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POL-25

This is a proposal for discussion, not an enacted law.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Bill · Security, Defence and Sovereignty

New Counter-Terrorism and Justice and Trial Safeguards Bill

A replacement federal law addressing terrorism through precise criminalization, graduated penalties and professional evidence-based investigation, while closing avenues for arbitrary detention, coerced confessions and liability based on kinship or presumed affiliation.

Document number
POL-25
Version
1.0
Axis
Security, Defence and Sovereignty
Document type
A federal bill to repeal and replace Counter-Terrorism Law No. (13) of 2005
Publication / last updated
5 October 2026
Scope
Republic of Iraq

Executive Summary

The proposal rests on the State's constitutional duty to combat terrorism in all its forms and protect Iraqi territory from serving as a base, transit route or arena for terrorist activity. At the same time, it rests on constitutional rights to life, security, liberty and a fair trial, the prohibition of torture, and protection of freedom of expression and assembly. It therefore does not treat security and justice as conflicting goals: the most serious terrorism cases also require the strongest evidence and most disciplined procedures, so that actual offenders do not escape and innocent people are not punished.

Law No. (13) of 2005 remains the federal framework in force. It is a short law based on a broad definition, a list of acts and severe penalties. On 9 September 2026, the Council of Representatives completed the first reading of a new counter-terrorism bill comprising 23 articles, stating that its purpose was to unify and expand the relevant penal provisions to achieve deterrence. POL-25 offers a more detailed model: a composite definition requiring a serious act and terrorist intent; a clear distinction between killing, leadership, membership, recruitment, incitement and support; and separate rules for investigation, evidence, detention and appeal.

The drafting directly addresses key weaknesses revealed by Iraqi experience and international assessments: the breadth of the terrorism definition, excessive reliance on confessions, torture allegations, difficulties in early access to a lawyer, presumed liability of family members, cases involving children and returnees, and evidence originating in conflict areas. It also integrates requirements concerning counter-financing, foreign terrorist fighters, judicial cooperation and protection of witnesses and victims within Iraq's existing legal framework rather than creating parallel systems.

II — The Legislative Gap

Problems Addressed by the Proposed Law
IssueLegislative needResponse in the Bill
Broad definition of terrorismDistinguishing ordinary crime, terrorism and peaceful activityRequiring a serious act + specific terrorist intent + an express exception for peaceful activity
Disproportionality between defendants' rolesDistinguishing the killer, leader, member, inciter and supporterSeparate offences and penalties, with mandatory individualized sentencing
Confessions and tortureEvidence-based rather than coercion-based investigationEarly access to a lawyer, medical examination, recording of questioning and exclusion of evidence extracted by torture
Secret intelligenceUsing it without turning it into an untestable convictionMay initiate an investigation but shall not alone constitute decisive evidence
Families, children and returneesPreventing liability based on association or localityIndividual responsibility and assessment of coercion, recruitment, trafficking and rehabilitation
Financing and listingAvoiding duplication with Law 39 of 2015Structured referral to the financing and freezing regime with appeal safeguards
Cross-border threatsTravel, training and foreign evidencePrecise criminalization concerning foreign fighters and rules for cooperation and cross-border evidence

III — Proposed Legislative Policy

  1. A permanent law, not an exceptional-emergency law: Offences are built on defined elements capable of proof before a court.
  2. Strong security begins with strong evidence: Video recording, forensic and digital evidence, chain of custody and early access to a lawyer reduce both impunity and wrongful convictions.
  3. No collective liability: No family, locality, sect or ethnic group bears an individual's crime.
  4. Distinguishing roles: The law does not equate a perpetrator of intentional killing with a person who played a secondary role or acted under coercion.
  5. Ordinary courts have jurisdiction: Specialization within ordinary courts, without establishing exceptional courts.
  6. Complementarity without duplication: Financing, witness protection, juveniles and regulation of the Counter-Terrorism Service remain governed by their respective laws.
  7. Preventing extremism does not mean criminalizing thought: Prevention and rehabilitation are civilian policies; criminalization begins only with the conduct and intent specified by law.

