget under financial management law and remain subject to auditing and oversight. Fees and revenue collected may not remain outside the Treasury without statutory authority.
Article (85) — Government Directions
The Council of Ministers may direct the entity on general policy and executive priorities within its remit. Directions may not conflict with its law, extinguish rights, exempt statutory obligations or interfere in a dispute before the courts.
Article (86) — Regulatory Decisions
The entity may issue rules binding third parties only where the law clearly grants regulatory authority. Instructions, regulations and rules of general effect shall be lawfully published; secret rules shall not be applied against the public.
Article (87) — Relations with the Sectoral Ministry
Where an entity operates in a ministry-supervised sector, its law shall precisely identify the policymaker, implementer and regulator. Coordination shall not duplicate licences, approvals or inspections for the same activity without legal justification.
Article (88) — Review of Continued Need
Every entity not attached to a ministry shall undergo a functional review every five years to determine whether continued separation is justified or merger with a ministry or another body is possible. A merger requiring legislation shall await enactment.
Article (89) — Conversion into an Independent Body
An executive entity may not become an independent body by decision or renaming. Conversion requires legislation establishing the need for independence, safeguards, accountability and treatment of functions, assets and pending decisions.
Article (90) — Conversion into a Ministry
Where an entity's remit expands sufficiently to justify political representation in the Council of Ministers and full ministerial responsibility, conversion to a ministry shall be by law, specifying transferred powers and eliminating overlap with existing ministries.
Article (91) — Security Agencies
Security and intelligence agencies remain governed by the Constitution and their special laws. This Law applies to general administrative matters consistent with secrecy, security and those laws. It creates no new operational or security oversight power.
Article (92) — Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Functions
An executive body may not finally determine a dispute reserved to the judiciary without a valid constitutional or statutory basis. Administrative committee decisions remain judicially appealable under law. Investigation, accusation and decision-making shall be separated where significant administrative penalties are imposed.
Chapter Six — Independent Bodies: Independence, Powers and Governance
Article (93) — Source of Independence
A body's independence derives from the Constitution or legislation enacted pursuant to it, with scope defined by function. Absolute independence shall not be presumed; constitutionally guaranteed independence may not be reduced by regulation, instructions or administrative decision.
Article (94) — Functional Independence
Functional independence means the ability to make technical, regulatory or supervisory decisions within the law without directions on individual outcomes from a political or administrative body lacking legal authority. It does not prevent the constitutionally competent authority from determining general policy which the body is legally required to observe.
Article (95) — Financial and Administrative Independence
Financial and administrative independence means managing the body's approved budget, staffing and administrative affairs under general and special laws. It does not mean exclusion from the federal budget or exemption from audit, service or procurement laws unless a special system is expressly prescribed.
Article (96) — Constitutional Affiliation
Where the Constitution specifies a body's affiliation, accountability or oversight, ordinary law or decision may not alter it. Affiliation shall preserve separation of powers and shall not turn the affiliated authority into the body's daily executive administration unless constitutionally authorised.
Article (97) — Council of Representatives Oversight
Parliamentary oversight shall use constitutionally and statutorily prescribed tools, including information requests, hearings, formal questioning and removal where legal conditions are met. It shall not dictate the outcome of a pending investigation, licence or individual technical determination.
Article (98) — Council of Ministers Oversight of Executive Functions
Subject to independence and constitutional affiliations, executive oversight applies to functions inherently implementing general policy under the Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence, without affecting technical powers expressly made independent by the body's law.
Article (99) — Clear Statutory Purpose
Each independent body's law shall define objectives, functions and expected general outcomes and distinguish its powers from the sectoral ministry and other bodies. Broad wording allowing control of an entire sector without accountable boundaries is prohibited.
Article (100) — Regulatory Functions
For an economic or professional regulator, the law shall clearly specify tools such as licensing, standard-setting, inspection, data collection, administrative penalties and settlement of certain disputes. No tool may be exercised unless expressly granted or necessarily implied by law.
