Military partnerships: benefiting from allies without critical dependence
In March 2026, NATO relocated its mission personnel from Baghdad to Allied Joint Force Command Naples in response to regional security conditions, while continuing its advisory and capacity-building mission, according to the updated official description. A change in working location does not mean the partnership has ended, nor does it establish success or failure. It does, however, confront Iraq with a practical test: what can its institutions continue doing when a partner’s presence changes, and what remains dependent on that presence?
I use “partnership” broadly here, without assuming that every training relationship or arms contract constitutes an alliance carrying a mutual-defence guarantee. This distinction matters because public debate can attach expectations to a limited relationship that its documents never contained, then interpret unmet expectations as withdrawal from a commitment that never existed. Iraq can benefit from international expertise, equipment and cooperation. Doing so requires a written definition of each party’s contribution, the decisions Iraq retains, and what it can do if circumstances change.
When does dependence become critical?
Not every dependency is a security problem. Modern economies and armed forces benefit from specialisation and shared knowledge, and purchasing an external service can be more efficient than building an infrequently used domestic capability. Dependence becomes critical, in my judgement, when interruption of an external service or approval disables an essential function and the state lacks a lawful, practical alternative within an acceptable period. Risk is therefore measured not simply by the value of imports, but by the effects of interruption, the possibility of substitution and the time and resources it requires.
It is useful to distinguish technical dependence from legal and political dependence. Equipment may be available while aspects of its use or transfer remain subject to export agreements. The US Foreign Military Sales manual explains that eligibility does not guarantee a sale and that retransfers of equipment and services are subject to conditions and approvals. These are declared rules to understand before contracting, not evidence of arbitrary treatment in a particular Iraqi case. Ignoring them until after commitment can turn poor planning into an avoidable political dispute.
The answer is not to evade obligations, but to negotiate clearly and select arrangements whose conditions the state can fulfil. The cheapest offer may be less suitable if it comes with narrow rights or services difficult to replace. Restrictions may also be acceptable when they bring substantial benefits and a plan for continuity exists. The comparison must show price, return and limits on discretion together. Sovereignty is also exercised through an informed legal commitment, rather than by assuming that purchase grants unlimited freedom over everything associated with a product.
Diversified partners need an institution that integrates the results
Diversification can reduce Iraq’s exposure to a single supplier’s decisions, but it can also increase training, sustainment and integration burdens if pursued without a unified concept. Owning several systems does not ensure that they can work together, or that technicians can move between them without further training. NATO’s account of interoperability stresses that identical equipment is not essential, but compatibility involves procedures, people, information and technology. The lesson for Iraq is to test institutional coherence before counting suppliers’ nationalities.
I therefore propose defining how different products and services will be managed, and the additional cost of each choice, before diversifying. Partnerships can be allocated across complementary functions rather than duplicating the same function inside separate institutions. This requires an Iraqi body capable of defining requirements and assessing conflicts, together with legal review protecting partners’ information and rights. It is insufficient for every contract to look attractive individually. The combined portfolio has to be manageable within the available budget and skills.
NATO’s experience also illustrates the limits of comparison. Its interoperability accumulated through institutions, exercises and continuing review, rather than through adopting common labels. Iraq is not a member of the alliance, and its guarantees, financing and political arrangements cannot be transferred into a different setting. The applicable lesson is to make testing, learning and common concepts permanent responsibilities. Assuming that buying equipment from several countries automatically creates strategic balance confuses diversity of relationships with an institution’s ability to turn them into results.
Approval to cooperate is not delivery of capability
In an audit published in June 2026, the US Government Accountability Office described the complexity of technology-release and foreign-disclosure procedures and their multiple decision-making bodies. Citing officials, it reported completion of 26 of 33 reform actions by May 2026, with the remainder targeted for November. That describes progress reported at the time; it does not establish that every reform has now been completed. It is a reminder that a political willingness to cooperate does not remove the legal and institutional time required to implement it.
Iraqi planners should distinguish a memorandum of understanding from an effective contract, a contract from delivery, and delivery from a sustained capability. Each stage has different conditions and may be delayed for reasons beyond any single party’s control. I propose that future capability should not be counted as presently available before its requirements are met, and that planning should identify verification points for oversight bodies. Delays would then become managed risks rather than surprises forcing urgent, more expensive and less competitive decisions.
Continuity of knowledge is particularly important in training programmes. Large participant numbers alone do not reveal whether an institution has learned. If trainees move to jobs that do not use their skills, or materials remain outside institutional curricula, the programme’s effects end with the programme itself. A better measure is whether Iraqi instructors can continue delivering accredited education, with updateable curricula and independent competence assessment. These are proposals for measuring institutional returns, not claims that every current Iraqi programme lacks those features.
A good partnership can also reduce the need for its own involvement in some areas by transferring agreed responsibilities gradually to the Iraqi institution. That need not end the relationship: it may move towards more advanced research, education or lawful technical cooperation. What matters is that continued dependence does not become the provider’s implicit measure of success. Evaluation should reward what the institution has accumulated and distinguish services it will continue to require from tasks it is expected to learn to perform itself.
Freedom of decision requires internal coherence
The Iraqi Constitution grounds external relations in mutual interests and respect for international obligations, while placing the armed forces under civilian authority. These principles establish an internal test for partnerships: they should serve an accountable state policy, rather than generate competing channels of influence inside its institutions. No external contract, however good, can compensate for the absence of a coherent Iraqi decision about need, funding and responsibility for lawful use.
I propose a periodic review of the partnership portfolio, showing the competent authorities which functions depend on one party, the lawful alternatives, switching costs, and progress towards training and sustainment objectives. Accountability does not require publishing sensitive information. General objectives, milestones and aggregate costs can be public, with detailed information available to authorised oversight. Crucially, the review should include the effects of Iraq’s own decisions, so that partners do not become a ready-made explanation for failures caused by domestic mismanagement or unrealistic financial commitments.
A useful military partnership broadens a state’s options and its capacity to carry out its decisions. A relationship supplying equipment without an institution capable of managing it may add obligations faster than it adds strength. What should remain in Iraq after each programme is usable knowledge, clear responsibility and the ability to continue lawfully when a partner’s circumstances change. This is a more demanding measure of independence than counting agreements or the flags displayed at their signing ceremonies.
Cite this article
Ali Zuweid. Military partnerships: benefiting from allies without critical dependence. 8 November 2026. https://alizuweid.com/articles/military-partnerships-without-critical-dependence/?lang=en
