Skip to content
POL-24

This is a proposal for discussion, not an enacted law.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Bill · Security, Defence and Sovereignty

State Monopoly on Weapons and Regulation of Arms and Ammunition Bill

A federal framework unifying arms regulation in Iraq: the State monopolizes organized armed force and military weapons, while civilian weapons are subject to restricted licensing, a national register, tracing and secure storage, with a voluntary surrender period for unlawful weapons and clear judicial and human rights safeguards.

Document number
POL-24
Version
1.0
Axis
Security, Defence and Sovereignty
Document type
A federal bill to repeal and replace Weapons Law No. (51) of 2017
Publication / last updated
5 October 2026
Scope
Republic of Iraq

Executive Summary

This proposal proceeds from a clear constitutional principle: the armed forces and security services are subject to civilian leadership; military militias outside the armed forces are prohibited; and national security policy and the establishment and management of the armed forces fall within federal jurisdiction. The proposal translates this principle into a single legal system that goes beyond penalties, connecting licensing, registration, tracing, storage, voluntary surrender, management of State stockpiles and judicial and parliamentary oversight.

The current Law No. (51) of 2017 regulates possession, carrying, sale and repair and provides penalties for smuggling, manufacture and trade. However, it is no longer sufficient on its own to address the goal of a “State monopoly on weapons” as a broader national policy. An official study by the Supreme Judicial Council identified a problem in the penal treatment of possession of military, medium and heavy weapons. Meanwhile, throughout 2025 and 2026 the Ministry of Interior continued registering citizens' weapons and building a tracing database, alongside a government programme to purchase medium weapons. [3][5][8][9]

On 11 August 2026, the parliamentary Security and Defence Committee announced its discussion of a bill on the State monopoly on weapons, confirming that the issue had entered the legislative process. POL-24 is therefore drafted as a comprehensive law repealing and replacing Weapons Law No. (51) of 2017, not a parallel law: it permits limited civilian possession of individual light weapons under strict conditions, distinguishes home possession from public carrying, prohibits non-State possession of military, medium and heavy weapons, and bans armed wings and unofficial foreign armament and funding. [7]

The proposal takes account of Iraq's obligations under the United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, to which Iraq acceded on 23 May 2013 and which entered into force for Iraq on 22 June 2013, through marking, record-keeping, cooperation, tracing and measures against illicit trafficking. [10]

II — Proposed Legislative Policy

The proposal rests on seven interrelated legislative choices:

  1. Not equating a “State monopoly on weapons” with a “complete ban on civilian weapons”: The State monopolizes organized armed force and military weapons, while limited individual civilian weapons are permitted subject to licensing, registration and secure storage.
  2. Separating possession from carrying: Possession of a weapon at home confers no right to carry it in public; a carry licence is a separate exception based on demonstrated necessity.
  3. Closing the gap concerning medium and heavy weapons: Unofficial possession of prohibited weapons is a separate offence attracting a proportionate penalty, with a voluntary surrender period before strict enforcement.
  4. Preventing parallel armed force, not targeting social identity: The law targets no particular party, tribe or component of society. It prohibits any unofficial entity from possessing an armed wing, weapons store, camp or armed chain of command.
  5. Use existing institutions: The Ministry of Interior, national register and permanent national committee form the core of implementation, avoiding the unnecessary creation of a new bureaucratic authority.
  6. Tracing from source to destruction: Marking, inventory, transfer records, seizure and destruction form part of the law, covering the State's own weapons as well as the civilian market.
  7. Rights-respecting enforcement: Homes may not be searched without judicial grounds or a situation permitted by law; licensing must not discriminate politically; peaceful gatherings are not prohibited. The prohibition concerns bringing weapons into a gathering regardless of its purpose or message.

IV — Statement of Reasons

For the purpose of unifying the legal framework governing arms and ammunition; consolidating the principle of the monopoly of the State and its constitutional institutions over organized armed force and military weapons; addressing shortcomings revealed in applying Weapons Law No. (51) of 2017, particularly concerning medium and heavy weapons, tracing and stockpile management; regulating limited civilian possession, carrying, trade, repair, manufacture, import and export on modern foundations; establishing a unified national register; ensuring marking and tracing and preventing diversion and smuggling; opening a lawful pathway for voluntary surrender and purchase of prohibited weapons where appropriations are available; protecting constitutional rights and ensuring judicial and parliamentary oversight; and implementing the Republic of Iraq's international obligations in force concerning illicit firearms trafficking, this Law has been enacted.

