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POL-23

This is a proposal for discussion, not an enacted law.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Bill · Security, Defence and Sovereignty

Popular Mobilization Authority Bill — Reorganization, Governance and Integration into the National Security System

A federal framework preserving and strengthening the Popular Mobilization as a national military institution through institutionalization and professionalism, unifying command, weapons, funding and doctrine within the state, separating military service from party activity, protecting personnel, martyrs and wounded persons' rights, and opening a lawful route for integrating unofficial armed formations.

Document number
POL-23
Version
1.0
Axis
Security, Defence and Sovereignty
Document type
Federal Bill to Repeal and Replace Existing Law
Publication / last updated
5 October 2026
Scope
Republic of Iraq

Executive Summary

The bill starts from an established legal fact: Popular Mobilization Authority Law No. (40) of 2016 made it part of Iraq's armed forces under the Commander-in-Chief and incorporated Diwani Order No. (91), requiring personnel to sever political and party affiliations and prohibiting political activity within its ranks. The Constitution also prohibits militias outside the armed forces, subjects armed and security forces to civilian leadership and bars political intervention. [1][2]

The 2016 Law was brief and enacted during the war against ISIS. It did not itself establish a detailed, permanent system for structure, governance, command, staffing, training, financial oversight, joint operations and integration. Subsequent legislation reflected this: the Cabinet approved a new bill in February 2025; Parliament held a first reading on 24 March and second-reading discussion on 16 July 2025, before the issue returned in the new parliamentary term. [3][4][5]

On 9 August 2026, Parliament announced it had asked government to send the Authority bill. On 26 August, the Security and Defence Committee discussed personnel service and retirement. On 29 September 2026, the Cabinet approved the Popular Mobilization bill and referred it to Parliament. Legislative need is thus current, not hypothetical. A government bill is active, while the 2016 Law remains effective until Parliament completes new legislation and it is published in the Iraqi Gazette. [6][7][8]

The choice is neither dissolution nor unchanged fragmentation, but strengthening the Popular Mobilization by making the entire force a fully constituted state institution: one operational command, unified staffing and ranks, exclusively state weapons, stores and funding, shared military education, political neutrality, financial, judicial and parliamentary oversight, and firm protection of fighters' rights. Armed groups outside the official framework receive an individual integration route preserving dignity and experience without importing partisan armed command chains into the state.

II — Proposed Legislative Policy

The proposal rests on institutionalization, not dissolution. It retains the Authority as an administratively distinct armed-forces component under the Commander-in-Chief while removing parallel operational, partisan or financial independence. The force and respect for its sacrifices remain; every weapon, order, funding stream, promotion and deployment becomes part of the state system.

The Bill's Institutional Formula
IssueLegislative Response
Popular Mobilization's Status and SacrificesRetain the Authority as a federal military institution and protect personnel, martyrs and wounded persons' rights and historical memory
Unity of Military DecisionsOne Commander-in-Chief chain, joint command for combined operations and no parallel orders
Armed Political ActivityProhibit military party affiliation and political use of uniforms, arms and resources while preserving individual civil rights
Unofficial FactionsIndividual integration, vetting, weapons surrender and reconstituted units under state orders, rather than importing intact party wings
Armament and StoresState ownership, central inventory, licensed stores and special control of missiles, drones and heavy weapons
Overlap with Police and IntelligenceDefine a military function without general criminal-investigation authority or a parallel intelligence agency
Finance and EconomyAuditable federal funding, no direct accounts or donations, and commercial activity separated from military command
Oversight and AccountabilityParliament, the Board of Supreme Audit, courts and oversight bodies; no special courts or functional immunity

File boundaries: The bill does not reproduce detailed service and retirement, state weapons monopoly or military justice laws, which have separate files. It establishes necessary connecting provisions for the Authority to function legally within the national system.

Fourth — Explanatory Memorandum

1. Why Is the 2016 Law Insufficient?

The 2016 law fulfilled an important historical function: it brought Popular Mobilization within the State framework, placed it under the Commander-in-Chief and military laws, and required disengagement from political parties. However, it is a brief law born in wartime and cannot by itself resolve the questions of a permanent State: who owns the weapons and stores? How are commanders appointed? Who oversees the budget? What are the limits on arrest and investigation? How does the Authority work with the army and police? How are those outside the official framework integrated? The new law answers these questions without discarding the legitimacy established by its predecessor. [2]

2. Strengthening Popular Mobilization Means Strengthening Its Institution

Military strength is not measured solely by the number of rifles. A stronger institution is one whose personnel establishment, weapons, budget and readiness the State can ascertain, whose leadership can deploy it under a single order, and whose personnel know their rights and career paths. The proposal therefore preserves the Authority while transforming it from an umbrella under which multiple organizational identities may coexist into a State force governed by a single standard.

