Readiness: why owning a system is not enough
The US F-35 fleet’s mission capable rate fell from 67% in fiscal year 2021 to 44% in 2025, according to a Government Accountability Office report published on 11 June 2026. The indicator measures the proportion of time an aircraft can perform at least one assigned mission; it does not mean the remaining proportion of aircraft is permanently grounded. That distinction matters: the finding reveals a gap between possessing technology and making it available, but cannot reduce military capability as a whole to one number.
For Iraq, the example raises a question that extends beyond aircraft type or country of manufacture: what has the state actually purchased when it receives a new system? It has acquired a physical asset and contractual rights and obligations. Its ability to use that asset lawfully, safely and sustainably depends on a further chain of conditions. Debate must therefore distinguish ownership, equipment serviceability and institutional readiness for a mission. Confusing them can turn an acceptance certificate into evidence of an outcome not yet achieved.
A number must be defined before it is interpreted
Readiness, as used here, is an authorised institution’s ability to perform its assigned mission within specified time, conditions and resources. It is not a permanent quality attached to a system when purchased, or a general score transferable between missions. Equipment may be technically serviceable while its team lacks a required qualification or approved support is unavailable. A unit prepared for one mission is not necessarily prepared for every conceivable mission. A clear definition protects decisions against excessive confidence and unwarranted pessimism alike.
The American indicator therefore cannot be used to estimate Iraq’s readiness or to conclude that a particular aircraft type is ineffective in every context. Fleets differ in age, size, mission, support arrangements and measurement methods. The comparative value lies in demonstrating that availability requires management and measurement even within a well-resourced institution. Assessing an Iraqi case requires verified Iraqi data. The sources used here do not provide a standardised national measure that would support such a judgment.
A further distinction separates equipment undergoing planned maintenance from equipment stopped by an unexpected fault. Both may reduce availability during a particular period, but the former may protect safety and service life while the latter indicates a different problem. Without separating them, an indicator might penalise an organisation that performs necessary maintenance and reward one that postpones it to improve this month’s appearance. Useful measurement explains why an outcome occurred and how long it lasted; it does more than colour a box green or red.
An annual average can also conceal meaningful variation. An availability percentage might rise because many assets have been retired, even while the actual number available falls. The percentage must therefore be read alongside its denominator, changes in missions and data quality. This does not require publishing sensitive figures. It is a condition for sound assessment by authorised bodies and prevents major financial decisions being based on comparisons that are not equivalent.
The gap between equipment and the institution operating it
Britain offers a separate assessment within the same programme. In July 2025, the National Audit Office found that achieved capability was below Ministry of Defence plans, citing delays involving equipment and infrastructure, support problems and personnel shortages. It also recognised the aircraft’s military value. The assessment therefore distinguishes the asset from the supporting institution that turns it into capability; it is not a blanket judgment against the technology.
The comparison between the United States and Britain is deliberately limited. They are not wholly independent cases, because both participate in a global programme and its associated support arrangements. Similar problems cannot therefore establish a universal law applying to all armed forces. The comparison does help separate responsibilities belonging to the shared programme from national responsibilities, such as preparing personnel and complementary infrastructure. When Iraq purchases equipment abroad, that division should be clear before a dispute arises about responsibility for delays.
The issue extends beyond aviation. A September 2025 US review of 18 selected ground-vehicle types identified shortages of parts and technical data among sustainment challenges, alongside maintenance-skills shortages affecting several fleets. The sample cannot represent every military vehicle worldwide. It does show that information rights and human skills belong within sustainment planning rather than being treated as administrative details to address after acquisition.
Personnel preparation consequently cannot end with an initial certificate. Institutions must retain expertise, update it when systems change, transfer knowledge to replacements and provide career paths that do not penalise specialists for remaining in technical roles. These are organisational proposals for Iraq, not verified descriptions of its current personnel policies. Their rationale is that losing a qualified individual can impair an investment far larger than the cost of preparing a replacement, without that loss appearing in the original purchase price.
Readiness incentives can work against readiness
The 2026 GAO report also found that some contractor incentives did not align with military service requirements. This is a problem in incentive design, not proof that every support contract fails. The analytical lesson is that rewarding a partial indicator can satisfy a contract without delivering the benefit for which the state needed it.
The same problem can arise within an institution. If management is rewarded solely for lower maintenance expenditure, postponing work can look like a short-term financial success. If it is rewarded solely for closing procedures quickly, repair quality may be neglected. The answer is not an endless proliferation of indicators but a balanced set connecting availability, safety, service continuity and their cost. Interpretation must remain subject to independent review, because those producing an indicator may have an interest in improving how they appear.
Contracts also need a fair distribution of risks. A supplier should not be held responsible for an outcome caused by delayed government obligations, just as the state should not pay as though a service were complete when its conditions remain unmet. Responsibilities for data, qualifications, local support and changes in requirements must therefore be specified, together with a dispute-resolution process. This is a governance issue before it is a question of penalties: a harsh contract that cannot identify the cause of failure may produce litigation lasting longer than the original problem.
Demanding readiness should not become an unrealistic demand for every asset to be permanently available. Institutions need maintenance, training and renewal periods, and priorities change over time. The purpose is to align resources and commitments with authorised missions and make constraints visible to decision-makers. Concealing those constraints to protect an institution’s reputation postpones the cost of acknowledging them until choices are narrower and correction is harder.
What can Iraq change in the way it manages capability?
I propose beginning with a register connecting each major programme to the mission it serves and the body responsible for its life cycle. Contracting, delivery, qualification and verification of capability should be recorded as separate stages, with delays and their causes identified. Authorised institutions would examine detailed information, while a public summary could describe programme progress, costs and administrative improvements. This would support accountability without making operational information available to adversaries.
Readiness should be examined before purchases are expanded, so the state does not address poor availability by adding assets that increase the same institutional burden. The most productive investment might be in training, information or an improved support contract; replacement might be necessary if sustainment is no longer viable. This connects directly with capability-based planning: the decision should follow the binding constraint and the expected benefit of removing it, rather than a fixed preference for either procurement or maintenance.
Financial oversight has a role beyond checking whether an invoice is valid. It can compare initial estimates with actual costs, question expenditure made before complementary requirements were ready and investigate programmes with recurring problems. Equally, institutions should not be punished for every justified revision to an estimate: recognising a mistake early creates an opportunity to correct it. Accountability should examine the quality of the decision given the information available and the honesty of reporting when that information changes.
This article offers neither a readiness percentage for Iraq nor a replacement equipment list. It proposes making readiness an institutional responsibility that can be examined within a defence policy connecting resources with missions. The question after every delivery then becomes clear: what capability has actually become available, what sustains it and who verifies that? A state able to answer honestly is closer to durable strength than one content simply to count what it owns.
Cite this article
Ali Zuweid. Readiness: why owning a system is not enough. 2 November 2026. https://alizuweid.com/articles/military-readiness-beyond-equipment/?lang=en