V — Explanatory Memorandum

1. Why Replacement Rather than Partial Amendment?

The 2017 law performs a traditional licensing function and contains important provisions worth retaining, but it does not build a complete system for control of weapons across the State and society. Scattered amendments to definitions, penalties, the register, stockpiles, voluntary surrender, marking, tracing and cross-border trade would make it a composite, complex text. The proposal therefore opts for repeal and replacement while keeping licences and instructions in effect for a transitional period.

2. What a “State Monopoly on Weapons” Means in the Proposal

It means the State's monopoly on organized armed force and military weapons, and the prevention of parallel armed wings, formations and stores, rather than criminalizing every civilian weapon regardless of type or purpose. The proposal permits limited civilian weapons for home possession under registration and licensing, and makes public carrying an exception based on necessity rather than a social privilege.

3. Tribal Weapons and Community Disputes

The proposal addresses the substance of the problem without turning the law into rhetoric against tribes: no collective ownership of weapons in a tribe's name, no exemption for medium and heavy weapons, and no lawful use of weapons in tribal settlements, armed intimidation or coercive settlement. At the same time, it permits the involvement of tribal sheikhs and community leaders in surrender and awareness campaigns as community partners, not licensing authorities.

4. Light Weapons and the Right to Security

A complete ban on civilian weapons in an environment containing large quantities of arms could drive possession into the black market and weaken compliance. The proposal therefore adopts a gradual approach: registration of limited light weapons for households, training, examination and safe storage, and a strict distinction between possession and carrying. Personal weapons thereby change from unidentified assets into regulated property that can be traced and held accountable.

5. Why Are There No Broad Exceptions for Officials?

Weapons associated with official protection must remain State property under State custody, not personal property attached to an office. Officials in their civilian capacity are subject to the general rules unless they have official protection or a demonstrated individual need. This rule prevents public employment from becoming a permanent route to armed privilege.

6. Protecting Demonstrations and Peaceful Assembly

The proposal avoids older wording linking punishment to gatherings “against the Government”. The new prohibition is neutral: no weapons at any demonstration, public gathering or vote, regardless of political direction. The law thus protects gatherings from weapons and protects the constitutional right to protest from stigmatization in criminal legislation.

7. Tracing and Data Protection

The database is more than a list of names. It records a weapon's life cycle: manufacture or import, marking, ownership and transfer, loss and theft, seizure, examination, then destruction or reallocation. In return, the law restricts access to personal data, records access logs and prevents disclosure of security or personal details in public reports.

VI — Alignment with Existing Legislation

Legislative alignment
Legislation / FieldRelationshipTreatment
Weapons Law No. (51) of 2017Repeal and replacementPreserves the substance of lawful licensing and rebuilds the system around weapons control, tracing, voluntary surrender and management of State stockpiles.
Penal Code No. (111) of 1969, as amendedComplementarityIts general provisions and more serious offences, such as killing, threats and explosives offences, apply where their elements are met.
Counter-Terrorism Law in forceComplementarity without expansionWhere weapons are connected with terrorist intent, the more severe provisions apply; unlicensed possession alone does not automatically become a terrorism charge.
Laws governing the armed forces, internal security forces, Popular Mobilization Authority and security servicesInstitutional complementaritySpecial service and command laws apply, while this Law governs inventory, coding, diversion prevention and tracing.
Political Parties LawComplementarityThe political consequences of armed wings and unofficial funding and armament are addressed under the legal framework for parties, with criminal liability preserved.
Private security company lawsComplementarityInstitutional weapons remain subject to licensing, inventory and duty-linked issue procedures.
Customs, ports of entry and organized crime lawsComplementarityImport, export, transit and illicit diversion are also subject to the relevant penalties and procedures.

When this text is referred into the official legislative process, a final article-by-article comparison must be made with the State Monopoly on Weapons Bill discussed by the Security and Defence Committee in August 2026, and with any amendment entering into force after this document's date, to prevent duplication or conflict.

VII — Transitional Provisions and Implementation Requirements

Phase One — Before Entry into Force (90 days): Prepare databases, surrender points, training, licence forms and arrangements linking ministries and ports of entry.

Phase Two — Civilian Regularization (180 days from entry into force): Register or surrender unregistered civilian weapons, with exemption for the offence of mere prior possession.

Phase Three — Prohibited Weapons (90 days from entry into force): Surrender medium, heavy and automatic weapons and military materiel, with the possibility of a limited purchase programme if funds are appropriated.

Phase Four — Full Enforcement: Once the grace periods expire, penalties apply in full and earlier registration campaigns become the permanent National Register.

