Skip to content
POL-26

This is a proposal for discussion, not an enacted law.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Legislative Proposal · Security, Defence and Sovereignty

Security and Intelligence Services Oversight, Accountability and Intelligence Community Coordination Bill

A legislative framework unifying oversight, accountability and coordination rules across Iraq's security and intelligence institutions, placing the National Intelligence Council on a statutory basis and ensuring operational effectiveness without turning secrecy into an oversight vacuum.

Prepared by:

Document number
POL-26
Version
1.0
Publication / last updated
7 October 2026
Scope
Republic of Iraq — Federal

Executive Summary

The proposal responds to a direct constitutional requirement: security and intelligence services must operate under civilian leadership, in accordance with the law and human rights principles, and under Council of Representatives oversight. Separate founding laws for each service are insufficient to build a common oversight system or address overlapping functions, information sharing, classified spending and responsibility for failures crossing institutional boundaries.

The proposal neither merges the services into a single agency nor creates a new intelligence service. It instead places the existing National Intelligence Council on a statutory footing as a coordination platform, establishes binding general rules for the intelligence community and creates specialized parliamentary oversight with technical support, while preserving the original jurisdictions of the judiciary, Federal Board of Supreme Audit and Federal Commission of Integrity. It also prohibits surveillance or detention powers being granted by secret orders and establishes common safeguards for data, human sources, foreign cooperation and reporting wrongdoing.

II — Legislative Gap and Proposed Policy

Gaps Addressed by the Bill
IssueProblemLegislative Response
Multiplicity of servicesPotential overlap in files and data and duplication of capabilitiesRegister of mandates, responsibility matrix and statutory coordination council
Parliamentary oversightNeed for specialized, secure access to classified informationPermanent subcommittee, technical support office, closed hearings and annual reports
SecrecyClassification may become a barrier to accountabilityThe rule that secrecy protects information but does not remove judicial, parliamentary or financial oversight
Data and surveillanceDifferent controls among bodies and the possibility of unchecked expansionLegality, necessity, proportionality, purpose limitation, audit trails and prohibition of secret surveillance powers
Foreign cooperationRisks of onward sharing of data or circumvention of domestic lawRegister of arrangements, risk assessment and prohibition on requesting actions the body cannot lawfully undertake within Iraq
Shared failuresDifficulty attributing responsibility when information crosses several institutionsPost-incident review, a duty to share and documentation of decisions and dissenting views

The proposed policy is a model of multilayered oversight: executive leadership and regulation, internal compliance, specialized parliamentary oversight, judicial oversight of rights and procedures, financial and integrity oversight, and public reporting insofar as security is not harmed. This model is more suitable than creating a new commission with broad powers, because it uses existing constitutional and statutory institutions and adds the tools they lack.

III — Text of the Bill

In the name of the people

Presidency of the Republic

On the basis of approval by the Council of Representatives and ratification by the President of the Republic, and pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq of 2005, the following Law is issued:

Security and Intelligence Services Oversight, Accountability and Intelligence Community Coordination Law

IV — Statement of Reasons

To implement constitutional provisions subjecting security services and the intelligence service to civilian leadership, Council of Representatives oversight, the law and human rights principles; regulate coordination among federal intelligence bodies and prevent overlap and duplication; ensure secure information sharing; establish effective parliamentary, judicial and financial oversight of classified activities and expenditure; protect services' neutrality from politicization; and regulate international cooperation and protection of data and sources, this Law has been enacted.

V — Explanatory Memorandum

1. Why a Separate Framework Law?

A service's founding law defines its composition, head and duties but cannot alone regulate the shared spaces among all services. The greatest institutional risks arise at interfaces: who leads a shared case? Who holds the authoritative version of information? Who is responsible for failing to share? How does Parliament review spending distributed among multiple bodies? How is a service prevented from requesting information from a foreign partner in a manner circumventing Iraqi legal safeguards? The proposal therefore addresses the “system”, not the “service”.