3. Political Leadership Is Separate from Military Service

The Constitution itself prohibits the armed forces from intervening in politics. The ban on partisan activity therefore targets neither an opinion nor a component of society; it applies the State's rule to everyone. Anyone wishing to engage in politics may leave military service in accordance with the law. Anyone choosing military service shall receive orders, promotion and funding exclusively from the State.

4. Integrating Factions Does Not Mean Bringing Them Inside as Armed Parties

The proposal opens a practical route for those bearing arms outside the official framework: individual vetting, assessment of competence, surrender of unregistered weapons, then entry into the Authority, Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Interior according to need. Collective experience may be preserved when units are formed, but command, operational designation and funding become the State's responsibility. This arrangement protects combatants from exclusion and the State from dual chains of command.

5. Defining Duties Prevents Conflict with Other Institutions

After reorganization, Popular Mobilization would be a broad military force capable of support, deployment, counter-terrorism, defence and border duties, but not a second police force, Counter-Terrorism Service or intelligence service. The proposal therefore restricts routine internal security and criminal investigation activities and places joint missions under clear command orders.

6. Specialized Weapons under Central Control

Missiles, drones, air defence and electronic warfare are strategic capabilities whose use cannot be left to an individual unit's decision. The proposal does not deny the Authority these capabilities when the State needs them. It places their acquisition, operation and storage within the national command and control network, turning specialized capabilities into strength for the State as a whole.

7. The Judiciary Must Not Be Subordinate to the Military Institution Whose Actions It Investigates

The proposal does not establish a “Popular Mobilization court” administratively subordinate to the Authority. The Constitution provides for military courts to be regulated by law and prohibits special courts. Military offences therefore remain before the military judiciary established by law, and civilian offences before the competent courts. This rule protects combatants from exceptional procedures and citizens from the conflict inherent in an institution being both party and judge. [1]

8. Separating the Economy from Military Command

Extensive commercial activity creates a conflict between the armed force's mission and market interests, exposing expenditure and contracts to legal and financial risks. The proposal does not prohibit the State from benefiting from public companies or engineering capabilities historically associated with the institution. It rejects making a commercial company part of the combat chain of command or a source of military funding outside the Treasury.

9. Rights Must Not Be Lost in Transition

Any military reorganization fails if personnel feel that the law threatens their salary, pension or family entitlements. The proposal therefore expressly safeguards the continuation of lawful rights, makes rank regularization subject to challenge, and separates structural reform from any diminution of the rights of martyrs and the wounded.

10. International Obligations Are Part of Sovereignty, Not Its Opposite

Iraq has been a party to the four Geneva Conventions since 1956 and to Additional Protocol I since 2010. Incorporating international humanitarian law into training and discipline protects Iraqi military personnel and strengthens the State's legitimacy in war; it does not transfer decision-making authority abroad. [10]

V — Harmonization with Existing Legislation and Processes

Legislative Alignment Matrix
ReferenceStatusEffect of the Proposal
Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005Civilian leadership; prohibition of militias outside the armed forces; federal security jurisdiction; military justice regulated by lawDirect implementation of these principles without constitutional amendment
Popular Mobilization Authority Law No. 40 of 2016The law in force establishing the Authority and placing it under the Commander-in-Chief and military lawsRepealed and replaced with a detailed framework while preserving lawful rights and obligations
The Authority bill that underwent two readings in 2025An earlier legislative process to regulate structure and powers that did not culminate in a law in forceCompatible provisions may be drawn upon and reassessed in light of the Constitution and the new parliamentary term
Council of Ministers referral of 29 September 2026A new government bill referred to the Council of Representatives according to the government statementThis proposal may be merged with it during deliberations to produce a single text and avoid two parallel laws
Military Service and Retirement Law and the anticipated special law for the AuthorityRegulation of service and retirement rights remains the subject of a separate legislative processThe proposal preserves rights and refers financial and service details to the relevant law
Military justice, penal and procedural lawsRegulate offences and procedures of a military natureRemain in force; the proposal does not establish a judiciary specific to the Authority
Proposed State Monopoly on Weapons Law, POL-24Addresses weapons outside all official institutionsThis proposal addresses weapons within the Authority and integration, leaving general criminalization and licensing to the specialized law

VI — Transitional Provisions and Implementation Requirements

Principle: Transition is achieved not through a dissolution or renaming decision, but through a process of enumeration, establishment placement, inventory, regularization of command and integration that produces a single institution within a legally defined period.