The effectiveness of permanent criminal prohibitions should not depend on the compensation programme's success. Compensation is a tool to accelerate compliance, not a condition for the State's monopoly on prohibited weapons. Any purchase programme should also be subject to financial limits and technical standards so that no market emerges for importing weapons in order to sell them to the State.

VIII — Financial and Implementation Impact

The proposal creates a real financial impact, but published data alone do not permit a reliable aggregate estimate. The main cost components are:

Financial Impact Components
ItemCost natureLegislative Response
National Register and institutional connectivityEstablishment and development, followed by operation and maintenanceReuse existing Ministry of Interior and Ur portal systems instead of building a separate system.
Marking, examination and ballistic tracingEquipment, laboratories and trainingPhased implementation based on risk and the highest-priority categories.
Surrender, storage and destruction centresTransitional and operationalUse existing police commands and stores while improving security and inventory standards.
Medium weapons purchase programmeOptional and temporaryImplemented only with a budget appropriation, valuation schedules and a published financial ceiling.
Oversight and auditingLimited operating costsRelies on existing bodies and the National Committee without creating a new independent authority.

Before launching a broad purchase programme, the National Committee shall submit a financial estimate to the Council of Ministers and Council of Representatives covering the target number of weapons, price range, storage and destruction costs and risks of circumvention. The law includes no aggregate figure unsupported by an up-to-date national inventory.

IX — Relevant International Comparison

The proposal follows an established international approach in three areas: marking weapons with numbers and identifiers that allow tracing, retaining records for long periods, and regulating import, export, transit and cooperation on tracing requests. These elements are linked to the Firearms Protocol and the International Tracing Instrument. [10][12]

In managing the transition from widespread arms proliferation, the proposal combines registration, voluntary surrender, limited purchasing and subsequent enforcement. This model reduces the need for broad mass-confiscation campaigns that may conflict with safeguards for homes, property and due process. It makes voluntary compliance a transitional window rather than a permanent exemption.

The Arms Trade Treaty is used here solely as a source of best practices in diversion prevention and end-user verification. Iraq is not a party as of 5 October 2026, so the document attributes no treaty obligations arising from it to Iraq. [13]

X — Sources and References

  1. Iraqi Constitution — Iraqi Council of Representatives — Articles (9), (19), (38), (78), (100), (109), (110) and other provisions concerning sovereignty, civilian leadership, rights and federal jurisdiction. Source.
  2. Ministry of Justice — Publication of Iraqi Official Gazette Issue 4439 — Contains Weapons Law No. (51) of 2017 and its general reasons for enactment. Source.
  3. Ministry of Justice — Weapons Law No. (51) of 2017 — Ministry of Justice page for the law in force. Source.
  4. Ministry of Interior — Directorate of Identity Cards and Weapons Licences — Licensing conditions and procedures applied under the current Weapons Law. Source.
  5. Supreme Judicial Council — Proposed Guidance on Weapons Law No. (51) of 2017 in Force — An official study explaining the law's provisions and highlighting a penal gap concerning possession of military, medium and heavy weapons. Source.
  6. Council of Representatives — The Concept of a State Monopoly on Weapons: A Reading of the Government's and Religious Authority's Views — A parliamentary study of the constitutional, legal and political framework for a State monopoly on weapons. Source.
  7. Council of Representatives — Security and Defence Committee Discusses the State Monopoly on Weapons Bill — Official announcement on 11 August 2026 of discussion of the State Monopoly on Weapons Bill within the security legislative agenda. Source.
  8. Iraqi News Agency — Registration of Citizens' Weapons Extended until the End of 2026 — Describes continuation of the second registration phase and development of a weapons tracing database. Source.
  9. Ur Portal — Purchase of Medium Weapons from Citizens — The government service for documenting and purchasing medium weapons from citizens under the weapons control programme. Source.
  10. United Nations — Iraq's Accession to the Firearms Protocol — Iraq deposited its instrument of accession on 23 May 2013; the Protocol entered into force for Iraq on 22 June 2013. Source.
  11. United Nations — Status of the Firearms Protocol — Official status of parties and the Protocol's general obligations. Source.
  12. United Nations — International Tracing Instrument — The international framework for marking, record-keeping and cooperation in tracing illicit small arms and light weapons. Source.
  13. Arms Trade Treaty — Participation Status — Shows that Iraq is not a State Party to the Arms Trade Treaty as of the document's preparation date. Diversion prevention standards are therefore used as a best-practice reference, not as treaty obligations arising from it. Source.

POL-24 · Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · 5 October 2026

What are you looking for?

Search content published on the website.