V — Reasons for Enactment

More than two decades having passed since enactment of Counter-Terrorism Law No. (13) of 2005; terrorist methods, financing, travel, digital recruitment and cross-border evidence having evolved; and there being a need for a more precise definition distinguishing terrorist offences from ordinary crimes and peaceful activity, for responsibility and penalties proportionate to role, outcome and intent, for evidence-based investigation and exclusion of torture and secret detention, for protection of defence rights, victims and witnesses, and for alignment with the Constitution, relevant Iraqi laws and international obligations in force, this Law has been enacted.

VI — Explanatory Memorandum

1. Why Replacement Rather than Partial Amendment?

The problem with the current law lies not in a single article but in its entire structure: a broad definition, an undifferentiated list of acts, penalties insufficiently distinguishing roles, and the absence of a comprehensive procedural chapter for terrorism cases. A series of scattered amendments would therefore leave the same basic structure intact. The new law rebuilds the framework from definition through entry into force.

2. Defining Terrorism

The proposal requires two concurrent elements: a serious act specified by law and specific terrorist intent. This prevents any violence, damage or speech from automatically becoming “terrorism” and leaves ordinary crimes to the Penal Code. It also expressly excludes political, journalistic, religious and trade union activity and peaceful assembly unless they become criminalized conduct whose elements are established.

3. Punishment and Individualized Responsibility

The proposal retains the most severe penalties for a terrorist offence committed with direct intent to take life and resulting in death. It rejects automatically extending the maximum penalty to membership, harbouring, financing or incitement without proof of participation and intent connected to the lethal act. This is the central shift from broad liability to proportionate individual responsibility.

4. Investigation and Trial

The law's most important security investment is improving evidence: registering detention, early access to a lawyer, medical examinations, video recording of questioning, regulation of digital evidence, judicial control of technical surveillance, and preventing secret evidence from being the sole basis of conviction. These rules do not obstruct investigation; they reduce challenges and subsequent collapse of cases, and strengthen courts' ability to distinguish actual offenders from the innocent.

5. Women, Children and Families

The proposal expressly separates an offence from family relationships. A spouse, child or relative does not become an accused person through blood relationship or companionship. Cases involving children and returnees require examination of forced recruitment, trafficking, coercion, age and actual role, while keeping civilian rehabilitation separate from criminal responsibility.

6. Prevention and Rehabilitation

The law does not turn “extremism”, as an idea or indicator, into a crime. Prevention of violent extremism leading to terrorism takes place through education, social cohesion, local action and rehabilitation programmes. Criminal law begins when material conduct matches a clear criminal definition.

VII — Harmonization with Existing Legislation

LegislationRelationship to the Bill
Counter-Terrorism Law No. (13) of 2005Fully repealed and replaced upon entry into force of the new law.
Penal Code No. (111) of 1969Rules on attempt, participation and general principles remain in force where there is no special provision.
Criminal Procedure Code No. (23) of 1971Remains the general procedural framework, supplemented by safeguards specific to terrorism cases.
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Law No. (39) of 2015Remains the specialized authority for financing and freezing; the proposal prevents duplication of penalties.
Counter-Terrorism Service Law No. (31) of 2016, as amendedThe law does not change the Service's institutional structure or leadership; it regulates offences and procedures.
Witness Protection Law No. (58) of 2017Applies to terrorism cases, with an added rule prohibiting decisive reliance on anonymous testimony.
Juvenile Welfare Law No. (76) of 1983, as amendedRemains the special legal framework for children pending replacement by a newer law.
Laws on Compensation for Victims of Terrorist Operations and Female SurvivorsVictims' rights remain independent and are not exhausted by the criminal judgment against the offender.

VIII — Transitional Provisions and Implementation Requirements

First-Year Priority: Equip questioning rooms in central facilities with video recording; unify the deprivation-of-liberty register; establish a digital evidence protocol; train investigators, prosecutors and judges; and review pending cases substantially dependent on a contested confession or a loosely defined characterization of membership.

The law requires no new security authority. Implementation is distributed among the Supreme Judicial Council, Public Prosecution, Ministries of Interior and Justice, competent agencies and existing financial bodies. Joint information-sharing instructions should prevent any body from retaining decisive data without timely conversion into lawful judicial evidence.

IX — Financial and Implementation Impact

The law's financial impact is moderate and concentrated on procedural quality rather than creating institutions. The main costs are recording equipment for questioning, secure digital records, expanded legal assistance, independent medical examinations, training for investigators, judges and experts, witness protection and upgraded digital evidence capabilities.