Proposed Transitional Timetable
Period from Entry into ForceRequired Action
30 daysForm the Supreme Reorganization Committee and approve a work plan and risk register
90 daysIssue initial regulations, open the integration window for unofficial personnel and establish rank and establishment criteria
6 monthsComplete personnel and biometric enumeration and the central inventory of weapons, sites, contracts and accounts
9 monthsApprove the new structure, regularize command positions and unify payroll, stores and communications systems
12 monthsReconstitute units and adopt joint training, doctrine and military education pathways
18 monthsClose the transitional phase and publish a government and parliamentary report on compliance, funds, personnel establishment and integration

Any extension must be technical and specific, not politically open-ended. Existing operational orders shall remain in force during the transition unless revoked or amended, preventing any security vacuum.

VII — Financial and Implementation Impact

Nature of the Impact: The law assumes neither an increase in personnel nor new armaments and therefore provides no unverifiable aggregate financial figure. Direct costs centre on digital and biometric enumeration, inventory and tracking, unification of human resources and payroll systems, professional training, reorganization of stores and the work of transitional committees.

Most of the transition can be funded using existing establishments and infrastructure if resources are reassigned rather than duplicate agencies created. Before any expansion of the establishment or creation of a new command or educational institution, a financial impact statement must identify capital and operating costs for three years and the funding source.

The largest potential positive financial impact cannot be estimated in advance from public data: eliminating duplicate salaries, ending ghost personnel entries, controlling stores, preventing uncoordinated procurement and separating commercial accounts from military expenditure. This must not be recorded as “confirmed savings” before an audit produces actual figures.

VIII — Brief International Comparison

No country exactly matches Iraq's experience, so the proposal does not copy a foreign model. It draws on general principles of security sector reform: civilian leadership, a clear chain of command, separation of the military institution from party competition, official weapons and personnel registers, auditable budgets and a judiciary independent of the chain within which misconduct occurs.

Under international humanitarian law, Iraq's accession to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I makes training forces in civilian protection and the rules of armed conflict part of an existing national obligation, not an optional addition. [10]

As for integration, the principle best suited to Iraq is integration of individuals and capabilities under State institutions, rather than integration of political loyalties as independent units. This preserves combat experience and sacrifices while preventing the reproduction of a parallel army within the State's army.

IX — Sources and References

  1. Constitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005 — Iraqi Council of Representatives. Particularly Articles 9, 61, 78, 80, 95, 99, 100, 109 and 110. Official source.
  2. Supreme Judicial Council — Jurisdiction of military courts. Includes the texts of Popular Mobilization Authority Law No. (40) of 2016 and Diwani Order (91), including the provisions subjecting the Authority's personnel to military laws and requiring political disengagement. Source.
  3. The Council of Ministers approves the new Popular Mobilization Authority bill and refers it to Parliament. Iraqi News Agency, 25 February 2025. Source.
  4. The Council of Representatives completes the first reading of the Popular Mobilization Authority bill. 24 March 2025. Source.
  5. Minutes of Council of Representatives session No. (2), 16 July 2025. Included the report and discussion of the Popular Mobilization Authority bill at its second reading. Official source.
  6. Iraqi Council of Representatives — Decisions and recommendations of session (8), 9 August 2026. The Council's Presidency announced that it had contacted the Government to request submission of the Popular Mobilization Authority bill for enactment. Official source.
  7. Iraqi Council of Representatives — Security and Defence Committee meeting, 26 August 2026. Addressed the service and retirement law for Popular Mobilization personnel as part of the security package. Official source.
  8. The Council of Ministers votes on the Popular Mobilization bill and refers it to the Council of Representatives. Statement of the Prime Minister's Office as published by the National Iraqi News Agency, 29 September 2026. Source.
  9. The Popular Mobilization Authority resumes administrative establishment-placement procedures for personnel. Iraqi News Agency, 20 May 2026. Source.
  10. International Committee of the Red Cross — IHL Treaties: Iraq. Status of Iraq's accession to the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. ICRC.
  11. Prime Minister: the first of October marks a serious beginning in addressing weapons outside State control. Iraqi News Agency, 1 October 2026; includes confirmation of proceeding with legislation regulating Popular Mobilization within the security system and under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Source.

POL-23 · Security, Defence and Sovereignty · Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · 5 October 2026

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