Economic Diplomacy

Chapter profile

Table (1): Chapter profile

The preceding chapter, V4-D09-C02, established that independent foreign-policy decisions do not mean isolation, and that multiple relationships become a strategic asset when competent Iraqi institutions organise them and measure their benefits and costs. This chapter moves from “how do we cooperate without dependence?” to “how do we use cooperation to generate a job, opportunity, contract or export?” It does not reopen neutrality, alliances or rules of recognition and representation, but uses the previous chapter’s conclusions as the legal and operational foundation for turning political channels into practical economic interests.

The chapter aligns with the vision’s standards for productive investment, repeat exports, fiscal discipline and traceable government outcomes. These boundaries prevent a commercial attaché’s success being declared merely because a memorandum was signed, or the value of a project delivered by another ministry being attributed to the attaché without evidence of contribution.

1. Contents and governing decisions

Chapter profile; executive summary; concepts and boundaries; Constitution and institutions; baseline and numerical quality; diagnosis and causes; mission services; productive investment; market opening; agreements; World Trade Organization; case studies; geography and sectors; SMEs and diaspora; integrity and risks; comparative model; scenarios; theory of change; the 2030–2045 ladder; indicators; programmes; implementation and financing; review; gap register; references.

2. Executive summary

Economic diplomacy is part of the state’s ability to turn external relations into value inside Iraq: an enterprise begins production; an exporter reaches a buyer and supplies repeatedly; a company absorbs technology or financing on known terms; an agreement reduces a defined trade barrier; or a dispute file resolves a problem that caused a shipment to be lost or a project delayed. Success is measured not by ambassadors, visits and forums, but by documented outputs in a causal chain beginning with information and ending in an outcome confirmed by the investor, exporter and regulator.

The economic baseline shows the scale of transformation required. In 2024, total Iraqi exports were approximately USD 105.079 billion according to the official report. Of this, USD 95.025 billion was crude oil and USD 5.579 billion petroleum products. Another category of roughly USD 4.475 billion was not fully diversified: 77.2% of that category itself consisted of fuels, mineral oils and related products.¹ Promoting “USD 4.5 billion in non-oil exports” without separating hydrocarbons therefore reproduces a misleading picture of diversification. Success requires a file for each product, firm, buyer, standard, payment risk and border requirement.

For investment, UNCTAD’s country fact sheet published with the World Investment Report 2025 records negative net inward foreign direct investment of USD 7.458 billion for 2024.² A negative figure does not mean “there are no projects”. Intercompany financing repayments and transfers of capital, earnings and ownership can affect the net balance-of-payments figure. In September 2025, the International Finance Corporation announced prospective partnerships and investments of approximately one billion dollars. Such announcements and partnerships differ methodologically from recorded flows or the value of assets entering service.³ The chapter therefore proposes a unified national classification of investment stages: initial interest → qualification review → binding agreement → financial close → actual capital expenditure → commercial operation.

Iraq does not lack external economic institutions. The Ministry of Trade has a Department of Foreign Economic Relations and commercial attachés, alongside the Iraq International Trade Point, which publishes opportunities and exhibitions and provides information support. The Iraqi Embassy in Washington describes the commercial attaché’s role in expanding trade and facilitating direct investment.⁴ There is also a National Investment Commission, a one-stop shop and governorate investment commissions. Creating a “ministry of economic diplomacy” would therefore probably be costly duplication. The priorities are to assign responsibilities, standardise working rules, enable information exchange, and establish administrative escalation, service-time and accountability mechanisms.

Initial practical priorities are a functional coordination unit within existing structures, pilot “market desks” in demonstrably worthwhile missions, a timestamped opportunity and project register, usable market profiles, one investor and exporter request gateway, training for attachés in partner and contract quality assessment, and links between trade negotiations, standards, customs, payments and firms. Success is reviewed annually and effort redirected towards markets and sectors producing real conversion, rather than locations recording the most meetings.

The 2045 horizon does not rely on an investment or export total hypothetically attributed to Foreign Affairs. The desired outcome is a professional external economic institution with selective, high-quality coverage, improving Iraqi firms’ market access and helping competent bodies turn investor interest into productive projects, with an attribution standard that prevents celebration of achievements that would have occurred without its involvement.