Available public data do not allow an exact financial estimate without an inventory of investigation centres, questioning rooms, annual cases and digital storage capacity. The law therefore requires executive bodies to prepare a detailed financial estimate during the next budget cycle, distinguishing establishment costs, operating costs and existing resources that can be reused.

X — Safeguards and Compliance Indicators

A counter-terrorism law's success is not measured solely by convictions. Appropriate legislative indicators reveal the quality of the whole system: the proportion of detainees brought before a judge within the statutory period; the proportion of recorded questioning sessions; access to counsel from the outset; pre-trial detention duration; the proportion of cases supported by physical or digital evidence independent of confessions; torture allegations independently investigated; acquittals and releases; listing orders judicially reviewed; use of witness protection programmes; and reoffending rates after rehabilitation. Figures should be published in aggregate form protecting operational and personal confidentiality.

XI — Sources and References

  1. Iraqi Constitution — Iraqi Council of Representatives — https://iq.parliament.iq/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A/
    Articles 7, 15, 19, 37, 38, 46 and other relevant constitutional safeguards.
  2. Ministry of Justice — Counter-Terrorism Law No. (13) of 2005 — https://www.moj.gov.iq/view.6698/
    The federal law in force that this proposal seeks to repeal and replace.
  3. Council of Representatives — First Reading of the Counter-Terrorism Bill, 9 September 2026 — https://iq.parliament.iq/blog/199516/
    The Council announced completion of the first reading of a new bill aimed at unifying penal provisions and expanding the scope of countering terrorist offences.
  4. Council of Representatives — Security and Defence Committee Discusses the Counter-Terrorism Bill — https://iq.parliament.iq/blog/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B4-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9%D9%8A-%D9%82/
    The Committee voted on the bill internally in preparation for legislative procedures.
  5. Ministry of Justice — Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Law No. (39) of 2015 — https://www.moj.gov.iq/view.1955/
    The existing framework for terrorism financing and financial freezing.
  6. Supreme Judicial Council — Terrorist Assets Freezing Committee — https://www.sjc.iq/view.68052/
    Explains the relationship between counter-terrorism law, anti-money laundering and terrorism financing law, and attachment and confiscation procedures.
  7. Ministry of Justice — Witnesses, Experts, Informants and Victims Protection Law No. (58) of 2017 — https://www.moj.gov.iq/view.3194/
    The national framework for protecting participants in criminal and terrorism proceedings.
  8. Supreme Judicial Council — Children's Rights under the Juvenile Welfare Law — https://www.sjc.iq/view.3502/
    A reference for juvenile-specific rules under Law No. (76) of 1983.
  9. Supreme Judicial Council — Standardization of Legal and Judicial Terminology — https://www.sjc.iq/view.71801/
    Presents definitions and provisions from Law No. (13) of 2005 and highlights the breadth of its current structure.
  10. United Nations Committee against Torture — Concluding Observations on Iraq, 2022 — https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=pGXCo8HBKyqwe1FExwYMzLouDfP8XH1Yca2IMT%2FG%2FAAAeaB08Zej%2BVohjJlKB8NlOFfLwlrHfYkf7X%2Fdm33Q3A%3D%3D
    Noted the broad definition of terrorism and concerns regarding trial and detention safeguards in terrorism cases.
  11. United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism — Promoting Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism Efforts in Iraq — https://iraq.un.org/ar/297197-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B2-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8
    Training in Iraq on human-rights-compliant investigative techniques.
  12. Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee — Legal Issues — https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/ar/content/legal-issues
    Resolution 1373 and subsequent resolutions on effective criminalization and foreign terrorist fighters.
  13. Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee — Foreign Terrorist Fighters — https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/ar/content/foreign-terrorist-fighters
    A reference for obligations concerning travel, training, rehabilitation and reintegration.
  14. Security Council — Resolution 2396 (2017) — https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/sres23962017
    Border and information cooperation, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration.
  15. International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law — Supporting Iraq's Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2026–2030 — https://theiij.org/event/iij-ct-phare-and-euam-iraq-advance-iraqs-2026-2030-counter-terrorism-strategy/
    Documents work with Iraqi bodies on a strategy based on the rule of law and human rights.

POL-25 · Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Security, Defence and Sovereignty

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