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POL-28

This is a proposal for discussion, not an enacted law.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · Legislative Proposal · Security, Defence and Sovereignty

Defence Procurement, Contracts and Military Expenditure Integrity Bill

Subjecting the entire defence acquisition cycle—from identifying need to acceptance, maintenance and disposal—to special rules combining military readiness and security of supply with competition, integrity and audit, and preventing secrecy, urgency or intermediaries from becoming routes around accountability.

Document number
POL-28
Version
1.0
Publication / last updated
7 October 2026
Scope
Republic of Iraq — Federal

Executive Summary

Iraq has a modern general government contracting framework: Public Contracts Implementation Instructions No. (1) of 2025 were published in Iraqi Official Gazette issue (4849) on 17 November 2025 and came into application on 15 February 2026, replacing the 2014 instructions. The Ministry of Planning also publishes a specialized standard document for supplying arms, military equipment and materials. The problem is therefore not a complete absence of contracting rules, but the lack of an integrated defence law regulating the distinctive military acquisition cycle, secrecy, single-source procurement, government-to-government contracts, security of supply, intermediaries, whole-life costs and oversight of major programmes.

The proposal therefore neither creates a parallel public contracting system nor exempts the Ministry of Defence from general rules. It gives the special law precedence over instructions in specialized defence matters while retaining public contracts instructions and standard documents as supplementary references. It also affirms the right of the Federal Board of Supreme Audit, Federal Commission of Integrity, judiciary and competent parliamentary committees to access classified contracts under security arrangements: secrecy protects military information, not financial decisions from audit.

The proposal focuses on linking procurement to a demonstrated military need and an affordable life-cycle cost. It separates requirement-setting from supplier selection, requires disclosure of beneficial owners, intermediaries, commissions and conflicts of interest, and establishes special controls for single-source procurement, urgent purchases, international government-to-government contracts and subsequent contract variations. It also regulates local content and military manufacturing on the basis of quality and feasibility rather than nominal protection, and provides a secure avenue for challenges and parliamentary oversight without revealing sensitive capabilities.

II — Legislative Gap and Proposed Policy

General rules on competition, evaluation and guarantees are necessary, but do not alone answer defence-specific questions: who establishes the need before a system is selected? How are twenty-year operating costs calculated? When is a sole supplier genuinely the only source? How is an international government-to-government deal overseen? How are intermediaries and commissions disclosed? What remains secret and what can be published? How does the audit board examine a classified contract? How are post-award variations prevented from becoming a new contract without competition?

The selected legislative policy is a special law supplementing, rather than replacing, the public contracts system. Competition, standard documents and Ministry of Planning instructions remain the default, while the law adds a binding defence layer covering multiyear planning, segregation of duties, whole-life costs, security of supply, single-source procurement, international government-to-government contracts, integrity and intermediaries, classified oversight and contract management through the end of the life cycle.

IV — Statement of Reasons

To establish an integrated legislative basis for defence procurement linking expenditure to actual military need, whole-life cost and sustainability; ensure competition wherever possible and control single-source procurement, international government-to-government contracts and urgent purchasing; prevent conflicts of interest, hidden commissions, collusion and concealed beneficial ownership; subject classified contracts to financial, integrity, parliamentary and judicial oversight while protecting sensitive information; develop national industry and security of supply according to quality and feasibility; and unify contract life-cycle management from planning through acceptance, maintenance and disposal, this Law has been enacted.

V — Explanatory Memorandum

1. Why a Special Law alongside Public Contracts Instructions?

General Instructions No. (1) of 2025 provide the modern operating framework for government contracting, and the Ministry of Planning has a standard document for arms and military equipment. Contract classification, international government-to-government contracting, security of supply, systems' whole-life costs, classified information and parliamentary oversight, however, generally exceed the scope of standard documents and require a stable legislative foundation not changed by administrative circular.

