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Defence, deterrence and military power

Defence industry: when should Iraq make, buy or partner?

Ali Zuweid

By Ali Zuweid · Article date: · 8 min read

English translation published . Read the Arabic original.

When Australia issued its 2026 Defence Industry Development Strategy, it combined strengthening the national industrial base with deeper cooperation with international partners. Skills development and vocational training formed part of its implementation tools, according to the official account of the strategy. This combination deserves attention in Iraq. A state seeking to reduce dependence need not begin by severing relationships. It needs to identify what it must be able to do itself and what it can obtain abroad on sustainable terms.

Iraqi discussion of defence industry often treats manufacturing and importing as a moral opposition: the former means independence, the latter dependence. Yet a facility assembling components sourced exclusively from one foreign company may be more vulnerable to disruption than an institution that buys a finished product and possesses the legal and technical capacity to sustain it. Conversely, a small domestic business may provide an essential service absent from photographs of completed equipment. The relevant question is how much control the state has over a capability throughout its life, and what society pays for that control, rather than which country attached the final label.

From legal objectives to industrial choices

Iraq’s Defence Industries Commission Law No. 25 of 2019 provides a basis broader than building factories. It connects industrial development with staff development, research, private-sector participation and university cooperation. It also assigns needs prioritisation and periodic performance assessment to a coordination committee. These are statutory responsibilities; their existence does not establish implementation or any particular plant’s productivity. It does show why measuring success only through contracts or buildings understates the task established by law.

In my view, the practical starting point is to distinguish three different needs. Some capabilities must continue within Iraq because their interruption would be difficult to remedy within the required time. Some products can be purchased in markets with reasonable alternatives, making local production more expensive than its benefits justify. Some knowledge cannot be acquired efficiently without a partner, making a joint arrangement a means of learning as well as producing. These categories are not permanent. A service may move from imports to domestic supply as expertise accumulates, while an industry may lose its justification as technology or demand changes.

Choosing what to manufacture requires an estimate of fundable demand, rather than desired demand alone. A factory built around procurement expectations unsupported by the budget may operate below capacity, spreading fixed costs across too few products. Protection or price increases then become responses to a problem that should have been identified before construction. Public buyers can offer industry a view of demand over several years, but that view needs financial limits and periodic review. Otherwise, providing stability becomes a commitment to buy things the institution no longer needs.

Industrial sovereignty can begin with sustainment

Announcing Australia’s previous strategy in 2024, the defence industry minister explained that the government had reduced its industrial priorities from fourteen to seven. The official press conference records a political choice to specialise rather than expand commitments. This does not demonstrate that every Australian programme succeeded, nor does it make Australia’s priorities suitable for Iraq. Its more significant implication is that a country with a larger scientific and financial base accepts trade-offs, instead of claiming that every production stage must become national simultaneously.

For Iraq, sustainment, inspection, refurbishment and quality management deserve consideration when setting priorities, alongside finished products. These services can generate cumulative value: continuing work on existing assets enables technicians to train and performance to be tested, whereas a new factory’s expertise may remain unused if orders are delayed. This is not a recommendation to manufacture a particular component or undertake a particular technical modification. It is a recommendation to select activities that institutions can finance, measure and keep competent, then expand them when evidence demonstrates their value.

Moving work into a local workshop is insufficient if the necessary information and rights remain outside the contract. A US audit published in September 2025, covering five selected programmes, found that data-rights shortfalls contributed to reliance on single suppliers and restricted sustainment options. The sample does not represent every system, but it identifies a contractual problem intelligible beyond the United States. Buying an asset, receiving documentation and obtaining permission to use it are separate matters. None automatically grants a right to manufacture the product or re-export it.

“Technology transfer” therefore becomes meaningful when expressed through verifiable commitments: what knowledge will lawfully transfer, who will absorb it, and how competence will be demonstrated after training ends. I see little value in a high localisation percentage that conceals low-value assembly or imported purchases passing through a local intermediary. Domestic value added, retained skills and the Iraqi supplier’s ability to provide an accredited service are better measures, and should be assessed separately from headcount alone.

Partnership requires learning and accountability

An industrial partnership may be preferable to independent manufacture when knowledge requires years of experimentation or a market larger than Iraqi demand. It does not transfer capability merely by registering a joint company. Without an Iraqi institution able to define requirements and assess results, the partner determines what success means. Programmes for engineers, technicians and quality reviewers should therefore proceed alongside contracting, not after a facility opens. Spending on these people forms part of industrial investment, even when it produces no tangible asset to photograph.

University participation likewise needs a narrower, more verifiable purpose than signing general cooperation memoranda. Civil-use projects in measurement, materials, industrial management and safety can be commissioned under the relevant laws and controls, with funding linked to declared, reviewable outputs. Universities should not be required to prove commercial success before research matures. The state should nevertheless know which question it is funding and whether the project has added usable knowledge or training. Research and production require different assessment systems; neither should be exempt from accountability.

An economic risk arises when the regulator, purchaser and producer operate within a closed circle. An expensive industry may persist because acknowledging its weakness embarrasses every participant. I propose separating quality assessment from the factory’s interest in selling its output, allowing comparison with lawful alternatives on equivalent terms, and publishing aggregate findings on cost and delivery performance. Sensitive information can remain unpublished while still being available to authorised oversight bodies. Professional confidentiality does not require abandoning accountability for public money.

Employment should also be assessed on a net basis. A job funded through permanent subsidy may displace training or infrastructure capable of creating more opportunities elsewhere. This does not remove the justification for paying a premium to protect a strategic capability, but it requires government to identify that premium and make it visible in the decision. If supply security is the objective, it should be named and financed as such. If profitability is the objective, profit should be tested after accounting for support. Confusing the two turns every loss into an unmeasurable security success.

An Iraqi decision taken in stages

Decisions can proceed through successive review gates: establish the need, assess markets, rights and skills, then conduct a bounded pilot before expanding. At every stage, adjustment or termination should remain possible, with the cost of withdrawal understood. I propose that representatives of the end-user institution, industry, finance and independent expertise share responsibility for comparing manufacture, purchase and partnership within their legal mandates. This would prevent a single option reaching decision-makers only after time and money have been consumed justifying it.

The criterion I favour is the practical freedom an industry gives the state in exchange for its limited resources. Manufacture when demand is durable, knowledge can be developed and costs are acceptable; buy when the market offers better value with assured sustainment; and partner when cooperation delivers learning, rights and capability unavailable through purchase alone. Iraq’s defence industry will be judged by its ability to fulfil commitments and by the state’s ability to reconsider its investments, rather than by the breadth of its claims to self-sufficiency.

Ali Zuweid — Researcher in strategic affairs and national security

Principal sources and references

  1. 2026 Defence Industry Development Strategy — Australian Department of Defence، 2026-07-02.
  2. Iraq Defence Industries Commission Law No. 25 of 2019 — Iraqi Legislation Database / Supreme Judicial Council، 2019-11-04.
  3. Press conference launching the 2024 industry strategy — Australian Defence Ministers، 2024-02-29.
  4. Weapon System Sustainment: Planning and Management of Data Rights — US Government Accountability Office، 2025-09-29.
Cite this article

Ali Zuweid. Defence industry: when should Iraq make, buy or partner?. 6 November 2026. https://alizuweid.com/articles/iraq-defence-industry-make-buy-partner/?lang=en

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