Figure (1): Economic diplomacy’s real value chain; each stage requires independent evidence of transition.

3. Scope and definitions: what does economic diplomacy do?

Operational definition: economic diplomacy uses Iraqi political, commercial and investment institutions abroad, within their legal mandates, to reduce the cost of reaching information, partners, markets and finance; resolve cross-border barriers; and safeguard trade and investment cooperation terms, increasing verifiable economic opportunities inside Iraq. An embassy does not become a licensing authority or broker, and an attaché does not become a contractor, guarantor or shareholder in a deal.

Distinguishing functions matters in a country moving from large oil and consumer demand towards an exporting economy. Promotion introduces an opportunity to the market. Business development converts it into a qualified file handled by the competent parties. Government trade negotiation differs from two companies negotiating a private contract. Trade facilitation concerns rules, documents, time and crossings, while export finance is a decision of a regulated financial institution. A referral system is therefore built, not a monopoly over dealings.

Table (2): Measurement glossary | Proposed policy definitions, not pre-existing statistical data.

4. Constitutional and legal foundations and the responsibility map

Iraq’s Constitution places foreign-policy formulation, diplomatic representation and the negotiation, signature and ratification of international treaties and agreements through constitutional channels within federal powers. It also provides for modernising and diversifying the economy and encouraging the private sector and investment. External economic powers must be read within this framework, not as transferring management of every deal to Foreign Affairs. Treaty-Making Law No. 35 of 2015 governs treaty-related procedures. Each document’s binding nature must be assessed before describing it as an “agreement” with fiscal or arbitral effects.⁵

Ministry of Trade Law No. 37 of 2011 includes formulating domestic and external trade policy and supporting foreign economic relations among its purposes. The relevant department describes its responsibilities for agreements, committees and commercial attachés. Investment Law No. 13 of 2006, as amended, and its commissions and one-stop shop regulate aspects of licensing and incentives within their mandates, while governorates and regions exercise their lawful powers. Foreign Affairs represents the state and coordinates diplomacy, while executive investment decisions remain with the responsible bodies. Any file requiring authorisation, a government guarantee or a financial commitment goes to the competent authorities before an external promise is made.⁶

Table (3): Responsibilities | A proposed functional distribution grounded in law and the constitutional framework, without implicitly amending them.

5. Iraq’s baseline: the external economy as the evidence permits us to establish it

Before setting attaché targets, three kinds of data must be separated: (a) actually published national economic activity data; (b) information on existing institutions and instruments; and (c) mission contributions to company outcomes, for which no consistent, verifiable public annual register was available at the chapter’s date. Numerical fields on a government website do not establish a “success rate” until period, coverage, definition, denominator and verification source are specified.

Oil-export dependence creates a shared investment, promotion and trade problem: not every export increase is diversification. The statistical authority’s 2024 report records USD 4.475 billion in other merchandise exports under its methodology, but fuels and mineral oils account for a large share. The report excludes Kurdistan Region exports and therefore cannot serve as an all-encompassing national index of goods and services without reconciling regional and federal data, customs definitions and balance-of-payments concepts.⁷

Some bodies announce large cumulative values for investment licences or projects, while international sources report negative net FDI. Averaging the figures does not resolve the apparent conflict: one may represent a stock of licences, pledges or announced total costs, and the other a balance-of-payments flow governed by different rules. Institutional investment also requires distinguishing IFC’s announced intentions or partnerships from disbursements and completed project values, even when foreign institutions have strong reputations.⁸

Table (4): Comparative baselines | 2024–2026, from the statistical authority, UNCTAD and IFC; definitions and years differ.

6. Root-cause diagnosis: why does a relationship fail to become a productive deal?

The gap is not a “shortage of conferences” or an absolute lack of foreign-company interest, but the absence of a decision-ready economic file. An attaché may obtain the name of an interested company yet be unable to provide land with settled title, verified electricity capacity, exchange and settlement risk information or a predictable licensing timeframe. Conversely, an Iraqi producer may have domestic demand but lack conformity testing for a foreign market, payment security or contract-language capability. Contact loses its value at that point unless connected to sectoral procedures.

