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This is a proposal for discussion, not an enacted law.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Legislative Proposal · Security, Defence and Sovereignty

Military Judiciary and Justice Bill

Reconstituting military justice as a specialized jurisdiction within the federal judiciary, rather than an extension of the chain of command, with jurisdiction limited to offences of a military nature and arrest, detention, investigation, trial, appeal and enforcement subject to unified judicial safeguards.

Document number
POL-27
Version
1.0
Publication / last updated
7 October 2026
Scope
Republic of Iraq — Federal

Executive Summary

Article (99) of the Iraqi Constitution provides that military justice shall be regulated by law and that military courts shall be limited to offences of a military nature committed by members of the armed and security forces. The Constitution also guarantees judicial independence, defence rights and public trials, prohibits detention or investigation without a judicial decision, and bans special or exceptional courts. This proposal brings these rules together in a single system making military justice a specialized jurisdiction within the federal judiciary, while military command remains responsible for discipline and administration rather than adjudication.

The current framework rests on Military Penal Code No. (19) of 2007, as amended, and Military Criminal Procedure Code No. (22) of 2016, published in Iraqi Official Gazette issue (4444) on 24 April 2017. The existing system gives military courts broad jurisdiction over certain ordinary offences and relies on legally qualified officers and executive procedural intervention. The proposal therefore transfers investigation, trial and appeal to specialized federal judges, removes any executive veto over arrest or referral orders, and confines military justice to military offences in the Constitution's narrow sense.

The proposal does not eliminate the need for a Military Penal Code or turn disciplinary violations into crimes. It separates three pathways: administrative discipline for minor matters,military justice for purely military offences, andordinary criminal justice for ordinary offences, offences against civilians and serious crimes that should remain within the ordinary courts' general jurisdiction.

II — Legislative Gap and Proposed Policy

Gaps Addressed by the Proposal
IssueSituation Requiring ReformLegislative Solution
Judicial independenceTraditional military court composition relies on legally qualified officers within the military executive system.Specialized federal judges under the Supreme Judicial Council, outside the chain of command.
Scope of jurisdictionCurrent law permits military jurisdiction over certain ordinary offences merely because of the accused's status and the absence of a private right.Restricting jurisdiction to purely military offences under Article (99) of the Constitution.
Arrest and referralExecutive restrictions exist on enforcement of certain arrest warrants or referral of service members to court.Removing the executive veto, with a narrow alternative allowing operational postponement of enforcement by judicial decision.
Summary trialsConflation of disciplinary authority and criminal punishment.Limiting command to non-custodial administrative sanctions, with every deprivation of liberty requiring a judicial decision.
Classified informationThe need to protect secrets may conflict with defence rights.Protective orders, redaction and substitute summaries, while prohibiting decisive conviction on unchallengeable secret evidence.
AppealA military court of cassation separate from the general federal judiciary.A specialized military panel within the Federal Court of Cassation to unify judicial principles.

The proposal adopts an institutional model acknowledging military life's distinctive features while separating judicial and command functions. A commander needs swift disciplinary authority, not power to issue criminal judgments. A judge needs a deep understanding of military operations, not military rank or subordination to a ministry. This separation is the essence of balancing effectiveness and discipline with independence and rights.

IV — Statement of Reasons

To implement Article (99) of the Constitution requiring military justice to be regulated and military courts' jurisdiction confined to offences of a military nature; ensure judicial independence and prevent executive interference in justice; unify fair trial and defence safeguards and prevent torture and non-judicial detention; separate military command's disciplinary authority from investigation and adjudication; establish a judicial appeal route within the federal judiciary; and modernize treatment of digital evidence and classified information and protection of witnesses and victims, this Law has been enacted.

V — Explanatory Memorandum

1. Why Transfer Military Justice to the Judiciary?

The Constitution does not exempt military justice from judicial independence. It provides for it after provisions affirming judicial independence and prohibiting special courts. The proposal therefore makes military justice a judicial specialization within the federal system. Military knowledge can be supplied through training and technical expertise; independence cannot be secured if a judge is subject to the authority to which the accused belongs or which controls the judge's promotion and transfer.