Article (101) — Separation of Policy and Regulation
The executive shall determine general sectoral policy where constitutionally and statutorily authorised, while the independent body applies regulatory rules and makes individual decisions under law. The ministry may not issue directions extinguishing the body's exclusive regulatory powers; the body may not assume sovereign policymaking constitutionally reserved to federal executive authorities.
Article (102) — Separation of Regulator and Operator
A regulator may not directly own or manage a commercial enterprise subject to its regulation except for an exceptional statutory necessity with conflict-of-interest safeguards. Accounts, leadership and decisions shall be separated where regulatory and operational functions temporarily coexist.
Article (103) — Commercial Activities
An independent body may not trade or invest for profit without clear statutory authority defining purpose, risks and oversight. Collecting fees or selling technical services connected with its remit is not commercial activity where law permits it and revenue is deposited under the financial system.
Article (104) — Board of Directors or Commissioners
Where the body has a collective board, its law shall define membership numbers, qualifications, selection, terms, voting, quorum and termination grounds. Roles shall be clearly allocated so that the chair cannot monopolise decisions beyond legal authority.
Article (105) — Professional Diversity
Collective boards shall include the range of expertise required by the sector. Political quota allocation shall not replace professional competence. Required expertise shall be verifiably specified in the body's law or selection notice.
Article (106) — Membership Term
The law shall prescribe fixed terms for the head or members where the nature of independence requires them and specify whether and how often renewal is permitted. Staggered terms are preferable for collective regulators to ensure continuity and avoid replacing the entire board simultaneously, where law permits.
Article (107) — Continuation Pending Appointment of a Successor
An officeholder shall not continue after term expiry unless the law permits a limited caretaker period pending a successor. Such provision shall not become an indefinite extension. The appointing authority shall specify the vacancy-filling process within a reasonable time.
Article (108) — Appointment Conditions
Senior leadership conditions shall include integrity, competence, experience and independence from regulated interests, in addition to constitutional or special requirements. Conditions shall be announced before appointment unless the Constitution or law prescribes a different procedure.
Article (109) — Pre-Appointment Conflict-of-Interest Screening
A candidate shall disclose financial and professional interests and partisan or commercial roles that may affect independence under integrity and conflict-of-interest law. Disclosure shall not automatically bar appointment except in prohibited cases, but conflicts shall be addressed before taking office.
Article (110) — Prohibitions during Service
The body's head and board members may not undertake paid work or hold a controlling interest in an entity directly regulated by it, under special laws. Recusal rules apply where a material personal, family or professional interest exists.
Article (111) — Post-Service Period
A special law may impose a reasonable cooling-off period on senior leaders before employment by entities directly subject to their decisions, balancing conflict prevention with the right to work. Penal or financial restrictions may arise only by law.
Article (112) — Grounds for Removal
The body's law shall specify grounds for removing its head or a board member, including as appropriate incapacity, loss of a qualification, final conviction for a disqualifying offence, serious conflicts of interest, material breach of duty or statutorily defined failure. Political disagreement alone shall not justify removing an officeholder intended to be independent.
Article (113) — Removal Procedures
The constitutionally and statutorily competent removal authority shall be respected. The decision shall be reasoned and preceded by an opportunity to respond where based on personal misconduct. This does not affect the Council of Representatives' constitutional powers in constitutionally prescribed cases.
Article (114) — Vacancies and Acting Appointments
The body's law shall govern vacancies and acting appointments through defined periods and clear procedures. Where silent, the most senior authorised professional leader shall conduct necessary business without taking strategic decisions that cannot be deferred, until a substantive appointment is made under law.
Article (115) — Independent Budget
The body shall prepare its budget proposal according to statutory needs and performance indicators and submit it through the route prescribed by financial management laws and its special law. Appropriations shall not be reduced to punish an individual regulatory decision, while legislative budget approval and efficiency oversight remain preserved.
Article (116) — Regulatory Fees
No fee or financial charge may be imposed without a statutory basis defining it or permitting it under criteria. Fees shall be proportionate to regulatory or service costs or the statutory purpose and subject to transparency and audit.
Article (117) — Employment and Expertise
An independent body may organise human resources under service laws or a statutory special system to attract necessary expertise without unjustified privileges. Appointment, promotion and remuneration criteria shall be published and auditable.