The second bottleneck is informational. A separate embassy system cannot suffice if the National Investment Commission, trade departments, crossings, customs and banks use inconsistent project, market and company codes. Without one opportunity identifier, the same deal can be counted as an achievement by three missions and two implementing bodies, or follow-up can be lost among them. The solution is not an unlawful giant database, but a limited-data case register with access rights and an audit trail.

The third bottleneck concerns employee incentives. Rewarding meetings and memoranda produces more meetings, even without economic value. Penalising staff for a project delayed by the Ministry of Electricity or a foreign court encourages easy requests rather than high-impact economic needs. Responsibility must be attributable: embassy contributions are measured through qualification, referral and follow-up speed and removal of diplomatic obstacles. Contracts, spending and operation are shared-impact measures for the relevant bodies.

The fourth bottleneck is confusing market priority with market size. A country importing heavily from Iraq today is not automatically the best destination for new products. A smaller market may be better when certification is accepted, purchasing patterns fit and transport costs are low. Every mission needs a market portfolio based on competitiveness, not political standing or diaspora size alone.

Figure (2): A common chain of waste—many activities without passing decision gates.

7. Embassy and attaché: from protocol to a standards-based market service

An “economic embassy” does not turn every diplomat into a marketer or every consular employee into a business intermediary. The chapter proposes four assignable, trainable functions: lawful open-source market intelligence; professional networks with buyers, investors and regulators; handling access barriers and agreements through government channels; and feedback to Iraqi decision-makers. Every file must have one owner, a deadline and a defined response type, with an appeal route for delayed referrals or discrimination between firms.

The attaché maintains an industry- and product-specific “market profile”: HS or service classification, demand scale and patterns, registration and conformity requirements, verified applied or preferential tariffs, origin procedures, an importer list governed by privacy and consent, collection and shipping channels, practical complaints from Iraqi exporters, and sourced indicative prices rather than profit promises. The political mission facilitates escalation where official intervention with the host authority is needed, without granting a firm an exclusive advantage because of its proximity to officials.

Mission evaluation has three layers: service—response time, file completeness and information quality; the opportunity pipeline—conversion from enquiries to qualified interest and correct referral; and jointly attributed outcomes—documented executive decisions, removed barriers, repeat deals or projects entering service. The outcome layer never justifies dishonesty or announcing unrealised sums. An annual beneficiary sample checks equitable access for SMEs and governorates, rather than only well-connected suppliers.

Figure (3): The exporter’s journey with the attaché; each step has a success standard distinct from the next.

8. Attracting investment: from forum figures to an operating enterprise

A sound investment campaign starts inside Iraq, not abroad. What activity can a location accommodate? Is land ready, and are energy, logistics, services, labour and licences available? The sectoral body and competent commission prepare an “appraisable project memorandum” with technical, rights and financial information, explicitly stating unresolved matters. The mission tests international firms’ potential interest, records their questions and presents them to the project owner. It does not sell guaranteed profits or exemptions that have not been issued.

The mission adds value when qualified offers become more competitive and Iraqi information gaps shrink. It can reach partners with track records and references, verify facilities, finance and technical experience through public sources and lawful channels, and arrange institutional evaluation meetings rather than streams of meeting photographs. Competitors require equal protection, company data must not be shared with rivals, and conflicts of interest or unofficial payments must be referred to oversight bodies.

An opportunity passes five register gates: initial interest on measurable terms; qualification after beneficial-ownership and financial-capacity checks; a documented final memorandum to the competent authority; financial close and implementation contracts; and evidence of operation or expenditure and tangible progress. A mission’s role in opening a channel, resolving a foreign licensing issue or correcting conflicting information may be recorded. Investment value must not be attributed to it without evidence of financial close or implementation. Rejecting a deal that puts public money at high risk may be the best outcome.

Figure (4): The investment ladder—an announcement is not an achievement before the gates are passed.

9. Opening markets: from a first buyer to a sustained exporter

The chapter separates opening a trade door from producing goods able to pass through it. If an importing state relaxes an administrative restriction on dates, food or chemicals, benefits may remain absent where Iraqi facilities fail conformity requirements or exporters cannot afford testing and storage. This chapter therefore builds a negotiating enquiry channel and market-requirement database, while industry, agriculture and export chapters build products, quality, finance and border capabilities. Otherwise, agreements open markets for products that are not ready.

