Defence, deterrence and military power

Conventional and asymmetric deterrence: what suits a middle power?

By Ali Zuweid · Article date: 3 November 2026 · 8 min read

English translation published 6 November 2026. Read the Arabic original.

On 21 May 2026, Finland adopted a plan to strengthen the resilience of entities responsible for critical services. It covers the eleven sectors defined in the relevant legislation and clarifies public responsibilities and public–private cooperation. The official plan concerns the continuity of society’s functions rather than a weapons purchase. It nevertheless opens an important perspective on deterrence: how far can external pressure change a state’s decisions if its institutions and services remain able to function?

The plan alone does not prove that Finland deterred a particular attack, nor does protecting services replace military defence. It helps broaden the Iraqi question from comparing weapons to comparing the ability to protect national decision-making. For a state with limited resources facing larger powers, the task is to identify a combination that reduces opportunities for coercion and preserves the right of defence without burdening society with commitments beyond its capacity or escalation beyond its control.

Conventional and asymmetric approaches need not be opposites

Conventional deterrence relies on non-nuclear military capabilities to influence another actor’s calculations. Asymmetry describes differences in means or in the use of resources between actors, and may exist within the conventional domain itself. A state can therefore maintain regular armed forces while choosing investments that do not imitate a larger competitor item by item. A different approach does not imply abandoning law or using armed groups outside state authority; that raises a separate institutional question which the terminology cannot justify.

Another distinction helps organise the discussion. Deterrence by denial seeks to reduce the likelihood of aggression succeeding; deterrence by punishment threatens subsequent costs. Michael Mazarr’s 2018 RAND study, Understanding Deterrence, explains the distinction and the importance of the other actor’s perceptions. Possessing capability does not guarantee its intended interpretation: another government might see a decisive threat in what we regard as defensive, or doubt a commitment we consider clear.

I use “middle power” here as a relative analytical framework, not as a settled international classification of Iraq. It means a state able to protect interests and exercise regional influence but unable to sustain comprehensive competition with every major power. Its position changes with the issue, partner and pattern of economic dependence. A general military ranking therefore cannot determine national policy. The relevant questions concern commitments the state can fulfil and resources exhausted by claiming a wider capacity than it possesses.

From this perspective, imitating a major power may be a financial and political mistake even when each individual project looks attractive. Resources divided among distant ambitions can weaken the funding that makes any one of them sustainable. Conversely, reducing defence to one apparently inexpensive instrument may create excessive dependence on a single assumption. I propose evaluating a defence portfolio by its coherence and resilience to changing conditions, rather than by the novelty of each component or the impression it creates.

What Finland teaches—and what cannot be transferred

In its December 2024 defence report, Finland placed national defence, NATO deterrence, defence cooperation and total defence within a common framework. This is an official statement of priorities, not evidence that the same combination suits every country. It shows that societal resilience was conceived alongside regular military power and alliance relationships, rather than as their replacement.

Iraq’s circumstances differ. A policy adopted by an alliance member cannot be borrowed as though its guarantees and resources were available to Iraq. Nor is it enough to transfer Finnish institutional names without the conditions under which they operate. The useful principle is assigning responsibilities and verifying service continuity, then adapting it to Iraqi law and local administrative capacity. Any decision about Iraq’s relationship with an alliance or partner requires a separate political and constitutional assessment.

The comparison becomes useful when connected with everyday life. Continuity of water, healthcare, communications and public payments during a crisis reduces the ability of disruption to paralyse society. This may extend the government’s decision time and ease pressure to accept a hurried settlement. It is a plausible analytical relationship, not an equation guaranteeing deterrence or a measurement of Finland’s plan. Resilience cannot prevent every harm, but it may reduce the chance that limited damage becomes widespread institutional collapse.

Resilience also needs social legitimacy. Citizens who understand state responsibilities and trust the accuracy of official information are better placed to cooperate than those asked to bear costs without explanation or accountability. Yet turning all of society towards permanent mobilisation rhetoric may erode trust and restrict civic space. Protecting services and residents’ rights should therefore remain an objective in its own right, even when it contributes to national security. Society’s value cannot be reduced to its defensive function.

Unified decisions and law contribute to credibility

Articles 8 and 9 of Iraq’s Constitution establish good-neighbourly relations and peaceful dispute settlement, civilian authority over the armed forces, and the prohibition of military militias outside their framework. These rules govern the choice of means. Delegating escalation decisions to actors outside constitutional authority cannot therefore be presented simply as defence innovation: it changes who decides and who answers for the decision.

External credibility is affected by that unity. If another actor cannot identify which body can commit the state and implement its decision, understanding the limits of escalation or opportunities to reduce it becomes harder. Multiple messages may make an unintended threat appear to be official policy. This is a logical risk in fragmented decision systems, not an allegation about a specific incident. Controlling delegation and accountability protects state independence by preventing society from becoming the guarantor of decisions it cannot review.

The United Nations Charter supplies an international framework too. Article 2(4) prohibits threats or uses of force against states’ territorial integrity or political independence, or otherwise inconsistent with UN purposes. Article 51 preserves self-defence following an armed attack, subject to its conditions. Discussing deterrence consequently does not justify every threat or use of force, and claimed strategic usefulness does not replace legal assessment.

A sound defence policy therefore needs clear objectives and disciplined promises. Threatening actions the state cannot, or may not lawfully, carry out can force a choice between lost credibility and damaging escalation. Conversely, clear defensive purposes and diplomatic channels can reduce misunderstanding without abandoning the right to protection. Force and negotiation complement each other when they serve a defined political objective and remain under a single authority.

An Iraqi choice based on sustainability and controlled risks

The approach I propose for Iraq combines a regular defence foundation that can be financed and sustained, institutions and services less vulnerable to disruption, and external relationships that reduce the risk of isolation. This is neither a procurement prescription nor an operational force arrangement. It offers criteria for evaluating policy: does it protect residents and constitutional decision-making? Can it be sustained financially? Does it improve the state’s ability to manage a crisis or transfer decisions to another actor? Does it leave room for a lawful settlement?

This requires accounting for opportunity costs. Money committed to a new capability does not automatically remain available for education, health, infrastructure or sustaining existing capabilities. Nor does all civilian expenditure become defence expenditure simply by being labelled resilience. Each project should be justified through its direct function and assessable benefits, with its security contribution identified where one exists. Such discipline prevents defence becoming an unlimited claim on either the budget or state authority.

The credibility of this combination depends on actual readiness after equipment is acquired. An investment whose support remains incomplete gives the state more obligation than choice. Constitutional institutions need periodic review connecting ambition, resources and results within a coherent defence policy. Publishing sensitive details or issuing repeated threats cannot substitute for that review and may create risks without corresponding benefits.

A middle power need not prove it can fight every confrontation in order to protect its independence. It needs to make coercion less rewarding while preserving unified, lawful decision-making and a society able to function. On that basis, conventional and asymmetric approaches can complement each other under state authority, provided scarce resources do not become an excuse for absent accountability, and deterrence rhetoric does not become a policy inviting the war it is supposed to prevent.

Ali Zuweid — Researcher in strategic affairs and national security