Article (118) — Use of Experts
The body may contract experts and advisers as needed under contract and procurement laws, with conflict disclosure. No expert may be delegated final sovereign or regulatory decision-making authority unless permitted by law.
Article (119) — Regulatory Transparency
The body shall publish regulations, rules, general decisions, non-confidential meeting minutes and core statistics. For significant regulatory decisions, public consultation or stakeholder hearings shall be used where law and subject matter permit, with reasons for the final decision.
Article (120) — Reasons
Significant individual decisions shall contain sufficient reasons to explain their legal and factual basis, subject to investigative confidentiality, commercial secrets and privacy. The person concerned shall be informed of available appeal or review procedures.
Article (121) — Judicial Challenge
The body's decisions shall be challengeable before the competent judiciary under the Constitution and law. Independence does not preclude legality review. A decision may not be made final in the sense of immune from judicial review except within express constitutional limits.
Article (122) — Annual Report
Each independent body shall prepare an annual report covering activities, regulatory decisions, performance indicators, budget, human resources, challenges and risks, submit it to competent oversight authorities and publish a public version.
Article (123) — Accountability Hearings
The Council of Representatives or relevant committee may hold periodic hearings on the annual report and performance. Accountability shall focus on legality, results and efficiency and shall not become direction of pending individual decisions.
Article (124) — External Audit
The body's accounts shall be audited by the Federal Board of Supreme Audit under law. It shall address findings within announced periods or explain legal objections. Financial audit shall not substitute its view for technical regulatory judgment except when evaluating efficient use of public funds.
Article (125) — Integrity Oversight
The body remains subject to integrity, illicit enrichment, conflict-of-interest and anti-corruption laws. Independence protects lawful decision-making; it does not immunise against investigation or criminal or disciplinary accountability.
Article (126) — Performance Measurement
The body shall establish indicators linked to statutory objectives rather than decision counts alone, such as service quality, processing time, compliance, market stability and beneficiary protection according to sector. Indicators shall not incentivise increasing fines or licences as a financial goal.
Article (127) — Periodic Mandate Review
Every five years, an independent or joint governmental-parliamentary evaluation shall assess clarity of remit, continued need, independence, overlap and results. Evaluation alone shall not amend the body's law. A recommendation for amendment, merger or abolition shall be followed by a reasoned bill.
Article (128) — Termination of a Body
A body established by law may be abolished only by law, subject to constitutional limits for bodies with a constitutional basis. The repeal law shall identify the successor and treatment of staff, funds, records, contracts, rights, obligations and pending decisions.
Chapter Seven — Appointments, Senior Leadership and Institutional Integrity Safeguards
Article (129) — Legal Appointment Instrument
Ministers, entity heads and independent-body heads and members shall be appointed under the Constitution and each office's special law. This Law creates no appointment power conflicting with a special provision, but establishes compatible general procedural rules.
Article (130) — Publication of Requirements
Where law does not prescribe a closed nomination process, the competent authority shall publish the office's requirements, qualifications, experience, term and disqualifications. Professional searches and documented interviews may produce a shortlist without restricting constitutional selection and approval powers.
Article (131) — Qualification Verification
The nominating authority shall verify qualifications, experience, professional history and conflicts of interest before submission and is responsible for data accuracy. Materially false information is grounds for withdrawing a nomination or terminating service under law.
Article (132) — Parliamentary Hearing
Where Council of Representatives approval is required, the relevant committee shall hold a hearing focused on competence, integrity, institutional vision and conflicts of interest. It shall not bind the candidate to partisan directions or undertakings inconsistent with the office's independence.
Article (133) — Publication of Professional Biography
A concise professional biography of a senior leadership candidate or appointee shall be published, including relevant qualifications and experience, while protecting personal information unrelated to public accountability.
Article (134) — Oath Where Required
Where law requires an oath, substantive powers shall not be exercised before it is taken before the designated authority. No new oath may be imposed by regulation or decision without legal permission.
Article (135) — Code of Conduct
Ministries, entities and bodies shall adopt codes consistent with employee disciplinary and integrity laws, covering gifts, hospitality, stakeholder contact and use of information and public resources. Codes shall not replace disciplinary and penal provisions.