2. Separating Need from the Purchasing Decision

One of defence acquisition's greatest risks is starting with a known product and shaping the requirement around it. The law reverses this sequence: capability gap first, then alternatives, cost and sustainability, followed by procurement method. This separation improves quality and limits supplier and intermediary influence while needs are being defined.

3. Controlled Secrecy

Protection of operational plans, stocks, sensing and communications capabilities and locations is legitimate and necessary. Financial value, contractor identity, procedural integrity, commissions, payments and variations, however, must be auditable even where they cannot be published. The proposal therefore distinguishes the public's right to disclosure fromthe right of authorized State institutions to access information.

4. Single-Source and Government-to-Government Contracting

The proposal does not prohibit either method because the arms market does not always operate like an open civilian market. It requires a needs memorandum, alternatives comparison, testable pricing and a decision record, and prevents generic references to “secrecy” or a “strategic relationship” from alone justifying elimination of competition or price verification.

5. Whole-Life Cost and the Life Cycle

The cheapest system to buy may be the most expensive to operate because of ammunition, spare parts, training or support contracts. The law therefore requires life-cycle costing for suitable projects and links acquisition to maintenance, financing and operating plans. The aim is not higher spending, but fewer purchases that cannot be kept ready for use.

6. National Industry without Nominal Protection

The proposal recognizes the Military Industrialization Authority Law and the importance of reducing external dependence, but does not make “local” an exemption from testing, price or reliability. Preference is for genuine production, knowledge transfer and maintenance and development capacity, not mere assembly or registration of an agent in Iraq.

7. Integrity and Intermediaries

International defence contracts may use agents, advisers and local representatives for legitimate legal or commercial reasons. Risk arises where their identities, fees or beneficial owners are concealed. The law therefore does not prohibit intermediation itself, but makes disclosure of role, commission and beneficial ownership a contracting condition.

8. Practical Parliamentary Oversight

Parliamentary oversight does not require publishing military specifications. The proposed model is a public report on trends and indicators and a classified parliamentary annex on major programmes, exceptions and variations. Secrecy thus ceases to justify removal of oversight, while oversight does not expose defence capabilities.

VI — Alignment with Existing Legislation and Institutions

Existing ReferenceRelationship to the Bill
Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005Provides the basis for State authority over the armed forces and public funds, parliamentary oversight and federal powers; the proposal applies these principles to defence contracting.
Public Contracts Implementation Instructions No. (1) of 2025Remain a general and supplementary reference. The proposal is a special law for defence matters and requires the military standard document to be updated accordingly.
Standard Document for Supply of Arms, Military Equipment and Materials — Ministry of PlanningRemains an implementing tool and tender document, updated to incorporate the law's safeguards.
Military Industrialization Authority Law No. (25) of 2019Not repealed; the proposal connects domestic procurement to the Authority and national industry, subject to quality, cost and security-of-supply tests.
Commission of Integrity and Illicit Gain Law No. (30) of 2011, as amendedThe Commission retains jurisdiction over suspected corruption; the proposal guarantees secure access to classified files.
Federal Board of Supreme Audit Law No. (31) of 2011The proposal does not diminish the Board's powers; it expressly requires an audit-access pathway for classified contracts.
United Nations Convention against CorruptionIraq has been a party since 17 March 2008; the Convention supports the proposal's principles of integrity, public procurement, transparency and accountability.

VII — Transitional Provisions and Implementation Requirements

Within 90 days: Inventory acquisition projects and open classified contracts, designate compliance and central-register officers, and issue disclosure forms for conflicts of interest, beneficial owners and intermediaries.

Within 180 days: Issue implementing instructions, update the military standard document, launch secure-access protocols for oversight bodies and link new contracts to a digital register with an audit trail.

Within One Year: Complete the supplier-performance database, apply whole-life costing to major acquisition projects and submit the first public and classified annual report to the Council of Representatives.