2. Why Narrow Jurisdiction?

Article (99) does not place “every offence committed by a service member” within military jurisdiction; it requires the offence to be “of a military nature”. Jurisdiction over ordinary killing, attacks on civilians, corruption, torture, terrorism and other ordinary offences therefore shifts to ordinary courts, while desertion, military disobedience, breach of duty and unit and operational security remain within military justice.

3. Discipline Is Not Criminal Adjudication

The army needs a rapid mechanism for lateness, non-compliance and everyday violations. Speed, however, does not justify turning a commander into a criminal judge. The proposal therefore permits non-custodial disciplinary sanctions and reserves confinement, detention and criminal conviction to the judiciary.

4. Arrest Warrants and the Chain of Command

Judicial independence is incompatible with giving an executive body power to obstruct a judicial arrest warrant. An exceptional operational situation may nevertheless arise where immediately arresting a field commander during ongoing combat directly endangers soldiers and civilians. The proposal addresses this through a very short postponement request decided by the judge, not the commander, under conditions preventing operational necessity from becoming immunity.

5. Military Secrecy and Defence Rights

Military cases may involve operational plans, intelligence sources or sensitive capabilities. Protecting this information is legitimate, but the court must balance security necessity and justice. The proposal adopts alternatives such as closed hearings, redaction, secure summaries and counsel security clearance, with a decisive rule: no conviction resting substantially on evidence whose essential content the defence cannot know and challenge.

6. Relationship with the Military Penal Code

This Law is primarily procedural and institutional. Military Penal Code No. (19) of 2007, as amended, remains in force pending review, but its procedural references are interpreted under the new judicial structure. The proposal requires legislative review within one year to distinguish offences from disciplinary violations and update provisions inconsistent with the Constitution or modern armed forces.

VI — Alignment with Existing Legislation and Institutions

ReferenceProposed Effect
Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005Direct implementation of Articles (99) and (19), linking military justice to judicial independence.
Military Criminal Procedure Code No. (22) of 2016Repeal and replacement after a transition not exceeding 180 days.
Military Penal Code No. (19) of 2007, as amendedRemains in force for offences and penalties, with procedural references to this Law and subsequent legislative review within one year.
Supreme Judicial Council Law No. (45) of 2017Activates the Council's mandate to administer federal justice through a specialized military justice department.
Public Prosecution Law No. (49) of 2017Creates a military prosecution specialization within the existing service, not a prosecution body subordinate to the Ministry of Defence.
Criminal Procedure Code No. (23) of 1971, as amendedSupplementary authority for procedures and safeguards where no provision exists.
Internal Security Forces LawsNot automatically repealed; interfaces and jurisdictional conflicts reviewed within one year to ensure consistency with Article (99).
Laws Governing the Counter-Terrorism Service, Popular Mobilization Authority and Other BodiesTheir military personnel are subject to this Law insofar as their governing laws subject them to military laws.

VII — Transitional Provisions and Implementation Requirements

From Publication to 90 Days: The Supreme Judicial Council issues an establishment plan, identifies courts, premises, judges, prosecutors and technical and security needs, and begins personnel training.

From 90 to 180 Days: New courts gradually begin receiving cases; files, records and evidence transfer under official records; and former bodies cease opening new cases once the competent court becomes operational.

By Day 180 at the Latest: Military Criminal Procedure Code No. (22) of 2016 is repealed and all judicial functions transfer to the federal judiciary.

Within One Year: A comprehensive review is submitted of the Military Penal Code and its interfaces with laws governing internal security forces and other military formations.

Transition does not require discarding existing legal expertise in the Ministry of Defence. Current legally qualified officers and investigators are valuable resources for technical investigation, advice and judicial service where appointment requirements are met. Judicial status itself, however, must originate in the judicial system, not rank.