Attachés provide three services with potentially direct returns: (1) investigate buyers and confirm demand, specifications and durability; (2) help firms understand origin-related tariffs, testing, packaging and documents, referring them to standards bodies; and (3) escalate unjustified complexity or arbitrary decisions to government negotiation. Service is measured first by qualified cases reaching real buyers, then by the duration of trading relationships using company and customs data, without disclosing customers’ commercial secrets.

For petrochemicals and refined products, the state must not relabel them “non-oil exports” to show an imaginary leap. The proposed classification retains four baskets: crude oil, refined petroleum products, hydrocarbons and oil-derived chemicals, and other goods or services with defined domestic value added. Oil-based industries can contribute to industrial transformation, but must be presented transparently and separately from genuine diversification of buyers, products and markets.

Table (5): Barrier-to-outcome matrix

10. Trade agreements: “additional benefit”, not document counts

A useful agreement is not the one receiving the brightest publicity. It reduces costs, establishes a right, prevents discrimination or opens access firms can use. Negotiation is preceded by a trade-impact profile covering affected goods and services, actual tariffs, origin requirements, Iraqi product readiness, competitive constraints, effects on industry, duties and revenue, administrative costs, governorates and employment, and litigation and settlement risks. Not every memorandum is a “free-trade agreement”, nor every cooperation announcement an effective tariff concession.

Before signature, the document’s form, legal force, licensing and authorising bodies, entry-into-force, ratification and publication mechanisms must be determined, alongside consistency with Iraq’s existing obligations and international negotiations. In investment agreements, every investor-protection, arbitration or national-treatment clause requires specific legal scrutiny: are limits on regulatory authority proportionate, how are legitimate public laws safeguarded, and what limits apply to compensation claims? Expected fiscal effects are presented as ranges and scenarios, not automatic gain figures.

After entry into force, an agreement-use dashboard records eligible firms actually benefiting from preferences, classified trade values without double counting, technical barriers addressed, clearance times and standards compliance, and violations and remedies. If an agreement remains unused or costs exceed its effects, its terms must provide for review and correction rather than counting signature as an achievement forever.

Figure (5): Trade-agreement gates—a document is not an impact until benefits appear.

11. World Trade Organization accession: negotiation and legislative readiness

Iraq is not a full WTO member in the baseline provided by the ongoing-accessions page. On 18 July 2024, however, its accession working party resumed after a long interruption, and the government submitted documents and initial goods and services offers. It is therefore incorrect to say Iraq “joined in 2024” or predict a final date without evidence from negotiations and member agreement. Economic diplomacy should build a coordinated negotiating position grounded in the costs and benefits of each commitment, rather than symbolically delaying or accelerating accession.⁹

The chapter proposes a national trade-coordination team based on existing structures, connecting Trade, Finance, Planning, Agriculture, Industry, the central bank and regulators. Business chambers and exporter representatives participate in organised consultation without veto or disclosure rights over restricted material. A non-confidential legislative-alignment plan and its phases are published, while restricted negotiating offers remain protected under applicable law. Each commitment is tested for effects on prices, competition, procurement, standards and the state’s enforcement capacity.

Accession may bring reliable access, predictable rules and trade-dispute settlement. Poorly assessed commitments may remove legitimate support tools or create obligations institutions cannot implement. The chapter therefore does not claim “accession will increase exports by a given amount” without a reliable economic model. It builds a tracker of negotiation files, requirements, progress and responsible bodies.

12. Four Iraqi cases testing the mechanism’s value

13.1 Iraq International Trade Point: the foundation exists before the programme. Through the Ministry of Trade’s website, the Trade Point offers product and investment-opportunity promotion, market research, company connections and exhibition services. This organisational asset reduces startup costs, but does not itself publish a consistent series of opportunities converted into sustained supply. The proposal is to connect the platform, not replace it, through one request identifier linking attaché and investment records and trade gateways, retaining the client’s case until closure.¹⁰