Implementation requires neither a new independent authority nor an off-budget fund. The proposal's institutional approach strengthens specialization in existing bodies, separates duties and connects the Ministry of Defence with Planning, Finance, the audit board, the Integrity Commission and Parliament under secure information-access rules.

VIII — Financial and Implementation Impact

Expected direct financial impact is limited to moderate because it relies on existing institutions and creates no independent federal agency. Costs centre on a secure digital register, training, price and life-cycle analysis tools, facilities and procedures for auditing classified information, and integration of financial and contractual data.

The larger financial effect is expected to be preventive: fewer acquisitions of systems that cannot be operated or maintained; reduced uncontrolled variations, hidden commissions and unjustified direct contracting; and better negotiation of support and spare-parts contracts. No savings figure is stated because current public data do not support a reliable calculation.

IX — Relevant International Comparison

Standard / ModelUseful elementReflection in the Proposal
United Nations Convention against Corruption — Article 9 and Other ProvisionsTransparency, competition, objective criteria and oversight in public procurement, with anti-corruption measures.Disclosure of interests, beneficial ownership and intermediaries; documentation, audit and challenges.
European Union — Directive 2009/81/EC on Defence and Security ProcurementDefence-specific procedures preserving competition and controlling information security, security of supply and exceptions.Restricted tendering, competitive negotiation, classification safeguards, security of supply and reasoned single-source procurement.
NATO Building IntegrityAddressing corruption risks throughout the acquisition cycle, not only at signature, with functional separation and risk analysis.Oversight beginning with the needs and cost document and continuing through evaluation, implementation, variations and acceptance.
Arms Trade Treaty ATT — An International Standard Not Currently Binding on IraqEnd use and prevention of illicit diversion in conventional arms trade.End-use certificates and shipment and diversion tracing incorporated as domestic national-interest safeguards without claiming a treaty obligation.

X — Compliance and Oversight Indicators

Effectiveness is measured through auditable indicators, notably: the share of contract value competitively procured; the proportion and reasons for single-source contracts; average acquisition-cycle duration; the proportion of programmes using life-cycle costing; post-award variation value as a percentage of original value; on-time delivery rate; non-conformity rate; volume of domestic contracts with genuine industrial content; conflict-of-interest disclosures; suppliers disclosing beneficial owners and intermediaries; challenges and their outcomes; and amounts recovered or corrected following financial audit findings.

These indicators assess expenditure and procedural integrity, not publicly rank military capabilities. The annual report must distinguish publishable indicators from those retained in the classified annex.

XI — Sources and References

  1. Constitution of the Republic of Iraq — Iraqi Council of Representatives — Official source.
  2. Ministry of Justice — Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 4849, 17/11/2025 — Announcement of publication of Public Contracts Implementation Instructions No. (1) of 2025.
  3. Ministry of Planning — Public Contracts Implementation Instructions No. (1) of 2025 and Supplementary Rules — Official letter and compilation. The Ministry's letter states that application began on 15/2/2026 and the 2014 instructions were repealed upon entry into force.
  4. Ministry of Planning — Standard Document for Supply of Arms, Military Equipment and Materials — Official document page.
  5. Ministry of Planning — General Government Contracts Department and Standard Documents — Source.
  6. Ministry of Justice — Military Industrialization Authority Law No. (25) of 2019 — Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 4561.
  7. Ministry of Justice — Integrity and Illicit Enrichment Law No. (30) of 2011, as amended — Official source.
  8. Ministry of Justice — Federal Board of Supreme Audit Law No. (31) of 2011, as amended — Official source.
  9. United Nations Treaty Collection — United Nations Convention against Corruption — Iraq's accession on 17/3/2008.
  10. European Union — Directive 2009/81/EC on defence and security procurement — EUR-Lex.
  11. NATO — Building Integrity Compendium, Defence Procurement — Source.
  12. Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat — Treaty Status — Official participation status. Used only to establish Iraq's status, without treating the treaty provisions as binding on it.

Ali Zuweid's Political Programme · POL-28 · 7 October 2026

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