Article (136) — Register of Stakeholder Meetings
Regulators and bodies making significant market decisions shall maintain a public register of official meetings with companies, associations and stakeholders, subject to confidentiality, to ensure equal access and prevent undisclosed influence.
Article (137) — Recusal
An official shall recuse themselves from a decision involving a direct or material conflict of interest. The recusal and reasons shall be recorded, naming the lawful substitute. Recusal shall not paralyse the body where quorum can lawfully be maintained.
Article (138) — Collective Decisions
Collective boards and bodies shall record votes, abstentions and recusals in minutes and publish general outcomes unless law prohibits. A professional dissent may be recorded without affecting the majority decision's validity.
Article (139) — Individual Responsibility
Collective decision-making does not excuse a member's proven participation in illegality. A member whose objection is recorded shall not incur liability merely because the decision was issued, unless they separately committed an act giving rise to liability.
Article (140) — Protection of Professional Judgment
No employee or board member may be penalised merely for expressing a good-faith technical opinion within their remit. Accountability for gross negligence, abuse of authority, corruption or illegality remains.
Chapter Eight — Government Coordination and Prevention of Overlapping Powers
Article (141) — Lead-Authority Rule
For shared matters, the Council of Ministers shall designate a lead body responsible for coordination and preparing joint decisions without removing other bodies' powers. The decision shall define leadership scope, required outcomes, duration and each body's responsibilities.
Article (142) — Powers Matrix
The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers shall prepare a federal matrix of senior-level powers identifying the ministry, entity or body responsible for each principal function, shared functions and legal bases. It shall be updated upon every new law and made public.
Article (143) — Overlap Notice
If a body considers another's decision or draft regulation to overlap its powers, it shall notify that body in writing within a reasonable period, identifying the legal basis. Both shall attempt institutional settlement before escalation, without prejudice to judicial recourse.
Article (144) — Executive Overlap Resolution Committee
The Council of Ministers may establish a legal-technical committee to resolve overlap between two ministries or executive entities where the dispute is neither judicial nor constitutional. Its recommendation becomes binding upon adoption within Council of Ministers powers and shall not amend legislation.
Article (145) — Disputes with Independent Bodies
Where overlap involves an independent body, its independence and law shall be respected. The Council of Ministers' role shall be confined to coordination or constitutional powers. Constitutional interpretation or validity of a federal decision shall be referred to the competent judicial authority under law.
Article (146) — Joint Legislative Proposals
Where a ministry's bill affects another ministry's or body's powers, its opinion shall be obtained before referral to the Council of Ministers and State Council under lawful procedures. The explanatory memorandum shall record agreement and disagreement, without making an objection a veto unless law so provides.
Article (147) — Data Interoperability
Bodies shall exchange data needed for their duties through secure government platforms under the minimum-necessary principle, following data protection and digital government laws when in force. Citizens shall not be asked to provide data held by another government body where lawful exchange is possible.
Article (148) — Unified Identifiers and Dictionaries
The state shall adopt common institutional and service identifiers, data dictionaries and exchange standards preventing inconsistent entity or function names across budgets, staffing, contracts and digital platforms. The national digital government authority shall coordinate technical implementation.
Article (149) — Shared Contact Centres
Related entities' contact and public-service centres may be unified through a shared government platform, provided decision responsibility remains with the competent body and requests can be traced to the legally responsible authority.
Article (150) — Joint Procurement
Recurring purchases with standard specifications may be pooled to reduce costs and improve integrity under public procurement law. Pooling shall not impose a particular supplier or restrict an independent body's justified specialist technical requirement.
Article (151) — State Continuity
Each entity shall maintain a business-continuity plan covering record preservation and substitute authorities in emergencies, coordinated with the national disaster-risk and state-continuity framework. Plans shall create no exceptional powers beyond emergency laws.
Article (152) — Cooperation with Governorates
Institutional channels shall coordinate federal bodies and governorates on shared services, data and projects, respecting administrative decentralisation and creating no hierarchy absent from law.