13.2 The IMF and international financing institutions are not “free money”. IFC’s 2025 example illustrates different project stages: prospective gas financing, a partnership for Umm Qasr Port, a building-materials project, agricultural and health feasibility studies, and a USD 10 million trade-finance line. Each has a different stage, risk and instrument type; they cannot all be grouped as “investment implemented this year”. Diplomacy can facilitate institutional relationships and remove negotiation obstacles, while proof of implementation remains with the company, implementing body and financier.¹¹

13.3 Electronic customs: UNCTAD’s 2025 report recorded a 128% increase in Iraqi customs revenues between 2023 and 2024 in the context of ASYCUDA adoption. This demonstrates scope for better collection and organisation through digital tools, not an automatic reduction in container export-entry time. Trade diplomacy should use this shift to exchange data with partners, seek document recognition and coordinate border risks, publishing separate time and cost indicators when available.¹²

13.4 Updating the 2026 investment map: in September 2026, the National Investment Commission directed the map towards industrial, high-quality, agricultural and digital projects with economic returns. This direction must become fully prepared projects before distribution to attachés. Sector announcements alone cannot support embassy promises to attract large capital sums. A limited pilot group should have ready ownership, energy, contract and data conditions, with recurring barriers escalated for central reform decisions.¹³

13. Sectors and governorates: an opportunity portfolio, not a wish list

Iraq cannot market every governorate and product identically. Basra has ports, industry, maritime services and energy; Najaf and Karbala have economic chains linked to pilgrimage; Mosul and northern cities have agricultural, industrial and logistics potential; and central areas have manufacturing bases and markets. These are examples, not funded projects or quantitative comparisons. Place, infrastructure, tenure, environment and demand must be tested before selecting sectors and contact points according to evidence rather than local influence.

The economic-diplomacy portfolio ranks each opportunity against multiple criteria: demonstrable productive benefit; land, utility and institutional readiness; market demand and competitive advantage; Iraqi employment and knowledge transfer; water, energy and emissions effects; currency and payment risk; and transparent contracting and community rights. A large residential property opportunity does not receive a high score merely because of its dollar value where an industrial alternative generates better jobs, exports and domestic linkages with less finance.

Attachés support governorate capabilities without creating local foreign policies independent of the federal state. Governorates and their commissions provide opportunities and data and act as implementing partners, while formal relations and agreements remain at the constitutionally competent level. The geographical distribution of served requests and ready opportunities is measured publicly so external services do not become a privilege for Baghdad or a narrow set of firms.

Table (6): Qualitative application examples, not final selections of governorates or firms.

14. SMEs and the diaspora: equitable access abroad

When economic diplomacy works only through large delegations, small firms may never reach an embassy or foreign exhibition despite having suitable products. The vision proposes an open application and screening gateway with published criteria, a rapid basic-response route, Arabic market materials and referral to conformity, financing and existing national-fund requirements. Advanced market research may be paid or subsidised under clear law, but connections must not purchase priority access or exemption from rules.

The Iraqi diaspora has professional connections that can reduce partner-discovery costs and build initial trust. It is not a “remittance fund” into which the state compels individuals to invest. The vision proposes consent-based, transparent voluntary expertise and professional networking in standards, products, firms and investment, with conflict-of-interest controls and disclosure of commissions and deal connections. Service is measured by tangible knowledge effects, such as a more ready file or a corrected standard, not assumed amounts of money sent.

Equitable benefit should be measured by company size, sector, governorate, participation of women-led businesses where lawful voluntary data exist, and distribution of service opportunities. Arbitrary numerical quotas are not imposed on private commercial contracts. Unjustified concentration must nevertheless be exposed, and access channels corrected where institutional discrimination is demonstrated.

15. Integrity, data governance and investor and exporter protection

State involvement in commercial facilitation creates new risks: an employee may gain advance information about land, tenders or distressed firms, or present a particular company as the “official choice” without criteria. Controls therefore cover conflicts of interest and recusal for personal connections, records of official meetings involving high-value opportunities, prohibition of unlawful commissions and private brokerage in the state’s name, and published selection criteria for firms benefiting from exhibitions.

Anti-money-laundering, counter-terrorist financing, foreign bribery, sanctions and trade restrictions are treated as specific legal compliance duties, not slogans. A mission does not replace a bank, anti-money-laundering authority or court. Within its powers, it checks minimum beneficial-ownership and reputational-risk information from official sources and refers warning signs to competent bodies. Risks must not become unlawful discrimination by nationality, sect or region, or an assumption of investor criminality without evidence.