VIII — Financial and Implementation Impact

Expected financial impact is moderate and transitional. The proposal creates no new independent judicial authority outside State institutions; it adds a specialization to the Supreme Judicial Council, Federal Court of Cassation and Public Prosecution. Costs centre on appointing or assigning judges and staff, training investigators, creating a secure case-management system, preparing courtrooms for classified information and transferring archives and records.

Existing military court premises and security infrastructure can be reused after judicial administration is separated from the Ministry of Defence. Public data on case numbers, staff and premises are insufficient for a reliable financial figure. A joint inventory by the Supreme Judicial Council and Ministry of Defence is therefore required before the transitional budget is allocated.

IX — Relevant International Comparison

Model / StandardUseful elementApplication in the Proposal
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights — Article 14 and General Comment No. 32Fair trial safeguards apply to ordinary, specialized and military courts; military character does not justify reducing them.Full application of defence, publicity, independence and confrontation safeguards to military justice.
Canada — National Defence ActMilitary judges exercising independent judicial functions, public trials and functionally independent military prosecution.Separation of judicial and prosecutorial functions from the chain of command, with a clear military specialization.
United Kingdom — Armed Forces Act 2006The military court is presided over by an independent legally qualified judge, with a judicial appeal structure separate from operational command.Specialized federal judges and appeals before the Federal Court of Cassation.
Iraqi Constitutional PrincipleArticle (99) limits military justice to offences of a military nature.Making the nature of the offence, not the accused's status alone, the jurisdictional criterion.

X — Compliance and Oversight Indicators

The law's effectiveness is measured through auditable judicial indicators: the proportion of cases referred to ordinary courts for lack of military character; average time before an arrested person is brought before a judge; average pre-trial detention; proportion of accused persons with counsel from first questioning; appeal numbers and reversal rates; ill-treatment complaints and outcomes; case-disposal times; decisions involving classified information and protective measures used; and cases of operational delay in executing arrest warrants, their reasons and judicial review outcomes.

XI — Sources and References

  1. Constitution of the Republic of Iraq — Iraqi Council of Representatives — Official source
    Articles (19), (37) and (87)–(100), particularly Article (99) on military justice.
  2. Ministry of Justice — Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 4444, 24/4/2017 — Source
    Documents publication of Military Criminal Procedure Code No. (22) of 2016.
  3. Ministry of Justice — Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 4238 — Source
    Documents First Amendment Law No. (36) of 2012 to Military Penal Code No. (19) of 2007.
  4. Federal Court of Cassation — Decision 1189/Expanded Criminal Panel/2024 — Source
    A recent decision on military jurisdiction under Article (4) of the current Military Criminal Procedure Code.
  5. Supreme Judicial Council — Judicial Institute: Legal Procedures Concerning Security Service Personnel — Source
    Explains application of Law No. (22) of 2016 and restrictions on execution of arrest and referral orders concerning service members.
  6. Ministry of Justice — Supreme Judicial Council Law No. (45) of 2017 — Source
    An institutional reference for administration of federal judicial affairs.
  7. Ministry of Justice — Public Prosecution Law No. (49) of 2017 — Source
    A reference for organization of the Public Prosecution within the judiciary.
  8. United Nations — Iraq's Common Core Document HRI/CORE/IRQ/2025 — Source
    Lists Military Criminal Procedure Code No. (22) of 2016 among Iraqi legislation in force reported internationally.
  9. United Nations — Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights — Source
    Documents Iraq's ratification of the Covenant on 23 March 1976.
  10. Human Rights Committee — General Comment No. 32 on Article 14 — Source
    Establishes that Article 14 safeguards apply to ordinary, specialized and military courts.
  11. Canada — National Defence Act — Source
    A comparative reference for independence of military judges and prosecution, public trials and appeals.
  12. United Kingdom — Armed Forces Act 2006 — Source
    A comparative reference for a military court led by a legally qualified judge and a service justice system separate from operational command.

POL-27 · Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Security, Defence and Sovereignty

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