2. Placing an Existing Council on a Statutory Basis Rather than Creating a New Institution

Current Iraqi practice already includes the National Intelligence Council and its Secretariat within the National Security Advisory. The proposal gives this framework a clear legal basis while preventing it from becoming a parallel collection service or operational command. Its functions are priority-setting, coordination, conflict resolution and joint assessment.

3. Parliamentary Oversight, Not Operational Management

Effective oversight requires access to classified information, but does not mean that Parliament selects targets or handles sources. The proposal therefore distinguishes executive tasking from legislative oversight: the Committee reviews law, policy, spending, compliance and failures, while operational management remains with the executive and services within their mandates.

4. Secrecy and Rights

Intelligence work requires genuine secrecy, but legality requires a reviewable audit trail. The proposal therefore establishes records of authorizations, sensitive decisions and data access, protects sources, prohibits secret detention, torture and partisan surveillance, and ties intrusions into privacy to a statutory mandate and judicial authorization where required by law.

5. Independence of Analysis

Politicized analysis and manufactured consensus are among the most dangerous forms of intelligence failure. The proposal therefore recognizes the right to record dissenting professional views and distinguishes facts, assessments and confidence levels, enabling political decisions to rest on a more truthful picture even amid uncertainty.

VI — Alignment with Existing Legislation and Institutions

Reference / InstitutionRelationship to the Bill
Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005The constitutional source for civilian leadership, legislative oversight and operation of the intelligence service under the law and human rights principles.
Iraqi National Security Service LawRemains the Service's founding law; POL-26 adds cross-cutting rules on oversight, coordination, data and shared expenditure.
National Intelligence Service LawRemains the Service's founding law; the proposal does not alter its constitutional mission but defines its relationship to the oversight and coordination system.
Laws Governing the Ministries of Defence and Interior, Counter-Terrorism Service and Popular Mobilization AuthorityTheir original mandates remain in force; their intelligence activities are subject to this Law's common safeguards.
National Intelligence Council / National Security AdvisoryPlaces the existing coordination arrangement on a statutory basis, defines its limits and prevents it from becoming an independent arrest or covert collection service.
Council of RepresentativesCreates a specialized oversight channel within it to fulfil Article (84) while protecting classified information.
Supreme Judicial Council and Public ProsecutionKeeps judicial oversight, criminal investigations and authorizations within existing judicial institutions.
Federal Board of Supreme Audit and Federal Commission of IntegrityCreates no substitute for either institution, but affirms their access to classified spending and financial investigations under confidentiality safeguards.

VII — Transitional Provisions and Implementation Requirements

First Three Months: Identify all federal bodies and units conducting intelligence activity, designate contact points and establish a classified file with the parliamentary committee.

Within Six Months: Adopt the mandates register, responsibility allocation matrix, classification and exchange standards, incident-reporting template and secure exchange platform controls.

Within One Year: Review founding legislation and instructions, activate the parliamentary technical support office and audit trails, and complete alignment of foreign cooperation and classified expenditure.

Phased implementation is preferable because the law's main value lies in procedural discipline, record quality and inter-institutional trust, rather than immediate large-scale restructuring that could create a security vacuum.

VIII — Financial and Implementation Impact

Expected financial impact is limited to moderate because the proposal relies on existing institutions and creates no new security service. Main costs are the Council of Representatives' technical support office, development of access and audit logs, secure inter-institutional connectivity, joint training and strengthened compliance units.

Insufficient public data exist to calculate precise costs for connectivity platforms, numbers of cleared users or each service's current infrastructure. The proposal therefore requires a technical and financial inventory before allocation, prioritizing reuse of existing infrastructure and consolidation of duplicate systems.

IX — Relevant International Comparison

ModelElement Useful to IraqWhat Is Not Copied Verbatim
Canada — NSIRAIntegrated review of security and intelligence activities across several institutions rather than fragmented oversight within each service.Creation of an entirely new federal agency; the Iraqi proposal uses existing institutions to reduce cost and overlap.
United Kingdom — Intelligence and Security CommitteeA small parliamentary committee dealing with policy, administration, expenditure and some operational matters under strict confidentiality.The British appointment system; the proposal preserves Iraq's parliamentary character and proportional representation.
North Macedonia — Law on Coordination of the Security and Intelligence CommunityA separate law devoted to coordination and role definition among multiple services.That system's specific executive structure; Iraq already has an existing National Intelligence Council.
DCAF / Venice CommissionMultilayered oversight, lawful information access, proportionality and the principle that secrecy is no substitute for accountability.No single model suits every country; Iraqi drafting is based on the Constitution and national institutions.