The electronic case system does not collect companies’ entire correspondence unnecessarily. It defines mandatory fields, leaves sensitive documents in the owning bodies’ repositories, and records access, changes, reasons for refusing service and final decisions. The state publishes aggregate service rates without exposing trade secrets or sensitive databases about non-public parties, under privacy, record-retention and legal-review rules.

Figure (6): Integrity safeguards in economic-diplomacy services from application to decision.

16. International comparisons: transfer instruments, not institutions larger than our needs

Four experiences were chosen for observable functions, not because Iraq wholly resembles their economies: Korea’s KOTRA for market information and field support; Australia’s Austrade for classifying exporter journeys and tracking finance and grants; Enterprise Singapore for partnership networks and company access; and investment and trade agencies separating investor service from licensing decisions. The vision does not transfer their office counts or budgets to Iraq. It tests how their mechanisms can use existing Iraqi institutions and change service behaviour.

KOTRA uses overseas offices to provide market information, buyer matching and market-entry support, and lists an office in Baghdad. The lesson is to support individual firms with information, partners and clearly scoped services rather than merely organise an exhibition. Austrade publishes export-market-development grant figures and classifies firms by readiness to enter and expand in markets, enabling benefit and resource-allocation measurement. This does not make Australian grant values automatically appropriate for Iraq’s budget.¹⁴

The third experience separates diplomatic from specialist commercial functions while maintaining shared contact records. Iraq’s lesson is not to “create a giant institution”, but to establish standard services, response deadlines, known responsibilities, downloadable and reviewable market information, and annual outcome-quality evaluation. Comparative choices should exclude models dependent on sophisticated banking or export-insurance markets Iraq cannot immediately finance or regulate, or place them in a later phase conditional on financial-system reform.

Table (7): Comparative mechanisms, not claims of causal superiority; official institutional sources, references R16–R18 and R25.

17. The reference scenario and alternatives to 2045

Continuation scenario: if missions keep organising events and collecting information disconnected from licences and finance, meetings and memoranda may increase while investor-interest conversion and sustained exporter numbers do not. Institutions may compete more over announcements than bottleneck removal. This is not a numerical economic forecast, but an institutional path conditional on unchanged rules.

Realistic reform scenario: 2027 begins with a limited unified register, five standard services and mission pilots selected for actual demand. By 2030, service times are visible, priorities reviewed, documented barriers resolved and investor and exporter referrals improved. Between 2031 and 2035, the market network linked to product and project records expands, followed by stable portfolio and outcome review through 2045 using domestic and external sources. Service success does not require every deal to succeed; failure causes and corrections are recorded.

Accelerated reform scenario: if the programme coincides with more accurate investment and export baselines, inter-agency digital operation, consistently prompt investor service and improved trade finance and logistics, diplomacy can contribute more economically. Current evidence, however, does not support a national impact multiplier or a GDP share attributable to embassies. Such estimates must later rest on comparable cases and independent impact testing.

Table (8): A comparison of assumptions and qualitative outputs, not numerical economic forecasts.

18. Iraq in 2045 and the theory of change

By 2045, every qualified Iraqi company should know where to request foreign-market-entry services, how long a response takes and how to challenge an unjustified refusal, and should receive commercial information from identified sources. Foreign investors receive published opportunity files showing what is and is not ready, with a coordination channel that does not turn the embassy into an investment-approval authority. When a shipment stalls, a standard changes or an international dispute emerges, the state can escalate it through one negotiating channel on a written decision.

The theory of change begins with specific opportunity data, then efficient and impartial service, lower market and partner search time and cost, greater likelihood of conversion to a contract or measurable benefit, and accumulated company and institutional knowledge. The final link cannot succeed without production, standards, energy infrastructure, finance and courts. The chapter therefore does not claim that full economic diversification can be generated from abroad. Diplomacy reduces friction and opens doors; domestic firms’ competitiveness makes those doors valuable.

The independently testable causal pathway asks: did the applicant receive a faster, better response? Did qualified-opportunity conversion improve compared with cohorts without the standard service? Did mission intervention actually remove a barrier affecting a shipment or contract? If company, customs and investment evidence cannot answer, the result must be marked “attribution unproven”.