Article (153) — Cooperation with Regional Authorities
Cooperation with regional authorities shall follow the Constitution, laws and valid administrative agreements, especially for shared matters, crossings, data and services spanning internal boundaries, without altering constitutional powers allocation.
Chapter Nine — Transparency, Oversight and Institutional Evaluation
Article (154) — Public Institutional Guide
Each entity shall publish a public guide to its powers, structure, leadership, service procedures, complaint and review channels and legislative links. It shall be periodically updated and available in searchable digital form.
Article (155) — Publication of Regulations and Instructions
General regulatory instructions not published as legally required shall not be enforceable against the public. Current regulations, instructions and rules shall be published on the official website, identifying their effective and amendment status.
Article (156) — Institutional Indicators
Each entity shall select a limited number of outcome, efficiency and service-quality indicators rather than activity measures alone, presenting annual comparisons against targets and explaining material deviations.
Article (157) — External Evaluation
The Council of Ministers, Council of Representatives or competent authority may commission an academic, professional or oversight body to conduct an independent institutional evaluation, ensuring necessary data access and protection of legally confidential information. A summary and recommendations shall be published.
Article (158) — Overlapping Powers Report
Every two years, the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers shall issue a public report on institutional overlap, temporary entities and unregularised structures, with legislative and administrative recommendations for merger or clarification.
Article (159) — Review of Older Laws
The Ministry of Justice, State Council and General Secretariat, within their respective remits, shall periodically list older organisational laws no longer reflecting the state structure after the 2005 Constitution and propose amendment or repeal, without presuming them invalid merely because of age.
Article (160) — Protection of Public Records
Organisational charts, organisational decisions and records transferring powers and assets are public records to be preserved under the national archiving system. They shall not be destroyed or concealed upon governmental change or restructuring.
Article (161) — Reporting Unsupported Structures
Internal audit units shall notify the head and oversight authorities of any permanent formation, leadership post or spending unit operating without an apparent legal basis. Corrective measures shall protect good-faith employees' rights.
Article (162) — Liability for Unlawful Organisational Decisions
An official deliberately establishing an entity, granting powers or spending appropriations without legal authority shall face administrative, financial and criminal accountability under applicable laws. This Law creates no new crime or penalty outside those laws.
Chapter Ten — Restructuring and Transitional and Final Provisions
Article (163) — Initial Comprehensive Review
Within twelve months of entry into force, the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, in coordination with the Ministries of Planning and Finance, State Council and relevant bodies, shall comprehensively review the federal administrative structure, including laws, structures, powers, entities not attached to ministries, independent bodies and temporary formations.
Article (164) — Legislative Alignment Plan
Within eighteen months, the Council of Ministers shall submit to the Council of Representatives a package aligning laws conflicting with this Law or Article (86) of the Constitution. Priority shall go to older ministry laws, laws no longer reflecting actual powers, and bodies with unclear affiliations or leadership appointment procedures.
Article (165) — No Immediate Collective Restructuring
Entry into force shall not automatically dissolve, merge or abolish an existing ministry, body or entity. Each shall continue under its law until the competent amendment instrument is issued, unless this Law expressly provides otherwise.
Article (166) — Continuation of Internal Rules
Existing internal rules, instructions and organisational decisions remain effective insofar as consistent with this Law and the entity's law, until amended or replaced within transitional periods.
Article (167) — Register Updates
All entities shall provide the General Secretariat with register data within one hundred and eighty days. The first register shall be published within nine months and continuously updated.
Article (168) — Regularisation of Formations
Within twelve months, entities shall identify permanent formations lacking an apparent legal basis or whose affiliation changed in practice without the required legal instrument, and submit a regularisation plan within six additional months.
Article (169) — Repeal of the Administrative Formations Establishment Law
The Establishment, Merger and Change of Affiliation of Administrative Formations Law No. (12) of 2011 is repealed from the commencement of this Chapter's implementing provisions. Valid decisions issued under it remain effective unless amended under this Law.
Article (170) — Preservation of Special Laws
A provision in a ministry's or independent body's special law shall be repealed only expressly or to the extent of irreconcilable conflict. Interpreters shall prefer readings preserving the Constitution, each body's powers and statutory independence.