X — Compliance and Oversight Indicators

The law's effectiveness is measured through institutional indicators, not the number of covert operations. Key indicators are: completeness of the mandates register; reduction in cases with disputed leadership; transmission time for joint warnings; proportion of access logs audited; handling of serious incidents within deadlines; implementation of parliamentary and audit-board recommendations; review of data retention periods; complaints closed through a lawful process; and the proportion of recommendations from failure reviews actually implemented.

XI — Sources and References

  1. Iraqi Constitution — Iraqi Council of Representatives — https://iq.parliament.iq/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A/
    Articles 9 and 84 affirm civilian leadership, legislative oversight and operation of services under the law and human rights principles, and define the National Intelligence Service's constitutional function.
  2. Council of Representatives Laws Database — National Security Service Law and National Intelligence Service Law — https://iq.parliament.iq/law/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86/
    The database documents the Council's votes on the National Security Service Law on 9 May 2024 and the National Intelligence Service Law on 19 January 2025, showing the need for a common oversight and coordination framework beyond each service's founding law.
  3. Iraqi National Intelligence Service — Official Profile — https://www.inis.gov.iq/National-Intelligence-Service.html
    Describes the Service's remit, national security protection mandate and the principles of rights and freedoms underlying its establishment.
  4. Council of Representatives — Decisions of the Session of 6 July 2026 — https://iq.parliament.iq/blog/%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A9-1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AB%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-6-%D8%AA/
    Documents the sixth parliamentary term's continued consideration of the National Security Service and intelligence service within shared legislative and security work.
  5. Implementation Plan for Iraq's “Iraq First” National Security Strategy 2025–2030 — Published Copy Bearing the National Security Advisory Letterhead — https://law.uodiyala.edu.iq/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-12-5-2025.pdf
    Includes intelligence sector reform and central monitoring, and names the National Intelligence Council Secretariat, intelligence service, National Security Service and supporting bodies.
  6. National Intelligence Council — Session of 1 March 2026 — https://ninanews.com/website/News/Details?key=1283420
    Documents the Council's continued operation as a functioning framework bringing together intelligence community leaders under the National Security Adviser's chairmanship.
  7. DCAF — Overseeing Intelligence Services: A Toolkit — https://www.dcaf.ch/overseeing-intelligence-services-toolkit
    A comparative reference for designing parliamentary, expert, judicial and financial oversight of intelligence services while preserving effectiveness and confidentiality.
  8. DCAF — The Role of Parliaments in Overseeing Intelligence Tasking — https://www.dcaf.ch/role-parliaments-overseeing-intelligence-tasking
    Distinguishes intelligence priority-setting as an executive responsibility from Parliament's oversight of the process, resources and compliance.
  9. Venice Commission — Democratic Oversight of Security and Intelligence Services — https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD%282015%29006-e
    An international reference for legality, multiple levels of oversight and protection of rights in covert activities.
  10. Canada — National Security and Intelligence Review Agency — https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/en/about-nsira/what-we-do/
    A model for integrated review across multiple bodies rather than confining oversight to one service.
  11. United Kingdom — Justice and Security Act 2013 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/contents
    A model of a specialized parliamentary committee reviewing expenditure, administration, policy and some operational matters under confidentiality arrangements.
  12. DCAF — Law on Coordination of the Security and Intelligence Community in North Macedonia — https://www.dcaf.ch/implementation-law-nsa-and-law-coordination-security-and-intelligence-community-republic-north
    A comparative example of a separate law coordinating a multi-institutional intelligence community, illustrating the need for precise allocation of mandates.

POL-26 · Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Security, Defence and Sovereignty

What are you looking for?

Search content published on the website.