Figure (7): Theory of change—a supporting diplomatic role, with economic outcomes owned by the competent bodies.

19. The transformation ladder: 2027, 2030, 2035, 2040 and 2045

In the first 100 days, government approves an economic-diplomacy responsibility map and standard service model, designates a coordination unit within existing structures, and selects pilot missions according to real Iraqi company and project needs rather than host-country size. In 2027, a case-flow and timing survey begins, testing request data and indicator denominators and identifying resources. No national success values are established before the foundational year is complete.

By 2030, priority economic missions receive the minimum service, with numbered referrals, response times and complaint review. By 2035, services connect to customs, market and investment information where law and explicit sharing agreements permit. By 2040, evaluations reshape office distribution according to demonstrated impact. By 2045, economic diplomacy becomes a state function with public reports, independent review and continuity through leadership changes.

Table (9): Location counts are organisational targets conditional on cost and demand, not a description of the existing network or an instruction to open new embassies.

20. Indicators and targets: measurement before numbers

Indicators were selected because they fall within service institutions’ capabilities, not because they produce large numbers. Every percentage uses a defined set of cases meeting published eligibility criteria, not all emails or exhibition attendees. A target covering 90% of offices refers to economically prioritised offices included in the service, not every state mission, including places where the function is unnecessary. Values for 2030 onwards are proposed design and implementation commitments requiring costing and competent approval, not illustrative forecasts.

“Opportunities passing qualification” helps track screening quality, but artificially raising the figure by weakening eligibility is a governance risk. It is therefore paired with independent random-sample audits. Contract success rates must not become personal financial incentives for ambassadors: deals differ in role and impact, and early termination may be legitimate and protect public money. Repeat-export and implemented-investment data are published by competent register owners and used in Foreign Affairs reports as shared outcomes, not exclusive achievements.

Table (10): Every percentage in the 2030–2045 columns is a minimum target. Proposed figures concern institutional performance; economic-impact figures are not set before the 2027 measurement and attribution assessment.

21. Defining each indicator and preventing manipulation

ED-01 = priority service locations using a unified electronic register with sample audit ×100 ÷ the approved number of priority locations that year. ED-02 = cases meeting file requirements and formally referred to the competent owner within ten working days ×100 ÷ eligible cases in the same year. Time spent completing missing information is excluded only where the beneficiary received a reasoned notice, and the number of excluded cases is disclosed to prevent circumvention.

ED-03 = opportunity files containing verified legal identity, the nature of demand, timing, preliminary financing terms and a verification record ×100 ÷ all opportunity files classified as qualified. ED-04 = cross-border barriers receiving an escalation, settlement or reasoned final-response decision within 60 days ×100 ÷ all barriers accepted into the system. A complaint disappearing without evidence of resolution does not count. ED-05 = closure files recording the reason for closure and a documented impact or failure ×100 ÷ closed case files.

ED-07 and ED-08 measure shared impact. The first links the mission’s intervention file to a document stating its outcome; the second leaves contract, shipment, customs and investment data with their owners. The system avoids “adding up dollars” by counting one deal for several bodies. Every annual report undergoes independent sample audits, with companies entitled to correct inaccurate information.

Figure (8): The indicator hierarchy—each level has a data owner and cannot be combined into one indicator.

22. Implementation package: nine assignable programmes

ED-P01 — Responsibility and Coordination Charter

Within 100 days, a Council of Ministers decision defines ownership of market, project and contract data; the roles of Foreign Affairs, Trade and investment bodies; service schedules; and resolution of conflicting assignments. The output is an updateable responsibility matrix, published to the extent compatible with negotiating confidentiality, preventing a parallel administrative apparatus.

ED-P02 — Numbered Economic Opportunity Gateway

Link exporter and investor request forms to a referral register with one identifier, response deadlines and a right to know case status, separating sensitive commercial data from public outputs. Start with a pilot scope, information-security assessment and operating-cost review, connecting existing gateways where interoperability is feasible rather than buying a new system.