Article (171) — Regulations and Instructions
The Council of Ministers may issue implementing regulations under paragraph (Third) of Article (80) of the Constitution. Competent bodies may issue instructions within statutory authority, without amending powers established by law.
Article (172) — Five-Year Review
After five years, the Council of Ministers shall review implementation and report to the Council of Representatives on clarity of powers, administrative costs, entity numbers, overlaps, service processing times and necessary legislative amendments.
Article (173) — Statement of Reasons
To address historical fragmentation of rules governing ministries, entities not attached to a ministry and independent bodies; implement Article (86) of the Constitution; prevent duplicate powers and unnecessary administrative expansion; define independence, accountability and supervision; establish a federal administrative register; and unify establishment, merger and affiliation-change rules, this Law is enacted.
Article (174) — Entry into Force
This Law enters into force ninety days after publication in the Official Gazette, except provisions assigned special transitional periods.
Explanatory memorandum
1. Why a Framework Law?
Article (86) does not necessarily require one law to contain every detail of every ministry, but requires fundamental ministerial structures and powers to be statutory. Iraq relies on separate ministry laws differing in age and detail. A framework law therefore supplies common rules and requires special laws to be updated without repealing them together. [1] [4] [5]
2. Distinguishing Entities outside Ministries from Independent Bodies
This distinction is fundamental. An entity outside a ministry may belong to the executive and be subject to government oversight, whereas an independent body derives independence from the Constitution or law. Iraqi constitutional jurisprudence addressed this early in Decision 88/Federal/2010. The Bill therefore prevents names from producing independence not legally granted. [6]
3. Independence Is Not Isolation
No public body is beyond oversight. The Bill distinguishes lawful oversight—such as formal questioning, auditing, judicial challenge and corruption investigation—from directing the technical outcome of an individual decision. This reflects parliamentary and oversight practice and international principles linking independence to accountability rather than its absence. [8] [10]
4. Reforming Law 12 of 2011
The existing Law enabled limited administrative creation of lower-level formations, but four articles cannot adequately address transfers, mergers, conflicts, registers and temporary formations. The Bill replaces it with more detailed rules while retaining the practical principle that lower levels may be changed administratively where statutory powers are unchanged. [3]
5. Preventing Policy–Regulation Conflicts
Institutional disputes can arise where a ministry sets policy and operates enterprises while an independent body regulates the sector. Telecommunications Decision 233/Federal/2023 highlights the importance of boundaries between sovereign policy and technical regulation. The Bill does not decide every sector's arrangements in place of its special law, but requires clear statutory boundaries rather than daily disputes. [7]
6. Federal Administrative Register
The purpose is not a merely formal database but a link between law and reality: every entity has a legal basis, head, affiliation, remit, structure and spending unit. A unified institutional identifier reduces inconsistent names across budgets, staffing, contracts and digital platforms and accelerates detection of parallel entities and overlap.
7. Periodic Review
Creating a body does not mean it must exist forever. The Bill requires a functional review every five years, but merger or abolition remains subject to the necessary legal instrument. Professional evaluation is thereby separated from political or legislative abolition decisions.
Alignment with Existing Legislation
| Legislation or Framework | Status | Proposed remedy |
|---|---|---|
| Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, particularly Articles 60, 61, 73, 78, 80, 85, 86 and 102–108 | Supreme framework | This Law operates within it and changes no constitutional affiliation or independence. |
| Establishment, Merger and Change of Affiliation of Administrative Formations Law No. 12 of 2011 | Regulates lower levels in four articles | Repeal and replacement after the new organisational chapter takes effect. |
| Council of Ministers Internal Rules No. 2 of 2019, as amended | Govern Council procedures under Article 85 | Remain effective; review only what is necessary for consistency of the register, matrix and coordination. |
| Special Ministry Laws | Differ in age and structure | Remain effective and undergo an alignment programme within 18 months. |
| Independent-Body Laws | Each body has distinct structures and powers | Special and constitutional provisions prevail; general rules apply supplementarily. |
| Federal Financial Management, Staffing and Service Laws | Govern funding and employment | This Law creates no posts or resources outside them. |
| Integrity and Federal Board of Supreme Audit Laws | Oversight and auditing | Remain applicable to independent and executive bodies within their scope. |
Transitional Provisions and Implementation Requirements
Within 180 days: Entities submit data to the federal administrative register and begin identifying formations requiring regularisation.
