Defence, deterrence and military power

Air defence: why is it a system, not a missile?

By Ali Zuweid · Article date: 4 November 2026 · 9 min read

English translation published 6 November 2026. Read the Arabic original.

On 23 April 2026, the US Government Accountability Office published a report showing that the Department of Defense had identified critical growth in estimated operating and support costs for 14 systems across 36 sustainment reviews conducted for fiscal years 2023 and 2024. These findings concern varied systems, not an assessment of Iraqi air defence. They nevertheless reopen a question often absent from a debate that ends when a contract is signed: what can a state keep working after it can afford to buy it? Government Accountability Office report.

The question is particularly important in air defence, where capability can easily be reduced to a missile name, a country of origin or a delivery photograph. Purchased equipment can be displayed; responsibility for operating it, sustaining it and connecting it to state institutions is less visible. For Iraq, which needs to protect its sovereignty, citizens and civilian airspace within limited resources, three questions precede any comparison of products: who holds lawful decision-making authority? How do separate assets become a continuing institutional capability? And what will that capability cost throughout its life? My argument is that air defence becomes a system when these commitments align, rather than through an increase in equipment numbers alone.

A system begins with a relationship between institutions

In February 2025, NATO defence ministers endorsed an integrated air and missile defence policy that treats interoperability, coordination among political, military and civilian authorities, and continuity under disruption as core principles. It connects interoperability to consistent practices and procedures, not simply similar equipment. This is the institutional lesson relevant here in NATO's published policy. It does not mean that Iraq should copy a collective alliance's arrangements, political commitments or scale of resources.

The distinction matters because importing equipment does not automatically import the relationships between the bodies using it. Two institutions may agree that airspace protection matters, yet disagree over accepting information, maintenance responsibilities or funding professional development. Unless these boundaries are resolved administratively and legally, each contract can become a separate project judged by its deliveries, while shared capability remains a responsibility without a clear owner. In my view, the first test of integration is whether responsibility can be traced from political decisions through professional management to oversight, while specialised functions remain with bodies qualified to perform them.

In Iraq, Articles 9 and 110 of the 2005 Constitution place the armed forces under civilian leadership and make national security policy and the establishment and management of armed forces federal responsibilities. Building on that means treating air defence development as part of the state's constitutional responsibility, not a field for competing sources of authorisation. Civilian leadership cannot be reduced to a procurement decision issued from above. It includes defining purpose and responsibility, then enabling the competent institution to do its work and holding it accountable. Confusing political direction with daily professional management weakens both.

For this reason, I do not treat supplier diversification as an absolute virtue or an absolute mistake. It may reduce a particular external dependency, while adding different commitments for training, support and contracting. The judgement depends on the institution's ability to manage these commitments within a coherent approach. A purchase becomes institutionally expensive if it requires a permanent exception to existing working arrangements, even when its acquisition price appears attractive. A partnership is useful when it expands the state's capacity to decide and to understand what it owns, with clear support and development terms, rather than transferring an opaque dependency from one party to another.

The purchase price is not the cost of retaining capability

The US audit findings in the introduction illustrate a broader problem: a financial estimate does not become a fixed promise merely because it appears in a contract. It would be wrong to transfer American cost increases to Iraq or infer a local outcome from a foreign sample. The defensible lesson is the need for independent review of expectations over time. When service life or support terms change, so do the commitments on which the original comparison rested. A budget able to fund the initial purchase may struggle to protect training and maintenance from later cuts unless these burdens are calculated and put before decision-makers from the outset.

A serious comparison, in my view, is between alternatives that achieve a defined purpose at a sustainable cost. Depending on the contract, this includes personnel, training, support, upgrades and an orderly end to service. A supplier's total figure is insufficient: decision-makers need to understand the assumptions that change it, who reviews them and which obligations it excludes. This is financial and institutional work that can be scrutinised without publishing sensitive specifications. Professional development is not a decorative addition to the project. If repeatedly deferred, equipment may arrive while achievement of the purpose for which it was acquired remains delayed.

Iraq also needs to resist an understandable but misleading administrative incentive: demonstrating a new achievement is easier than demonstrating the value of spending on existing assets. I do not assume that every development project is unnecessary. I propose applying the same comparison to new and existing commitments. Addressing a support problem may be more valuable than adding another obligation; alternatively, a new capability may indeed be necessary. A documented professional assessment should decide, rather than the attraction of an announcement. This connects to the study of military institutions and defence policy: turning resources into a continuing public function, instead of treating expenditure as sufficient proof that it exists.

Civil aviation safety is part of protection

In October 2025, the International Civil Aviation Organization's Assembly called on states to strengthen civil–military cooperation and information sharing, and directed further work and guidance on conflict-zone risks. ICAO's statement on the Assembly's outcomes connects safety with authorities' ability to coordinate. For Iraq, this makes the relationship between defence and civil aviation a matter of protecting people and sustaining economic activity, rather than a contest over jurisdiction or a detail to postpone until a crisis.

A shared purpose does not mean abolishing independent civilian safety assessments or releasing every piece of information to the public. It means each body knows who is responsible for assessing risk, communicating decisions and reviewing their effects under the law. A safety decision can affect passengers, transport companies, workers, hospitals and trade, while no single authority can represent all these considerations. My proposal is that the quality of coordination itself should undergo institutional review, and that responsibility for informing the public of necessary civilian information should be clear, while protecting information whose disclosure would cause harm.

Promises also need discipline. Owning a system does not justify claiming absolute protection; nor does a disruption alone prove that an investment was worthless. Sound policy reduces risks and limits their consequences within boundaries understood by the responsible authorities. A correct precautionary decision may carry economic costs, just as avoiding a short-term cost may produce a greater human cost. Decisions should therefore be assessed against the information available when they were made and the applicable legal and professional standards, rather than solely against their outcome or pressure to maintain a favourable media image.

What should Iraqis be able to see in a defence project?

I propose distinguishing what citizens need to know from what authorised oversight bodies need to examine. A project's general purpose, its financial framework where the law permits, its institutional milestones and the bodies responsible for follow-up can be disclosed without exposing operational details. Conversely, secrecy should not prevent authorised scrutiny of contracting, obligations and professional acceptance. The difference between secrecy that protects capability and secrecy that shields mismanagement is established by access and accountability rules, not by good intentions alone.

I am not advocating waiting for comprehensive reform before addressing a demonstrated urgent need. Necessity may require a specific contract, but its scope, funding and review should remain clear, and the exception should not become the permanent method of building the force. In my assessment, the better approach ties expansion to a demonstrated ability to sustain it and treats project acceptance as a stage for verifying relevant obligations, not an occasion that ends the questions. The state can then explain why it is advancing one option or deferring another, instead of equating every delay with weakness and every purchase with success.

Air defence is a system because the sovereignty it serves is a continuing responsibility: lawful authority, cooperating institutions, qualified people, sustained resources and civilian safety that remains in view. A missile is a component that can be purchased; this relationship has to be built and reviewed. When a project is judged by its ability to fulfil its public purpose over time, procurement becomes the beginning of an accountable commitment. Iraq then moves closer to possessing a capability institutionally as well as materially.

Ali Zuweid — Researcher in strategic affairs and national security