ED-P03 — Specialist Market Profiles

The Ministry of Trade and missions select limited baskets of qualified Iraqi products and one or two markets per basket. They produce profiles covering technical conditions, potential buyers, payment, storage and transport requirements, with explicit sources and validity dates. Use in company requests is measured, not page counts.

ED-P04 — The Investor Path from File to Implementation

The National Investment Commission and sectoral bodies prepare ready projects under published specifications, after which Foreign Affairs directs attachés to seek qualified partners. A barrier-escalation path is established, and actual expenditure and operation are documented in the commission’s register, without exceptional exemptions or hidden guarantees.

ED-P05 — Trade Barrier Programme

Create an export-case register distinguishing rejected standards, incorrect duties, transport obstacles, government restrictions and delayed certificates. Trade officials and the mission work with counterpart bodies on recurring problems rather than pursuing an undocumented complaint under a political label.

ED-P06 — Impact Assessment Before and After Agreements

Foreign Affairs, Trade, Finance and relevant bodies review every agreement with material benefits or costs for market-access scope, origin conditions, cost, revenue, legal commitments and dispute settlement. They evaluate use after 12–24 months and propose amendments or corrections where needed.

ED-P07 — Professional Commercial Attachés and Economic Missions

A training and assessment curriculum uses real cases: trade-data analysis, reading specifications, distinguishing FDI from announcements, company verification, confidentiality, conflicts of interest, buyer meetings and resolving delays. It concludes with a simulation and audited market file, not attendance hours.

ED-P08 — Small Exporter and Diaspora Service

One electronic window provides eligibility criteria and transparent access for small firms and voluntary knowledge contributions by skilled Iraqis abroad. Undisclosed commissions and turning attaché offices into exclusive commercial agents are prohibited.

ED-P09 — Performance Report and Annual Review

An annual report from Foreign Affairs, Trade and the commission separates service activity, file quality, closed barriers, sectorally attributed outcomes, costs, complaints and corrective measures. It includes an impartial audit sample and an annual test for discontinuing ineffective services.

23. Implementation, financing and dependency matrix

Costs are ranked because they depend on an inventory of existing systems and staff. “Low” means organisational, training and record changes within current resources; “medium” means technical integration or gradual expansion of an existing service. No cost rank authorises expenditure before life-cycle costing, contracting instructions and an approved budget. The programme should preferably be absorbed within Foreign Affairs, Trade and the National Investment Commission instead of a new permanent entity. Its debt and deficit effects are reviewed under the economic door’s rule.

Table (11): Initial programme matrix | Costs are qualitative and do not constitute approved allocations; CAPEX/OPEX details follow a 2027 study.

24. Risk, response and safeguard register

The risk matrix is qualitative until an event series permits numerical probability estimates. The greatest risks are rewarding an institution for announcing an outcome before it exists, or redirecting economic policy towards a well-connected firm. Others include regional volatility, payment and insurance constraints, sensitive commercial data passing through multiple systems, and shortages of experienced legal and economic staff. Every risk is tied to a warning sign and response owners, not the generic recommendation to “take the necessary measures”.

Table (12): Operational risk register | Reviewed quarterly in the first three years, then annually.

25. Annual review, independent evaluation and correction

The annual report begins by reconciling each indicator’s definition with the preceding year and disclosing changes in office, company or governorate coverage. Each service owner reports inputs, outputs, time, objections and corrective decisions. Sectoral bodies then present shared investment and export outcomes without repeating them under every ministry. Memorandum or licence values must not be added up as “flows”. Unreviewed cases and outcomes lacking sufficient attribution evidence are clearly marked.

Every five years, impact is evaluated through an appropriate comparison between firms receiving standard services and similar eligible firms that did not, minimising selection bias where possible. Evaluation is not designed to prove the programme effective in advance, but to identify valuable services worth expanding and others that should end. Available professional findings are published, while company details and confidential treaties remain protected on a legal basis subject to periodic review.

Sustainability requires managing the programme through falling oil revenues or changing governments. If permanent costs rise faster than the share of qualified cases progressing to decisions or deals, new expansion is frozen and services reorganised. Evaluation must not impose cosmetic private-sector targets or deny SMEs a basic lawful service.

26. Data-gap register and how to close it

Table (13): Current data gaps | The absence of a complete public series does not mean the institution lacks operational data.