Within 9 months: Publish the first register and senior-level powers matrix.
Within 12 months: Complete the initial comprehensive administrative review and identify overlap and structures lacking an appropriate instrument.
Within 18 months: The Council of Ministers submits an initial alignment package for priority ministry, entity and independent-body laws.
Within 24 months: Entities complete regularisation of temporary or legally unclear formations and consolidate duplicate functions where laws permit.
Transition must be institutional rather than confrontational. The Bill therefore dissolves no entity automatically and transfers no staff en masse without a plan. Updating laws and structures is linked to staffing, budgets, assets, contracts and data.
Financial and Implementation Implications
The Bill creates no new central authority. Initial costs centre on developing the federal administrative register, integrating structural data with budget and staffing systems, and legal and organisational reviews. Most work can be undertaken by the General Secretariat, Ministries of Planning and Finance, State Council and existing digital bodies, with limited procurement of technical or advisory services when needed.
Published data do not permit a reliable estimate of savings from merging duplicate units, so the Bill supplies no hypothetical financial figure. Effects must be measured after implementation through abolished or merged formations, reduced overlap, decision times, general administration costs as a share of expenditure, and numbers of entities with updated legal bases and structures.
Later mergers or abolition may yield savings or transition costs, but these must be calculated in the specific proposal, including employee rights, asset transfers, contracts, digital systems and premises. Expected savings alone shall not justify restructuring that weakens services or necessary independence.
Relevant Principles of Institutional Comparison
Modern independent-regulator systems share governance principles: role clarity, prevention of undue influence, board design, accountability and transparency, participation, financing and performance evaluation. These do not prescribe one institutional model but help determine appropriate independence for each function. [10]
The Bill draws two principles from this experience as adaptable to Iraq's Constitution: first, independence must have a clear functional justification rather than merely a wish to leave a ministry; second, independence requires strong accountability and transparency mechanisms. Iraq's constitutional text, Federal Supreme Court decisions and special laws remain controlling.
Sources and references
- Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, particularly Articles 60, 61, 73, 78, 80, 85, 86 and 102–108. Iraqi Council of Representatives. Official text.
- Council of Ministers Internal Rules No. (2) of 2019, as amended, Iraqi Legislation Database. Text.
- Establishment, Merger and Change of Affiliation of Administrative Formations Law No. (12) of 2011, Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 4200. Text.
- Ministry of Finance Law No. (92) of 1981, Iraqi Legislation Database; ministry internal rules continue to be amended through 2026. Ministry Law, 2026 Internal Rules Amendment.
- Ministry of Justice, Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 4841 of 2025, Law No. (9) of 2025, First Amendment to Ministry of Education Law No. (22) of 2011. Official issue announcement.
- Federal Supreme Court, Decision 88/Federal/2010, Council of Ministers oversight and the position of independent bodies. Court decisions database.
- Federal Supreme Court, Decision 233/Federal/2023 of 10/10/2023, interpretation of relations between the Ministry of Communications and Communications and Media Commission and Articles 103 and 110/Sixth. Decision.
- Iraqi Council of Representatives, Session of 9 July 2026, formal questioning and removal of the head of a national body based on constitutional jurisprudence concerning independent bodies. Source.
- Federal Supreme Court, Jurisprudence on Separation of Powers and Legislative Initiative, including the Court's study of Law No. 6 of 2006 and Decisions 21 and 29/Federal/2015. Source.
- OECD, The Governance of Regulators (2014), best-practice principles for regulatory governance: role clarity, independence from undue influence, decision-making structure, accountability and transparency, participation, financing and performance evaluation. Source.
- Iraqi Council of Representatives, Parliamentary Research and Studies Department (2025), briefing paper “Independent-Body Laws after 2003”, illustrating multiple establishing laws and institutional models. Source.
Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · POL-06 · Version 1.0