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Defence, deterrence and military power

Life-cycle costs: why a cheap weapon can become the most expensive

Ali Zuweid

By Ali Zuweid · Article date: · 8 min read

English translation published . Read the Arabic original.

In April 2026, the US Government Accountability Office published an audit showing that the Department of Defense had identified critical operating and support cost growth for fourteen systems across thirty-six sustainment reviews conducted for fiscal years 2023 and 2024. The increase concerned cost estimates, not a count of failed systems, and its causes included longer service lives. This finding in GAO’s 2026 report raises a problem overlooked when debate compares purchase prices alone. Much of the bill can change after equipment enters service, while the political judgement remains attached to the price announced at contract signature.

For Iraq, “we bought it for less” does not establish sound stewardship of public money. The relevant questions concern what the country will obtain over the years of service, the personnel, facilities, training, maintenance and upgrades required, and what happens when resources contract. Cheap equipment can become the most expensive option if subsequent costs are high or the required performance is not delivered. It can also genuinely remain the best option. Neither a brand name nor a higher price settles the comparison. Cost, outcomes and risk have to be assessed together.

The purchase invoice and the boundaries of comparison

Life-cycle cost brings together the resources required to acquire, use and sustain a capability, and dispose of its assets when no longer needed, over a stated period and under explicit assumptions. An offer including training and support cannot fairly be compared with one covering equipment delivery alone, with the difference labelled a saving. Nor should twenty years of expenditure for one option be compared with ten years for another. The first professional task is to align the scope, disclose exclusions and identify who will pay expenses absent from the purchase contract.

This may sound like accounting, but it changes policy. When one organisation pays for equipment and another must operate it, the first can announce an achievement the second cannot afford. When expected upgrades sit outside the estimate, a system appears cheaper because part of its requirement has been shifted to a future budget. I propose that every major decision carry a statement of whole-government cost, rather than the contracting organisation’s costs alone, identifying responsibility for each component before commitment. The allocation of responsibility then becomes part of evaluating the offer itself.

GAO’s cost-estimating guide provides a useful foundation: document assumptions and data, analyse sensitivity and risk, and update estimates using actual costs. This method cannot supply a certain number for the future. Its value is to make disagreement examinable: did usage change, or wages, exchange rates or the scope of service? An aggregate figure presented without its assumptions makes it difficult later to distinguish an estimating error from changed circumstances or poor execution.

Savings that create later costs

Consider a purely illustrative calculation, not an Iraqi contract. One option costs one hundred monetary units to purchase and twenty a year to operate; another costs one hundred and forty to purchase and twelve a year. Over ten years, their undiscounted totals are three hundred and two hundred and sixty respectively, before other differences are considered. This does not prove the second option is better: effectiveness and risk may differ. It does show how the ranking can reverse once recurring costs enter the calculation, and why expenditure must ultimately be compared at a common point in time.

Choosing the lowest total is still insufficient. The cheaper option may be less available, take longer to staff competently or require infrastructure the institution cannot complete on schedule. In that case, it offers a different outcome rather than the same outcome for less money. The measure I propose is cost against an approved, verifiable level of defence service, with expected shortfalls shown instead of concealed inside an average. The final choice remains political and institutional because it balances security, resources and time, but it becomes more accountable.

The British audit of the F-35 programme in 2025 offers an important comparison. The National Audit Office connected the gap between achieved and planned capability with delayed aircraft and infrastructure, personnel shortages and global programme problems, while recognising military and industrial benefits. This is not a judgement about the product’s suitability for Iraq. It demonstrates that funding an asset does not fund the whole capability. A reduction that solves today’s budget problem may also delay the benefit of an investment already substantially paid for.

Reducing expenditure must therefore be distinguished from reducing waste. Postponing unnecessary spending saves money, whereas deferring essential sustainment can shift costs into a larger repair or a loss of service. A budget heading alone cannot reveal the difference. Institutions need records connecting expenditure with asset condition and the result of the work, so they can rank spending by its effects. Decision-makers and oversight bodies should receive that administrative information in an intelligible form, while technical details requiring protection remain protected.

Affordability is part of readiness

Iraq’s public finances make this discussion more urgent. In its 2025 consultation, the International Monetary Fund estimated that the oil price required to balance the public finances had risen from around $54 in 2020 to around $84 in 2024, according to its assessment of Iraq. This is a historical estimate of fiscal pressure, not the current oil price or a direct measure of defence spending. Its implication is that recurring commitments should not be appraised on the assumption that one comfortable revenue year will persist throughout a system’s life.

I therefore propose testing each major investment against a lower-than-expected funding scenario, identifying what can be delayed and what cannot be dispensed with. Accepting fewer assets with funded sustainment may be better than buying more and then restricting their use because resources are unavailable. This must be established case by case; it is not a general rule for reducing the armed forces. The appraisal should show whether economies of scale offset additional costs and whether the required capability is actually achieved at the scale the budget permits.

Another risk arises when a substantial share of commitments is in foreign currency while the institution depends on a domestic budget. The decision should show how exchange-rate or service-price changes affect cost, and whether the contract allocates those risks clearly. The aim is neither to eliminate uncertainty nor to pay any price to transfer it to the supplier, who may charge a substantial premium. It is to compare the cost of protection with the cost of exposure, and disclose the assumption underlying the choice.

A contract that remains reviewable after delivery

Life-cycle management does not end when an estimate is approved. I propose assigning responsibility for tracking actual expenditure and deviations from the plan, with periodic reviews connecting money to performance. If service life or usage changes, that change should be recorded before new and old figures are compared. A higher estimate caused by additional years of service is not the same as one caused by poor contracting, even though both need funding. Making that distinction prevents exaggerated allegations as well as blanket justifications invoking changed circumstances.

Support, training, upgrades and relevant rights should also be clear before delivery, with payments measured against outcomes within the contractor’s responsibility. It is inappropriate to hold the contractor responsible for failure caused by missing staff or the institution’s delayed facilities, just as formal indicators should not excuse failure to meet contractual obligations. An evidential allocation of responsibility reduces disputes and improves incentives. General satisfaction reports or counts of training visits cannot substitute for assessing the competence those visits are supposed to leave behind.

Serious defence economy means purchasing capability whose continued operation the state can finance, rather than obtaining a small opening invoice. Comparison may favour a lower-priced product, sustainment of existing assets, or a smaller purchase with better support. Decision-makers and overseers need to know why an alternative was selected and which assumptions could change that judgement. The purchase price then becomes the beginning of the calculation, with sustainability the test of its success.

Ali Zuweid — Researcher in strategic affairs and national security

Principal sources and references

  1. Weapon System Sustainment: Critical Cost Growth — US Government Accountability Office، 2026-04-23.
  2. Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide — US Government Accountability Office، 2020-03-12.
  3. The UK’s F-35 capability — UK National Audit Office، 2025-07-11.
  4. IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Iraq — International Monetary Fund، 2025-07-09.
Cite this article

Ali Zuweid. Life-cycle costs: why a cheap weapon can become the most expensive. 7 November 2026. https://alizuweid.com/articles/defence-lifecycle-cost-cheap-weapons/?lang=en

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